NonAlignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st Century (13 page)

India’s response to this evolving situation and divergent imperatives needs to be underpinned by a set of strategic principles. To begin with, our nuclear policy should emphasize the hardening and survivability of our
arsenal. In the face of the growing nuclear arsenals in our neighbourhood, we need to ensure an assured second-strike capability. Our main effort must be devoted to the development of the maritime leg of our nuclear capability and the accompanying command and control systems. We also need to work towards the operationalization of our missile defence capabilities. There will be external pressure to desist from this course, on the grounds that it will lead to a nuclear arms race in the region. We must forthrightly point out that such arguments are confusing the causes for the consequences.

Second, India should adopt a proactive stance against nuclear proliferation. We should be open to participating in international counter-proliferation initiatives that are non-discriminatory and are consonant with international law. Further, we should draw attention to the underlying drivers of insecurity that may be propelling certain states to acquire nuclear weapons and to the need to address these basic issues if non-proliferation is to succeed in the longer run.

Third, to prevent nuclear terrorism we need a combination of unilateral and multilateral measures. Deterring nuclear terrorism will require substantial upgrading of our screening and surveillance capabilities at various entry points along our land borders (especially
those with Pakistan) as well as our air- and seaports. Then again, the current state of technology for screening nuclear material is not sufficiently advanced. We therefore need to adopt a clear declaratory policy on nuclear terrorism. Our stated nuclear doctrine needs to be amended to affirm the responsibility of the state from which nuclear weapons or material may be stolen. It should clarify that we will be willing to act on strong but less than perfect information. This would help disabuse any state of the notion that it can claim helplessness in preventing theft of material or warheads.

Given that the acquisition or development and use of a fully fashioned nuclear device by terrorist outfits is rather difficult, the most likely form of nuclear terrorism is the use of a ‘dirty bomb’. The psychological and public effect of the detonation of a ‘dirty bomb’ will be enormous. But its physical effects, especially in terms of contamination, are likely to be relatively mild and capable of being contained—provided we have the necessary capabilities and expertise. We need urgently to look into this aspect of disaster management.

More important, we need to take steps to develop capacities for attribution and to strengthen capabilities in nuclear forensics. Any response to a nuclear attack carried out by a terrorist group will rest on our ability to identify
the source (primarily inferred from the isotope). The best way forward would be to step up cooperation with the United States and other countries in nuclear forensics, and to invest in the enhancement of our own research and development (R&D) capabilities in this area.

Fourth, we should make it clear that complete nuclear disarmament is, and has always been, an objective of Indian policy. The history of India’s tryst with nuclear weapons is ample testimony to this fact. At various points in the past decades, India has been in the forefront of efforts to promote nuclear disarmament. The Rajiv Gandhi plan of 1988 represents the most recent effort to convey a sincere and credible message to the world that nuclear disarmament needs to be taken seriously. That plan is currently being updated.

India should support the current calls for global zero, provided these are sincere, fair and non-discriminatory. We should also be prepared not to stand in the way of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), provided all nuclear powers recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are prepared to do so. At the same time, we should recognize that neither global zero nor CTBT may be attainable any time soon. We should direct our efforts at measures designed to delegitimize nuclear weapons. Till such time as nuclear weapons are
accepted as currency of power in international politics, complete nuclear disarmament will remain a chimera.

Towards this end, we need to promote with greater seriousness and vigour a proposal that we have already mooted: a global no-first-use (NFU) treaty. This will go a considerable distance in reducing the strategic and psychological importance of nuclear weapons. If accomplished in tandem with deep cuts to their arsenals by the major nuclear powers, this could set the stage for serious efforts at the total elimination of nuclear weapons. By pushing for a global NFU treaty, we could credibly work to advance the cause of disarmament without prematurely compromising our own security.

A nation needs to continually reinvent itself as it moves up the growth curve. Every doubling of its gross domestic product (GDP) puts the nation at the cusp of transformation for the next doubling. Simply put, there is much more at stake when the GDP per capita is $2000 as opposed to $200. People begin to have an expectation of the future, rather than to worry about survival. This expectation of a better future manifests itself in a number of ways, such as demands for accountable leadership, good governance, equal opportunity, security and asserting a place in the world. India’s fundamental institutions will need to be transformed to meet these expectations, to keep up with the times and to keep up with growth. Failure to do so can lead to instability and thus become a risk to national security, whereas embracing such transformations can actually enhance national security.

Such transformations can be accelerated by focusing on creating
ecosystems
. The government should leverage
assets available within India’s vast economy, its human and physical capital, to achieve strategic national security objectives. A successful ecosystem acts as a force multiplier by amplifying the impact of government policies.

