Nelson: Britannia's God of War (16 page)

He had also been ordered to ensure there were sufficient transports in hand to evacuate Corsica.
⁴⁷
With Bonaparte at Leghorn with his fellow Corsican, the political agent Saliceti, the French threat to Corsica was greatly increased. Small bodies of men were landed to sow dissension among the populace. Nelson recognised the danger, advising Elliot to seize the island of Elba and the key harbour of Porto Ferraio from the Tuscans. Elliot agreed, urging Nelson to act without waiting for Jervis’s sanction.
⁴⁸
Meanwhile Jervis had ordered him to institute a close blockade of Leghorn, which could not be considered a neutral harbour while under French occupation. After spending so much time in the city he was distressed by the suffering of the evacuees, although it would appear that Adelaide Correglia was not among them.
⁴⁹
Nelson and Elliot quickly concocted plans to seize Elba, writing to Jervis to report the bloodless seizure of the harbour on 10 July.
⁵⁰

Jervis was delighted – doubly so, since Spencer had confirmed Nelson as a commodore. He also advised Elliot to rely on Nelson’s advice when handling troublesome Corsican privateers operating under British authority, because ‘he is a reasonable and disinterested man in money matters’.
⁵¹
Elliot needed no prompting: after thanking Nelson for his action at Elba he asked him to handle complex financial transactions at Genoa.
⁵²

While Nelson hoped the Austrian and Neapolitan armies would recover Leghorn, and seized on any rumour of allied success,
⁵³
the war was moving away from the coast. Bonaparte’s rapid and ruthless advance drove the old-fashioned, slow-moving armies of the
ancien
régime
from post to post. Amidst the confusion Nelson reflected that the King of Naples had been England’s ‘most faithful ally’,
⁵⁴
an opinion that would influence his actions three years later. The Austrians were ‘too inactive. They look to us for impossibilities.’
⁵⁵
Finding the constant diplomatic fencing with the government of the Genoese republic unrewarding, he advocated more extreme measures, and had to be restrained by Elliot and Jervis. The latter, though convinced of Nelson’s zeal and determination, had no evidence of any higher talent for fleet action or politics: he called his commodore ‘an excellent partisan’ who did not ‘sufficiently weigh consequences’.
⁵⁶
It was perhaps
fortunate that Jervis had no competent admirals and that Nelson was the senior captain.

The precarious situation of the small French garrison at Leghorn seemed open for exploitation. Nelson was running a very tight blockade, and local intelligence suggested that the populace might rise against the French, allowing a small British expedition to secure the town. After his experience on Corsica, he was anxious to find a ‘suitable soldier’ – meaning one young enough to be under his command. Elliot dashed his dreams, stressing that General De Burgh, the ranking officer on Corsica, would command.
⁵⁷
The limited British force could only be used to follow up Austrian success in the main theatre, where rumours abounded that Bonaparte had died of his wounds.
⁵⁸

Such optimism soon dissolved. With Spain about to join the war, Jervis faced the prospect that a powerful Franco-Spanish fleet from Cadiz would attack while he blockaded Toulon. He was caught between two fleets, each numerically superior. To lessen the numerical disadvantage he recalled the two battleships off Leghorn, leaving Nelson with his pendant flying in a frigate to support Elliot with smaller craft.
⁵⁹
With the picture darkening rapidly, Britain’s Mediterranean strategy was on the point of dissolution, and the main players were preparing for the worst.

