Operation Mercury (14 page)
Authors: John Sadler
Upham's company found themselves pinned down by the supporting strafing but were able to launch minor raids against the concentration of parachute and glider-borne invaders, the men returning loaded with spoils in true brigand fashion. The enterprising Major Thomason put his ill-gotten gains to sound practical use:
About four hundred parachutists were landed right on top of us and were suitably dealt with. I gained much information from a German officer who I wounded in the foot with my revolver on the way down ⦠I found in his pack a fairly large Nazi emblem and asked him what is was for and he said: âIf we require supplies we expose this'.
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Putting this intelligence into effect Thomason received a handy drop of equipment, including rations and weapons.
The situation generally, where the invaders landed in defended areas, became very confused, with sporadic firing erupting like wildfire; a deadly game of hide and seek in the tangled terrain. Friend might fire on friend in the confusion but, as the morning wore on, the surviving pockets of attackers were gradually mopped up.
Landing without incident, the laconic Heydte had experienced a relatively easy landing with the distinctive white walls of the prison clearly visible in the distance. His quiet enjoyment was abruptly shattered when an Me109 took a particular dislike to him and he was obliged to leap into a ditch to avoid the hail of bullets, the irony of being first shot at by his own side did not escape him.
...[the fighter pilot] obviously never imagined that this lackadaisical figure wandering about in such unmilitary fashion down the centre of the road could possibly have been the commanding officer of a German battalion.
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Parachute Engineers coming down by Episkopi fell foul of the Greek 8 Regiment who offered them a very warm reception. When von der Heydte combined with Derpa's 2nd Battalion, the paratroops overran and took the village of Aghia where Heidrich established his HQ, joined by the diminished remnants of the divisional command whose four gliders landed foul of hidden tree stumps not revealed by aerial reconnaissance, suffering yet more casualties. Von der Heydte, as he set up his HQ, and from which the distinctive profile of the church at Galatos could be seen, noted by mid morning:
When the first reports arrived from the companies they were contradictory and obscure. While sections of the battalion, advancing westwards on the right flank, along the high ground south of the valley, had met without any serious resistance from the enemy, the resistance in the valley itself had increased by the hour. The British seemed slowly to be organising a line of defence. During the first hours the fighting had apparently consisted of single, disjointed actions, sudden unexpected encounters, and mutual surprises; but now both sides were gradually organising themselves for battle.
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Puttick's failure to heed Kippenbburger's warnings of the tactical significance of Prison Valley had just been exposed. The respite gave the Germans an invaluable breather, to halt and reorganise their badly mauled forces. This fog of confusion and loss that attended the dispersed landings had robbed Heidrich of an immediate opportunity to mount any serious probes against the defenders' positions around Galatos. Local attacks were pressed home with vigour but, lacking coordination and support, were largely doomed from the outset:
We advanced to attack [Cemetery Hill]. We proceeded, without opposition about halfway up the hill. Suddenly we ran into heavy and very accurate rifle and machine-gun fire, the enemy had held their fire with great discipline and allowed us to approach well within effective range before opening up. Our casualties were extremely heavy and we were forced to retire leaving many dead behind us ... the first attack on Galatos had cost us approximately 50 per cent casualties about half of whom were killed.
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These defenders were not, in fact, crack infantry but a scratch formation, the Petrol Company of the Composite Battalion. Desperately short of rifles and machine guns, the men were mainly support personnel:
⦠the rifles were without bayonets, and five fewer than the men who needed them, and besides rifles there were only two Bren guns, one Lewis machine gun and an anti-tank rifle. The men were for the most part drivers and technicians and so ill trained for infantry fighting.
