Modern Islamist Movements: History, Religion, and Politics (36 page)

advantange. Pakistani government officials accused the Jama(at of pro-Indian sympathies and anti-Pakistani endeavors. Based on these suspicions, the government imprisoned Mawdudi and a large number of other members of the Jama(at, declaring the organization seditious and similar to communist parties (which the Jama(at vehemently opposed) in its potential to undermine the state and national security. The Pakistani government’s imprisonment of Mawdudi and other members of the Jama(at indicated that it felt threatened by the Jama(at’s public denouncements of its policy in Kashmir. This sequence of events reinforced the Jama(at’s role in religious and political discourse in Pakistan and increased the attention the government gave to the Jama(at and other Islamist groups. These events also increased those groups’ potential to influence religious and political debates in Pakistan. Pakistan’s government was not able to abolish the Jama(at nor was the government successful in removing it or other Islamist groups from influencing politics in the country. Indeed, while Mawdudi was in prison, he continued his religious and political work, influencing a large number of leaders and other Pakistanis in an attempt to move Pakistan closer to the Jama(at’s Islamist vision for Pakistan. Mawdudi’s imprisonment, partly because it demonstrated his commitment to his Islamist principles and his opposition to the Pakistani government, increased his already prominent stature among many Islamists in Pakistan.79

The Jama(at-i Islami and Ayub Khan

Mawdudi was freed from prison in 1950 and the next major set of events related to the Jama(at involved it using its increasing influence to exert pressure on the government with respect to the constitution of 1956. Two of the Jama(at’s and other Islamists’ demands to which the government acceded and which appeared in the constitution included naming the state the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan” and the establishment of the “repugnancy clause.” This clause stipulated that no laws could be passed that were repugnant to the teachings of the Quran and Hadith and that all of Pakistan’s laws that had been passed until that time could be investigated by Muslim authorities and, if necessary, repealed.80 Mawdudi and the Jama(at quickly accepted the constitution as Islamic and declared yet another victory with respect to what they considered to be Pakistan’s overly secular government.81 Yet, the military coup in 1958 which enabled General Muhammad Ayub Khan to become Pakistan’s President created a situation which hindered the Jama(at from influencing Pakistan’s laws. President Ayub Khan’s modernizing agenda intentionally attempted to block the Jama(at and other Islamists from influencing politics in Pakistan. As Ayub Khan’s regime worked to increase its influence, the Jama(at faced a political establishment that was far

less willing to bend to pressure from the Islamists and far more willing to exert pressure on them. The Ayub Khan administration’s move away from integrating Islamist principles with the state’s ideology and laws caused a tangible loosening of the Jama(at from the apparatus of the state. As the Pakistani state took a more hostile approach to the Jama(at, an approach that was increasingly effective, Mawdudi worked hard to prevent the Jama(at from radicalizing, as, for example, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood had done, and incurred President Nasser’s wrath in the process.82 The job of maintaining the strength and unity of the Jama(at, while preventing it from radicalizing in the face of steady government opposition, was enormously difficult for Mawdudi, who wrote, “We put up with [Pakistani President] Ayub [which is “Job” in Urdu] with the patience of Ayub [Job].”83

Throughout the period of Ayub’s rule, the Jama(at continued in its efforts to Islamize Pakistan’s constitution and its laws, incurring steadfast governmental opposition. However, Ayub Khan was far too clever to oppose the Jama(at’s Islamist goals with secularism alone. Rather, Ayub Khan coopted and adapted liberal Islamic principles (or Islamic modernism) as a way of gaining popular approval for his government and its policies. For example, in a speech to Pakistan’s ulema in May 1959, Ayub Khan stated that Pakistan and the ulema must rid themselves of the forms of Islam which block progress (which implied the Jama(at’s form of Islamism for example), and interpret religion in ways that promoted the country’s progress and fought communism.84 During the period from approximately 1958 until 1968, Pakistan’s governmental leaders, including Ayub Khan, promoted Islamic modernism as a way of attempting to block groups such as the Jama(at-i Islami from Islamizing the country. Islamist groups were forced to retreat from many of their efforts in the face of the government’s relative success in combating them. The Pakistani government closed the offices of the Jama(at and related organizations. It also denounced the Jama(at in many of its publications and it restricted almost all of the Jama(at’s endeavors.85

