In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan (45 page)

29.
Author interview with Graham Fuller, August 19, 2008.

30.
Quoted in David B. Edwards,
Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), p. 36.

31.
Alexander Lyakhovskiy,
Plamya Afgana
(Moscow: Iskon, 1999). Released by the Cold War International History Project.

32.
Eric Pace, “Babrak Karmal, Afghanistan’s Ex-President, Dies at 67,”
New York Times
, December 6, 1996.

33.
Anatoly Dobrynin,
In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986)
(New York: Times Books, 1995), p. 435.

34.
Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), p. 413.

35.
CC CPSU Politburo Session March 17–18, 1979, Deterioration of Conditions in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and Possible Responses from Our Side. Released by the National Security Archive.

36.
Transcript of Telephone Conversation between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and Afghan Prime Minister Nur Mohammad Taraki, March 18, 1979; Conversation of the chief of the Soviet military advisory group in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Gorelov, with H. Amin, August 11, 1979. Released by the Cold War International History Project.

37.
Transcript of A. N. Kosygin-A. A. Gromyko-D. F. Ustinov-B. N. Ponomarev-N. M. Taraki Conversation on March 20, 1979. Released by the National Security Archive.

38.
CPSU CC Politburo Decision and Instruction to Soviet Ambassador in Afghanistan, May 24, 1979. Released by the Cold War International History Project.

39.
Excerpt from Politburo meeting, March 18, 1979. Released by the Cold War International History Project.

40.
Tanner,
Afghanistan,
pp. 231–32.

41.
Andropov-Gromyko-Ustinov-Ponomarev Report to CC CPSU on the Situation in Afghanistan, June 28, 1979. Released by the Cold War International History Project.

42.
On the Soviet Union’s dossier on Amin, see Alexander Lyakhovskiy,
Plamya Afgana.

43.
Andropov-Gromyko-Ustinov-Ponomarev Report to the CC CPSU on the Situation in Afghanistan, October 29, 1979. Released by the National Security Archive.

44.
Dobrynin,
In Confidence
, p. 436. Personal Memorandum from Andropov to Brezhnev, December 1, 1979. Released by the Cold War International History Project.

45.
Author interview with Graham Fuller, August 19, 2008.

46.
Alexander Lyakhovskiy’s account of the meeting from Alexander Lyakhovskiy,
The Tragedy and Valor of the Afghani
(Moscow: GPI Iskon, 1995), pp. 109–12. Released by the Cold War International History Project. Lyakhovskiy was a major general in the Russian Army. During the war in Afghanistan, he served as assistant to the commander of the Operative Group of the USSR Defense Ministry.

47.
Georgy Kornienko’s Account of the Politburo Decision to Send Soviet Troops into Afghanistan, from Georgy M. Kornienko,
The Cold War: Testimony of a Participant
(Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994). Released by the National Security Archive.

48.
Lyakhovskiy,
The Tragedy and Valor of the Afghani,
pp. 109–12.

49.
Georgy Kornienko’s Account of the Politburo Decision to Send Soviet Troops into Afghanistan.

50.
On growing concerns of Islam in Afghanistan, see Soviet Communication to the Hungarian Leadership on the Situation in Afghanistan, March 28, 1979. Released by the Cold War International History Project.

51.
Directive No. 312/12/001 of December 24, 1979, signed by Ustinov and Ogarkov, December 24, 1979. U.S. President Jimmy Carter sent a letter to Brezhnev arguing that the Afghan government—especially Amin—had not requested Soviet assistance. On Brezhnev’s response, see Reply to an appeal of President Carter about the issue of Afghanistan through the direct
communications channel (Excerpt from the Minutes of the CC CPSU Politburo Meeting, December 29, 1979). Released by the Cold War International History Project.

52.
Dobrynin,
In Confidence,
p. 440.

53.
Ibid., p. 439.

54.
Author interview with Ambassador Ronald Neumann, April 16, 2008.

55.
Tanner,
Afghanistan,
pp. 235–36.

56.
Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin,
The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB
(New York: Basic Books, 1999), p. 11. Also see, for example, USSR Ministry of Defense and General Staff Operations Groups in the DRA. Released by the Cold War International History Project.

57.
Tanner,
Afghanistan,
p. 237.

58.
Brzezinski,
Power and Principle,
p. 427.

59.
Robert M. Gates,
From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 143–45.

60.
Gates,
From the Shadows,
pp. 145–46.

61.
Brzezinski,
Power and Principle
, p. 427.

62.
Gates,
From the Shadows,
pp. 147–48.

63.
Rubin,
Fragmentation of Afghanistan,
pp. 104–5.

64.
Ibid., p. 121.

Chapter Two

1.
Jon Lee Anderson, “American Viceroy: Zalmay Khalilzad’s Mission,”
The New Yorker,
December 19, 2005, p. 60.

2.
See, for example, Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,”
Foreign Affairs,
vol. 37, no. 2, January 1959. A slightly different version of the article was published by RAND as P-1472 in December 1958.

