Reagan: The Life (89 page)

Reagan nodded. “I am in the same position,” he said. “It is possible that before long I will not have the powers I do now. Why not use the time that we have and make a contribution to the creation of a world free of the nuclear threat?”

Gorbachev threw the question back at Reagan. “When I sit opposite you, opposite the president of the United States, I can look you in the eye with a clear conscience,” he said. “We have brought far-reaching proposals. I ask you to appreciate this. One thing is needed to reach agreement: a desire on your side.”

The roadblock on strategic reductions was the president’s insistence on unlimited testing of SDI, Gorbachev said. He again asked Reagan to reconsider. The Soviet proposal was less limiting than the president appreciated or was willing to admit. “We do not touch the SDI program within the framework of laboratory experiments. I do not think that this point would greatly limit you.” He professed knowledge of what the United States had achieved on SDI. “We know that in two or three areas you have had some breakthroughs. We know, and we ourselves are doing a few things. So the laboratory phase should not constrain you.”

Reagan said he couldn’t give Gorbachev what he asked. He had pledged that he would not bargain away SDI. “I cannot retreat from my position and renounce what I promised our people.” He repeated that SDI did not threaten the Soviet Union. The United States was willing to share the technology, which would help both sides protect themselves against third states or nuclear maniacs.

Gorbachev said again that the Soviet side was asking the president not to abandon SDI, simply to reframe it within the context of a strengthened
ABM Treaty. “We are giving you this opportunity to show that your idea is alive, that we are not burying it, that the United States can continue laboratory work on SDI, but cannot go beyond the framework of research. As for the nuclear maniac, we can handle this issue somehow within the framework of the ABM Treaty too.”

“I’m not sure of that,” Reagan rejoined, growing testy. “And anyway, damn it, what kind of agreement are you defending?” The ABM Treaty reinforced the nuclear status quo, which was what he was trying to overturn. “I do not understand the charm of the ABM Treaty, which in fact signifies guaranteed mutual destruction. We are holding talks about elimination of nuclear missiles, about how we should no longer be threatened with the danger that some gloomy day someone will push the button and everything will be destroyed.” That’s what they should be focusing on, not on freezing the status quo in place. And SDI was part of the solution, especially over the long term. “Even when we destroy these missiles we must have a defense against others. The genie is already out of the bottle.
Offensive weapons can be built again. Therefore I propose creating protection for the world for future generations, when you and I will no longer be here.”

Gorbachev thought Reagan accorded the ABM Treaty too little credit. It had been the basis for the nuclear stability of the last decade. Again he asked the president for concessions to match those already made by the Soviet side. “As the American saying goes, ‘It takes two to tango.’ And it takes two to control arms, to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons.”

Reagan expressed disappointment that Gorbachev seemed to fear that SDI was part of an American effort to gain advantage over the Soviet Union. “It is not true,” he said. “We do not have any hostile intentions toward you. We recognize the differences between our systems, but we think that our countries are entirely capable of living in the world as friendly rivals. I understand that you do not trust us, just as we do not trust you. But I am convinced that the historical facts are on our side. Long ago
Karl Marx said—”

Gorbachev interrupted: “Earlier you referred to Lenin, and now you’ve moved on to Marx.”

Reagan didn’t miss a beat. “Everything that Marx said, Lenin said it too. Marx was the first, and Lenin was his follower.” And what they both said was that for
socialism to succeed, it had to be triumphant throughout the world. This had been the consistent position of Soviet leaders. “Maybe you have not managed to express your views on this yet, or you do not believe it. But so far you have not said. But all the others said it.”

“So you are talking about Marx and Lenin again,” Gorbachev said dismissively. “Many people have already tried to bring down the founders of this well-known line of social thought. No one has been able to do this, and I advise you not to waste time on this.”

Gorbachev shrugged. “I do not want to argue with you,” he said. “I respect your independent nature and your views and ideas. And I am convinced that if you and I have different ideological ideas, that is not a reason for us to shoot at one another. On the contrary, I am convinced that in addition to political relations, purely human relations between us are possible also.”