Since the Second World War, national security has become synonymous with being at the frontiers of knowledge: nuclear technology, space technology, radar, cryptography, GPS and Internet are a few well-known cases. It is difficult to forecast where the next breakthroughs in technology may occur, and which of those may have a bearing on national security. The creation of the nuclear bomb and the security implications of the space race could never have been anticipated. These innovations were possible because the United States has a strong culture of research and innovation at its universities, built up over decades. This talent could be leveraged to solve national security problems when the need arose, but none of it could be planned.

More generally, being at the leading edge of the knowledge frontier has been a crucial aspect of national security over the course of history. A great power is defined by its ability to produce knowledge in all fields,
rather than simply being a consumer of knowledge produced elsewhere. A strong knowledge-based society and economy will naturally support universities and firms that are at the frontiers of knowledge, which house specialists in every imaginable discipline. The defence and security establishment can tap into this pool of experts as the need arises.

For India to enhance its knowledge capacities, we will need modern multidisciplinary research universities that are the best of class and can attract the best talent worldwide in the natural and social sciences. Talent attracts talent, creating hubs of excellence, training the next generation of researchers and innovators. India has done quite poorly in the most significant measure of innovative research output: publication in peer-reviewed journals. India’s share in the global publication authorship by country stands at 2 per cent today; the United States is at 21 per cent and China has reached 10 per cent in a matter of two decades.

Higher education in India today is in the concurrent list of the Constitution. The regulatory system for higher education is still not conducive for freedom, innovation and diversity. There are high entry barriers for the creation of good universities, local and foreign. Currently, no Indian university institution figures in lists of the leading
100 universities in the world. It takes many years for a university to establish itself as a thought leader and to build a reputation that will attract the best minds. The task ahead is a large one.

While creating a sensible regulatory structure for not-for-profit and private institutions, there is an urgent need to strengthen public universities. These universities need to be reformed on many dimensions: administration, finance, research capabilities, cultures of teaching and accountability. No world-class research ecosystem can be created without serious commitment of public funds, or public institutions. High-end research is a risk investment, and the market does not supply it easily.

A body similar to the National Science Foundation can be set up, where the government can prioritize thrust areas through transparent, competitive, peer-reviewed funding of proposals. But this body must internalize norms that promote genuine excellence and innovation. It must not be merely another bureaucracy controlling Indian science.

India needs to transform itself into a knowledge economy, for which it needs to build institutions that can deliver higher education and focus on the frontiers of research. A knowledge ecosystem approach is desirable, which includes public and private universities, funding agencies, channelling of government funds for research,
funding from private sources and a culture of research with workshops, conferences and journals that attract the best minds worldwide.

The existing infrastructure of security-related knowledge (especially on matters pertaining to hard power) is deeply deficient. The gap between the government and the wider community of security studies remains large. Bridging this gap will require action along two lines. First, we need to foster more study and research in these areas. Institutions that were designed for these purposes have been unable to make much of an impact on our knowledge base. Reorienting them will also require addressing the quality of higher education in the areas of international relations and security studies.

The ultimate strength of the national security system will always depend on the human quality that populates the system. There is a dearth of human resources, in terms of both quantity and quality. While the former needs to be quickly made up, the latter requires educational platforms that impart skills required at various levels of the national security system. Most civil service officers are generalists and learn on the job. We need an educational and training structure that integrates civilian officers with the military counterparts. The Indian National Defence University must be speedily established.

We also need to increase the capacities of our training institutions to attract foreigners from friendly countries especially in our strategic neighbourhood. Presently, for example, we are unable to meet the demand from foreign countries for vacancies in institutions like the National Defence College (NDC) and the Defence Services Staff College. Conversely, we need to meet the demand especially from countries from our strategic neighbourhood and establish training teams in these countries.

Second, we need to consider ways in which we can leverage the available expertise for the government’s requirements. To do so, we need to address the fundamental problem of information asymmetry between the government and those working outside. Those within the governmental system believe—with some justification—that they have something of an edge in knowledge pertaining to specific policy issues, and that there is little that outside experts can contribute to their functioning. Yet, this is a narrow view of the role of experts on policy issues. For, outside experts are required not so much to second-guess policy-makers as to help them contextualize and conceptualize policy problems. Then again, we need to come up with ways of sharing classified information with outside experts to enable them to produce work that is attuned to the requirements
of policy-makers. We need to institutionalize a system whereby we contract specific pieces of policy-oriented research to domain experts, and grant them grades of clearance depending on their backgrounds and on the sensitivity of the work at hand. Such an arrangement will go some way in bridging the prevailing gap between information and expertise.

