Ike's Spies (5 page)

Murphy was a great talker, Eisenhower a great listener. As Murphy spun his tale and Ike concentrated on what he was saying, the sun started to set. Lights began to blink on in Telegraph Cottage in the long end-of-summer British twilight. It grew chilly. Murphy and Eisenhower went inside for dinner in front of a bright coal fire. Harry Butcher had driven the other guests to the site, waiting until dark so that the location of Telegraph Cottage would remain secret. Butcher pulled all the drapes, a near disaster in a room full of cigar-smoking diplomats and army officers, plus Ike, who ordinarily smoked a pack of Camels after dinner (four packs in a day).

It was a gathering of Very Important Persons. The supreme commander for Operation
TORCH
was the host. His deputy, General Mark Clark, was there, along with his chief of staff, General Walter Bedell Smith, and Colonel Julius Holmes from the newly established Civil Affairs Section. Three American civilians were present: Ambassador (to the Court of St. James') John Winant, Presidential Adviser W. Averell Harriman, and Foreign Service official Freeman Matthews. Ike's political adviser from the British, Hal Mack, was also there, along with Brigadier Eric Mockler-Ferryman of the British Army. Mockler-Ferryman was head of the
TORCH
G-2 (intelligence) section. Butcher served, he wrote, as “kibitzer, water boy, cigarette girl, and flunky.”
²³

After dinner, Murphy began by explaining the attitude of the French Army. He said the Allies should not expect to find an enthusiastic welcome, if only because most French officers “cherished
their oath of fidelity to Marshal Pétain.” Murphy said he had talked freely with a number of French officers about the possibilities of an Allied invasion of North Africa. They were anxious for it to happen, but they feared the Allies would come in insufficient force and leave it to the French to do the rest. Ike quickly reassured Murphy on the last point; indeed, he overdid it. He told Murphy to tell his French friends there would be 150,000 troops in the initial landings, with a rapid buildup to 500,000. Murphy said the French “would be greatly encouraged by the size of the expedition,” as they were when he told them. Later, however, the French officers were bitter, because the actual figures were 100,000 and 250,000.
²⁴

Murphy wanted to tell Dubreuil and his other French friends the date of the attack, so that they could be fully prepared. Ike shook his head decisively. Under no circumstances would he let the French in on the secret. Murphy pointed out that it would be difficult to arrange for effective collaboration if the Allies did not take the French into their confidence, but Eisenhower was adamant. If the French knew on Monday, the Germans would know on Tuesday and have troops in Algiers by Wednesday. Ike told Murphy to tell the French that the contemplated date of the invasion was February 1943.

Who was Murphy to tell this story to? The question was crucial, the options many. Whatever Frenchman or group Murphy chose to deal with would have the inside track to power in North Africa. He could go to Admiral Darlan, via his son in Algiers—Darlan was commander in chief of French armed forces and had already shown a keen interest in involving himself in such an operation. But Darlan was known to be violently anti-British, so Murphy had not followed up his overtures.
^*
Or Murphy could approach General Alphonse Juin, in command of the French North African land and air forces, with his headquarters in Algiers. A tough patriot, a man of great integrity and spirit, and an outstanding
soldier, Juin would have been the perfect collaborator. But Murphy had not reached out to him, nor any of the other leaders of the French armed forces.

There still remained a number of options, chief of which was working with de Gaulle's Free French, who were anxious to take control in North Africa. The British, hating Darlan and not trusting Juin, were ready to bring de Gaulle in on the operation; Churchill had said that the Free French movement was “the core of French resistance and the flame of French honour.”
²⁶
But Roosevelt neither liked nor trusted de Gaulle, who had denounced FDR for maintaining diplomatic relations with Vichy. Besides, there were few Gaullists in Algeria at this time, or so Murphy reported. De Gaulle had charged French officers who stayed at their posts after Pétain signed the armistice with treason; such officers could hardly be expected to welcome de Gaulle as their leader.

That brought it down to Dubreuil on the civil side, and Generals Mast and Giraud on the military side. Murphy had maintained and expanded his contacts with Dubreuil and The Five, who were building an underground army in Algiers under the command of Henri d'Astier de la Vigerie, who has been described by historian Arthur Funk as “a character from the Italian Renaissance, a brilliant, persuasive charmer, fascinated with intrigue, at heart a royalist, who exercised an almost hypnotic influence on the young men he led.”
²⁷
D'Astier's “army” was a new organization a few hundred strong known as the Chantiers de la Jeunesse. Murphy, repeating what he had heard from d'Astier, said the group was well organized and capable of decisive action on D-Day. When
TORCH
began, the Chantiers de la Jeunesse would take possession of such key points as the radio stations in Algiers, the police stations, and military headquarters. Then if all went well the Americans could walk into the city unopposed.

With regard to the regular French Army, Murphy's contact was General Mast, chief of staff to the corps commander in Algiers. Mast, a friend of Dubreuil's, told Murphy that General Giraud was the key to success. Murphy explained to Ike and the others at Telegraph Cottage that Giraud, a one-legged hero of World War I, had escaped from a German prison camp in 1941 and was in hiding in the South of France.

(As Murphy talked and the others listened intently, Ambassador Winant signaled to Butcher with his big Corona cigar—he had
heard a noise outside the window. Butcher took his flashlight and investigated. He found only the sergeant on patrol duty, who had stubbed his toe in marching around the cottage.)

