One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power (68 page)

188
.
  
Palmer,
Summons of the Trumpet
, pp. 261–62.

189
.
  
Summers,
On Strategy
, pp. 90–91.

190
.
  
Clodfelter,
The Limits of Air Power
, p. 209.

CHAPTER 14

By Land and Sea: Non-Carrier Naval Aviation

Sterling Michael Pavelec

A
ircraft presented an interesting new technology to the U.S. military. At the turn of the twentieth century, both the land and sea Services—the Army and the Navy—considered how to incorporate aviation into their branches. The Navy saw great potential in aviation technology and quickly integrated it into Navy doctrine, strategy, and thinking, as well as dedicating funds for procurement of aircraft and peripheral technologies. Over time, with frequent fits and starts along the way, the Navy developed coherent doctrine and aviation assets to perform uniquely naval roles. In this chapter, I will outline some of the ideas that the Navy tried and eventually adopted, and introduce the various airframes beyond carrier aviation that the Navy has employed over the past one hundred years. At the start of the twentieth century, a new technology emerged that changed the grammar of warfare.
¹
The introduction of aircraft and submarines transformed naval warfare to include the third dimensions: undersea and aerial operations. New technologies translated into new strategies as planners attempted to gain strategic advantages.

The great naval theorists, Corbett and Mahan,
²
were the founding fathers of naval and maritime strategy up to and including World War I (1914–1918).
³
However, by the end of the Great War, technology forever altered naval warfare. Fortunately, American military planners and strategists were at the leading edge of technological adaptation and envisioned the incorporation of the third dimension into strategy. Unfortunately, they were not the only ones.

As seen elsewhere in this book, others are recounting lighter-than-air naval aviation
⁴
and the development of carrier aviation.
⁵
This chapter will focus specifically on
land- and sea-based naval aviation, and the doctrine and development of the naval air arms that were not based on ships at sea.

As aviation technology evolved, presenting a new idea for warfighting, both the Army and Navy became interested in the possibilities.
⁶
The Army, into and after World War I, adopted aviation as an Army branch (Signal Corps, Air Services, and by 1941 U.S. Army Air Forces) for two types of operations: support for land forces and as strategic bombers. The Navy, on the other hand, incorporated air assets to perform uniquely naval missions and to fill roles that the Army was unwilling to perform. The early Navy missions were twofold: support the fleet and a secondary mission of aerial support of naval missions aground (observation and attack). In 1913, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels commissioned a board under Captain (Navy) Washington Irving Chambers to “consider all views and prepare a comprehensive plan for the organization of a Naval Aeronautic Service.”
⁷
The Chambers Board studied the chaotic program to that point and subsequently recommended a separate bureau—which was denied—as well as procurement. Naval aviation was relegated an office status, the Office of Naval Aeronautics, with representatives from Navigation, Construction and Repair, Steam Engineering, Ordnance, and the Marine Corps.
⁸
Finally, the board requested fifty planes and estimated the costs at just under $1.3 million for the aircraft and support equipment and men.
⁹
The Navy was taking a vested interest in naval aviation.

Early aviation experiments in the Navy were multifaceted. The Navy considered a number of ways to adapt air power for naval applications. Everything was tried; most were adopted. With the technology of the 1910s, the Navy looked into lighter-than-air (LTA) as a viable possibility for fleet support. Given that LTA was at the time comparable technology to heavier-than-air, the Navy began an expanded program of LTA development.
¹⁰
In addition to LTA, the Navy embraced land-based aircraft in experiments both onboard ships as well as from land bases. Further, the Navy was interested in sea-based floatplanes and flying boats for the flexibility they promised. Beginning with the 1911 USS
Pennsylvania
experiments, the Navy sought ways to incorporate air power into existing doctrine. In January, test pilot Eugene Ely made aviation history when he landed his Curtiss pusher on a modified deck, proving the feasibility of aviation for naval applications. Further Navy tests proved the viability of aircraft wedded to ships, aircraft carrier technology received due attention, and floatplanes were assigned to seaplane tenders, battleships, and cruisers. As Navy experiments progressed, Navy doctrine began to form. In the end, developing doctrine focused on the core naval roles that aircraft provided in support of the fleet.

