Islam without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty (14 page)

The infusion of the misogynistic attitudes of the Middle East into Islam also influenced the way the Qur’an was interpreted. For example, the Qur’an presents a version of the story of Adam and Eve and their fall from grace for tasting the forbidden fruit, but, unlike the Old Testament, it doesn’t portray Eve as the deceiver—Adam receives the divine reproach.
²⁴
But in the Qur’anic commentaries written after the third century of Islam, Eve started to receive the blame. This occurred at the same time that dozens of new Hadiths appeared, defining women as cunning, insidious, and immoral creatures. No wonder that Islamic feminists of our times often uphold the Qur’an in order to challenge misogynistic Hadiths, which they see as products of the “male-domination ideology.”
²⁵

The traditional Islamic ban on painting and sculpture also was a Hadith-induced late invention. Although the depiction of living forms was not explicitly forbidden by the Qur’an, “most jurists, basing themselves on Hadith, held that this was an infringement of the sole power of God to create life.”
²⁶
On the big debate between free will and predestination, most Hadiths supported the latter view, reflecting “ancient Arab beliefs.”
²⁷
The Qur’anic ban on usury was similarly extended by way of Hadiths, leading to the traditional position that all forms of interest are prohibited.
²⁸
With the stagnation of the Shariah through such moves, the economic dynamism of the early centuries of Islam would also slowly fade away.
²⁹

The tendency toward “strictness and rigorism” showed itself vis-à-vis not only Muslim society, but non-Muslims as well. The rules regulating the affairs of the
dhimmis
—the protected Jews, Christians, and others—became less tolerant as time went by and Muslims adopted, often via the Hadiths, the attitudes of the Byzantine and Sassanid Empires.
³⁰

The doctrine of
jihad
, too, was emboldened by the Hadiths and their proponents. The earlier scholars tended to put greater emphasis on religious practices such as prayer and mosque attendance, and they did not see
jihad
as a religious obligation.
³¹
“The Arab conquests, however, gave a psychological twist to Islamic thought,” notes Western historian Ann K. S. Lambton, “as a result of which the duty of jihad was exalted in the Traditions [i.e., Hadiths].”
³²

The great champion of the Hadiths, al-Shafi, was particularly influential here. He developed the theory that the more peaceful verses of the Qur’an were abrogated by “the sword verses,” while it was also possible to see them referring to different contexts—war against belligerents, peace with others.
³³
He also divided the world into the Abode of Islam and the Abode of War and envisioned constant warfare between them. Political theorists after al-Shafi would enshrine this concept in their writings by averring that one of the duties of the caliph was to “launch jihad at least once a year.”
³⁴
Most Hanafis would disagree, though, and argue “that non-believers could be fought only if they resorted to armed conflict.”
³⁵

The People of Reason, unsurprisingly, sounded more reasonable.

H
ADITHS
R
EVISITED

Here I should provide a brief comment in order to avoid painting merely a black-and-white picture of the Hadiths. Not all of them were forgeries, and not all of them had distasteful content. There are, in fact, many inspiring Hadiths with good moral teachings on charity, compassion, and honesty. Moreover, the idea of an Islam totally devoid of the Hadiths—as the Sola Scriptura–type radical reformists of our era suggest—is not plausible. At the very least, without the rich historical information that the Hadiths provide us, it would be impossible to understand the context of the Qur’an—which is often imperative to understanding its meaning.

The problem, then, is not the existence of the Hadith literature, but rather the way it is handled. The People of Tradition turned these narratives into a sanctified source that must only be obeyed and not questioned. Quite intentionally, they put the Hadiths above human reason. That’s why the main criterion they considered when accepting a Hadith was its chain of transmitters—and not its content.

But the People of Reason, as might be expected, used reason for judging the Hadiths. The Mutazilites, in particular, “held the rational sense of the content of these reports about the Prophet to be a more important test of their validity, along with analysis of the chain of transmitters.”
³⁶
In the course of this book, we will see that some contemporary Muslim reformers advocate such a rational reevaluation of the Hadith literature.

T
HE
H
OUSE OF
W
ISDOM—AND
I
NQUISITION

Having been introduced to the People of Tradition and their ideas, let’s return to the story that opened this chapter: that of the “radical cleric” Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal and his campaign against the People of Reason.

These two opposing camps of Islamdom (from here on, the Traditionists and the Rationalists) engaged in their war of ideas for at least five centuries—from the eighth to the thirteenth. Throughout this period, the Traditionists very often secured the backing of political authorities. Only during a brief period in the early ninth century did the Rationalists win the favor and even the active support of the political authority—a support that turned out to be more curse than gift.

Let’s examine how this political factor played out. We have seen how the Umayyad caliphs supported the predestinarians against the defenders of free will in order to justify their corrupt rule. But, despite all such efforts, the Umayyads were overthrown by the rival Abbasid dynasty in 749. The latter brought important changes to Islamdom, ending the Arab supremacist attitude of their predecessors and allowing non-Arab Muslims, such as Persians and Turks, to hold prominent positions.

The Abbasids also moved the capital of Islamdom from Damascus, the Umayyad base, to Iraq—first to Kufa and then to the new city they built: Baghdad. With beautiful parks, gardens, villas, canals, and promenades, this new capital soon earned fame as the most beautiful city in the world. It also would be the stage for the Golden Age of the early medieval Islamic civilization, which peaked during the thirty-three-year reign of Harun al-Rashid (786–809), whose magnificent court inspired
One Thousand and One Nights
.

