Henri II: His Court and Times (29 page)

Several writers allege that it was not chance but treason
which placed Guise's cypher in the enemies' hands. If we
are to believe the historian Beaucaire, who wrote during the
reign of Charles IX, under the name of Belcarius, Benvenuto
Cellini, and Brantôme, Madame d'Étampes, alarmed at the declining health of
her royal lover and the approach of the day when the Dauphin would succeed him,
and her enemy, Diane de Poitiers, reign supreme, had become a warm friend and
partisan of the Duc d'Orléans; and, in order to ensure
herself an asylum on the King's death, ardently desired to
bring about an arrangement between François and Charles V,
which would secure to the young prince an independent
sovereignty, such as the Emperor had offered him in 1540,
and which the Dauphin's party had persuaded the King to
reject. As she considered that the success of the Imperial
arms would be the surest means of accomplishing this, she
had established a secret correspondence with the Emperor,
through the medium of one of her admirers, the Comte de Bossut-Longueval, and had resumed, from interested motives,
the policy which her enemy Montmorency had embraced
from religious fanaticism.

That Madame d'Étampes had constituted herself the
champion of the younger brother against the elder and had
the strongest reasons for wishing to see him established in an
independent sovereignty, and that she used her influence with
the King in favour of peace, is certainly true. But, though her
enemies believed, or, at any rate, affected to believe, that she
was at this time in communication with the Emperor, and
though, after François's death, a prosecution for high treason
was commenced against both her and Longueval, it is doubtful
if there was any foundation for such a charge.

The stubborn defence of Saint-Dizier had given time for
such troops as François had been able to raise to repel the
invader to assemble on the left bank of the Marne between
Châlons and Épernay.
⁰³
The King had entrusted the
command of this army to the Dauphin, with Annebaut as
his counsellor and guide, giving him stringent orders to keep
the river between himself and the Imperialists, and dispute
the passage whenever it should be attempted, but at all
hazards to avoid a decisive engagement, the loss of which
must inevitably entail that of Paris.

It was a heavy responsibility for a young man of twenty-six,
and, as the Dauphin's confidence in his lieutenant had been
rudely shaken by the Roussillon expedition, he entreated his
father to recall Montmorency, whose presence in this extremity
would be of incalculable value. But the King "took it in very
bad part that one should have dared to speak to him of this,
and fell into great wrath against the generals who were with
the prince, whom he suspected of having counselled this
request."
⁰⁴

On the capitulation of Saint-Dizier, Charles sent to urge
Henry VIII to march at once on Paris, but the English King,
who preferred the easier conquest of maritime Picardy,
declined to move until Boulogne and Montreuil had capitulated. His refusal placed the Emperor in a very serious
position, for he could not advance on the capital until his
ally was ready to co-operate with him, and his supplies were
nearly exhausted. In these circumstances, he decided to open
negotiations for peace on the basis of the proposals which
François had rejected in 1540, and
pourparlers
were held at
La Chaussée, between Châlons and Vitry. They were without
result, however, and François despatched an ambassador to
Henry VIII to endeavour to treat separately with him.

In the first days of September, Charles began to advance
along the right-bank of the Marne. It was believed that he
intended to lay siege to Châlons, but he passed by that town
and encamped about two miles beyond it. His situation was
daily becoming more critical, for the light cavalry of the
Dauphin had stripped the country bare on both sides of the
river, and the Imperialists were on the verge of starvation.
He had, indeed, already decided to retreat towards the Netherlands, when he received information — through Madame d'Étampes's agent, Longueval, if we are to believe Beaucaire —
that the Dauphin had established the magazines of his army at
Épernay and Château-Thierry, neither of which places was
fortified, and that the bridge of Épernay had not yet been
destroyed.

