Kennedy: The Classic Biography (47 page)

The financial sacrifice required was considerable. Even by the standards of state and local government, Federal executives were paid shockingly low salaries. The Superintendent of Schools in La Due, Missouri, received a higher salary than the Secretary of Defense (and McNamara’s earnings at the Ford Motor Company had been $410,000 the previous year). The Chief Probate Judge of Cook County, Illinois, was paid more than the Secretary of State. The city of Los Angeles alone offered twenty-eight positions more highly paid than any Cabinet post.

Kennedy wanted a ministry of talent. Several limitations and pressures beset him in his hunt for the best. Most of his previous contacts and friendships were in two fields—politics and journalism. Most of them were in the East. Many of the best members of Congress preferred the security and seniority of their seats to the Executive Branch, and in many cases could help us more by staying where they were. Each private pressure group in a particular field, such as labor or agriculture, put forward names unacceptable to other groups in the same field. It was difficult, the President-elect found, to check quietly on a man’s ability and philosophy without arousing his expectations, his Democratic Senator’s irritation and some party faction’s opposition. Names of those supposedly under consideration—some of which he had never even heard or considered—continually leaked out to the press, which promptly concluded they were deliberate “trial balloons” on the part of Kennedy. Even personality problems cropped up. He was, for example, irritated by Stevenson’s delay in deciding on the UN Ambassadorship and publicly announced that it had been offered in order to make rejection all the more difficult.

There were also pressures of time. Clifford and Neustadt both urged him to appoint a Budget Director almost immediately. Eisenhower, the press emphasized, had announced his final Cabinet choice by December 1, which was the day Kennedy announced his first (Ribicoff). Even after he had completed his full Cabinet on December 17 (with Day), some sixty additional key policy posts and several hundred more key positions remained to be filled, and he was determined not to delegate to the Cabinet full discretion in the selection of the “sub-Cabinet.”

The process was arduous as well as long and deliberate. “This is the one part of the job I had hoped would be fun,” the President-elect had remarked somewhat sardonically as we wearily reviewed names one night in Palm Beach. “But these are the decisions that could make or break us all.” He lacked neither advice nor assistance. In the first large-scale organized effort of its kind ever undertaken by a newly elected political party, Larry O’Brien and Sarge Shriver did a skillful job of meticulously screening the qualifications of tens of hundreds of applications and recommendations, for positions high and low. Aided by Dungan, Wofford, Donahue and Adam Yarmolinsky, they not only received names but searched for new ones. Their vast card file of candidate evaluations was both less systematic and more sensible than some news stories reported.

In this operation Bob Kennedy played a major role, and each Cabinet member, when appointed, had an important voice in the selection of his subordinates. Kennedy advisers with backgrounds in special areas—particularly Paul Samuelson on economics and finance, Jerome Wiesner on science and defense and Chester Bowles on foreign affairs—submitted influential lists. Those of us who had no direct responsibility for personnel were nevertheless deluged by calls and communications from campaign workers, contributors, friends and old college classmates (including a great many never previously heard of). Advice poured in from most members of the Senate and from several members of his family.
²
Clifford and Neustadt on occasion gave names to fit the jobs their memoranda described. Other sages were consulted, including the Vice President-elect, Dag Hammarskjöld, Dean Acheson, Walter Lippmann, John McCloy and particularly Robert Lovett (with Kennedy trying in vain to draft the latter two for Cabinet positions—McCloy did accept a temporary assignment in the disarmament effort and filled it admirably).

But for the top thirty to fifty jobs, the bulk of the work and all the final decisions rested with Kennedy. He personally interviewed dozens, studied the writings and qualifications of others and placed calls all over the country to check references. “What do you know about this man?” he would ask. “How well do you know him—is he just a lot of talk?” He was endowed with unusually good instincts for sizing up good men. He was also fortunate in possessing both the personal magnetism and the powers of persuasion that enabled him to attract good men, to win them to his banner and to induce them to serve their country. He stayed in close touch with the Shriver office (calling Shriver’s office late one night from Palm Beach and finding only a secretary present, he good-naturedly “demanded” that she confess “who is leaking all the names”), but he kept his list of Cabinet possibilities in his head rather than in a card file.

He preferred to avoid any names that would not receive Senate confirmation or a security clearance. But he had no hesitation about naming all the favorite targets of the extreme right, many of whom violently disagreed with each other: Bowles, Stevenson, Acheson, Galbraith, Mrs. Roosevelt, Schlesinger, Kennan, Bohlen, Nitze, the Bundys, Robert Weaver, Murrow and Mennen Williams. He was neither impressed by great fortune nor afraid of great intellects. When his brilliant economic adviser James Tobin at first demurred on the grounds that he was something of an “ivory tower economist,” the President-elect replied, “That’s all right—I’m something of an ivory tower President.” He did, in fact, appoint to important posts a higher proportion of academicians, including fifteen Rhodes scholars, than any other President in history including Roosevelt—more even than those European governments in which intellectuals abound only in the lesser civil service positions. His appointees, it was observed, had among them written more books than the President could read in a four-year term, even at twelve hundred words per minute.

But most of Kennedy’s academicians had previous government experience, just as many of his politicians and businessmen had previously been writers or teachers. He wanted men who could both think and act, “men of ability who can do things…people with good judgment.” The qualities he sought largely mirrored his own: an outlook more practical than theoretical and more logical than ideological; an ability to be precise and concise; a willingness to learn, to do, to dare, to change; and an ability to work hard and long, creatively, imaginatively, successfully.