In 813, Harun’s son, al-Ma’mun, a Rationalist by conviction, sat on the Abbasid throne. Word has it that the young caliph once had a dream in which he saw Aristotle, who told him that “reason and revelation” were not just compatible but also mutually supportive, and that a good Muslim ruler should encourage both.
³⁷
Hence, al-Ma’mun founded an academy called the House of Wisdom, where philosophical and scientific works of ancient Greece, including all the major works of Aristotle, were translated into Arabic. Great minds such as al-Kindi, “philosopher of the Arabs,” and mathematician al-Khwarizmi, from whose name the word
algorithm
comes, were also employed in this academy, along with numerous Christians.

As a Rationalist, al-Ma’mun was interested in theological debates, including interfaith ones. He invited Abu Qurra, a Greek Orthodox bishop from Syria, to his court, and the latter defended Christian theology while the caliph tried to refute his arguments —all in a civilized manner. Al-Ma’mun and his successors would continue to welcome discourse with Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, Buddhists, and many others—helping Islamdom flourish intellectually.
³⁸

So far, so good. But in the ninth year of his rule, al-Ma’mun made a disastrous decision that would stain all his good works. His distaste for the Traditionists—whom he found not only “vulgar” but also politically suspicious—led him to launch the
mihna
, a sort of inquisition, in order to impose the “created Qur’an” doctrine on all scholars.
³⁹
Prominent figures of the Traditionist camp, including Ahmad Hanbal, were arrested, questioned, and, in some cases, even flogged for their insistence on calling the Qur’an “uncreated.” This tyrannical policy would last for sixteen years under al-Ma’mun and two of his successors, and, naturally, it would create havoc not just in Baghdad but throughout the empire.

The exact motivation and the culprits behind this bizarre inquisition have long been a matter of controversy. The “created Qur’an” was certainly a doctrine championed by the Mutazilites, and, although they “were not directly responsible” for the
mihna
, their doctrinal link puts them under suspicion.
⁴⁰
One pertinent explanation, which also makes sense in light of our previous acquaintance with Ahmad Hanbal and his campaign against the Rationalists, comes from Nimrod Hurvitz, an expert on the formation of the Hanbali school. He suggests that the
mihna
might have been supported by the Rationalist theologians as “an act of self-defence” rather than an attack. Frustrated with the “scare tactics” of the Traditionists, who constantly declared the Rationalists heretics, the latter seem to have found the
mihna
a lifesaver, as it silenced those who harassed them and allowed them to “raise their heads, speak their minds and establish themselves in their proper role in society.”
⁴¹

Yet still, this whoever-suppresses-my-suppresser-is-right approach was certainly wrong. It should be acknowledged as a historic mistake of the Mutazilites and others who seem to have allied themselves with the
mihna
. And perhaps some reform-minded Muslims of our day who tend to support authoritarian measures against contemporary Traditionists should derive a lesson from this.

A further lesson can come from the fact that the
mihna
ended in utter failure. Not only did the Traditionists remain steadfast in their doctrines, but the inquisition helped them gain further popularity by turning them into folk heroes. And soon, they had their own chance for dominance.

T
HE
D
ESTRUTION OF
R
EASON

In 847, the Abbasid caliphate passed to a new member of the dynasty named al-Mutawakkil. He was a nephew of al-Ma’mun but also his exact opposite. He not only ended the
mihna
but also reversed the official policy and gave full support to Traditionists such as Ahmad Hanbal, adopting their doctrines as the official view.

Now the Mutazilites were the outcasts. “Every discussion about a thing that the Prophet did not discuss,” al-Mutawakkil declared, “is an error.”
⁴²
He ordered the Traditionists to preach against the Mutazilites, who were soon fired from all official posts.
⁴³
The House of Wisdom lost caliphal favor and declined. One of its eminent scholars, al-Kindi, who had produced more than 250 treatises on philosophy, physics, chemistry, medicine, psychology, and even music theory, was beaten, and his library was confiscated. Traditionism was back with a vengeance.

Al-Mutawakkil also suppressed non-Muslims. Under his rule, Christians and Jews were stripped of much of their social status and were forced to wear distinctive clothing. Some churches and synagogues in Baghdad were demolished, and every tenth Christian or Jewish house was confiscated to make room for future mosques. Al-Mutawakkil even “ordered that wooden images of devils be nailed to the doors of their [the non-Muslims’] homes to distinguish them from those of Muslims.
⁴⁴

Even worse, al-Mutawakkil’s policies were there to stay. The Traditionists continued to enjoy official support and became “the most ardent supporters of the institution of the caliphate.”
⁴⁵
The most radical among them, the Hanbalis, grew more and more assertive under the patronage of the throne. In 935, Muslim author Ibn al-Athir wrote:

In that year the Hanbali affair became more distressing as their fury intensified. They began to raid the houses of the commanders and of the common people, and if they found wine they poured it away, and if they found a singing girl they beat her and broke her instruments. They hindered buying and selling and delayed men who were walking along with women and youths, to question them about their companions. If the answers failed to satisfy them they beat the men and dragged them to the chief of police and testified about their immoral acts. The Hanbalis wrought discord upon Baghdad.
⁴⁶