Lethal Trajectories (58 page)

Chinese military structure:
The armed forces of the People’s Republic of China are referred to as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The navy is referred to as PLA Navy, or PLAN. The PLA is formally under the command of the Central Military Commission, which reports through a joint state government and party system, often chaired by the president.

A number of situational constructs in this chapter set the stage for the remainder of the book. The more noteworthy ones are as follows:

The New Cold War:
Unlike the previous cold war between the U.S.S.R. and Western powers, the new cold war between China and the United States is being fought over resources and markets, not ideology. While less confrontational than the players in the previous cold war, China has become more assertive about protecting its economic interests. Current trends suggest the pendulum is swinging more in China’s favor, given its relative strength to the United States and other Western powers.

China is now a global economic juggernaut surpassing the United States in energy used, greenhouse gases emitted, and new automobiles sold. With GDP growth rates almost four times that of the United States’, China could approach GDP parity with America by the 2020s if current trajectories continue. (In fact, a recent IMF Report even suggested China could overtake the GDP of the United States as early as year-end 2016.) The concomitant requirements for more oil, commodities, freshwater, and world market shares will create a strain on finite global resources, causing price escalations and potential conflicts. In response, China is bolstering its military power. Indeed, stress points are now appearing regularly in the form of conflicts in the South and East China Sea and growing friction with India over Himalayan water supplies.

China’s trade surpluses, manufacturing prowess, lower cost structures, and capital surpluses give it distinct competitive advantages. Its long-term strategic focus on infrastructure development and renewable energy systems, and its quest to lock in access to scarce resources, all but guarantee its continued economic growth.

Unencumbered by the political preconditions on trade imposed by the United States and other nations (e.g., lack of overt human-rights abuses, adherence to fair labor laws, and so forth), China is a less demanding business partner for many countries. China’s boilerplate strategy seems to be to invest in the infrastructure of a new trading partner, usually in a manner that secures access to physical resources such as oil fields. The raw materials China imports are then turned into finished goods, which are sold back to the host country and others, often along with military equipment and high-tech goods. As an added inducement, China’s veto power in the UN Security Council can provide air cover for regimes fearful of sanctions. It is a win-win for China, as it ensures the continued employment of its massive work force and builds global clout through economic partnerships and not military power. China also owns a growing portion of Western economies—particularly the United States—in the form of large infrastructure investments, T-bill holdings, and massive dollar amounts held by its central banks.

Power structure in the People’s Republic of China:
The structural labyrinth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is complex. While the dominant power resides in the Communist Party of China (CPC), the CPC’s central focus of power resides in the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). While the workings of the PSC are not well understood outside of China, it is known to be a nine-person group that meets weekly, and it is believed to make big decisions by consensus. The larger oversight body is the twenty-four person Politburo, and Politburo members generally hold key positions in government and have a voice in key personnel matters. For purposes of this book, the title
Chairman
was used in place of the title
President,
which is now used in the PRC. As in the book, the president often holds multiple positions of power in China.

China’s SCO Pact and other alliances:
As a lead partner in the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO), China is aligned with Russia and the oil-rich “stans” of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Iran, Pakistan, and other countries have observer status in the SCO. The SCO gives China access to oil and political influence in a pivotal region of the world. China has also secured a growing presence in the oil-belt areas of Africa and South America, including the new Brazilian deepwater oil fields. China’s current investments in Venezuela have provided Hugo Chavez with an alternative market for his oil, presumably replacing shipments to the United States.

China’s blue-water navy:
A “blue-water” navy is one capable of operating on the high seas, as compared to a “brown-water” navy operating mainly within the confines of a nation’s coastal waters. China’s navy is ramping up its blue-water capability with strategic implications for current maritime powers. That decision reflects China’s desire to a) protect the security of international sea lanes to the Gulf Region and other distant trade partners, b) establish firmer control of the mineral-rich seabeds of the South and East China Sea, and c) extend its reach beyond the South China Sea and Philippines into what is called the second island chain, reaching out to Guam and overlapping the American navy’s area of supremacy. While not an immediate threat to American sea power, China is devoting about a third of its military budget to the development of its navy, with the most impressive growth taking place in their submarine fleet.

