Jessen & Richter (Eds.) (7 page)

I N T R O D U C T I O N : N O N - C O M P E T I T I V E E L E C T I O N S 27

as the above-mentioned mechanisms for
preference falsification
all ensured that the vast majority of voters participated and conformed (Ó Beacháin in

this volume; Jacobs 1970, 69; Gross 1986, 27; Lewis 1990, 91).

Antipathy or indifference was not so much reflected in dissenting votes

or demonstrative abstaining from voting, but rather in complacency and

uncertainty with respect to elections without choice. For example, a study

showed that in Poland in 1958 only four per cent of the population were

familiar with the voting procedure. Even after the 1973 elections twenty

per cent of Polish voters did not know which candidates had been elected

for which political committees. In addition, the voters had to constantly

face the fact that the election results could be manipulated as required.

Even if such falsifications were not widely necessary in light of the pres-

sures on the population (Lewis 1990, 91), the knowledge that manipulation

could take place was both demotivating and demoralizing (Drygalski and

Kwasniewski 1990, 308; Yurchak 2006, 15–17; Jacobs 1991, 186; see in this

volume Tsipursky, Merl and Ó Beacháin). Thus dictatorial elections pro-

moted political passivity, indifference and cynicism—a fundamental atti-

tude that certainly made it easier for the post-communist states to establish

new forms of electoral authoritarianism (see in this volume Ó Beacháin; on

political apathy see Nohlen 2009, 28).

Open rejection of the elections and non-conformist behavior, the third

option open to the electorate, always remained the exception. This was not

only as a result of pressure from above and the paralyzing perception that

all others were publicly participating. The pressure to conform that arises

from peers, colleagues, and neighbors should not be underestimated—

adaptation, subordination and integration into the
collective
or the
community
of the people
were key values while individualism and
Eigensinn
(Alf Lüdtke, see Lindenberger 1999) were frowned upon. Whoever refused to take part

in the elections disrupted the regulated course of events. In Socialism a

non-voter or voting booth user
could, under certain circumstances,

provoke the punishment of his shop floor brigade or housing collective in

that he or she put the brigade’s
premium or the renovation of the house at risk (see Tsipursky in this volume). Non-voters demonstratively positioned

themselves outside society. Even if someone only wanted to criticize the

elections, they would quickly be labeled as anti-social and a suspected

oppositionist. Those who disapproved of the voting ritual nevertheless

took part in order not to be excluded from society. As a rule, non-voters

28

R A L P H J E S S E N A N D H E D W I G R I C H T E R

were well-known, self-confident outsiders who no longer expected

anything from society and who openly rejected it.

Despite these factors, the infamous 99 per cent results were not seen

immediately, nor were they universal. On the one hand, there were differ-

ences among the regimes. It was the communist dictatorships in the Soviet

sphere of power that placed a particularly high value on almost complete

approval at the polls. Although it is also the case that elections held in

Fascist Italy, National Socialist Germany and more recently those held in

China on a local level saw participation and approval rates that would be

unthinkable in western liberal democracies. Nevertheless, there were also

results that were under the 90 per cent level (Jacobs 1991, 187; see Lu and

Shi 1999; Fimiani, Corner, and Omland in this volume). The
totalitarian
99

per cent did not only depend on the specific political traditions, the elec-

toral politics of the regime and the relative insularity of the Soviet empire.

They were also the result of a longer process of acclimatization and the

successive implementation of the demand for loyalty from those in power

(see Ó Beacháin and Merl in this volume). During the first few years of the

Soviet Union, in the countryside only about a quarter of the electorate

went to the polls. In contrast to the modern technology of central state-

organized elections, in the villages there initially continued to be a “patriar-

chal oral culture of village politics” (Figes 1988, 26). Before 1920, when a

national campaign was started to increase the political activities of women,

female participation in elections in the Soviet Union was more the excep-

tion than the rule (Radkey 1989; Figes 1988).

Democratic electoral traditions could also have an inhibitory function:

in the large industrial cities in Northern Italy, where there was a long his-

tory of democracy, under the Fascists up to 18 per cent of the electorate

did not vote or voted “no” (Fimiani, 16; Corner, 10). Also, in East Ger-

many after 1945 there were significant levels of “no” votes with respect to

single-lists (Bienert 2008). In Czechoslovakia the workforce, which was

familiar with democracy, at first did not resign itself to letting its vote be

dictated by the Party and maintained a “stubborn localism” (Heumos in

this volume).

Lastly, one should not lose sight of the importance of the micro-poli-

tics of the elections. They show once again that elections under dictator-

ships were not only instruments of the top-down exercise of power, but

also to a certain extent served as means of communication between the

ruling powers and society. In the Soviet Union many voters used the ballot

I N T R O D U C T I O N : N O N - C O M P E T I T I V E E L E C T I O N S 29

paper as a type of petition, and wrote down their worries, complaints and

wishes (Merl and Bohn). They did not do this, for the most part, in order

to articulate their fundamental rejection of the system, but rather in the

hope of achieving a concrete improvement in their living standards.

The functionaries of the Communist Party responded to these concerns

in their election meetings or in individual conversations. In the later years

of the GDR, they hugely concerned themselves with potential non-voters,

and had
election discussions
with them in order to encourage them to vote.

These discussions often centered on concrete wishes. In a rather crude

form of haggling, voters were presented with trade-offs in exchange for

their votes if they expressed dissatisfaction about their housing, working

conditions or lack of supplies. While such individual discussions were

reserved for possible non-voters, the normal citizens could have their say

at the public election meetings that were held throughout the country dur-

ing election campaigns. At these the citizens could present the candidates

with
election contracts
in which they demanded new shopping facilities or reminded them that a building needed renovating. The candidates could

then accept these requests if they could be fulfilled within the Party’s plan

(Merl 2007; Richter 2009, 283–295). It was not only pressure and propa-

ganda that ensured a high rate of participation—local negotiations also

played a part. Along with petitions, election campaigns belonged to the

communication channels used for exchanges between the ruling and the

ruled on a local, micro-political level. However, it was by no means close

to being political participation on an effective level.

Most of the articles in this volume were first presented and discussed at

a conference on Elections under 20th century Dictatorships, which took

place in 2009 at the University of Cologne. The editors would like to thank

the
Faculty of Arts and Humanities
as well as the
Center for Comparative European Studies
for their financial and organizational support, as well as Miryam Marthiensen and Felix Kramer for their invaluable help in organizing the

conference and in the editing of this book. Many grateful thanks are also

due to the Fritz Thyssen Research Foundation (
Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung für

Wissenschaftsförderung
), as well as the Federal Foundation for the Reappraisal of the SED Dictatorship (
Bundesstiftung zur Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur
).

Without their generous financial support neither the conference nor the

publication of this book would have been possible.

30

R A L P H J E S S E N A N D H E D W I G R I C H T E R

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