One Tribe at a Time: The Paper that Changed the War in Afghanistan (7 page)

Tribal Security Forces could do this through the tribal jirga system, beneath the authority of a tribal council and backed up by a Tribal Engagement Team to bring US resources, leadership and training to bear. Together with the tribal elders, they can act as peacemakers and brokers, bringing the important actors to negotiate.

These traditional institutions can facilitate justice and legitimacy through a local approach to resolving conflicts.

The Taliban…have been working in the villages for years to establish “shadow governments” of Sharia law courts and other indigenous institutions, providing the justice and fair play that the villagers cannot get from a remote and corrupt national government.

The Taliban know this, even if we don’t. They have been working in the villages for years to establish “shadow governments” of Sharia law courts and other indigenous institutions, providing the justice and fair play that the villagers cannot get from a remote and corrupt national government.

“On a national scale, we are not going to win hearts or change minds. This must be done on the ground, person-to-person, by gaining respect and trust with each tribe. In other words, we need to employ a Tactical Engagement Strategy, one tribe at a time. Study and gain a detailed appreciation of Pashtunwali, the honor code of the
Pashtuns, in order to communicate effectively, whether kinetic or non-kinetic, within the target audience’s cultural frame of reference.” (McCallister 2008)

Speaking of Iraq, Carter Malkasian and Jerry Meyerle state, “Another way to reduce government misrule could be… to empower traditional tribal structures that may be more representative and have greater authority on the ground.”

“In Afghanistan, tribes are even more important. Most Pashtuns identify themselves first and forever with their tribe, sub-tribe, or clan. Competing political institutions and figures are much weaker and most of the population lives in rural areas, far from government institutions.” (Malkasian and Meyerle 2009)

Another major COIN tenet is to separate the insurgent from the population. The presence of the Tribal Engagement Teams
would facilitate this very quickly. Once the TETs were on the ground with the tribal leadership, insurgent elements would either be killed or have to leave the area. The presence of the TETs would also make it difficult for the local Taliban supporters to be mobilized when the Taliban wanted to surge in certain areas.

Local Taliban fighters would be much more inclined to re-integrate into the tribe once the TSFs (Arbakai) start to be implemented. Which low-level Taliban members could re-integrate would, of course, be up to the tribal leadership.

Good governance is the follow-on to reliable security. Tribal Security Forces can facilitate both. “Unless you are confident in the ability of your government to enforce its peace, then the man with a gun at your door at midnight is your master.” (Kelly 2009, 5)

The safe-haven issue in the eastern and southern portion of Afghanistan is a huge factor that could potentially cause the failure of the entire campaign. From my own experience, the location and demographics of the village of Mangwel and members of the tribe located there make this a situation where we could and did acquire much more intelligence to make more informed decisions in that region.

Given enough time, effort and resources, a Tribal Engagement Strategy could be expanded to the entire border region, not only policing the infiltration routes from Pakistan (which the tribesmen know as intimately as we know the streets of our own hometown), but providing actionable intelligence about who has crossed over, where they are, and what potential danger they represent.

Putting US soldiers (TETs) on the ground with the tribes will say more about our commitment than anything else we can do.

“US military operations most succeeded when leaders at the small-unit level had enough leeway, specialized assets, and firepower to engage the population and develop their own intelligence. Indeed, US military doctrine needs to establish far looser and more broadly distributed networks that have a high degree of independence and survivability. (Jones 2008, 98)

The RAND study also points out four more reasons to depend on indigenous actors to fight the war:

1. Most insurgencies have taken between eleven and fourteen years to win. Therefore, the indigenous forces eventually will have to win the war on their own, and they must develop the capacity to do so.
   

   

   For some of our missions we dressed in Afghan garb, especially when we didn’t want the Taliban to know our teams were operating in certain areas. Here I’m in the local garb with AK-47 ready to go. This is my favorite personal photo from Afghanistan.
   

2. Indigenous forces usually know the population and terrain better than external actors and are better able to gain intelligence.
   
3. A lead US role can be interpreted by the population as occupation (especially in Afghanistan).
   
4. A lead indigenous role can provide a focus for national aspirations and show the population that they control their own destiny.
   

These Tribal Security Forces should be used to assist—not replace—the national and local police.

The bond here between the tribal leaders and councils and their US counterparts on
the Tribal Engagement Teams is crucial. Remember, tribal honor codes mandate adherence to treaties and contracts, particularly between warriors who have fought side-by-side and risked their lives together.

A vast majority of the tribes just want to be left alone. Years and years of broken promises have severely damaged our ability to deal with the tribes. The Tribal Engagement Teams would show a commitment to the tribes and the tribal leadership that we will be unable to replicate in any other way. Putting US soldiers (TETs) on the ground with the tribes will say more about our commitment than anything else we can do. It will be a great “honor” and show them trust and respect by truly joining forces with them.

The GIRoA (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) must find a way to incorporate the historical tribal structures into the national political system. It will not look like anything we can envision at this point, and may vary from province to province or even from tribe to tribe. But it can be done. Tribal Engagement Teams can help facilitate this.

