Hitler's Jet Plane (3 page)

The expression ‘the Me 109’ sounds more formidable and slips off the tongue more smoothly than ‘Bf 109’ and the Propaganda Ministry was quick to seize upon it. The deception was never corrected with the FAI and Fritz Wendel’s world record stood for thirty years. Even then only a few surpassed it. In 1939 Germany had four pilots who each held a world aviation speed record, and that in itself was a world record.

These achievements brought the piston engine to the zenith of its development. The four-stroke machine invented by Nikolaus August Otto could advance no further. And aircraft speeds could neither be increased by higher revs or a different design of spinner. To fly faster would only be possible powered by rockets or jet propulsion. In the endurance field, hardly 500 kph had been attained: even the Me 109 could not manage 400 kph in winning the competition over the set course at Dübendorf. The fastest propeller-driven aircraft of World War II were the twin-engined RAF Mosquito, and the German Dornier 335 ‘
Pfeil
’ with a propeller front and rear. These were capable of approaching 750kph in December 1944 and became the world’s fastest series-produced aircraft. But that was the dead end.

The first manufacturer to fly a jet aircraft successfully was Ernst Heinkel AG of Warnemünde, whose experimental rocket-propelled He 176 and jet-propelled He 178 made their maiden flights piloted by Erich Warsitz in the summer of 1939. Interested onlookers on the ground were Hitler, Goering and Ernst Udet, Minister for Aircraft Production and Supply, but with the impending invasion of Poland only weeks away decisions had to be postponed until such time as Warsaw had requested an armistice. The German High Command was sure that Britain and France would look the other way once more. Later in the war both aircraft went on show in the Berlin Aviation Museum and were eventually destroyed there in an air raid.

The successor to the He 178 was the twin-engined He 280 with He S 8A turbines each developing 700 kg thrust. First tested in 1942, Udet recognised the possibilities of the machine at once but his pleas for its adoption by the Luftwaffe fell on deaf ears. Seven months later he was dead and Milch, who took over his office, lacked his predecessor’s vision and felt that the development of the turbojet ‘with which the He 280 was first powered had enough bugs in it that the original flights of the jet fighter were made with the engines uncowled’ and was thus not sufficiently advanced for him to advocate it. In the event, although work was continued on the prototype, the aircraft fell prey to the 1940 edict that any development which would not be usable within six months was to be abandoned. This might not have stopped Professor Messerschmitt but it was certainly the end of the He 280, the aircraft for which the time was ripe.

Shortly before the outbreak of war, aeronautical engineers in Britain, France, Italy and the United States were considering jet-engine designs, but in development already they lagged far behind Germany. The Kiel-based firm of Hellmuth Walter supplied the 600kg-thrust rocket motor for the Heinkel He 176 and was developing a liquid fuel for the Alexander Lippisch-designed Me 163 rocket fighter. The jet engine for the He 178 had been built by engineer Dr Hans Pabst von Ohain while early work on jet turbines had been in hand since 1935 at BMW and the Junkers Motorenwerke (Jumo). Information regarding progress being made on building the new turbines came from BMW and Jumo in a steady flow and Messerschmitt was confident that his Me 262 prototypes would be ready for testing as soon as the turbines arrived and were fitted.

Since BMW led Junkers in the development race, Messerschmitt consulted chiefly with the Bavarian firm and calculated from the available data that the fighter could top 800 kph in level flight. This speed was hitherto only dreamed of but still sufficiently short of the sound barrier that the expected problems at Mach 1 need not be addressed.

There was an initial difference of opinion about where the two engines should be sited. For aerodynamic reasons, Messerschmitt himself wanted the two cigar-shaped turbines built into the wings. After his engineers explained the difficulties this would cause, such as poor accessibility for maintenance and repair, the large personnel requirement for engine changes and finally a much greater risk of the whole aircraft exploding if hit by enemy fire, Messerschmitt was persuaded to sling a turbine below each wing. This would allow a conventional piston engine to be fitted in the nose of the experimental prototype as a stand-by in the event of turbine failure. The wisdom of this precaution was to prove itself, although not quite in the way that had been anticipated.

By the outbreak of war in September 1939, German military aviation had been developed only to the stage where the Luftwaffe could control the airspace over the Reich and the territories adjacent to it. Until then, it had seemed improbable that Germany would be faced by a dangerous enemy or superior combined enemy forces in the air. Hitler had concluded a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, the French air force was obsolete, the Polish air arm was small, obsolete and not independent of the Polish army, while Germany with 4,500 aircraft, some of them of the most modern design, led the field in Europe. The RAF at the time had a thousand fewer aircraft than the Luftwaffe.

