One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power (23 page)

Shortly after this impressive performance, the fleet's new aircraft carriers,
Lexington
(CV-2) and
Saratoga
(CV-3), arrived in Hawaiian waters. ComAirRons Reeves transferred his flag to
Lexington
, and over the next few weeks the two big carriers engaged in daily training in the conduct of flight operations and in a series of exercises testing how carriers could operate together, becoming the first operational carrier division in the fleet.
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EMERGENCE OF THE FAST CARRIER TASK FORCE: FLEET PROBLEMS IX-XV, 1929–1934

The Fleet Problems of 1929–1934 were the most critical in the development of the autonomous Carrier Task Force.
²⁰
Of these, FP IX (1929), the first in which
Lexington
and
Saratoga
took part, was certainly the most important.
²¹

Held in January, the scenario was familiar: the defense of the Panama Canal by a smaller force against a major attack from the Pacific side. Admiral William V. Pratt, commanding Black (Japan), had originally intended to proceed to the Galapagos and approach Panama from the southwest, but financial considerations led to the plan being changed to a direct approach from the northwest. Based on a suggestion by ComAirRons Joseph M. Reeves, as the forces were still taking up their initial positions, Pratt dispatched
Saratoga
at high speed to the Galapagos, to approach the canal from the southwest, while the main body approached more directly.

Escorted by one light cruiser,
Saratoga
proceeded to the Galapagos, and then turned northward for a fast approach to Panama. At 0548 on 26 January, when about 140 miles south of the canal, she began launching seventy aircraft: seventeen bombers, forty-nine fighters, three scouts, and a “communications relay” plane.
²²
Blue was aware of a possible carrier strike from the southwest, but the raid nevertheless achieved complete surprise. Beginning about 0700
Saratoga
's planes “destroyed” the Miraflores and Pedro Miguel Locks, before hitting military installations. Army fighters attempted to intercept, but the attackers escaped without loss.
Saratoga
followed this strike with two more, at one point maintaining eighty-three aircraft in the air simultaneously. Compounding this success, aircraft tender
Aroostook
(CM-3), standing in for
Langley
, with the Black main body, launched a single amphibian representing a notional twenty-four aircraft, which “destroyed” the Gatun Locks, on the Atlantic side of the canal. Unfortunately, shortly after this,
Saratoga
, operating in foggy weather, was located by Blue battlewagons making a sweep of the Gulf of Panama and ruled “sunk.”

Half of CinCUS Henry A. Wiley's thirty-six page critique of the problem dealt with air operations.
²³
Praising the quality of Navy aircraft and aviators over those of the Army, he went on to stress “the great usefulness of aircraft carriers,” recommending that more be procured, though noting the difficulty of protecting them. In the process, stressing a point first made by Blue commander Vice Admiral Montgomery Meigs Taylor during planning for the problem, Wiley concluded that the primary objective in carrier operations was the defeat of the enemy carriers.

Given her thirty-three knot speed, it may seem curious that
Saratoga
was “sunk” by enemy battleships, but this was in fact the first of many such incidents. Carriers would be “sunk” or “damaged” by surface ships during virtually every problem between 1929 and 1937, and would come under “gunfire” on numerous other occasions.
²⁴
The fleet's aircraft lacked the range to conduct effective operations at long distances, forcing carriers to get close to their objectives to launch and recover strikes, putting them at risk from slower surface combatants. Not until mid-1941 would the U.S. Navy have aircraft capable of long-range operations, a year after the Japanese navy. This vulnerability, as much as any hostility to aviation, led some Admirals to be wary of independent aircraft carrier operations.

FP X (March 1930) required Blue (U.S.) to conduct an offensive across the Caribbean to oust Black (a European power) from a lodgment in the Antilles. Inspired by
Saratoga
's performance in 1929, Black's Admiral William C. Cole formed an independent strike group around
Lexington
. As Blue, with both
Saratoga
and
Langley
, drove across the Caribbean from Panama, Black concentrated north of Haiti. On 10 March, with destroyers and cruisers forming a scouting line ahead of her,
Lexington
proceeded at high speed into the Caribbean south of Guantanamo, as the Black main body followed, covered by flying boat patrols. Scouts from the two fleets began making contact on the 13th.

Early on the 14th, with the fleets about seventy-five miles apart, south and southwest of Haiti, the two Blue carriers were on a northwesterly course some two dozen miles east of Navassa Island. Some
Langley
fighters were on reconnaissance, and
both carriers had aircraft spotted on deck and others below being serviced. Shortly after 0800 three
Lexington
scout bombers spotted the Blue carriers. Calling for support, at 0815 the scouts dive-bombed
Saratoga
, putting several bombs into her flight deck, inflicting serious damage.
Saratoga
's crew began to put out notional fires and haul aircraft out of danger, but fourteen minutes later five waves of
Lexington
dive-bombers began arriving, forty-two aircraft in all, to shower the ship with bombs. Aircraft aboard
Saratoga
began “exploding” and she was ruled out of action. Four minutes after that, fifteen
Lexington
fighter bombers struck
Langley
, followed two minutes later by a dozen more, and soon she too was ruled to be in flames. Blue aircraft returning from patrol interfered, but were ineffective. In less than twenty minutes both Blue carriers had been put out of action, and Black surface forces shortly arrived to sink
Langley
.

The USS
Lexington
with Martin bombers on deck
.

