Nelson: Britannia's God of War (9 page)

On 25 August Nelson was sent to Turin and Naples to inform the British ministers. Along the way he fell in with HMS
Tartar
, and learned that Hood needed troops as a republican army was approaching Toulon, fresh from the sack of Marseilles. Nelson’s charm, determination and professionalism helped him to obtain Neapolitan troops under the recent alliance: with Sir William Hamilton’s support, he secured four thousand men before Hood’s official request reached Naples. Royal flattery compensated him for missing the entry of the fleet into Toulon, and the chance of a role ashore.

Nelson was soon off again, however, to deal with a French frigate off Sardinia.
¹⁴
The frigate was nowhere to be found, and he returned to Toulon on 5 October, to find the anchorage under fire, and more significantly, that;

Little wonder: two thousand Neapolitan troops reached Toulon on 27 September, and another two thousand followed on 5 October, timely reinforcements as the republicans were already firing on the town.
¹⁵
Only now did Nelson feel himself fully restored to the light of Hood’s favour; he relished the opportunity to follow an officer of great ability and decisive character, declaring that ‘Was any accident to happen to [Hood], I am sure no person in our fleet could supply his place.’
¹⁶
It is not clear whether he included himself among those lesser mortals: perhaps while Hood remained in command he chose not to reflect on the subject.

Hood recognised the abilities of his zealous subordinate, detaching him to Cagliari by way of Corsica to join Commodore Linzee. However, Nelson’s concerns were more personal. Other officers had become public figures by capturing enemy vessels of equal or greater force, earning knighthoods, prize money and promotion for their followers. He had yet to fire a gun in anger. On 22 October, he had a chance to join the heroes, encountering three French frigates, a corvette and a brig off the coast of Sardinia at 2 a.m. The
Agamemnon
was short-handed, having left many men ashore at Toulon, and alone, having lost contact with an accompanying frigate. Moreover, the officers on the
Agamemnon
believed that one of the French vessels was a battleship. Once it was light enough to ascertain that they were enemy
ships, however, Nelson pursued the nearest, the
Melpomene
, and engaged her for four hours, leaving her badly damaged. But just as he closed for the kill the wind failed. He concluded that it would be unwise to continue the action – though revealingly, he asked his officers whether they approved this decision, demonstrating that he was still honing his leadership, fighting methods and command style. The officers agreed to repair the damaged rigging in case the French chose to resume the action.
Agamemnon
had lost only one man killed and six wounded, while her opponent was shattered. Nelson’s sea journal quoted a famous passage from Addison’s
Spectator
of 1711, concerning death, resignation and the comfort he took from the support of God.
¹⁷
This simple faith was the bedrock of his world, giving meaning to his actions and a conviction that if God was on his side the enemy would not prevail.

Arriving at Cagliari, Nelson found Linzee far from helpful, and a belated pursuit proved fruitless: the enemy had, as Nelson guessed, run into a Corsican harbour. The squadron then headed for Tunis, where a French battleship and frigate lay, protected by the neutrality of the port. Nelson ran the
Agamemnon
between the two French ships, prepared for a fight and resigned his life to God. Linzee’s instructions were to persuade the Dey to allow the ships to be taken, but the Dey was too clever for Linzee, who cautiously sent back to Toulon for further orders. Nelson thought it would be best to take the French ships, pay the Dey a suitable bribe to salve his wounded pride and have done with the business. He instinctively preferred action, and was convinced that ‘the people of England will never blame an officer for taking a French line of battle ship’.
¹⁸
This was the course for personal glory, but it was hardly worth annoying a useful neutral in order to seize the last French battleship in republican hands.

After a fruitless cruise along the North African coast Nelson received orders from Hood to take the frigate
Lowestoffe
under his command to look out for the frigates he had engaged the previous month around Corsica and on the adjacent Italian coast. They were a threat to British trade and allied interests, but he found them anchored close under the batteries at San Fiorenzo. Nelson was buoyed up by this further mark of Hood’s confidence and the Very handsome letter’ that accompanied it. However, far away from Toulon, he had completely misread the state of the war. With an optimism that reflected Hood’s opinions, he told Locker that the naval conflict was over, Toulon was in no danger
and that even if it had to be evacuated the fleet and arsenal could be destroyed. December would prove the error of this judgement.

