Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (240 page)

34.
Watanabe Osamu,
Sengo seiji shi no naka no tenn
sei
(Aoki Shoten, 1990), p. 86.

35.
Uchida's instruction stated that “Manchuria is Japan's outer rampart…. We have not the least intention of making Manchuria into a protectorate or committing territorial aggression against it.” However, because the “Kuomintang government…has levied taxes, stirred up strikes against foreigners…and taken many extreme actions similar to those of the communists, the imperial government cannot ignore the intrusion into the Three Eastern Provinces of the southern forces who have such tendencies.” Gaimush
hen,
Nihon gaik
nenpy
narabi shuy
monjo II
(Hara Shob
, 1969), pp. 117–19.

36.
Whitney R. Harris,
Tyranny on Trial: The Evidence at Nuremberg
(Southern Methodist University Press, 1954), writes (p. 523) that, “The International Military Tribunal construed the Briand-Kellogg Pact as making aggressive war criminal, as well as illegal, and as affording the juridical basis for the punishment of individuals who initiated and waged wars of aggression in violation of its terms.” The Tokyo tribunal took the same position. See “Trial of Japanese War Criminals: Documents” (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946), pp. 14–15.

37.
For the text of the treaty see
FRUS, 1928,
vol. 1, pp. 153–56.

38.
Kiyozawa,
Gendai Nihon bunmeishi, dai sankan, gaik
shi
, pp. 435–37.

39.
Hatsue Shinohara, “An Intellectual Foundation for the Road to Pearl Harbor: Quincy Wright and Tachi Sakutar
.” Paper presented at the Conference on The United States and Japan in World War II, Hofstra University, Dec. 1991.

40.
The treaty was signed in Paris (August 27, 1928) and ratified in Japan (June 27, 1929) with the government declaring that it understood the offending phrase did not apply to Japan. It went into force on July 24, 1929.

41.
Suzuki,
K
shitsu seido
, pp. 168–70.

42.
In “A View of International Law in the Kellogg-Briand Pact” and
“Britain's New Monroe Doctrine and the Effect of the No-War Treaty,” both published in 1928, Tachi belabored the obvious point that the signatories to the pact had renounced war “as an instrument of national policy,” but not the right of self-defense. Focusing on the interpretive notes that France, Great Britain, and the United States exchanged prior to signing the Pact on August 27, 1928, he observed that:
Britain does not recognize the application of the No-War Pact in regions where it claims to have a vital interest…. If other countries recognize this claim of Britain, it will lead to a situation where the United States too will claim that war based on the principle of the Monroe Doctrine is not prohibited by the No War Pact. I have to acknowledge, therefore, that, in addition to cases of the activation of the right of self-defense, wars exist that cannot be prohibited by the Pact in connection with the Monroe Doctrine of the United States and the New Monroe-ism of Britain.
Tachi Sakutar
, “Eikoku no shin-Monr
shugi sengen,” in
Gaik
jih
577 (Dec. 15, 1928), p. 3. See also Quincy Wright, “The Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties,” in
American Journal of International Law
23 (1929), p. 105.