The Great War brought rapid expansion to the naval air arm; during the war Congress appropriated the necessary funds.
¹¹
At one point, an idea was floated to define U.S. naval aviation as a separate component of the Navy, like the semiautonomy of the Marine Corps, which was unsuccessful.
¹²
During the war, naval aviation
came into its own. Planes and balloons were employed to support the fleet in the Atlantic. Early roles included using air assets in the observation role to protect the fleet against German surface and sub-surface threats. The U-boat (
Unterseeboote—
submarines) was emerging as a threat to the U.S. Navy and merchant marine when transporting goods to the war zone. Naval aviation found its niche: protecting fleets and convoys from the German
Hochseeflotte
. However, the first “Battle of the Atlantic” was fought with very primitive technology; the United States did not yet have aircraft carriers. The Navy employed balloon ships and seaplane tenders (which used cranes to lower and recover seaplanes for use) in the role of fleet protection. Interestingly, the Navy did set up static bases on land in the United States, using land-based aircraft for fleet support and for anti-submarine warfare close to the East Coast. Along the Atlantic coast of the United States, the Naval Reserve Flying Corps was tasked with practicing flying and providing observation for the Navy. Among the corps were a group known as the “Yale Unit,” formed into the Aerial Coast Patrol, flying out of Gravesend Bay (New York) spotting for mines.
¹³
However, when the war started for the Americans,
¹⁴
the Navy still only had fifty-four planes, three balloons, and forty-eight Navy and Marine Corps officers. With the commitment to the war, the Navy expanded rapidly.

The first component was money. Immediately after the declaration of war, the Navy was given $3 million for aviation procurement, followed by $11 million in June and another $45 million in October. Money was not the issue. Unfortunately, planes were not easily built, and pilots took time to train. The Aircraft Production Board, headed by Howard Coffin, streamlined aircraft production for both the Army and Navy, providing the much needed airframes for war. As part of the later-termed military-industrial complex, a dedicated Naval Aircraft Factory was established in Philadelphia to produce flying boats and seaplanes for the Navy. Although production promises were extravagant, the first H-16 flying boats did not start to roll off the production line until March 1918. Training was even more erratic. Most of the training was farmed out to established training facilities, including one in Toronto, Canada; most Navy pilots were trained at NAS Pensacola (Florida).

In addition, in order to show good faith to the French, U.S. Navy aviators were sent to France in June 1917. A liaison was sent to Paris; the Navy was determined to support France's war effort in any way possible. The French demanded that American pilots be retrained by French aviators who already had combat experience, while American mechanics received remedial instruction in country as well. The Americans then set up coastal bases in order to free up French pilots for other duties. By taking over some French bases and building others, the Navy began providing air cover with coastal patrols. Extending their influence across the channel and into the North Atlantic, the Navy also set up bases for operations, training, and repair in England including Eastleigh and Killingholme and in Italy.

The Navy's role in World War I air power was mixed and controversial. The Navy was dedicated to providing fleet support, spotting for mines, and conducting anti-submarine warfare in the Atlantic and English Channel. But when the Navy requested land-based bombers for offensives against German submarine pens and various land targets, in an early form of strategic bombing, the Army balked. U.S. Army Major General Benjamin Foulois, Commander of the U.S. Army Air Services in theater, blocked Navy procurement of land-based bombers, arguing that strategic bombing was an Army role. The tensions created during the war were continued into the postwar, interwar, era.
¹⁵
The Army was not only obstreperous about the Navy mounting bombing attacks, it was also vehemently against separating the air services altogether, an argument that would continue to rear its ugly head. In the end, General John Pershing, Commander of the American Allied Expeditionary Forces, was given the final vote; he allowed the Navy to have bombers after the Army's requirements had been met. The Navy finally had the equipment and manpower to launch bombing raids in September 1918, but only in piecemeal attacks against German targets. By the end of the war, the Navy had discovered two important lessons: first, the need and viability of aircraft for fleet protection, and second, the uphill battle they would face in competing with the Army for aviation resources.

