Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (125 page)

Nevertheless, at Hirohito's insistence, T
g
persisted, telling Sato that Japan could not reveal its peace plan in advance and that he should concentrate on learning Soviet intentions and getting them to accept Prince Konoe as the emperor's special peace envoy. On August 2 T
g
sent another message to Sat
telling him that the emperor, the prime minister, and the military leaders were “placing their hopes on this one matter. Although you may have your own
opinion, understand this situation and somehow stimulate the Soviet side to accept our special envoy.”
⁶⁴
After receiving T
g
's message, Sat
cabled the Foreign Ministry again urging acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration.
⁶⁵

Neither Sat
nor retired foreign ministers Shigemitsu Mamoru or Arita Hachir
believed that the war could be ended through the good offices of the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister T
g
himself doubted it. But in compliance with the wishes of the emperor, who wanted his imperial prerogatives to be guaranteed internationally, T
g
kept trying and would not agree to direct negotiations with the Allied governments even when the president of the Cabinet Intelligence Bureau, Shimomura Kainan, visited his residence on August 4 and pleaded: “It is not enough to deal only with the Soviet Union. There is no hope if we continue like this. Somehow, by backdoor channels, we must negotiate with the United States, Britain, and China.”
⁶⁶