*

Arriving at Leghorn on 22 December, Nelson heard about the evacuation of Toulon, of Hood’s heroic conduct, the knavish behaviour of the Spanish, and the horrors of the republican entrance into the city. These events did not feature in his sea journal, so the letters sent to Edmund, Fanny and Clarence were fresh compositions. Although Hood’s autocratic leadership style and adversarial approach to inter-service cooperation had created difficulties at Toulon, Nelson was correct in his judgement that no one else could have carried out the task. Hood had the experience, prestige and confidence to take on such a vast politico-military mission. He kept the Republican armies at bay until mid-December with a polyglot mixture of British, Spanish, Neapolitan, Sardinian and French troops, backed by naval gunfire and sustained by his optimism. Caught between the potential for an early and decisive blow through Toulon, and the pressing but limited objectives of securing Mediterranean trade, alliances and influence, Hood waited for the troops that would secure Toulon, and used the time to spread his fleet. On 16 December Civil Commissioner Sir Gilbert Elliot heard that two British regiments were coming, causing the gloom that had descended over the beleaguered fortress to lift. Within twenty-four hours the key position at Fort Mulgrave had fallen to a French assault, forcing Hood to order the city evacuated.
¹⁹
He had little more than a third of his fleet at Toulon when the crisis came. Little wonder the evacuation was unsatisfactory.

British Mediterranean policy collapsed because the major players –Britain, Austria and Spain – had divergent, often irreconcilable aims, while the minor powers were ineffective in the new conditions of mass mobilisation and total war. France, operating under new rules, and on home soil, could raise far more men than the
ancien
regime
allies, and was prepared to use them with a speed and ruthlessness that smashed the ill-coordinated multi-national forces and overwhelmed the arthritic and disjointed command system of the allies. At Toulon numbers and ruthless political leadership had driven the allies out. France’s fast-moving mass armies and her young generals such as Napoleon Bonaparte, pressed on by the financial needs of the Republic and the frailty of the anti-French coalition, had deprived Britain of a mainland resting place for her fleet.

Nelson, like Hood, was quick to make the best of the situation, declaring that the cost of occupation would have ruined the country. Hood withdrew the fleet to Hieres Bay, with three French battleships and smaller craft, to wait on developments. Though disappointed on the mainland, he continued to seek a secure base: the best option was the rebellious, newly French island of Corsica, which was under inspection before Toulon fell. The island would dominate the 1794 campaign.

The loss of Toulon ended a period of slow and inadequate attempts by the British government to reinforce their unexpected bridgehead in France. It gave the initiative back to the French, who quickly shifted their troops onto the Alpine front to attack the Sardinians and Austrians. Following the withdrawal, Hood had resumed his core role covering British shipping, supporting the allies on land, blockading a rapidly reconstituted French fleet in Toulon and attacking any French shipping.

There was still an overriding need for a secure base. Minorca, lost to Spain in 1782, could not be considered while she was an ally. However, Corsica was a recent acquisition of France. British planners had already considered the idea of retaining the island as a war indemnity when the short, successful war they anticipated ended. After Toulon, Hood and Sir Gilbert Elliot decided to seize the island as a base from which to continue the campaign on the coasts of Provence and Piedmont. Corsica was a prime source of naval stores, which could be used to support the British fleet, and there were several good anchorages – especially San Fiorenzo Bay on the north-west coast, only three hundred miles from Toulon and close to the Franco-Italian coast where naval support for the allies would be critical. Moreover, the political situation on Corsica encouraged the British: the islanders
were in revolt under the veteran nationalist leader Pasquale Paoli, confining the French to a handful of coastal towns. The British exploited this, supplying Paoli with money, weapons and ammunition; in return he was willing to place the island under British protection.
¹
Once again Hood exceeded his political authority by accepting this offer.

In mid-December Hood had detached Nelson from Linzee’s squadron to check reports that a French squadron was in San Fiorenzo. There were three frigates there, with another at Bastia; Hood was confident they would soon fall into British hands.
²
From early January Nelson was on station, blockading San Fiorenzo and regretting that he had not taken the
Melpomene
in October, when he had the chance – he feared there would be few more opportunities to gain public glory.
³
He also reflected on the rapid, threatening reconstitution of the French fleet and the imminent arrival of Hood with a small military force to capture the island.
⁴

The squadron reached San Fiorenzo on 26 January, only to be driven back to Elba by gales. Nelson’s concern that the French might profit from this opportunity to get troops into Corsica was mixed with hopes that his brother Maurice would find a permanent post.
⁵
Clawing his way back to his station, Nelson was alarmed to find Linzee in charge of the army transports, noting in his journal, ‘Beware of dilatoriness. Expedition ought to be the universal word and deed.’
⁶
As if to prove his point he landed to burn some ships carrying wine for the French two days later, and opened correspondence with Paoli.

