Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (330 page)

34.
J
nikki
, pp. 149, 151–53.

35.
Yamada,
Daigensui Sh
wa tenn
, p. 196. Just as Japanese war planners in late 1941 and again in late 1942 underestimated American industrial and military capacity, so they erred in seriously overestimating Germany's industrial capacity. According to historian Abe Hikota, the Army General Staff estimated that Germany in Oct. 1942 was producing monthly 2,000 tanks and and 3,000 airplanes, when its actual production in Dec. 1942 was only 760 tanks and 1,548 planes. The general staff was off by factors of 2.6 on tanks and about 1.9 on airplanes. See Abe, “Dai T
'A sens
no keisuteki bunseki,” p. 853.

36.
Kido K
ichi nikki, ge
, p. 970.

37.
Yamada,
Daigensui Sh
wa tenn
, p. 196, citing “Y
hei jik
ni kanshi s
j
,” July 11, 1942 (unpublished).

38.
Senshi s
sho: Dai hon'ei rikugunbu
5 (1973), p. 350.

39.
Yamada,
Daigensui Sh
wa tenn
, pp. 198–99.