Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (28 page)

Equally noteworthy was the Japanese public's unawareness of the dispute over the crown prince's marriage, while the civilian leaders of the right wing—for whom resorts to gangster methods were second nature—easily kept abreast of developments at court and exercised hidden influence there and also in the world of conservative party politics.
²⁹
T
yama, for example, was on close personal terms with many court officials well before and long after the incident. Kita (later executed for his minor role in the February 26, 1936, military uprising) used the incident to strengthen his relations with members of the imperial house, such as Prince Chichibu,
to whom he presented a copy of his famous “Plan for the Fundamental Reorganization of Japan.” Its opening chapter, on “The People's Emperor,” called on the military to seize power in a coup d'état and reorganize the state. The emperor would provide legitimation and, in the process, move closer to the people. Starting in 1922 Kita began to exert political influence on T
g
and Ogasawara Naganari just as they were beginning their new careers as lobbyists for an expanded navy.
³⁰
(Ogasawara, who had converted to Nichiren Buddhism around the time of the Russo-Japanese War, was a particularly close friend of the demagogic Nichiren preacher Tanaka Chigaku.)

After the closing of the Ogakumonjo, T
g
and Ogasawara—the ex–school president and the school's director—tightened their cooperative relationship. T
g
, then seventy-five, was able to maintain his public activities only through his energetic spokesman, Ogasawara. And in 1921 Ogasawara went on the reserve list, after which the most effective way for him to maintain his relationship with those in power was to draw nearer to T
g
, who as a fleet admiral remained on the active list, attending meetings of the Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals Conference, where he was privy to top naval secrets. T
g
and Ogasawara—men with close ties to the religiously inspired ultranationalist right—soon became prominent advocates for construction of a fleet of submarines and a naval air force. Following the signing in Washington of the Five-Power Naval [Limitations] Treaty in February 1922, they, together with Adms. Kat
Kanji and Suetsugu Nobumasa, formed the core of a naval pressure group hostile to the new international order and opposed to further arms cuts.
³¹

Makino Nobuaki also came to the fore in Japanese politics during 1921. Makino had served in cabinets headed by Saionji and attended the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 as the de facto leader of the five-man Japanese delegation. He returned home deeply worried about the collapse of bourgeois monarchy in Europe and anx
ious to check the democratic current that had begun to sweep the world. After Imperial Household Minister Nakamura took responsibility for the dispute over the crown prince's marriage and resigned, Saionji, with the support of Matsukata, recommended Makino as the new imperial household minister.
³²
On February 19, 1921, Makino assumed his duties, bringing with him as his vice minister Sekiya Teizabur
, a Home Ministry bureaucrat with firsthand knowledge of colonial and police affairs.