“Unquestionably,” Reagan responded. He smiled as he added, “And I would even like to convince you to join the Republican Party.”

“An interesting idea,” Gorbachev rejoined. He shifted back to SDI, joking that he was doing Reagan a favor. “I think I am even helping the president with SDI. After all, your people say that if Gorbachev attacks
SDI and space weapons so much, it means the idea deserves more respect. They even say that if it were not for me, no one would listen to the idea at all.” If these commentators were right, the president should show gratitude. “I am on your side in this matter, but you have not appreciated it.”

Reagan didn’t consider SDI a joking matter. His smile was gone. “What the hell use will ABMs or anything else be if we eliminate nuclear weapons?” he demanded.

“Mr. President, you just made a historic statement: What the hell use will SDI be if we eliminate nuclear weapons?” Gorbachev responded. “But it is exactly because we are moving toward a reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons that I favor strengthening the ABM Treaty. In these conditions it becomes even more important.”

Reagan tried another tack. “I am the oldest man here,” he said. “And I understand that after the war the nations decided that they would renounce
poison gas. But thank God that the gas mask continued to exist. Something similar can happen with nuclear weapons. And we will have a shield against them in any case.”

“I am increasingly convinced of something I knew previously only second-hand,” Gorbachev said. “The president of the United States does not like to retreat. I see now that you do not want to meet us halfway on the issue of the ABM Treaty, which is absolutely essential in conditions where we are undertaking large reductions in nuclear arms.”

He paused, wearily. “I see that the possibilities of agreement are exhausted,” he said. He had gone as far as he could. “I think we can conclude our meeting with this.” The two of them had not achieved the results he had hoped for, results the world had hoped for. “But we must take account of the realities. And the reality is that we are unable to work out agreed-upon proposals on these issues. You and I talked about the possibility of major reductions in nuclear weapons, but if the fate of the ABM Treaty is unclear, then the entire conception collapses and we return to the situation that existed before Reykjavik.”

He reflected. “Perhaps you will report this to Congress,” he said. “We will report to the
Politburo and the
Supreme Soviet. I do not think the world will stop. Events will unfold, and neither will our relations stop. But we will not succeed in taking advantage of the present opportunity.”

Reagan hadn’t given in, but he wasn’t ready to give up. “Can we go away from here with nothing?” he asked.

“Unfortunately, we can,” Gorbachev replied stolidly.

The foreign ministers, Shultz and Shevardnadze, reminded their
bosses that they had to issue a communiqué. They exchanged phrases, seeking language that wasn’t entirely negative.

Gorbachev grew impatient. “Well, Mr. President,” he said, “ ‘X hour’ is approaching. What are you going to do?”

Shultz jumped ahead of Reagan. He said he had some phrasing that might suit both sides. He started reading.

Gorbachev cut him off after only a few words. “That is not acceptable to us,” he said. But he said he was willing to let Shultz try again, at greater length. “Maybe, if the president does not object, we will declare a break for one or two hours,” he said.

Reagan nodded, and the two sides recessed.

N
OT FOR YEARS
had Reagan worked this intensely and long. He was nearly exhausted. He had been counting on being back at the White House for Sunday dinner with Nancy. But he realized he and Gorbachev stood at the brink of one of the great decisions in world history. If they could bridge the gap between them on SDI, they might put the planet on a path to a post-nuclear age. Future generations would thank and revere them. He couldn’t leave Iceland without one more try.

The American offer at this point, as sharpened by Shultz with Reagan’s approval, was that the two countries would abide for five years by the
ABM Treaty’s provisions for research, development, and testing. During this time they would reduce their strategic offensive arsenals by 50 percent. During the next five years they would continue to reduce their offensive ballistic arsenals, with the goal of total elimination by the ten-year mark. As long as the reductions proceeded, the two sides would adhere to the ABM Treaty. After the ten years, assuming all offensive ballistic missiles had been eliminated, both sides could deploy strategic defenses if they wished.