Nelson understood the significance of the Corsican presence in the French army, and although he kept a brave face in public, he realised the island must fall if the Austrians were defeated.
⁶⁰
He advised Elliot that the best defence would be to attack the French at Leghorn.
⁶¹
He was not troubled by the threat of a Spanish fleet, having absolute faith that the tactical skill and seamanship of Jervis would secure a victory over any enemy.
⁶²
By the end of August, however, the Leghorn operation had been abandoned, and the troops from Corsica were sent back to Gibraltar.
⁶³

A brief period with the fleet off Toulon convinced Nelson that Jervis had the French under control. He returned to Genoa to withdraw the British merchants, and found himself acting for the British minister. Although this was ‘much against my inclination’,
⁶⁴
he exploited the opportunity to impose a more logical policy on Genoa. The Genoese would not allow him to load a cargo of bullocks bought for the fleet, fearing a French takeover. When the Genoese fired on his squadron he did not dignify the insult with a reply, but used it as a pretext to carry out more useful actions, seizing a French bomb vessel from under batteries
at San Pietro d’Arena on 11 September, blockading the harbour and seizing the Genoese island of Capraja on 18 September with Elliot’s concurrence.
⁶⁵
Jervis could not resist sending Nelson’s reports to Spencer: few men were so capable with either the sword or the pen, and none with both.
⁶⁶

Having played a useful role in the capture of Corsica Nelson was dismayed to find himself preparing to evacuate the British minister, government and troops. The Cabinet had decided to evacuate the Mediterranean in August, unable to spare the necessary naval forces to secure command of the sea when faced by French, Spanish and Dutch fleets, each of which might escort an invasion of the British Isles. Matters became critical when the loss of northern Italy to the French deprived the fleet of vital supplies. If the fleet withdrew, Corsica and Elba would have to be evacuated. Inevitably Jervis selected Nelson, his most dependable, resourceful and independent junior. This prompted a Shakespearian outburst from the Commodore, who quoted from
King
John
on the subject of England meeting the world in arms.
⁶⁷

With Naples about to make peace, and Spain about to make war, the logistics of the fleet were under serious threat, since Sicily and Barcelona had been vital sources of food.
⁶⁸
On 25 September, Jervis finally received the long-anticipated order to evacuate Corsica: the Mediterranean was to be abandoned. He kept his fleet concentrated to cover the operations while Nelson evacuated the island and Captain Cockburn in the frigate
Minerve
blockaded Leghorn.
⁶⁹
Jervis planned to join the Viceroy at Bastia once Rear Admiral Man returned from Cadiz with his squadron.
⁷⁰
Shifting his flag into the sixty-four-gun
Diadem
, Nelson left Leghorn, where a thousand Corsicans were assembling for a landing at Bastia.
⁷¹
He had to remove the garrison and administration from an island in uproar: the local populace were desperate to appease the returning French by turning on the British.

With a squadron of ten warships and thirty transports under his orders, Nelson was in his element. At last he had a major task, albeit a negative one, in which he could show his worth. The operation proceeded better than anyone except he might have expected. The Corsicans at Bastia tried to stop the evacuation and seize the British stores, but when Nelson arrived on 14 October he took his ships close to the town, sent for the local Council and threatened to bombard. This enabled the army and British merchants to remove their stores,
cannon and equipment unhindered, while the rest of the island was changing allegiance.
⁷²
The moral courage Nelson displayed at Bastia secured his place in Elliot’s affections, and marked him as the man for a crisis. Jervis already knew this; he relaxed once he knew Nelson had reached Bastia.
⁷³

Belated orders from London to reverse the evacuation could have thrown the situation into confusion, but Jervis had the wisdom to ignore them.
⁷⁴
It was now too late: the strategic picture was so changed by the hostility of Spain that the island would be invaded as soon as the fleet was drawn out of position, and could not be defended once the enemy were established ashore.
⁷⁵
Nelson took his convoy to Elba, where the troops landed. Always the optimist, he concluded that possession of the tiny island had saved the Smyrna convoy and his own fleet from attack. It promised to be a useful base.
⁷⁶

He left Bastia on 19 October, ‘rich in the praise of my Admiral and the Viceroy’, and all the more satisfied as others had declared that it could not be done. The timing was perfect: twenty-six Spanish battleships appeared off Cape Corse the following day, heading for Toulon. Now all that was required was to bring the Spanish to battle: he was confident the fleet was ready, with an admiral ‘fit to lead them to glory’.
⁷⁷
Jervis agreed that he could beat them ‘with such stuff as I have in this fleet’.
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He praised Nelson’s contribution to the evacuation, but did so within the context of a wider effort by the fleet: Nelson did not evacuate the island single-handedly.
⁷⁹

