One Tribe at a Time: The Paper that Changed the War in Afghanistan (8 page)

Rapport building and cross-cultural competency is the key.

If an important part of our strategy is to build working ground-level alliances with the tribes, how do we make this happen? My ODA 316 and I created a model for successful tribal engagement and all that it requires. The relationships I developed in Iraq and Afghanistan not only worked while we were there, they have stood the test of time and continue to this day. This chapter is all about how our model can be adapted successfully to similar situations anywhere.

First, let’s look at an earlier example of successful tribal engagement. One of the main areas under contention today is in Southeast Afghanistan near Khas Khonar and the Pesch Valley areas. This is exactly where Sitting Bull’s village of Mangwel is located. This same area was one of the British Empire’s most challenging territories. How did they deal with it?

“From the 1890s to 1947, British control relied heavily on a small number of highly trained British officers. These frontier officers were highly educated, committed, conscientious, and hard working. Many had studied law and the history of the area and spoke some of the local languages. They had a deep sense of duty and a strong national identity. All required a depth of administrative competence and judgment to successfully wield the extensive powers at their disposal. They contributed significantly to the province’s security
and stability. These men were particularly valuable in navigating the intricacies of tribal politics.” (Roe 2005, 20)

The key to a successful tribal engagement strategy is the ability to identify men (Tribal Engagement Team members) who have a special gift for cross-cultural competency and building rapport—that is, they must become educated in the ways of the tribes and build strong relationships with them based on mutual trust and objectives.

These men must like to fight and spend countless months, even years living in harsh circumstances. They will have to fully comprehend tribal concepts of honor, loyalty and revenge—the Pashtunwali code. Initially, they will have very little physical security other than the AK-47 they carry, their planning skills and the tribal fighters they live with.

The situation at each tribe will be complex and will vary. Each will present its unique spider web of loyalties and subtle agendas that a Tribal Engagement Team must deal with smartly—and brutally when necessary. At the same time these men must be alert to detect and mediate local rivalries, sometimes within the tribe they are advising. They will have to be subjective on one issue and objective with another.

The IED threat, the civilian casualties caused by air strikes, the inability of US forces to protect locals in rural areas, the immediate need for more Afghan and US troops, and the fact that we are losing the tactical and strategic information campaign there.

This tribal engagement plan addresses all five problems head on.

First
, the IED threat will decrease to near zero because there will be little need to move troops around. The TETs will live in the village with the tribe. There will be no need to travel the dangerous roads between the firebases and the population.

Second
, the TETs will be living with the tribe in its village, so calling in air strikes on your own village is not an option, unless the decision is made by the tribal leader in extreme circumstances. The tribal leader will be the final authority to make the call for air support, thus avoiding civilian casualties in his tribal domain.

Third
, TETs living inside the village, not in some distant firebase, will increase the security of the village. The enemy will have to be much more aggressive to penetrate the tribal area, and that will dramatically
increase the chances that we (the TET and Arbakai) will be able to kill them.

Fourth
, the TETs will decrease the need for both US and Afghan government forces by training and advising a Tribal Security Force (TSF) or Arbakai. The Arbakai could be trained, equipped and organized as a modular, loose-knit unit. Eventually each TSF could be integrated into a kind of confederation—with district, regional and national units—to fight against any greater threat. Attack one tribe and you attack us all. This will take years to accomplish, but it will have tremendous enduring benefits for all concerned.

Fifth
, the TETs must develop their own Information Operations and provide ground reports to all news media—the story has to be told. International media coverage of Muslim countries is extremely important. Seventy to eighty percent of
the Afghan population cannot read, so videos and the spoken word in Pashto will be essential. This strategy will not work without a major Information Operations (IO) campaign.

Tactical Tribal Engagement (TTE) is one possible solution in certain areas for the current problems facing the United States military in Afghanistan. This tactical strategy has far-reaching effects that will impact the operational and strategic nature of the war not only in Afghanistan, but across the border region of eastern Afghanistan and the ungoverned areas of the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) in Pakistan, specifically the northern FATA areas.

1. Establish and maintain rapport with the chosen tribe in the area. Advise and assist its leaders in all matters.
   
2. Provide real security for the village. Not presence patrols, but 24/7 on-site security. A permanent presence that the tribes can rely on. “Advise, assist, train, equip and lead” a TSF, an Arbakai.
   
3. Facilitate tactical civic action programs. Integration with the local Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) is crucial, along with the ability to use funds that units have at their disposal for “quick” money to help tribes who are facilitating the success of CF and the Afghan government. The TETs would also address basic healthcare and infrastructure services (water, electricity and irrigation), construction and repair of schools and clinics, both to improve
   the life of the tribe and employ its individual members for pay. These programs should be worked through the local/district/provincial/national governments when possible and be integrated into the US battle space owner’s overall plan.
   