Gorbachev opened the afternoon session with his counterproposal. He agreed to the two five-year reductions of offensive ballistic missiles. And he liked the ten-year adherence to the ABM Treaty, although he wanted it embraced at the outset, without the dual five-year formula proposed by the Americans. Yet he continued to insist that research and testing of strategic defense technologies be confined to laboratories. Testing in the field must wait until the end of the ten-year period.

Reagan responded indirectly. “
Our position offers a somewhat differ
ent formulation,” he said. “I hope we can eliminate the difference in the course of our talks.” He repeated the proposal Shultz had crafted.

Gorbachev answered that there were definitely differences between the two positions. “Your formula, as I see it, fails to meet our position halfway,” he said. “The main aspect of the Soviet Union’s approach is that in the period in which the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. are carrying out deep reductions in nuclear weapons, we ought to reinforce instead of impairing or undermining the
ABM Treaty.” The president’s attachment to SDI would have the latter effect. Gorbachev said he was asking no more than was entirely within the spirit of the ABM Treaty. “What we are talking about primarily is the renunciation of testing any space components of ABM defense in space—that is, refraining from any steps which would in effect pave the way to deployment of such systems. I want to emphasize once more that what is prohibited according to our formula does not affect laboratory testing and leaves open the possibility for the American side, like the Soviet side, to conduct any laboratory research relating to space, including SDI research. We are not undermining your idea of SDI; we are permitting that kind of activity, which is already being conducted by the United States and which is impossible to monitor anyway. We are only placing the system in the framework of laboratory research.” Gorbachev said he wasn’t asking any more than was reasonable. “I think the U.S. could go along with this, especially considering the major steps the Soviet Union has made.”

Reagan shook his head. “That doesn’t remove the question of what we are to do after ten years if we should want to create a defense against ballistic missiles,” he said. He couldn’t fathom Gorbachev’s stubbornness on strategic defense. “I just don’t understand why you object so much to SDI,” he said. He added, “As for what the ABM Treaty prohibits and what it permits, the two sides have differences of interpretation here.”

Gorbachev was mystified, too, but by Reagan’s attachment to SDI. Yet his proposal granted much of what the president sought. “As you see, we are offering a broad formula of what we can do after the ten years,” Gorbachev said. “If you should deem it essential to continue SDI, we can discuss that. And so why deal with the question in advance, right now? And why force us to sign SDI? Perhaps we might have other interests.”

Reagan stood firm. “We want right now to provide for the possibility of defense in case, ten years from now, when we no longer have missiles, someone should decide to re-create nuclear missiles,” he said.

Gorbachev asked Reagan to focus on what the two sides had agreed
on and what it would allow them to do. “We will be able to accomplish the historic task of eliminating strategic offensive weapons,” he said. He continued, “Why complicate things with other problems which we are uncertain about, the consequences of which are unclear? It would only undermine one side’s confidence in whether it was acting correctly by reducing its nuclear forces under conditions where the other side is taking steps which could have aggravating consequences for the entire process.” Gorbachev reiterated that SDI was not being eliminated. “The scientific-technical aspect of SDI could still continue, your capability in that sphere. The decision would by no means sound the death knell for your SDI program.”

Reagan defended America’s pro-SDI interpretation of the ABM Treaty. “We are only proposing such research, development and testing as are permitted by the ABM Treaty,” he said. He wondered aloud if there was more to the Soviet resistance than Gorbachev was admitting. “What objection can there be unless something is being hidden?” He repeated yet again his willingness to share SDI technology. “We will make it available to the Soviet side if it wants it.” Reagan added that if either side had reason to worry about strategic defense, it was the United States. “If the Soviets feel that strongly about strengthening the ABM Treaty, why don’t they get rid of Krasnoyarsk”—where the Soviets had built a radar system the American government deemed in violation of the ABM Treaty—“and the whole defense structure they have built around their capital? They have a big defense structure and we have none. It is a peculiar fact that we do not have a single defense against a nuclear attack.”