In his critique, CinCUS William V. Pratt noted how the “suddenness with which Black gained complete control of the air” had decided the outcome of the problem.
²⁵
Inspired by the “Battle of Navassa Island,” most observers agreed on the importance of getting in the first blow, urged the acquisition of more carriers, and recommended procurement of better scout aircraft, to increase the carrier's reconnaissance reach and ability to make preliminary strikes. Aviation officers stressed the value of operating carriers in independent strike forces, while the Chief of Staff of the Battle
Fleet recommended carriers conduct continuous scouting and maintain an offensive reserve always ready to strike the enemy.
²⁶

During FP XI (April 1930), held in the same waters, both sides tasked their aircraft carriers with eliminating their opposite numbers. Inclement weather and a number of command and staff errors hampered the effectiveness of air operations, though
Saratoga
did eventually inflict extensive damage on
Lexington
, confirming the value of hitting the enemy's aircraft carriers first. During the problem, Vice Admiral William C. Cole, commanding Blue, had formed a task force around
Lexington
, and in his critique he proposed that permanent Carrier Task Forces be established—of one carrier, heavy cruisers, and destroyers—to train and operate together: an idea that would be extensively tested for the rest of the decade, be formally implemented in early 1941, and prove highly effective during the first year of the Pacific War.
²⁷

Cole's proposal was first tested in FP XII (February 1931), a trial of the effectiveness of an aircraft-heavy force against a conventional Battle Fleet with limited air assets, during a hostile attack on the Pacific side of the Panama Canal.
²⁸
Blue's Vice Admiral Arthur L. Willard, although inferior in most assets, was given
Lexington
and
Saratoga
, several aircraft tenders, and the airship
Los Angeles
(ZR-3). He formed a “Striking Force” under Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, who organized two task forces, each of one carrier, two cruisers, and four destroyers. Directly under Reeves, the
Saratoga
Task Force was to cover the approaches to Panama from the northwest and west, while the
Lexington
Task Force, commanded by the carrier's skipper, Captain Ernest J. King, provided cover from the south and southwest. Airship
Los Angeles
was assigned to patrol along the demarcation line between the carrier operating areas, while aircraft based on tenders conducted reconnaissance and patrols in support of the carriers and their scouting lines. The Black fleet commenced the maneuvers about 850 miles southwest of the Panama Canal, a few degrees above the equator, divided into two expeditionary forces and supporting task forces.

Blue's task organization proved quite effective. Flying boats from Panama located elements of the Black fleet on 18 February, the second day of operations. On the 19th, both Blue carriers located the Black expeditionary convoys, with some help from the airship
Los Angeles
, which was promptly lost to an enemy airplane. Extensive carrier air strikes on Black caused heavy damage, but not enough to prevent both Black convoys from effecting notional landings, though the beachheads came under sustained air attack until the problem ended on the fifth day.

Although not decisive, the performance of naval aviation during the problem had again demonstrated that aircraft, and particularly carrier aircraft, could serve as an offensive arm. Nevertheless, carrier operations had been hampered by the short range of their aircraft, which forced them to approach close to their objectives, leading to several close encounters with Black surface forces.

Los Angeles
received mixed reviews. While Black's Admiral Frank H. Schofield concluded that their cost was “out of all proportion to their probable usefulness,” noting that “they had an appeal to the imagination that is not sustained by their military usefulness,” Blue's Vice Admiral Willard, endorsed their use.
²⁹

Perhaps the most important result of this problem was that it first revealed the serious logistical demands of carrier operations. The high speed and operational tempo that the carriers maintained resulted in both running very low on fuel, avgas, ordnance, and aircraft—about half of which were “lost” in combat or to mechanical problems. At the time, these logistical difficulties were viewed as limitations of carrier aviation, but they underscored the need for an effective underway replenishment system, already under experimentation.

After routine exercises around Panama, the Battle Fleet departed for California in March, leaving behind the carriers, which entered the Caribbean with the Scouting Fleet for a series special maneuvers (21–30 March). The most important of these was the first, essentially a duel between two carrier task forces, each of one carrier, four light cruisers, and two destroyers, with Rear Admiral Reeves in
Saratoga
defending the canal from an attack by Captain King's
Lexington
.
³⁰

After
Lexington
had a day's head start to “lose” herself in the Caribbean, the maneuvers began well before dawn on 22 March. With
Saratoga
about 150 miles east of Colon, Reeves, considering King's options, concluded that
Lexington
was most likely northeast of Colon and sent a destroyer in that direction, calculating that the aggressive King would be unable to resist the “bait.” He then positioned
Saratoga
in echelon behind the destroyer. Reeves' estimate was exactly correct.
Lexington
scouts found the destroyer soon after dawn on the 22nd. King ordered a major air strike to trace the destroyer's course back to
Saratoga
. Meanwhile, a
Saratoga
scout had already located
Lexington
. Reeves put a large strike in the air and ordered some cruisers toward the enemy carrier. As
Lexington
's aircraft looked for
Saratoga
, seventy
Saratoga
aircraft “sank” their carrier, aided by the cruisers that arrived during the action; from the time
Saratoga
's strike was launched until
Lexington
was “sunk” little more than an hour had passed. While this underscored the importance of getting in the first blow, the “loss” of
Lexington
led to some calls for “small carriers and flying deck cruisers” to avoid losing too many aircraft with a single ship, a recommendation that went nowhere.
³¹