National security apparatus in the United States:
Following the 9/11 attack and subsequent investigations of America’s intelligence failures, the intelligence-gathering apparatus of the United States was reorganized under the National Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. A director of national intelligence was appointed to lead a sixteen-member intelligence community in directing the national intelligence program. Within this framework, presidents have tended to massage the National Security Council and Situation Room activities to best suit their styles. This book assumes that the U.S. intelligence apparatus was reorganized after a failed terrorist attempt to detonate an electromagnetic pulse bomb over the eastern seaboard in 2015 was made public. The restructured intelligence community in the book more closely resembles the intelligence apparatus existing prior to 2004.

Exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS):
The definition of territorial waters has become increasingly important as a determinant for jurisdictional ownership of underwater resources (i.e., oil, natural gas, seabed mining, etc.) The standard practice today is to use the 200-nautical-mile EEZ line set out in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea. Unfortunately, ambiguities in UNCLOS and the EEZ definitions have left the door open for conflict, and disagreements are likely to worsen as resources become tighter. The Chunxiao Incident is but one example of a potential conflict over disputed territorial waters.

Perhaps no one has more at stake with respect to UNCLOS directions than the United States, which has vast coastal areas and a blue-water navy to protect its interests. Significant future conflicts are possible in the Arctic waters and other areas where climate-change has melted the sea ice, making underwater areas more accessible to seabed mining. Gulf Coast exploration—particularly off the Florida Keys—could also create an area of conflict.

American–Japanese Security Treaty:
The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan was signed on January 19, 1960. It was a one-sided commitment whereby the United States agreed to assist Japan in case of armed attack on a Japanese-administered territory, but which precluded Japan from assisting America by virtue of their constitutional ban on overseas deployments of their armed forces. Over time, Japan has relied less on outsourcing their military protection to the United States. On February 19, 2009, the two countries signed a bilateral agreement to redeploy the III Marine Expeditionary Force from Okinawa to Guam. For purposes of this book, Japan’s trajectory away from dependence on American military power has been assumed to continue.

OPEC:
The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries began operations in January 1961. The organization was designed to safeguard its members’ interests both individually and collectively and to stabilize the oil markets and safeguard members’ revenue streams. Its 2011 membership was: Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.

This oil powerhouse holds about 70 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and produces about a third of the world’s oil. Saudi Arabia is the driving force within the cartel, with the largest surplus capacity. As oil production by members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (see chapter 21 notes) and other non-OPEC countries continues to decline, OPEC is increasingly viewed as the prime source of new oil to meet future energy needs. Oil-production trajectories suggest that OPEC will garner an even larger market share—and with it a commensurate increase in power and leverage—as non-OPEC production declines.

In a sense, the world oil markets are betting the farm on OPEC’s ability and willingness to produce the oil necessary to meet future demand. The problems with this scenario are threefold: 1) OPEC oil reserve numbers are not audited, and there is widespread concern that OPEC may not have the reserves they claim to have. This concern was exacerbated by the mysterious increase in oil reserves claimed by several OPEC producers toward the turn of the last century. 2) The capital required to explore and develop new oil discoveries is immense. Future production is predicated on the willingness of the national oil companies to undertake such ventures even though their revenue streams can be more easily secured through price increases. 3) The Saudis have hinted that they may slow or halt future oil exploration to save their oil wealth. Saudi Arabia, like other OPEC nations, will also continue to consume more of its own oil, leaving less available for export.

Religious extremism:
This book has deliberately refrained from referring to a specific religious group or sect for two very important reasons: 1) there is an inherent danger in stereotyping and pigeonholing the multiple beliefs of any given religion into a one-size-fits-all box, and 2) to do so may lead to misrepresentations or, worse, disrespect for a specific religion. It is not unusual, for example, to see non-Arab sources refer to Wahhabism, the state religion of Saudi Arabia, as the underlying source for Saudi extremism. However, that is somewhat analogous to blaming John Calvin for all Christian extremism. Accordingly, references to a movement will not be ascribed to a specific sect, but rather in generic terms such as “extremists” or “fundamental extremists.” It is not the intent of this book to disrespect or make false representations about any religion, and anything leading to that interpretation is unintentional.

Saudi coup threats:
There is tension in Saudi Arabia between the House of Saud and opponents of the regime who see it as being too closely aligned with Western powers and permissive of Western ways. Saudi leadership performs an intricate balancing act in managing their oil-based economy, which is dependent on alignments with foreign governments and markets, while being sensitive to domestic pressures calling for greater enforcement of fundamentalist beliefs and more widespread sharing of the national wealth. There have been coup attempts and uprisings in the past—even schisms within the royal family; a violent regime change at some future date is not outside the realm of possibility. Recent attempts by the Saudi regime to tone down advocates of extremism might, in fact, have the unintended effect of sowing the seeds for a future backlash.