When the Dauphin, who was encamped opposite Châlons,
perceived that the Imperialists had no intention of halting to
besiege the town, he despatched a body of troops to destroy
the bridge and to burn or throw into the river all the provisions
which they were unable to bring away. But the officer who
commanded them failed to execute his task with the necessary
promptitude,
⁰⁵
and the Emperor, by a rapid march, forestalled
him, and Épernay and Château-Thierry, with all the stores they
contained, fell into the hands of the enemy.

On receiving this alarming intelligence, the Dauphin at once
fell back on Meaux and La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, by which movement he covered the capital, but, at the same time, exposed
himself to the danger of being taken in the rear by the English,
should they advance from Picardy.

The panic of the Parisians when they learned that the enemy
was within striking distance of the city was indescribable.
Never in history had such terror been witnessed within its walls.
"You would have seen," relates Paradin, "rich and poor,
great and small, people of all ages and all conditions, flying
and carrying away their property, by land, by water, by wagon;
some dragging their children after them, others bearing old
men on their shoulders." The Seine was so thickly covered
with boats "that it was impossible to see the water of the
river," and several of them, overloaded with passengers, sank
with their cargoes. The same terror and confusion prevailed
in the country round Paris, and the roads were blocked by
flocks of sheep and herds of cattle, which their distracted
owners were driving towards Normandy or the Loire. In
their efforts to escape from the invader, many of the fugitives
found that they had but exchanged one evil for another, for
bands of robbers hung like vultures on the flanks of the procession and reaped a rich harvest amidst the general panic.
⁰⁶

However, the resolute attitude of the King, who had hastened
from Fontainebleau to Paris immediately he was informed of
the approach of the enemy, and who, accompanied by the
Duc de Guise, rode on horseback through the streets, telling
the citizens that "if he could not protect them from fear, he
would protect them from harm," and that "he would die in
their defence rather than live without saving them," produced
an extraordinary effect. In a few hours the emotional Parisians
had passed from craven terror to the most boundless confidence, and, declaring that "they were no longer afraid, since
they had their King and M. de Guise for defenders," the whole
city rose in arms.

Meanwhile, the Emperor had been sending urgent messages
to his ally to advance, but Boulogne was now on the point of
surrendering, and Henry VIII was not disposed to forgo so
valuable a prize at the moment when it was within his grasp.
Moreover, sickness was rife among his troops, and the Netherlands transport department, so far from being capable of supplying the army on a long march, had broken down under the
easy task of attending upon a stationary camp within a few
miles of the frontier.
⁰⁷
To cross the Somme at this juncture,
he declared, was impossible.

Charles was in even worse case. His army, a bad one,
consisting chiefly of inferior
landsknechts
and very deficient in
cavalry, was dwindling every day from sickness, and still more
from desertion — for, by some accident, the money to pay the
troops had not reached him — while that of the Dauphin was
constantly increasing. An advance upon Paris, now that
Henry VIII's co-operation, upon which he had based all his
hopes of success, had failed, would have been an extremely
hazardous undertaking. Nor did he really desire the dismemberment of the French monarchy, his only object being
to cripple François, so that he might be free to deal with the
German Protestants and the Porte.
⁰⁸

Accordingly, instead of following the course of the Marne,
he retired on Soissons, which he took and sacked (September
12), and from there reopened his negotiations with the
French Court. François was, of course, ready enough to
treat, and on September 18 peace was signed at Crépy, the
King's acceptance of the Imperial terms being precipitated by
the news that on the 14th Boulogne had fallen, and the fear
that Charles might be far less generously inclined when he
learned that his ally was now free to co-operate with him.