The lightning victories over Poland and then France played their part in strengthening German confidence in the invincibility of the Wehrmacht and there were relatively few people, even among those in the know about certain adverse trends in Luftwaffe development, who took a less sanguine view. But even having disposed of the French, the German Luftwaffe was simply not strong enough for an air-war across the western European continent, particularly if pitted against the consequential and technically well-armed opponent which Great Britain was becoming. After an initial superiority the balance shifted to a parity between the fighter pilots of both sides during the Battle of Britain, but Germany lacked a modern heavy bomber able to penetrate far enough inland with a worthwhile payload even from airfields in northern France. And had such a bomber been available, no fighter existed with the range to provide aerial protection to, say, Liverpool or the Tyne and back. Early on, all hopes resided in the He 177 bomber. This machine was to prove itself a problem child of the first order. The trio of twin-engined bombers which formed the backbone of the German offensive against southern England were short-ranged and either troublesome mechanically, such as the Ju 88, or obsolete, as were the He 111 and Do 17: the Bf 110 ‘destroyer’ was too slow and had little value as a bomber. The mediocrity of the Bf 110 had been recognised by the Reich Air Ministry in 1939. Udet himself had asked Messerschmitt if he would be able to supply the Luftwaffe with 2,000 improved Bf 110s by October 1942. Messerschmitt said yes and got the contract. This meant that he was now turning out Germany’s principal fighter, and soon would be responsible for producing Germany’s principal light bomber, and after that the world’s first jet fighter.

By the beginning of 1941 – still without the jet turbines – the airframes of Me 262 prototypes V1, V2 and V3 were reported to the Ministry as ready for aerial testing. Since the manufacturers could not confirm a delivery date for the new turbines, Messerschmitt decided to fit a 750 hp Jumo 210G piston engine in the fuselage nose for the first test flights. Being portly, it was certainly a departure from the aerodynamic elegance of the shark-like hull, but it would serve its purpose and save time.

On the evening of 18 April 1941, Fritz Wendel, who had discharged himself from hospital against medical advice, climbed into the cockpit of Me 262 V1 and took off at 19:35 hrs. With its relatively weak engine, it was a close call to get the 2,660 kilos of machine into the air before arriving at the end of the 1,000-yard runway. In its first ascent and at altitude the new aircraft showed good flying qualities although the maximum 420 kph in level flight was only half its designed top speed. To see how the hull behaved at higher speeds, the aircraft had to be dived at a steep incline at full throttle repeatedly over the series of trials. On the first test, wing vibrations were observed at 540 kph. Twice previously flying other aircraft types Wendel had had to evacuate by parachute perilously close to the ground, but that was the risk a test pilot ran in the endeavour to find a new aircraft’s defects if it was to be recommended for series production. As the angle of dive became ever steeper, the starting altitude became progressively higher to allow the pilot more time to bale out in case of disaster. Wendel established that the dangerous vibrations fell away at higher speeds. This brought him a certain relief, but he was sure that later when the jet powerplants were fitted and provided much higher speeds, more unpleasant surprises would be bound to lie in wait. The flight characteristics of the new hull were not merely good, however; stability, the effectiveness of flaps, ailerons and rudder and performance at slow speed in particular were outstanding. Test flying the Me 262 airframe lasted the remainder of 1941.

3

Shortages, Technical Difficulties and the First Me 262 Crash

T
he chronic shortage of aviation spirit and materials for aircraft construction forced stringent economies including the halting of new developments considered speculative or whose completion was too far off. The Luftwaffe had been led to expect that it had until 1942 to equip for a major confrontation but in the event Germany had the dreaded scenario of war on two fronts once the Wehrmacht made its incursion into Soviet Russia on 21 June 1941. The day before, Hitler had ordered a reduction in the army and naval budget in favour of Luftwaffe armaments. Immediately following the announcement Goering demanded that the strength of the Luftwaffe be quadrupled and empowered his Secretary of State, Generalinspekteur Erhard Milch, to carry out the special task of establishing the capacity of the German aviation industry.

Milch requested from Goering a written appointment as plenipotentiary and received by return a document endowing him with unique scope. There was practically nothing which lay outside his jurisdiction from the closing down of factories to the building of new ones.