*

In early November Nelson rejoined the fleet, finding the leisure to catch up with his correspondence. He told Locker that the Franco-Spanish combined fleet was large, but ill-manned and worse commanded, while the British were small, but of unequalled quality.
⁸⁰
But he had reckoned without the incompetence of Man, whose squadron had rejoined the fleet without replenishing stores: Jervis had to send him back to Gibraltar to remedy the oversight. Once there, Man had a crisis of confidence, or perhaps a nervous breakdown, and headed back to England after consulting his captains – something Jervis had specifically ordered him not to do. Man was the only admiral sent on detached duty in 1796, and he had failed. Having lost a third of his fleet, Jervis had to abandon the Mediterranean in some haste. On 22 October the fleet set course for the Straits, taking ships of the Smyrna convoy in tow, in vile, tempestuous weather. This chain of events
depressed Nelson, but his spirits were cheered by Jervis’s very public demonstration of confidence, the presence of Elliot and a charming letter from Spencer praising his ‘spirited, dignified and temperate conduct at Leghorn and Genoa’.
⁸¹
This was the elixir of his genius.

After a few days anchored off Gibraltar, Nelson was ordered on ‘an arduous and most important mission’. He was to shift his flag from the
Captain
into the frigate
Minerve
, and recover the garrison of Elba.
⁸²
This was a hazardous task, requiring him to cross a sea controlled by over forty enemy battleships to the only remaining post under British control, and remain there long enough to embark the naval and military establishment. While Nelson was honoured by the trust, it is unlikely Jervis would have sent anyone else. Jervis ended his instructions with a telling passage: ‘Having experienced the most important effects from your enterprise and ability, upon various occasions since I have had the honour to command the Mediterranean, I leave entirely to your judgement, the time and manner of carrying this critical service into execution.’
⁸³
He told Elliot, the operation ‘cannot be in better hands’.
⁸⁴
Jervis himself, meanwhile, retreated to Lisbon, the closest secure anchorage, to refit, replenish his stores and wait for reinforcements. While he waited for Nelson to return, he had to keep the enemy inside the Straits and defend Portugal, Britain’s last ally.

Back in London the crisis was deepening. The naval threat had reached an unprecedented level, Britain’s allies had collapsed and the French appeared irresistible. Only a victory at sea could break the ever-tightening circle of events that threatened to strangle Britain. Spencer emphasised the point to Jervis: ‘a good hard blow struck now or soon will be worth twenty a little later’.
⁸⁵

Sailing from Gibraltar on 15 December, in company with the
Blanche
,
Nelson encountered two Spanish frigates off Cartagena late on the 19th. Immediately
Minerve
engaged and took the
Santa
Sabina
, after a skilful action of slightly over two hours. Unable to resist the chance to show off his seamanship and tactical acumen, last seen in Hotham’s action, Nelson took over from Captain Cockburn, fought the ship and wrote up the log entry. The next morning two Spanish battleships appeared, forcing him to relinquish his prize and escape. Fortunately for Nelson the Spanish were distracted by the prize crew of the
Santa
Sabina
, led by lieutenants Culverhouse and Hardy.
⁸⁶
Both Cockburn and Hardy were notable additions to his school, and Nelson was quick to exchange Hardy for the captured Spanish captain,
Don Jacobo Stuart, a great-grandson of James II.
⁸⁷
On Christmas Eve,
Minerva
took a six-gun French privateer, looking for intelligence rather than fiscal reward. The squadron arrived at Porto Ferraio on the 26th, where Nelson was anxious to consult Elliot on the political situation, but unfortunately he was absent in Italy. General De Burgh had no orders to evacuate and lacked the political courage to act on those Jervis had sent, as Nelson observed. Now that Naples had made peace with the enemy England had no source of supplies and was therefore finished with Italy. He left De Burgh in no doubt that Jervis’s command no longer extended inside the Straits.
⁸⁸