The government imprisoned Mawdudi twice during Ayub Khan’s presidency. As Ayub Khan’s government increasingly restricted the Jama(at’s work, the Jama(at placed a higher priority on removing Ayub Khan from power and on creating an environment in Pakistan that would be conducive to its Islamist objectives.86 Thus, during the 1960s the Jama(at attempted to build coalitions with non-Islamist parties in Pakistan which may have agreed with at least a few of the Jama(at’s policies. In general, the Jama(at found agreement with non-Islamist parties on such principles as the removal of Ayub Khan’s military government from power and the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Indeed, in 1965 the Jama(at supported the presidential candidacy of Fatimah Jinnah, who was the sister of the first Governor- General of Pakistan after Pakistani independence, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. This move by the Jama(at could be considered particularly unusual given the

fact that the Jama(at stood strongly in favor of the principle that only men, specifically Muslim men, should hold political office. Yet, at the same time, the Jama(at’s support of Fatimah Jinnah could be viewed as an example of its pragmatism and the lengths it would go – even to the point of contradicting crucial aspects of its own ideology – in its attempt to remove Ayub Khan from power. Thus, during Ayub Khan’s presidency, the Jama(at functioned, in some ways, like a typical political party.87

Some of the results of this change in the status of the Jama(at, from being primarily a resistance organization to being a political party, became all the more obvious in the period after Ayub’s presidency, which ended in 1969. In 1970, the Jama(at took part in elections with the hope of claiming power. In spite of vigorous campaigning on the part of various candidates who were members of the Jama(at, the party won only four seats in Pakistan’s National Assembly and four seats in some provincial assemblies in the country at large.88 In 1971, the Jama(at responded to the possibility of civil war in East Pakistan by activating itself in support of Pakistan’s central government and by participating in that government’s unsuccessful attempt to prevent East Pakistan from seceding as Bangladesh.89

The Jama(at-i Islami, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and Muhammad Zia ul-Haq

The secession of East Pakistan, the establishment of Bangladesh as an independent country, and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto becoming President of Pakistan in 1971 increasingly catalyzed the Jama(at’s political activity. One factor that spurred the Jama(at’s efforts was the Pakistan People’s Party’s largely secularist, socialist, and nationalist ideology. Viewing Bhutto’s political orientation as utterly antithetical to its Islamist principles, the Jama(at led a religious and political movement that intentionally appealed to Pakistanis’ Muslim sensibilities in its attempts to weaken Bhutto’s regime.90 While the Jama(at’s opposition to Ayub had enabled Islamist groups and groups with Islamist leanings to form a coalition resisting his presidency, opposition to Bhutto was solidified with Islam as the guiding principle.91 The Jama(at’s Islamist vision played a major role in consolidating the pro- Islamist and anti-Bhutto alliance, as the Jama(at and its coalition partners engaged in a nationwide grassroots resistance to Bhutto’s government. The Jama(at’s leadership in the opposition to Bhutto gave it increased popularity in much of Pakistan during this period. In the election of 1977, which is often believed to be an election where fraudulent means were used to favor Bhutto and his allies, the Jama(at won nine of the 36 parliamentary seats won by the opposition.92 During the anti-government protests which followed the elections, the Jama(at became even more popular. In this period,

the Jama(at, using its extensive grassroots networks in much of Pakistan, led protests which eventually severely weakened Bhutto, whose presidency ended in 1973.93 Later, the Jama(at’s activism created the environment for a military coup d’état in Pakistan in 1977.94