While most of the Taliban are from Pashtun tribes, the tribes themselves are not the enemy. The Taliban, al-Qaeda, HIG (Hezb-e Islami), Haqqani and other insurgent networks are the tribes’ enemy—our enemy.

The Taliban find many willing recruits among disaffected tribesmen. The Taliban offer fame, glory and the chance to live exciting, meaningful lives. Many recruits see the Taliban as their only way to survive: Kill as a Taliban or be killed by the Taliban.

“By 2006, village jihadists accounted for fifteen to twenty-five percent of the Taliban’s active fighting strength at any given time.” (Giustozzi 2008, 43)

Our Tribal Engagement Teams (TETs) can get inside this disaffection/recruitment cycle and show the tribes that our teams (and by extension, the Coalition Forces and the Afghan central government) are there to help them. If we give them a better alternative—show them that we are their friends and are committed for the long haul—they will not only not attack us, but will be more willing to share intelligence and even come back home and fight for their tribe.

Taliban assassination teams have killed more than 120 tribal leaders in the past two years alone, and through intimidation
driven many more away from their home districts. The practice of delivering “night letters”—written death threats—on tribal leaders’ doorsteps is extremely effective. It’s gangland, Afghan style. But the tribes are not all taking this passively; many are arming and organizing on their own, without US help.

The use of lashkars (Arbakai) is spreading, and we need to be there in the right way to join them as allies, not as intruders. “There is going to be a civil war. These lashkars are spreading,” says Asfandyar Wali Khan, leader of the Awami National Party, which controls the provincial government in the NWFP.

“It will be the people versus the Taliban.” (Wilkinson 2008)

The tribes are forming their own anti-Taliban fighting units, the Arbakai. Their main mission is to protect tribal homelands from any perceived threat (be that US
forces, Afghan Army units, Afghan Police units, predatory warlords, al-Qaeda and the Taliban). With our assistance they will grow stronger and be far more effective—and be our allies. Don’t we want to understand their motivations and influence them?

Engaging the tribes and understanding tribalism at its core is the surest and “lightest-footprint” opportunity we have to protect the tribes—the cultural and political foundation of Afghanistan—where they live, one tribe at a time. Doesn’t it make sense to join forces with as many of them as we can, while at the same time gaining valuable intelligence on our enemies? This is a fundamental step in establishing the basis for order and security in this region.

“Pakistan has already armed some of the tribes in areas where the Taliban is attempting to move in. Some of these lashkars have as many as 14,000 members in the FATA (Federally Administrated
Tribal Areas) of Pakistan.” (DeYoung 2008)

Many recruits see the Taliban as their only way to survive: Kill as a Taliban or be killed by the Taliban.

One tribal leader was recently quoted as saying, “I don’t need tanks. I don’t need planes. I don’t even need a single bullet. I will use sticks and I will use the guns my people have to defend themselves.” (Sappenfield 2008) Is that clear enough?

The enemy thinks he can wait us out. However, we can turn time into an ally if we engage and partner with the tribes and, most importantly, demonstrate our commitment to them.

My team and I clearly proved it can be done. Malik Noor Afzhal and his people loved us. They enjoyed our stories and our culture. We were able to disprove many of their
preconceived notions about “us” (outsiders, Americans, infidels or whatever).

When we left there, I promise you that the tribe in Mangwel thought very highly of Americans and what we represented, how we acted, and how we treated them. This is not just of tactical importance to understand, but strategic importance as well.

The enemy thinks he can wait us out. However, we can turn time into an ally if we engage and partner with the tribes and, most importantly, demonstrate our commitment to them. Once they believe that we share the same objectives and are not leaving, they will support us and fight alongside us.

“The Taliban is exploiting our major strategic…and tactical weakness: an inability to connect with the population (the tribes). Officials working in Pakistan and Afghanistan support this view, claiming that the youth ‘oppose the current tribal system
because they know it is not harnessing its potential.’” (Giustozzi 2008, 39)

My Tribal Engagement Strategy can beat the Taliban at its own game. “In its simplicity and effectiveness, the insurgents’ reliance on small teams to infiltrate villages and weed out pro-Kabul elements was to prove one of the strongest aspects of the Taliban strategy. It pitted Taliban strength (abundance of commitment, ideologically indoctrinated young fighters able to achieve basic tasks even without supervision from field commanders) against government/ Coalition Forces weaknesses (shortage of manpower, little or no presence in the villages, inability to patrol extensively away from the main roads, and a lack of effective intelligence networks in most areas).” (Giustozzi 2008, 102)

We must help the tribes protect themselves by fighting alongside them. Will we make mistakes? Yes. But the risk is well worth the gain.

For the Afghan people, the real war is one of Tribalism vs. Talibanism. If we do not move now to support the tribes in this fight for their lives, it will produce a number of consequences, all of them bad: Taliban operations will expand over larger areas, killing more tribesmen and sweeping in more recruits as they go.

The one system in Afghanistan that has been reliable for centuries will continue to crumble, resulting in more disaffected tribal members drifting into terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. Thus we will give up on the most critical element of Afghan society that can ultimately defeat the Taliban—the tribes. We simply cannot let this happen.

My Tribal Engagement Strategy can beat the Taliban at its own game.