Murphy said that Mast had told him that Giraud might be willing to come out of France to lead Operation
TORCH
, and that if he did come, Giraud would rally the French Army to his cause. On the face of it, that was highly improbable. Giraud had participated in the attempted Cagoulard coup of 1937, had no place in the hierarchy of the French Army, no popular following, no organization, no social imagination, no program, and no administrative abilities. But Murphy insisted that his sources were correct. Giraud was the man.

Murphy was aware of one possible difficulty. Giraud, Mast said, would insist on having the supreme command of all Allied forces fighting in North Africa. Ike scowled, his face reddened, as it always did when he was angry. He would never hand over his command to an unknown Frenchman, even if he had the authority to do so and thought it a good idea, which he most emphatically did not. Ike told Murphy to tell Mast to tell Giraud that the Allies could not place a half million of their fighting men under a French commander.

With that, the meeting broke up, Butcher driving the guests home. At breakfast the next morning, Ike and Murphy talked again, about civil affairs, about the need to bring in food and other supplies for the native population, and so on. Over coffee, Murphy suggested that Ike secretly send a high-ranking officer to Algeria, possibly by submarine, so that he could confer with Murphy's French Army friends about fifth-column activities at strategic points, such as seizure of airfields, the designation of coast artillery to be silenced by the French conspirators from the rear, and signals to the convoys by lights as to whether or not opposition should be expected. Ike mused that if such an officer were captured, it would be a tip-off to the enemy. Still, the idea of a surreptitious landing by submarine of an American general on the French North African coast appealed to him and he promised to think it over. Murphy then left, to be driven by Butcher to a nearby British airfield where a waiting plane carried him to Prestwick, whence he got on a TWA Stratoliner bound for Washington. After reporting to the President, he flew across the Atlantic again, back to Algiers.
²⁸

Two days after Murphy left London, Eisenhower reported to
Marshall on his reactions to his first spy. “I was very much impressed by Mr. Murphy. We had an afternoon and evening conference on the most secretive basis possible, and I believe much good was accomplished by his trip to this country.”
²⁹

EISENHOWER'S CHIEF OF STAFF
, Bedell Smith, was already there. When Clark joined them, the three American generals began a lively discussion of Murphy's messages.

Murphy had two requests. The first was to send a senior American general, accompanied by a small staff, to a secret rendezvous on the North African coast, near Cherchel. They were to land on a lonely beach about seventy-five miles west of Algiers. At the home of a close friend of Henri d'Astier's, who was the head of the underground resistance movement called the Chantiers de la Jeunesse and a member of Dubreuil's group, the American team would be met by French General Charles Mast, who had insisted on the meeting. Mast had convinced Murphy that if the Americans took him into their confidence, and if they brought General Giraud in on the conspiracy as commander in chief of the French and Allied forces, he could arrange a peaceful reception for
TORCH
. Clark took one look at the message from Murphy and blurted out, “When do I go?”

From the point of view of a professional intelligence service, it was obviously a terrible idea. If Clark were to be captured, the Vichy authorities in Algeria would certainly turn him over to the Germans. Clark, Ike's deputy, knew everything about
TORCH
. But to ignore Mast's request, or to send a low-ranking subordinate, could—according to Murphy, Ike's chief spy—jeopardize the whole operation. So Ike grinned as Clark asked when he could leave and replied, “Probably right away.” It was already the morning of October 17 and Mast had scheduled the meeting for the evening of October 20.
¹
Harry Butcher, who saw him later in the day, said “Clark was as happy as a boy with a new knife.”

In another message, Murphy reported that Mast remained unhappy with the idea of Giraud serving under Ike and proposed instead that Ike retain command of the American troops while Giraud became supreme commander. The French knew the terrain, Giraud outranked Eisenhower, and with Giraud in command the Allies could enter Algiers without firing a shot, Mast claimed.

A third message from Murphy said that Admiral Darlan had again conveyed to Murphy his willingness to cooperate with the Allies. Murphy had good reason to believe Darlan meant it, as the word came from the admiral's son, with whom Murphy had been in contact for over a year. Murphy said he had raised with Mast the possibility of bringing Darlan in on the conspiracy with Giraud, Dubreuil, and The Five, but Mast would have none of it. He denounced Darlan as a skunk, a traitor, an opportunist, and a man without a following. “The Army is loyal to General Giraud,” Mast declared, “and it will follow him, not Darlan. The Navy will fall in line with the Army.”
²

Murphy wanted a directive on Darlan. So did Eisenhower. Whatever Mast said of him, Darlan was the man in command of the entire Vichy military establishment, including the North African Army and Navy, while Mast was a one-star general who commanded nothing—he was only chief of staff to an officer who was not part of the conspiracy. Moreover, even the uninformed and naïve Americans at Grosvenor Square had to wonder if French military discipline had so far collapsed that the army was ready to ignore its established hierarchy to follow the lead of a man, Giraud, who had no official position at all. But Mast insisted that it was so, and Murphy believed Mast. Still, one could not ignore Darlan.

Eisenhower mused that sooner or later the Allies would have to pick between Darlan and Giraud as “our chief collaborator,” but he hoped that it would be possible to “secure the advantages accruing to us” if both men would cooperate. These were, however, not military matters, but political and foreign policy problems. Ike needed authoritative direction from his bosses, one of whom was the Prime Minister.