Strategic communications shape beliefs and influence behaviour. It is an important component of a nation’s soft power. Good governance requires good strategic communications as one of its primary functions. Communications have strategic value based on the impact they create on the intended audience. The audience for communications in a democracy spans domestic and international spheres. The function of strategic communication in governance has increased in importance due to the IT revolution. This poses both opportunities and challenges for governance. The opportunities are centred on the fact that government’s ability to communicate to the populace has increased substantially and will continue to do so. The challenges emanate from the fact that the populace will increasingly be exposed to
communications that originate from diverse, non-official sources. These communications flow through multiple media that include print, Internet, audio-visual and word of mouth, each medium with several strands, like the Internet which has a plethora of streams, now referred to as the social media. Government has no choice but to have a presence everywhere in order to communicate effectively.

In a democracy, effective strategic communications is required between the executive, the judiciary, the legislature and the populace. It is also required for diplomatic, security and developmental purposes. Government policies must be communicated to the targeted audience with an understanding of their beliefs, motivations and interests. A communication plan must accompany the execution of policy. The plan must consider the targeted audience, the rationale for the communication, the means of dissemination and the feedback loop. In essence, planning, policy evolution and execution must consider the importance of communicative value and not only the mere physical impact.

India has to acknowledge the importance of communications as a function of governance. There is a need to nurture a strategic communications culture in government that privileges its importance and guides the execution of policy. But it must be stressed that
internalizing the importance and value of communications is central to improving the effectiveness of governmental communications. Restructuring may be required. But an overarching architecture for governmental communications will not work, as in a democracy one cannot avoid the cacophony of opinions. Acknowledging the need and changing existing governmental strategic communications culture is the way forward.

Cyber-security threats point to sophisticated attackers, some of which appear to have resources that can only be commanded by a state actor. There have been multiple instances of such threats, including Google’s claims of China’s hacking of Gmail and the breach of the NASDAQ Directors Desk service. Systems such as those of Google are well protected and defended, and employ the best computer security professionals worldwide. The IT systems that are at the heart of critical IT infrastructure institutions (CIIIs) are possibly much more vulnerable. CIIIs include both government and non-government institutions: various infrastructure conduits (power, air, railways, water and oil, telecommunications), banks, stock exchanges and depositories, health care, taxation, industrial
applications and other government IT systems are vulnerable to attack. Many of these systems are complex, of systemic importance, and can have cascading effects, as demonstrated by the 1990 AT&T network crash and the north-eastern US blackout, almost two decades apart.

It is possible that such outages may be intentionally triggered by unfriendly state or non-state actors. Today, cyberattacks are powerful enough that the means of carrying out the attack can be classified as a weapon. Stuxnet may have set Iran’s nuclear programme back by three years, which is what an air strike would have achieved. The very nature of the Internet makes it difficult to identify the source of the cyberattacks. Even today, it is difficult to identify the command and control centre of botnets, which are created by viruses infecting computers and installing back doors through which commands are executed.

It is thus not very surprising that the Department of Telecommunications has expressed concern over the use of Chinese telecommunications equipment in Indian networks. The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission in its annual reports note China’s cyber activities and the impact on US national security. The United States has also set up a US-Cert and a Cyber Command whose mission includes ‘conduct[ing] full
spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries’. Recently, a cyber-security policy was also announced by the US government with a comprehensive near-term action plan.

The following measures may be taken to strengthen cyber security (some of these were made in the report of the Technology Advisory Group for Unique Projects under the chairmanship of Nandan Nilekani). India should set up a cyber command with offensive and defensive capabilities. This body should also be responsible for setting domestic procedures to respond to such attacks, as well as developing capacity in the various CIIIs so that there is better system-wide knowledge of our capabilities and shortcomings. As mentioned earlier, for this to be successful an ecosystem approach is necessary, and security-specific skills need to be imparted at all levels. An entire industry revolving around cyber security needs to be developed, including student training, insurance, software security companies, and so on. All this responsibility will inevitably be decentralized, and cannot be met by a single central agency.

Information and communication technology and national security intersect at various points:

a. Cyber security: Critical IT infrastructure institutions need to be protected against external threats.

b. Data mining: Data from disparate sources (such as intelligence agencies, police, Financial Intelligence Unit, news, etc.) can be mined to extract intelligence and discover linkages.

c. Defence infrastructure: Software is at the heart of almost everything—aircraft, ships, vehicles, logistics, signals, command and control, and even the gear of the future soldier.

ICT has become a comparative advantage for India, although it did start out at the lower end of the spectrum. The problem is that much of the software is often imported with defence hardware, rather than being developed indigenously. The local prowess in ICT is a valuable asset that should be leveraged by the defence establishment. The volume of defence spending in India is large enough for dedicated firms to be set up just to serve the national security needs.