3.
University of Chicago, “Ambassador Zalmay M. Khalilzad, PhD ’79: President Bush’s choice to become the next United States Ambassador to the United Nations,” Alumni in the News, 2007.

4.
Samuel P. Huntington,
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), pp. 246–48; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
The 9/11 Commission Report
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), pp. 63–67; 371–74; Ahmed Rashid,
Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 48, 54;
SIPRI Yearbook
1991:
World Armaments and Disarmament
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 199.

5.
Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “The Costs of Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan,” February 1987, p. 5. Released by the National Security Archive.

6.
Rashid,
Taliban,
p. 13; Barnett R. Rubin,
The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 7; Lester Grau, ed.,
The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996), p. xix; Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin,
Afghanistan—The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower
(Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2001), pp. 215–16.

7.
Joseph Brodsky,
Sochineniia Iosifa Brodskogo
(Sankt-Peterburg: Pushkinskii fond, 1997), pp. 118–19.

8.
Cynthia L. Haven, ed.,
Joseph Brodsky: Conversations
(Jackson: University Press of Mississippi), p. 97.

9.
Barnett R. Rubin,
The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System,
2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 122–23.

10.
Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, “Afghanistan: Ethnic Diversity and Dissidence,” March 1, 1980. Released by the National Security Archive.

11.
Defense Intelligence Agency, Directorate for Research, “The Economic Impact of Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan,” May 1983. Released by the National Security Archive.

12.
Rubin,
Fragmentation of Afghanistan,
p. 130.

13.
Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Five Years After,” May 1985, p. 9. Released by the National Security Archive.

14.
Yousaf and
Adkin, Afghanistan—The Bear Trap,
p. 58. On the desertion estimates, see page 57.

15.
Stephen Tanner,
Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban
(Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002), p. 244.

16.
Defense Intelligence Agency, Directorate for Research, “Afghan Resistance,” November 5, 1982. Released by the National Security Archive. Also see Session of CC CPSU Politburo, November 13, 1986. Released by the Cold War International History Project.

17.
Yousaf and Adkin,
Afghanistan—The Bear Trap,
p. 48.

18.
Tanner,
Afghanistan,
p. 239.

19.
Pravda
Correspondent Schedrov’s Letter to the CC CPSU on the Situation in Afghanistan, November 12, 1981. Released by the National Security Archive.

20.
Report of Military Leaders to D. F. Ustinov, May 10, 1981. Released by the Cold War International History Project.

21.
Tanner,
Afghanistan,
p. 248.

22.
On a Soviet analysis of Massoud, see, for example, Dossiers of Rebel Field Commanders. Released by the Cold War International History Project.

23.
Sebastian Junger,
Fire
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), p. 199.

24.
On the lethality of the Mi-24s during the Soviet War, see Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “The Costs of Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan,” February 1987, p. 4. Released by the National Security Archive. Also see Yousaf and Adkin,
Afghanistan—The Bear Trap,
pp. 177–78.

25.
Tanner,
Afghanistan,
p. 255; Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows:
The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), p. 348.

26.
Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, “The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Five Years After,” May 1985, p. 2. Released by the National Security Archive.

27.
Sir Morrice James,
Pakistan Chronicle
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 25.

28.
Yousaf and Adkin,
Afghanistan—The Bear Trap,
p. 113.

29.
Sean P. Witchell, “Pakistan’s ISI: The Invisible Government,”
International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence,
vol. 16, no. 1, Spring 2003, pp. 374–88.

30.
Alexander Lyakhovskiy,
Plamya Afgana
(Moscow: Iskon, 1999). Released by the Cold War International History Project.

31.
Yousaf and Adkin,
Afghanistan—The Bear Trap,
p. 40.

32.
On the importance of Islamic fundamentalism, see, for example: “Some Ideas About Foreign Policy Results of the 1970s (Points)” of Academician O. Bogomolov of the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System, sent to the CC CPSU and the KGB, January 20, 1980. Released by the Cold War International History Project.

33.
Yousaf and Adkin,
Afghanistan—The Bear Trap,
p. 117.

34.
Milt Bearden and James Risen,
The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Final Showdown with the KGB
(New York: Random House, 2003), pp. 236, 283.

35.
Quoted in Steve Coll,
Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001
(New York: Penguin Press, 2004), p. 120.

36.
See, for example, Bearden and Risen,
The Main Enemy,
pp. 236, 281–82.