At that time aviation production was in a poor state and output was insufficient to cover combat losses. Factory managers blamed two factors: shortages of labour and aluminium. Milch had this allegation investigated and discovered scarce aluminium and aeronautical-quality sheet-plate was being diverted to non-aircraft processes. He also found that Udet had made a significant reduction in engine production and the output of bombers, particularly the He 111 and Ju 88, but that no new bomber type was scheduled for series production. Even the Me 210, an improved version of the Bf 110, would not be operational before October 1942.

German intelligence was supplying horrendous reports regarding the rapidly growing production of aircraft in the still neutral United States and even Britain, where the factories were not disturbed by nightly enemy bombardment and could thus work at full output. Finally Milch learned that the new diveable bomber types would not be ready for operations before 1944.

By now very perturbed, Milch took Udet with him to visit Messerschmitt at Augsburg for the purpose of investigating the situation respecting the Me 109F fighter. Director Rakan Kokothaki had sources in Berlin close to Udet and Milch and knew that both were highly displeased that so few fighters were rolling off the production line. They were most anxious for the new Me 109F with its Daimler – Benz 605 engine, which was still causing serious problems. Furthermore Kokothaki knew of Milch’s exasperation at the succession of new aircraft types at Augsburg at such a critical time, of which as Milch understood it there were at the time no fewer than twelve being worked upon by designers and engineers. Upon notification of the forthcoming visit, Kokothaki recalled advising his chief: ‘For God’s sake, under no circumstances mention any project other than the Me 109F, and particularly not the Me 262.’

Milch and Udet arrived at the works on 7 August 1941. When awkward questions were posed at the very beginning of the tour of inspection about the series production of the Me 109F, Messerschmitt led his guests into another hall where he showed them Me 262 V1. He was convinced that at the first sight of the wonder aircraft they would forget the Me 109F. Milch went red in the face. His small mouth with its narrow lips pursed for a moment into an almost invisible line. Then he demanded, ‘What is the meaning of this, gentlemen? I have not come here to listen to music of the future but to find out how long you are going to keep us waiting to get the Me 109F operational. You are to concern yourselves exclusively with aircraft which we need right now and not with prototypes whose engines are not yet properly in order!’ (In August 1941, the 004A had just managed a thrust of 600 kilos with new turbine wheels on the Junkers test rig.) In connection with this directive, he ordered the head of his Ministry’s aircraft construction monitoring office to ensure that work on the Me 262 was halted at once and all energies focused on a production line for the Me 109F.

Udet stood aside during this scene, lurking in the background in a silent rage. Not until the leave-taking in the administration building did he make his bitter reproaches to Kokothaki regarding the desolate condition of the works. Everything was in pieces and the whole thing was a shambles, he said. Then he rejoined Milch’s entourage for the return flight to Berlin. There is evidence that in the long period preceding the Augsburg visit Milch and Messerschmitt had actively sought a reunion. It was at Milch’s suggestion that Messerschmitt was nominated a Professor. The negative result of the inspection was the final straw for Milch in the relationship with Messerschmitt, and the same was true for Kokothaki. But far, far worse was to follow.

It will be recalled that in 1939, Udet had awarded Messerschmitt a contract to provide, by October 1942, 2,000 light bombers of the designation Me 210, an improved version of the Bf 110. This situation now led directly to the most incomprehensible error of judgement in the history of world aircraft production. Perhaps overconfident because of his great personal ability and the Messerschmitt company’s track record, but also on account of the very short delivery date, Messerschmitt set up the jigs for series production and made a start turning out the airframes before the Me 210 maiden test flight. The latter was by all accounts the most hair-raising twenty minutes in the career of chief test pilot Hermann Wurster, who returned from it alive thanks only to his outstanding ability as a flier. ‘The aircraft is so unstable that it cannot be mass-produced in its present configuration. You couldn’t trust any pilot’s life to it. Apart from other modifications, the fuselage needs to be a metre longer,’ he reported. Faced with this damning opinion from his chief test pilot, Messerschmitt had to decide between losing many millions of Reichmarks or closing his eyes to the major problem and making do with the minor changes. He settled for the latter. After five Me 210 test pilots from the Luftwaffe’s experimental base at Rechlin had been given a decent burial, it was accepted that Dr Wurster was correct. Series production of the Me 210 was halted by the Reich Air Ministry on 13 March 1942 by which time 483 operationally useless machines had been completed.