Linzee continued to blunder, this time being too hasty. On 7 February, 1,400 British troops were landed, but the following day the famous Martello Tower beat off Linzee’s squadron. The troops quickly worked round to the rear of the tower, built a battery and drove out the garrison, securing the San Fiorenzo anchorage. Hood then sent Nelson with a small squadron to blockade Bastia and report on the defences. In his absence the San Fiorenzo redoubt fell to a neat and well-executed assault on 17 February, and the town was evacuated the following day. Bastia was only eight miles away, but the mountain road was twice as long, and posed problems for an army without draught animals or wagons.
⁷

As yet there were few indications that this war would be anything more than another round in the century-long Anglo-French contest. Nelson was not alone in thinking the war could not last: he saw the conflict petering out, ‘not by the French having an absolute monarchy
again, but by our leaving them alone, perhaps the wisest method we can follow’.
⁸
His natural optimism led him to place too much reliance on Corsican claims that the garrison was weak, although he could see they were hard at work building batteries. Speed was of the essence, and he did not hesitate to engage the defences of Bastia with his ships between 24 and 26 February. Buoyed up by Hood’s commendation and entrusted with the aims of the campaign, he hoped Corsica would be a permanent addition to the Empire, becoming prosperous by replacing the Italian states as a trading partner.
⁹
Hood offered him the seventy-four
Courageux
, which he wisely refused. He also showed him his correspondence with General Dundas, a conventional and pessimistic Scotsman who had already clashed with the dynamic Hood: characteristically, Dundas would not advance on Bastia, arguing that it could not be taken with only 1,500 troops and disputing Hood’s claim to be the overall British theatre commander. When Dundas requested proof of Hood’s pre-eminence the admiral declared that his faculties must be ‘palsied’. The obvious peacemaker, Gilbert Elliot, arrived too late to prevent an irrevocable breach. Dundas resigned.

Hood feared he might have to rely on starvation to take Bastia and Calvi, the last two towns in French hands; Nelson, still over-confident, believed a naval attack would suffice, even though there were twice as many French troops as he had reported to Hood. He put his trust in the ‘invincible’ British seamen.
¹⁰
This immature outburst ignored the lessons of Toulon. It was unwise to treat the French with contempt.

The pace to the campaign was tied to the political situation on the mainland. An early British success in Corsica would do much to counteract the adverse impression left by the evacuation of Toulon. Britain needed allies on the mainland, and a fleet based on Corsica would secure their seaward flanks. Elliot made this point,
¹¹
and Hood acted.

Dundas’s resignation did not help Hood, since his successor General D’Aubant was equally averse to attacking Bastia. Elliot considered D’Aubant a fool, others thought him a coward – whatever the truth, the military force was paralysed while he remained. As Nelson considered taking Bastia by blockade, Hood’s remarkable fund of mental resource provided an unconventional solution to the command problem. The fleet had been given several regiments of troops in lieu of the Marines that were not ready when they left Britain. Hood recalled these men, some six hundred, telling D’Aubant he needed them for a fleet action.
¹²
In fact he planned to land them at Bastia with junior
artillery officers and a naval party under Nelson.
¹³
Suitably inspired, Nelson detached a frigate to Naples to borrow mortars, shells and stores. The covering letter to Sir William Hamilton reflected his disgust with the soldiers’ caution – it was San Juan all over again.
¹⁴
While Nelson waited, he sounded the approaches to Bastia, harassed the garrison at night with his gunboats and prepared a captured frigate as a floating battery.

When a joint service Council of War did not endorse his plans Hood simply ignored it, landing a force of 1,000 soldiers and 250 sailors three miles north of Bastia. They quickly secured a strong position only 2,500 yards from the citadel, and prepared for a siege. He instructed Nelson to ensure the blockade of the town was complete, in case he had to rely on starvation, and waited until the batteries were ready.

By 11 April the sailors had installed seven heavy guns from the
Agamemnon
and four mortars from Naples with a good supply of shot and shell. Hood’s demand that the garrison should surrender was rejected with customary insouciant Republican bravado. The attack commenced on Hood’s signal. He directed operations from the anchorage, advising Nelson on new positions and engineering co-operation with Paoli’s irregulars. The following day a small group of officers and men were in the battery to observe the effect of the bombardment when a French shot killed a servant, only inches from Nelson.