By this treaty, all conquests made by either monarch since the truce of Nice
were to be restored; François renounced his pretensions to Naples, and to the
suzerainty of Flanders and Artois, and his claim to Tournai, while Charles
waived his right to Burgundy and ceded Hesdin. The King, "like a penitent
sinner," agreed to break off his alliance with infidels and heretics and to take
up arms against them conjointly with the Emperor. The Duc d'Orléans was to marry either the
Infanta Maria or the daughter of Ferdinand, Charles being
granted four months to decide which of the two princesses
he should give him. If he decided in favour of the Infanta,
she should receive the Netherlands, though during the lifetime
of the Emperor the young couple would only rule the
provinces in his name. In this event, François engaged to
abandon his claim to the Milanese; but, if Orléans left no heirs,
the King and Emperor would resume their rights to the Milanese
and Burgundy. If Charles selected his niece, she should be
given the Milanese, the Emperor, however, reserving the fealty
of the duchy until an heir was born. Orléans was to receive as
an appanage Orléans, Angouleme, Bourbon, and Châtellerault,
and François agreed to restore the territories of the Duke of
Savoy so soon as either the Netherlands or the Milanese was
conferred upon his son.

"This was to revert, after three years of immense sacrifices,"
observes Henri Martin, "to the system proposed by Charles V
in 1540, rendered only a little more acceptable by a few
concessions.
⁰⁹

The treaty, which was hailed with joy by Madame d'Étampes
and the friends of Orléans, excited the liveliest indignation in
the party of the Dauphin; and, as Sismondi points out, there
can be no doubt that the Emperor, who was perfectly informed
of the jealousy existing between the two brothers, foresaw that
if he married the younger to a princess of his House and took
him under his protection, he would become a dangerous rival
to the elder when he ascended the throne.
¹⁰

The Dauphin himself was particularly indignant. He had
wished to fight, instead of negotiating, in the belief that his
army, strengthened by the troops lately arrived from Piedmont,
would have been more than a match for that of the Emperor,
and could have crushed it before the English had had time to
come to its aid; and, when he learned of the proposed aggrandizement of his younger brother at the expense of his future
kingdom, his wrath knew no bounds. Although he did not
dare to refuse his signature to the treaty, he subsequently
entered a secret protest against it, at Fontainebleau, in the
presence of Vendôme, Enghien, and François de Lorraine,
Comte d'Aumale, eldest son of the Duc de Guise, in which he
declared that he had only signed "
pour la crainte et révérence paternelle
" (December 12, 1544). His example was followed
a few weeks later by the
Parlement
of Toulouse.
¹¹

Henry VIII at first refused to credit the report that his ally
had made a separate peace with France without even consulting
him; but the withdrawal of the Netherlands contingent
from before Montreuil, and the news that the Dauphin's army
was advancing by forced marches to the relief of the place,
soon dispelled all doubts on that score. In great wrath, he
ordered the Duke of Norfolk to raise the siege of Montreuil,
and, leaving that nobleman with some 11,000 men to guard
Boulogne, retired with the rest of his forces to Calais, where,
on September 30, he embarked for England.

The King's departure nearly occasioned the loss of the one
advantage which England had gained. He had given orders
to Norfolk to occupy the heights behind the town and to
remain there so long as the Dauphin was in the field. But the
duke, for some unaccountable reason, instead of obeying his
instructions, threw a garrison of 3,000 men under Sir Thomas
Poynings into Boulogne and retired within the Calais
Pale.
¹²

On learning of this retrograde movement, Henry VIII wrote
Norfolk a violently angry letter, ordering him to return immediately to the position which he had been instructed to hold.
But it was then too late for the duke to repair his error, as the
French, in overwhelming force, already lay between him and
Boulogne.

As the hurried march of the Dauphin had obliged him to
leave all his artillery behind, and the country for many miles
round had been stripped bare by the invaders, it was impossible
to undertake a regular siege; but, perceiving that several of
the breaches which the English cannon had made in the
ramparts still remained unrepaired, the prince resolved to
hazard a night attack on the lower town, in which he ascertained
that the invading army had left a large quantity of stores
and the bulk of its heavy artillery. In the event of success, he
would then be in a position to attempt the reduction of the
upper town and the citadel. Accordingly, on the night of
October 9-10, he despatched some 6,000 men — chiefly
Gascons, Italians, and Swiss — under Tais and Fougerolles to
make their way through the breaches into the town, while the
rest of the army was to follow, after a short interval, to support
them.