Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (115 page)

Wartime diplomacy, which at this time chiefly meant relations with Nanking and the manipulation of Nanking's ties with Chungking, also engaged the emperor's attention, as did military operations on the Burma front. Starting in late 1943 and continuing into early 1944, Hirohito and T
j
personally encouraged a new approach to China that they hoped would enable the armed forces to reduce their presence in China and thereby better sustain the attrition in the Pacific.
⁸⁹
This changed policy had been discussed at liaison conference meetings for over a year but its implementation had been delayed because of widespread resistance on the part of the ruling elites to surrendering Japanese “rights and interests” in China.
⁹⁰

Finally, on January 9, 1944, the T
j
government and the Wang Ching-wei regime in Nanking issued a joint statement announcing to the world that Japan would abolish its treaty-port settlements and extraterritorial privileges in China. Under this new policy the army was ordered to treat as a sovereign equal the client regime of
“National China,” which had just declared war on the United States and Britain, and to withdraw from overseeing Chinese administration in occupied areas. To facilitate the acknowledgment of Nanking's autonomy and the partial restoration of its sovereignty, Hirohito sent his youngest brother, Prince Mikasa, to Nanking as a member of the China Expeditionary Army's headquarters staff.
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Mikasa's mission was to engage in discussions with staff officers and promote understanding of the new China policy. While pursuing this and other peace maneuvers in China, the T
j
government also prepared to implement Operation Ichig
to destroy American air bases in China, from which B-29s were operating. The “Ichig
” offensive unfolded successfully from April to October 1944.

Hirohito did not personally embrace the principle of national self-determination, a major issue of wartime diplomacy for the Allied powers. Nor did he ever call for a reexamination of Japan's relationship with colonial Korea and Taiwan. Like Foreign Minister T
g
and his successor, Shigemitsu Mamoru, Hirohito thought in terms of the notion of “place,” meaning each racial entity in its proper place within the Japanese-led, multitiered “coprosperity sphere,” with the special privileges of Japan guaranteed by treaty. As the war worsened, however, he bowed to the exigencies of the situation and once again showed political initiative. Hirohito began discussing with T
j
how to take advantage of the opportunities created by the “Ichig
” offensive. They decided to alter their policy toward Yenan, in effect granting tacit recognition to Mao Tse-tung's Communist regime in Yenan in order to use the communists against Chungking—while by the same action also appeasing the Soviet Union.
⁹²