On 20 April Nelson learned that Corsica was to become a possession of the English crown. The following day Hood urged him to move quickly – Elliot had just reported the French were advancing against Sardinia:

The driving intellect at Bastia was Hood; Elliot provided political context. While D’Aubant carped from San Fiorenzo, the force ashore got on with the job. Nelson, finally at the heart of proceedings, and under the watchful eye of his Lord since April, was full of enthusiasm and energy, pushing himself forward wherever possible, anxious to gain full credit for the triumph. However, the wily Hood did not give him sole command of the troops and seamen he sent ashore, and when Nelson asked Hood to confirm his authority over all the naval detachments Hood merely requested the junior officers to follow Nelson’s
directions, carefully avoiding the word ‘order’.
¹⁶
Fortunately Nelson chose to read Hood’s letter as a vote of confidence, and cheerfully reminded Fanny that:

Nelson’s health, always a mirror of his soul, reflected the fact that he was busy from dawn to dusk, under fire and enjoying the confidence of his beloved chief. Most of his work was arduous rather than glorious, organising working parties to bring up cannon, shot, stores and fascines, building batteries and employing enough seamen to crew a frigate. To hasten the siege, Hood advised building a new battery on a commanding ridge; it opened fire on 1 May. Now that Elliot had returned, Lieutenant-Colonel John Moore, who had served under Dundas and shared his doubts about Hood’s approach, finally began to understand that the wider political context was driving the pace of operations, not pure military logic.
¹⁸
By contrast Nelson immediately understood Elliot’s argument that Corsica would give Britain command of the Mediterranean. However, that depended on taking the two towns.

Worried by the paucity of deserters, suggesting the French were not starving, Hood ordered more guns landed. Then the squadron captured a boat full of refugees, who indicated that the French were in desperate straits. As the siege drew to a close he was anxious to keep D’Aubant’s name off the capitulation, keeping the military glory for the junior officers ashore, while personally controlling the surrender.
¹⁹
When Moore wrote to say that six hundred more soldiers had arrived, and D’Aubant was now prepared to cross the mountains from San Fiorenzo, Hood brusquely told him not to bother: the town was about to fall and he could save himself the trouble.
²⁰
Moore argued that starvation alone had caused the town to fall. Even if he was correct, the honour still belonged to Hood, who had directed Nelson to blockade the town, while the army did nothing to aid the process.

Thoroughly disenchanted with his situation, and unable to influence the admiral, D’Aubant tried to hand over command, but Hood would not even provide a frigate to take him to the mainland. Instead D’Aubant brought his small force onto the ridge above Bastia just as the surrender negotiations were beginning. Bastia had cost seventeen
British lives, twenty thousand shot and shell, and forty-two precious days. A blockade would have been equally certain, but taken longer. In too much of a hurry to allow any prolonged discussion, Hood allowed the garrison of 3,500 – more than double the besieging force – the honours of war and a passage home. But though he found time to thank the officers and men, whose conduct and character he promised to remember ‘to the end of my life’, Nelson was given no time to celebrate: ‘You will do well to prepare for the removal of
everything
from your present posts, as no time must be lost in going off Calvi.’
²¹

Always anxious that his actions were appreciated at home, Nelson wrote to Locker, reminded brother William that the French ships taken at San Fiorenzo and Bastia were those he had engaged, and told Fanny that Hood’s thanks in public and private were ‘the handsomest that man can pen’.
²²
Yet in the public dispatch on the capture of Bastia, a triumph in which Nelson fancied he had played a key role, he received slight praise. Hood had skilfully played on Nelson’s anxiety to be noticed, employing him on missions where decision, energy and initiative were essential. He quickly assuaged Nelson’s wounded pride, using private flattery to make up for a public oversight, not for the first time.

*

In early June the French tried to interfere in the Corsican campaign, sending their hurriedly refitted, scratch-manned fleet to sea. On 5 June Hood heard the French were at sea. Believing himself heavily outnumbered, Hotham had retreated from seven sail with six of his own. As Hotham withdrew to San Fiorenzo Hood beat round from Bastia, joined him off Calvi on 9 June and signalled for a general chase as soon as he saw the French.
Agamemnon
soon took the lead, but the French scuttled into Gourjean Bay, close by St Tropez, before the British could catch them. While he planned his next move, Hood detached Nelson back to Bastia to pick up the stores and move on Calvi. If the French had a fleet there was no time to lose. They would throw troops and supplies into Calvi if they had the chance, and upset all his calculations.