4. Employ an aggressive tactical PSYOP plan that ties into the overall strategic IO campaign in the area. Tribes also can heavily counter the Taliban propaganda. This is a critical aspect of the success of the TTE strategy. The world has to see the Afghan tribes and US soldiers working, living, laughing, fighting and dying together.
   
5. Report “Ground Truth” continuously. This activity would tie the tribe in with all levels of the government system. It would also be the process by which the tribe’s concerns are relayed directly to
   the CF military apparatus. Such ongoing accounting would serve as a check and balance, reporting what is actually happening on the ground as opposed to what the GIRoA (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) may say is happening. “Ground Truth” provides feedback to headquarters level units (battle space owners) in charge of the area ANA and ANP.
   

“I want the entire plan to be so effective that the Taliban feel threatened by our very presence, without us even firing a shot.”

TET solutions should always be answers to local problems, yet always with an eye to integration with regional and national government representatives. It will also be imperative for TETs to watch for scenarios where local/district/provincial/national government forces can be successful. In
other words, cooperate and help set the government up for success.

In return, the TSFs and tribal members would provide security, intelligence and early warning of insurgent attacks to the TETs, who would then pass this on to higher commands.

I will train myself, my Tribal Engagement Team and my tribal counterpart for the tactical fight every single day.

I will establish strong, meaningful relationships with the tribal leaders.

My goal is to establish a relationship with my tribal counterpart, for my team to establish a strong relationship with the tribe; to establish focused security for the tribe
and the locals in the area; to plan, develop and then implement a well-conceived IO, PSYOP and CA plan.

I want to make it so the Taliban and al-Qaeda have no choice but to come and meet us on our terms.

I want the entire plan to be so effective that the Taliban feel threatened by our very presence, without us even firing a shot.

• The local ANA and ANP.
  
• Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).
  
• National level Information Operations facilitators to include all major news agencies and publications.
  
• The local US forces (battle space owners).
  
• The ODA in the area.
  
• Higher echelon PSYOP units.
  
• Higher echelon CA units.
  
• Access to air assets for re-supply and CAS.
  
• NGOs
  
• Report “Ground Truth” to higher commands. Be the conduit of information and requests from the GIRoA and higher to and from the tribes. Report “Ground Truth” as well as the tribes’ perceptions and expectations to the GIRoA and higher.
  

• Listen
  
• Understand
  
• Learn
  
• Influence
  

I could re-insert a Tribal Engagement Team in Mangwel tomorrow. However, in other areas it would take more time to perform a proper operational preparation of the battlefield (OPB) and build enough rapport to begin. There are many “acceptable” areas available. Acceptable does not mean no risk. This is not a strategy for the risk-averse. However, with the work we’ve done already, my TET would be safer in Mangwel than anywhere in Afghanistan.

Given the time and resources, I would go anywhere in the country and do this. It would take one month to prepare the TET for insertion into the area of operations (AO): I would need two weeks to do an analysis of the area (Area Study) and another two weeks to train my TET on the tactical tasks necessary to conduct the mission. The TET’s goal is to achieve “influence without authority.” The most reliable and lasting influence happens by acting as partners, not distant superiors or strangers.

The TSFs (Arbakai) will be a much more credible force than the local police (ANP) for many reasons. They will also give the villages and tribes what they need most: an accepted, professional force that can offer the tribe protection from the Taliban.

The relationships the TETs build with their tribes will have long-lasting effects, free of influence or interference by local/district/ provincial/national politics. The TET/TSF
alliance will be able to govern and secure the tribe’s area until the tribe is confident that the local police and army can help protect them. Even then the tribes will be able to maintain their autonomy.

Afghan tribes do not give up their autonomy to anyone. Many, many tribal militias fought against the presence of the Taliban long before 9/11.

The TET will also need to monitor closely the relationship the tribe has with other tribes in the area, and how they are interacting. Of course, the goal is to incorporate as many other tribes as possible into the TTE strategy and give each tribe a TET. That is the major goal of the expansion phase of the operation.

Why chase the enemy? Make him come to us. And when I say “us” I mean a group of people who have the same goals: the TET and the tribe.

Influence without authority
– Sitting Bulll and I enjoyed each other’s company. Our camaraderie set the tone for out team’s relationship with the rest of the tribe. We laughed and spoke of many things that most US forces are taught as being taboo.

Make no mistake, there is a lot more fighting and killing to do. We should do it on our terms, side by side with Afghans with as many advantages as we can have. The TTE strategy will give us that.

This plan requires a small group of men who can comprehend the extensive networks, influences and idiosyncrasies of the mission
and the environment. We’re talking about “street smarts”—the instinct to grasp and account for all second, third and fourth order effects of decisions at all levels.

This is warfare at the Ph.D. level. It is constantly changing and requires continual assessment. Only a few dedicated men can execute this plan properly.

It will become a very personal fight. Once we commit to the tribe, the Pashtunwali code comes into effect for the US team as well. In the end it will be the TET’s ability to build a true bond with the tribe that is backed up by warrior ethos: the ability and desire to fight and die alongside them when necessary.