His search succeeded. The men he picked were for the most part men who thought his thoughts, spoke his language and put their country and Kennedy ahead of any other concern. They were scrupulously honest; not even a suspicion of scandal ever tainted the Kennedy Cabinet. They were, like him, dedicated but unemotional, young but experienced, articulate but soft-spoken. There were no crusaders, fanatics or extremists from any camp; all were nearer the center than either left or right. All spoke with the same low-keyed restraint that marked their chief, yet all shared his deep conviction that they could change America’s drift. They liked government, they liked politics, they liked Kennedy and they believed implicitly in him. Their own feelings of pride—
our
feelings, for I was proud to be one of them—could be summed up in a favorite Kennedy passage from Shakespeare’s
King Henry
V in his speech on the St. Crispin’s Day battle:

…
we…shall be remembered—

We few, we happy few, we band of brothers…

And gentlemen…now abed

Shall think themselves accurs’d they were not here.

Those finally appointed were not always his first tentative selections. A farm leader—whom he had practically chosen to be his Secretary of Agriculture on the basis of a review of all the names—-talked, when summoned to his first meeting with the President-elect in Georgetown, only in terms of generalities and stereotypes. “It was so boring,” the President-elect told us afterward, “and the living room was so warm, that I actually fell asleep.” Orville Freeman, who had resisted the job, but was far more in the Kennedy image, was induced the next day to accept it.

Although he named far fewer businessmen than his predecessor, Kennedy scoured the business community seeking able administrators, particularly for the foreign aid program. And while he insisted on men loyal to his philosophy, he retained a far larger proportion of the previous administration’s officials and appointed far more opposition party members to sensitive posts than his immediate predecessor had done eight years earlier. I doubt, in fact, whether any new President bringing a change of party displayed so much bipartisanship in his initial appointments.

He worried longest over his selection of a Secretary of State, admitting to me that those aspirants whom he did not know had an advantage over those whose deficiencies as well as abilities he knew well. He worried the least over the postmaster-generalship, deciding almost as an afterthought that it would be well to have a Westerner. He privately predicted that the nomination of his brother as Attorney General (“Let’s announce it at midnight,” he said) would prove to be his most controversial choice then and one of his wisest choices later, and he was right on both counts.

There were other controversies. A New Deal economist said Kennedy had surrounded himself with too many “businessmen and bankers,” and a top businessman said the team contained too many academic “theorists.” Republicans stressed that four of the ten Cabinet members were Harvard graduates (overlooking the fact that Eisenhower’s Cabinet also had four and Theodore Roosevelt’s five, although not all at the same time). Actually his appointees came from every background. But John Kennedy, in selecting his associates, did not pretend or attempt to achieve an average cross-section of the country—he wanted the best.

The entire list of several hundred appointees would not prove to be wholly free of mistakes, from the Cabinet level on down. Some exceeded the President’s expectations and some failed to fulfill them. Noted men rarely equal their reputations—some are better, some are worse. In some instances the right kind of man was given the wrong kind of job. But as a group the remarkably high quality of Kennedy’s appointees reflected his own remarkable search for a true “ministry of talent.” My participation as a member of the Kennedy White House staff is still too recent to permit me to give an objective account of its personnel and their part in the government, but that part was too important to omit from any account of the Kennedy Presidency.

Our roles should not be exaggerated. We wielded no secret influence. We did not replace the role of Cabinet officers, compete with them for power or publicity, or block their access to the President. We could not impose our own views, nor assert the President’s views, nor speak in the President’s voice, without his prior or subsequent approval. “I will continue to have some residual functions,” the President said drily when told of the tremendous powers being ascribed to one aide.

President Kennedy tremendously increased and improved his own impact on the Executive Branch by the use of his personal staff. He knew that it was humanly impossible for him to know all that he would like to know, see everyone who deserved to be seen, read all that he ought to read, write every message that carried his name and take part in all meetings affecting his plans. He also knew that, in his administration, Cabinet members could make recommendations on major matters, but only the President could make decisions; and that he could not afford to accept, without seeking an independent judgment, the products and proposals of departmental advisers whose responsibilities did not require them to look, as he and his staff looked, at the government and its programs as a whole. He required a personal staff, therefore—one that represented
his
personal ways, means and purposes—to summarize and analyze those products and proposals for him, to refine the conflicting views of various agencies, to define the issues which he had to decide, to help place his personal imprint upon them, to make certain that practical political facts were never overlooked, and to enable him to make his decisions on the full range of
his
considerations and constituencies, which no Cabinet member shared.

Contrary to reports that President Kennedy, in Rooseveltian fashion, encouraged conflict and competition among and between his staff and Cabinet, our role was one of building governmental unity rather than splintering responsibility. Two dozen or more Kennedy assistants gave him two dozen or more sets of hands, eyes and ears, two dozen or more minds attuned to his own. They could talk with legislators, bureaucrats, newsmen, experts, Cabinet members and politicians—serve on interdepartmental task forces—review papers and draft speeches, letters and other documents—spot problems before they were crises and possibilities before they were proposals—screen requests for legislation, Executive Orders, jobs, appointments with the President, patronage and Presidential speeches—and bear his messages, look out for his interests, carry out his orders and make certain his decisions were executed.

In those areas where his interest and knowledge were limited, the scope of our discretion was often large. But even in those instances we did not make major decisions for him. Our role was to enable him to have more time, facts and judgments with which to make them himself—to increase
his
influence, not ours; to preserve his options, not his ego; to make certain that questions were not foreclosed or answers required before he had an opportunity to place his imprint upon them. In the words of Neustadt’s postelection memorandum, our task was to get “information in his mind and key decisions in his hands reliably enough and soon enough to give him room for maneuver.” That imposed upon him heavy burdens of overseeing everything we were doing, but he much preferred those burdens to the handicaps of being merely a clerk in his own office, caught up in the routines and recommendations of others.