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Despite the losses inflicted and the failure, on the Germans' part, to attain any major objectives, they had been allowed to concentrate in Prison Valley. This was a serious omission on the Allies' part. That the area was suitable as a drop zone had not gone unnoticed. As Captain Lomas observed:
⦠noticed the unusual attention the German planes paid to the wide Prison Valley, a level area with plenty of good cover, dominated by the fortress-like prison which would be an impregnable stronghold for airborne enemy forces. Major Sean McDonagh, OC Petrol Company, was also disturbed by the fact that the chief Warden of the prison was fluent in several languages, including German, and we were convinced that landings in force would occur in the valley with the prison as an essential strongpoint.
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Despite the obvious potential, Puttick appeared oddly reluctant to provide for a more concerted defence of the valley. Kippenberger was, on taking command of 10 Brigade, immediately struck by the scale of the risk:
Colonel Kippenberger took command of the 10th Brigade on 14th May and was soon aware of the shortcomings of the Greek regiments and the lack of infantry training of the ASC and Divisional Cavalry troops. He remonstrated in vain with General Puttick, going so far as to rub off the circles indicating the Greek positions on the General's map, insisting that they could not be considered effective military formations, but for all his pains he was met with âDon't spoil my map Kip.' The 20th Battalion, in reserve, could well have supported or replaced the Greeks.
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A savage incident occurred when the 10th Parachute Company, under Lieutenant Nagle, dropped onto the reserve areas occupied by medical units, 7th General Hospital and 6th Field Ambulance. Lieutenant Colonel Plimmer at once surrendered but was killed along with twenty or so patients, presumably those incapable of walking; the rest were apparently dragged to their feet and herded in front of the attackers as a human shield.
They came up against 18th New Zealand Battalion at Evthymi where their attempts to break through toward Prison Valley generally resulted in death or capture. A subsequent enquiry dismissed the concept of an atrocity, blaming the incident as caused by the âfog of war' â it does appear the hospital patients were marched as a POW column rather than a screen.
Prior to the attack, as noted, Brigadier Kippenberger had protested to Puttick that the disposition of forces covering Prison Valley was inadequate. He was most concerned that the Greek regiments and the ancillary New Zealand forces were neither fully trained nor equipped. He went so far as to assert that the Greeks were so unprepared, their deployment was tantamount to murder. In fact his concern over the mettle of the Greeks was unfounded but his doubts overall were sound. The Germans, though mauled, were still able to concentrate their surviving forces without hindrance.
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This was to prove significant.
A particularly glaring omission, for which some writers have blamed Kippenberger, was the failure to maintain an adequate garrison in the prison itself. The building was a veritable fortress and the fact the Germans were able to move in unhindered, gave them a strong tactical HQ.
In the third sector attacked, namely Rethimnon, parachutists at first captured the aerodrome, but were wiped out by a spirited counter-attack by Greek and Australian troops belonging to the 19th Australian Infantry Brigade.
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This description, from the Official History, is something of a simplification. The situation at Rethymnon was both more complex and more protracted than is suggested here. The Allied forces, in this sector, were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ian Campbell, a relatively young and energetic officer, who had only recently been appointed to command.
Campbell entrusted the defence of the town, with its mighty Venetian fortress guarding the harbour, to the 800 odd Cretan police, under Major Christos Tsiphakis, later to become a key figure in the resistance. The town was, by now, out of bounds to the Australians whose hard-drinking, free-fisted ways had occasioned a number of disturbances.
Major Alfred Sturm, leading the airborne assault, commanded a powerful force with which to achieve his objectives. These were, broadly, to secure both the town and the airstrip and then march westwards to consolidate the main group centre target of Chania/Souda. For the assault his second Parachute Regiment of three full and well-supported battalions was divided into three commands.
Captain Weidermann led the 3rd Battalion with two detachments of airborne gunners armed with howitzers, some mortars and anti-tank weapons, supported by a machine-gun company. These were dropped over the village of Perivolia and tasked with storming Rethymnon. Sturm, with a beefed up assault company and his HQ, was to land around the airstrip, whilst Major Kroh with 1st Battalion came down to the east and their job was to march west and ensure the airfield was secured. Kroh had additional heavy weapons including flame throwers, motorcycles with sidecars and more machine guns; a most potent combination.