General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq seized power from President Bhutto in a bloodless coup on July 5, 1977, and became Pakistan’s chief martial-law administrator while retaining his position as the Pakistani Army’s Chief of Staff. As Zia came to power, many Islamists, including members of the Jama(at, began to gain the impression that even though they might not be senior partners in Zia’s government, they could potentially operate in a favorable political environment and benefit from some governmental support. The strong ideological relationship between Zia’s government and the Jama(at produced what one member of the Jama(at called “a mother– daughter relationship” between those two entities.95 Zia hoped to buttress the power of his government by incorporating Islamist parties, such as the Jama(at, into his regime in such a way that he could maximize his influence on them. Thus, through this eventually failed strategy of making these Islamist parties his allies instead of his opponents, he tried to neutralize their influence. In this process of attempted accommodation, Zia incorporated the demands of the Jama(at and other Islamist parties into state ideology, thereby offering the Islamist parties a power-sharing arrangement in which the state would act as the senior partner, while the Islamist parties would benefit from the government’s support and be able to engage in a limited amount of political work. This strategy had circumscribed short- term success because it appealed to the Jama(at’s and other Islamists’ desire to spread their ideas. However, this strategy failed in the long term because it contradicted the Islamists’ goal of eventually completely Islamizing the whole of Pakistan. As this contradiction became increasingly noticeable to the Jama(at and other Islamists, and as other factors came into play, the political alliance between the Islamists, including the Jama(at, and Zia’s regime unraveled.96

Yet, before the coalition between the Jama(at and Zia’s regime was formalized, there were several policy areas where the Zia regime and the Jama(at cooperated. For example, the Jama(at and Zia’s regime cooperated in a comprehensive Islamization program within Pakistan which was introduced in February 1979 with the establishment of Islamic laws related to taxation and severe Islamic punishments for violations of codes which the Islamists interpreted as existing in the Quran, Hadith, and example of the Prophet. The Jama(at asserted that these new laws were the positive results of its continuing efforts to establish Islamic law in Pakistan. However, Islamization created friction between the Zia regime and the Jama(at because while both sides supported the general idea of Islamization, over time they disagreed on the actual content of it.97

The Jama(at-i Islami, Zia, and Afghanistan

While the Jama(at and Zia’s government may have disagreed on certain aspects of domestic policy, they largely agreed on Pakistan’s policy on Afghanistan, particularly after the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, which began in December 1979. For example, after the Soviet invasion of that country the Jama(at played a significant role in generating support among many Pakistanis for the efforts of the Jama(at and other Islamist groups in supporting the mujahideen, which was a large group of Afghan and non-Afghan Muslims who fought the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from the time the invasion began until it ended in 1989. Soon after the Soviet military entered Afghanistan, Zia tried to strengthen his ties with the Jama(at and consulted with them on his Afghan policy so as to give the Pakistani public the impression that his government and the Jama(at were united in their opposition to the Soviet invasion, which in large part they were. Zia and the Jama(at also declared that the war in which the mujahideen and other Islamist forces were engaging against“the atheistic and anti-Islamic Soviets” was a physical jihad.98

This coalition between Zia and the Jama(at was beneficial to both sides, especially to the Jama(at in that it established a close relationship between the Jama(at, on the one hand, and the Pakistani Army and security forces, on the other, while opening the upper levels of the Pakistani government to the Jama(at and its influence. This cooperative arrangement also gave the Jama(at an integral role in the flow of money and arms to the mujahideen. During this period, the Jama(at also used its close relationship with the Pakistani government as a way of providing the members of its organization, who so desired, military training and direct combat experience in Afghanistan.99

Through these avenues, the Jama(at influenced – with its Islamist ideology – the mujahideen and Afghan refugees both inside and outside of Afghanistan, beginning in the 1980s. The Jama(at’s impact on at least some Afghan refugees increased its positive reputation among Islamists in much of the majority-Muslim world and gave many Muslims throughout the world the impression that the Jama(at was concerned about the welfare of Muslims inside and outside of Pakistan. The Jama(at’s active support of the mujahideen benefited Zia because he could utilize that organization for a foreign policy objective, namely ousting the Soviets from Afghanistan, while partially diverting the Jama(at from influencing domestic politics. At the same time, the Jama(at used its support of the mujahideen as one way of justifying and sustaining its close ties with Zia’s regime. The Jama(at’s leaders and others within the organization interpreted its relationship with Zia’s government and its support of the mujahideen as beneficial because they seemed to increase the party’s power.100