Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (114 page)

At the conclusion of the conference, both chiefs of staff agreed, at least on paper, to prevent further depletion of men and matériel by establishing the “absolute defense perimeter,” and to rebuild, regroup, and redeploy to meet the coming Allied general offensive.
⁷⁹

 

The policy document adopted that day stated:

Within this “perimeter” lay the Japanese home islands, the Kuriles, the Bonin (Ogasawara) Islands, Iwo Jima, the Marianas, the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, and Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Indian Ocean. Beyond it lay Rabaul, the central Solomons, the eastern part of New Guinea, the Marshall Islands, and Makin and Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands.
⁸¹
More than 140,000 troops of the Eighth Area Army, mostly on Rabaul, as well as the troops in eastern New Guinea, would no longer be supported but be left to fend for themselves.

During the last three months of 1943 and the first half of 1944, Imperial Headquarters repeatedly drew down units on the continent in order to establish and hold the “absolute defense line.” Entire divisions and parts of divisions from China, the Kwantung Army, and the Korean Army were rushed to the Central Pacific to defend strategic bases and airfields on remote and ultimately doomed islands. But American offensives always developed at a pace that outstripped the ability of the Imperial Army and Navy to consolidate and respond effectively. Unable to read Allied radio messages (as the British and Americans could read theirs), the high command was never sure where to concentrate to meet Allied thrusts.

Despite the mounting losses Hirohito remained as undismayed,
rigidly self-disciplined, and aggressive as ever. When naval aide Jo reported to him on September 21, 1943, that “enemy transports have concentrated in the northeastern part of New Guinea and our defenses are on full alert,” Hirohito (aware from briefing materials that the Americans were headed for Finschhaven) replied, “Being ready to defend isn't enough. We have to do the attacking.”
⁸²

By November 1, 1943, Bougainville was the last major Solomon island in Japanese hands, and its airfields were under American attack.
⁸³
When, eight days later, Nagano reported good results in the second air battle off Bougainville, the emperor, according to the diary of naval aide Jo, “seemed satisfied and joined toasts with his aides-de-camp in their duty office.”
⁸⁴
An earlier report to the throne from Nagano concerning the first air battle off of Bougainville, on November 5, 1943, had greatly exaggerated the results, claiming that the American aircraft carriers “Independence” and “Bunker Hill” had been sunk when, in fact, only one torpedo boat was destroyed. Although no attempt had been made to deceive the emperor—Nagano and the Imperial Headquarters itself had believed the first front-line data—the incident pointed to the increasing difficulty Hirohito faced in obtaining accurate war reports from the Solomons.
⁸⁵

In late December, following its loss of control of the Vitiaz and Dampier Straits—the body of water between the island of New Britain and the north coast of New Guinea—the Japanese navy withdrew from the Solomons. The overall outlook for the army's position in New Guinea dimmed further when American and Australian forces under Gen. Robert Eichelberger, MacArthur's newly appointed field commander, captured Buna on January 2, 1944, and then continued to advance slowly, over several months, on the west along the New Guinea coast, and on the east through the central and northern Solomons. Approximately 50,000 Japanese troops of the Second Army in western New Guinea, and another 55,000 of the Eighteenth Army in the eastern part of the large tropical island,
were isolated or bypassed, and went down to defeat, though not before killing or wounding some 11,300 Americans.
⁸⁶
Meanwhile Rabaul had been encircled, and more than 130,000 troops had been left isolated there and on other islands in the Solomons.

American carrier task forces and marine assault troops had also moved into the Central Pacific and in bitter frontal attacks destroyed the Japanese garrisons on Tarawa and Makin in the Gilbert Islands. On February 18, 1944, American planes destroyed the main naval anchorage of the Combined Fleet on Truk Island, forcing the navy to evacuate it, leaving behind many of its tankers and eroding its future ability to maneuver. The dream of fighting one great decisive battle in the Central Pacific was finally over. Imperial Headquarters could do little but watch as the defense line on which they had placed their hopes was driven back to the Marianas. Two entirely separate drives were unfolding against them—one through the Southwest Pacific, the other through the Central Pacific—and there was not much they could do to stop either from accelerating.

In this situation T
j
secured Hirohito's consent to a drastic shake-up of the command structure. On February 21, 1944, he took the unprecedented action of forcing army Chief of Staff General Sugiyama to resign so that he (T
j
) could assume that position while also serving as army minister and prime minister. At the same time Navy Minister Adm. Shimada Shigetar
pressured Chief of Staff Admiral Nagano to resign so he himself could assume that post. Although the majority on both general staffs were opposed, T
j
once again had the emperor's strong prior backing. When Sugiyama conveyed his worries about the changes directly to the emperor, Hirohito simply told him to cooperate.
⁸⁷
That ended dissent. When he felt the need, Hirohito was willing to set aside one of the most hallowed Meiji-era military traditions—the division of power between military command and administration.

Behind T
j
's effort to unify the operational and administrative
structures of the services (and, indirectly, government affairs and military command) lay the Allied advance creeping ever nearer to the Japanese home islands, and growing distrust within ruling circles of the high command's handling of the war. The military peril was intensifying disputes over strategy—were the Marianas even defensible?—and over the allocation of scarce materials for the production of airplanes and ships. These disputes within the high command tended to delay production. Another supreme commander, less inhibited and worried about his own image, might have intervened forcefully and adjudicated these matters, but there is no indication that Hirohito did more than entrust their handling to his favorite prime minister, T
j
. And as T
j
briefed him on every slightest move he took or even contemplated taking, T
j
could do no wrong in his eyes. In the end T
j
's tinkering with the leadership structure and his assumption of three posts merely added to his enemies and hastened his ouster.
⁸⁸