Against this, Colonel Campbell could only count on two Australian battalions; the 2/11th (West Australians) under Major Sandover and the 2/1st, Campbell's own unit. The heavy weapons at their disposal were vastly inferior, both in quantity and quality, to those of the attackers. Their artillery comprised four antiquated Italian 100-mm guns and the same number of US 75s (minus sights).
If the defenders lacked numbers and adequate matériel Campbell, in part, made up for this by concentrating his defence around the airstrip and leaving only a light screen around the town and on the beaches. Topography also lent a hand as the airfield was dominated by two hillocks, A on the east and B on the west, which straddled the Wadi Pigi and dominated the level ground below. Campbell placed his two battalions accordingly, 2/1st on Hill A and 2/11th on Hill B. Between the two eminences he distributed the 4th Greeks, with the 5th further back in the further range of shallow hills around Adhele village.
Campbell had concealed his two Matilda Tanks in a dry river bed west of the airstrip and set up his own HQ on Hill D. This enabled him to remain in touch with the rest of the defenders and to respond quickly to any crises which might arise.
The very lack of heavy weapons and anti-aircraft guns, combined with the skilful camouflage of the defenders' trenches, succeeded in fooling the Germans into believing the area was very lightly held indeed. Captured aerial photographs showed the enemy had located only one of the defensive lines and this was immediately altered.
Determined to give the enemy no inkling of his strength or disposition, Campbell had only permitted the men to break their cover when they went swimming in the warming waters. No more than a score of men at a time were allowed this luxury. The returning swimmers then had to earn their privilege by attempting to creep back unseen, thus alerting Campbell and Sandover to all possible routes an attacker might take and where the areas of dead ground lay.
As Sturm's drop formed part of the secondary afternoon attack on 20 May there was no question of surprise and the inevitable ground strafing and dive bombing was less thorough and sustained than elsewhere. After a quarter of an hour the unmistakable sound of the heavier transport engines could be heard and the first two dozen Ju52s appeared, flying eastward in perfect formation along the coast. More appeared piecemeal and the lack of cohesion amongst the badly stretched squadrons was obvious.
Despite the fact that the drop was part of the second afternoon wave, the defenders had not been made aware of the morning landings further west. In consequence a number of officers were absent from their posts. Nonetheless, a terrific hail of small-arms fire greeted the intruders, the Brens hammering wildly as fast as the magazines could be loaded and these accounted for at least seven of the 160 odd planes that appeared, whilst another two exploded in a mid-air collision.
Some of Kroh's men fell into the Mediterranean and were swiftly pulled under by the weight of their equipment. One of the Australian defenders recalled that:
I was spellbound by the futuristic nature and the magnificence of the scene ⦠they were coming in along about five miles of coastline and as far as the eye could see they were still coming. They were about 100 feet above the water and rose to about 250 feet as they came over the coastline, dropped their parachutists, dived again and turned back to sea.
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Of the 161 transport planes involved in the drop, fifteen were brought down by the Allied guns, one of whose gunners:
...saw planes burst into flames, then the crews inside feverishly leaping out like plums spilled from a burst bag. Some were burning as they dropped to earth. I saw one aircraft flying out to sea with six men trailing from it in the cord of their âchutes. The âchutes had become entangled with the fuselage. The pilot was bucketing the plane about in an effort to dislodge them.
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On one of the planes, the platoon commander, first to jump, was killed before he exited. His comrades were so unnerved they refused to budge. The pilot swept around for a second run but this time the plane was riddled with one of the engines catching fire. He ditched in the sea and the shaken survivors came ashore by rubber dinghy. The continuous hail of fire accounted for all but a pair of them. Another group who jumped as instructed died horribly when they fell into a cane-brake, becoming impaled on the lethal bamboos as surely as on the bayonets of the defenders.