The chain reaction of so-called Arab Spring uprisings throughout North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 revealed the vulnerability of many, if not all, autocratic regimes. Given the younger demographics of the Arab world, where almost a third of the population is under age thirty, frustrations with a perceived lack of freedom and economic opportunity made geopolitical instability almost a given. Interestingly, as recently as March 18, 2011, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia made a rare televised appearance to announce economic and social reforms, apparently aware of volatility in his own kingdom.

Dirty bombs:
A dirty bomb is a radiologic dispersion device (RDD). It uses conventional explosives to spread radioactive material that can make areas uninhabitable for varying lengths of time. The half-life toxicity of the RDD—and thus, the amount of time an area is uninhabitable—depends on the radioactive substance used in the bomb. Gamma radiation-emitting materials such as plutonium-238, strontium-90, and cesium-137 are particularly toxic. With a highly toxic material that has been chemically or physically altered—weaponized—for maximum toxicity, an RDD’s radioactivity could render an area uninhabitable for decades.

Is a dirty-bomb scenario feasible? Consider this: in his book,
Secrets of the Kingdom: The Inside Story of the Saudi–U.S. Connection
(Random House, 2005), author Gerald Posner revealed that the Saudi government has a doomsday system in place, dubbed “petroleum scorched earth” or “Petro SE” by the NSA, that would destroy their entire oil infrastructure in the event of an enemy takeover. Developed after the Gulf War, it was meant as a deterrent to any would-be aggressors in that it negated any purposeful reason for an invasion. It was built with a number of fail-safe systems and codes to prevent an inadvertent detonation, and one might assume that the codes and procedures are among the Saudi government’s most closely held secrets. It takes little imagination to suggest the introduction of a radioactive element to enhance the lethality of the dirty-bomb defense system.

EMP weaponry:
The electromagnetic pulse produced by a nuclear explosion has been a known concept since almost the inception of atomic warfare. A nuclear bomb exploded high in the Earth’s atmosphere sends out an electromagnetic pulse that destroys or damages all electronic systems in its path in a nanosecond. Its effectiveness depends on the size of the explosion, altitude of detonation, and orientation with respect to geomagnetic fields.

The major effect of the EMP weapon is to destroy all electronic circuitry. The destruction caused by an EMP detonation high over an industrialized nation heavily dependent on electronic systems would be of staggering proportions. Such a strike would affect everyone, disabling everything from military targeting systems to business computer networks to home ventilation systems and critical hospital monitoring equipment. The specter of terrorists detonating a nuclear device atop a scud missile launched from a tramp freighter off the East Coast of the United States is chilling. As delivery systems—such as those possessed by Iran and North Korea—become more sophisticated and nuclear warheads more miniaturized for easier delivery, the threat grows.

Black-market nuclear weaponry:
Since the end of the Cold War, thousands of nuclear warheads have been dismantled, leaving tons of weapons-grade uranium in various stages of secure storage. Because it takes only a few kilograms of enriched plutonium to make a crude nuclear device—and far less for a dirty bomb—black-market uranium sales have grown lucrative. There have been several reported incidents of attempted transfers of weapons-grade uranium, and one can only imagine how many transactions went undetected. There is also concern that nuclear bomb-making blueprints are available on the black market. Nations like North Korea have been ingenious in importing materials needed for bomb-making and demonstrate the capacity for a committed buyer with a huge checkbook to secure high-tech weapons. As the proliferation of nuclear weaponry continues, it is not hard to imagine the sale of a turnkey nuclear weapon to a superwealthy buyer. A nonnuclear nation with cruise missile or intermediate-range ballistic missile capability could become an instant nuclear power with acquisition of such weaponry. Such is the scenario suggested in this book.

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC):
Created in May 1981, the GCC represents several Persian Gulf nations, 2011 membership being Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The alliance was designed to foster security, economic growth, and political ties. Collectively, the GCC possesses almost half of the world’s known oil reserves, and Saudi Arabia is the most powerful member of the alliance. Control of or access to the GCC would enhance the leverage of an oil-producing nation, a scenario suggested in the book.