As well, the Navy realized the effort and costs of the new modern arm. By the end of the war, the Naval Air Arm had grown to include 1,147 officers and more than 18,000 men assigned overseas.
¹⁶
Naval aviators had flown 22,000 sorties during the war, in a variety of airframes, mostly French and British. By the armistice, the Navy owned 570 aircraft in theater as well as 15 dirigibles and another 215 balloons of all types. Naval expansion illustrates the importance of the new technology to naval strategy.

The immediate postwar period brought downsizing and doctrinal changes to the Navy. Most of the changes were imposed; but significant changes also came from within. The U.S. Navy made a concerted effort to retain the important new air arm into the post–World War I era in the face of external limitations and internal reassessment.

Immediately after the war, in historical fashion, the U.S. military—guided by the government—began to radically downsize. Contracts for uncompleted material were cancelled, soldiers and sailors were discharged from duty, and the military demobilized. Navy aviation, while considered important, returned to prewar numbers of men and equipment. However, this was not all bad; the pilots and aircrew were more experienced after the war, and the equipment was substantially better. Naval airframes went on sale as surplus; wartime naval aviators began civilian careers as commercial pilots and instructors, often in the same surplus military aircraft they had flown during the war.

The early 1920s brought a number of significant changes to naval aviation. The first was good news, in the form of spending. The Naval Appropriations Act (1920) gave money to the Navy, some of which was put toward naval aviation. From the 1920 Act, the Navy commissioned the USS
Jupiter
(later
Langley
), the first U.S. Navy aircraft carrier. Two other ships were commissioned as seaplane tenders,
¹⁷
and money was set aside for two dirigibles—one built, and one bought from England. Six coastal bases were also funded.
¹⁸

At the highest levels of Navy command—as well as the Navy's most prestigious schools—naval aviation was a hot topic. In a series of memos between the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the President of the U.S. Naval War College (NWC) in Newport, Rhode Island, naval aviation emerged as a front-burner subject.
¹⁹
The CNO asked the president of the NWC about current thought on the theme, and the president responded with a memo to the CNO.
²⁰
The two-page memo discussed the importance of naval aviation and how it could best serve the Navy. The NWC president was adamant that the Navy retained its aviation capabilities—under no circumstances should it give control of the sphere to the Army.
²¹
At the behest of the president, the NWC began instruction and lectures on the importance and employment of naval aviation as a key component to an integrated Navy doctrine.
²²
The Navy began a lasting tradition of exploring and explicating the role of aviation in naval doctrine.

But perhaps most importantly, events in September 1921 solidified Navy concerns about the significance of aviation in the maritime sphere. Ironically it was an Army officer who illustrated the value of aviation to the Navy: William “Billy” Mitchell. Mitchell, who set out to prove the importance of air power to the Army—in order to argue the point of an independent air force
²³
—embarked on aviation trials at the expense of the Navy. In order to show the impotence of the Navy and how air power could be successful, he fabricated an aerial exposition to demonstrate the eclipse of U.S. naval power. With a few planes loaded with bombs, his pilots successfully bombed and sank captured German warships anchored for the demonstration.
²⁴
Mitchell did not get an independent air force, angered numerous Army generals and Navy admirals in his path, and was eventually court-martialed for insubordination. What he did achieve, unwittingly, was a determination in the U.S. Navy to pursue naval aviation as part of the Navy, for specifically naval roles. His actions widened further the existing schism between Army and Navy air early in the interwar period.