Reagan: The Life (93 page)

The White House initially gave the story the back of its hand. “
As long as Iran advocates the use of terrorism, the U.S. arms embargo will continue,”
Larry Speakes told reporters. In response to a direct question as to whether the arms embargo remained in effect, Speakes said, “Yes.”

Reagan refused to dignify the story with a public comment of his own. In his diary he blamed the media for more misreporting. “
Usual meetings,” he wrote. “Discussion of how to handle press who are off on a wild story built on unfounded story originating in Beirut that we’ve bought hostage Jacobsen’s freedom with weapons to Iran.” Reagan intended to continue his silence. “Our message will be ‘we can’t and won’t answer any Q’s on this subject because to do so will endanger the lives of those we are trying to help.’ ”

Reagan brought Jacobsen and his family to the White House. The president couldn’t resist the opportunity to express his satisfaction at Jacobsen’s freedom and his concern for the Americans still in captivity. But the event gave reporters license to question him on his policy toward the hostages and their kidnappers. “
Mr. President,” one reporter asked, “the Iranians are saying that if you’ll release some of those weapons, they’ll intercede to free the rest of the hostages. Will you?”

Reagan stuck to his script. “There’s no way we can answer questions having anything to do with this without endangering the people we’re trying to rescue,” he said.

Reporters had uncovered the rift between the State Department and the NSC staff regarding the hostages and relations with Iran. A reporter wanted Reagan to confirm or deny the division: “Could you just tell us whether Secretary of State Shultz agrees with your policy or disagrees and has protested, as has been reported?”

Reagan refused to reveal what advice he had been given. “We have all been working together,” he said.

“And Secretary Shultz supports the policy, and so does Cap Weinberger?”

“Yes,” Reagan said.

A reporter wanted more detail on how Jacobsen had been freed. “Why not dispel the speculation by telling us exactly what happened, sir?”

“Because it has to happen again and again and again until we have them all back,” Reagan said. He returned to the script. “And anything that we tell about all the things that have been going on in trying to effect his rescue endangers the possibility of further rescue.”

The reporters continued to push. “Your own party’s majority leader”—Robert Dole—“says you’re rewarding terrorists,” one said.

David Jacobsen stood beside Reagan through all this. His frustration grew with each probing question. Finally he burst out angrily, “In the name of God, would you please just be responsible and back off?”

Reagan nodded agreement with Jacobsen, and the two turned to go inside the Oval Office. A shouted question followed them: “How are we to know what is responsible and what is not?”

Moments later, away from the reporters, Jacobsen said to Reagan, “
My God, Mr. President, these people are savages. Don’t they realize what they are doing?”

Reagan again nodded, gratified that Jacobsen had said what he himself was thinking. “
It was an emotional and heartwarming meeting,” he recorded in his diary. He was pleased with his own response to a flap he hoped would blow over. “Now we are off to Camp D,” he concluded the day’s entry.

D
ON REGAN DIDN
’
T
think the problem was so easily resolved. He recognized that the arms-to-Iran story hadn’t emerged out of thin air, and he guessed that it couldn’t be waved away. He urged the president to get ahead of the story by telling everything he knew about it.

The problem was that Regan didn’t know how much Reagan knew. He could only guess at the extent of the president’s knowledge of the alleged arms-for-hostages deal. As chief of staff, Regan theoretically controlled the flow of information to and from the Oval Office. Theory and practice meshed closely in domestic affairs, but foreign policy often frustrated his efforts to keep on top of things. The national security adviser reported directly to the president; Robert McFarlane and then John Poindexter briefed Regan only intermittently on what they told Reagan and what he told them.

Regan nonetheless believed the president had to face the press. Before Reagan left for Camp David, Regan repeated his advice about telling all.

Reagan again resisted. “
Don, you heard what Jacobsen said,” he explained. “I
can’t
talk.”

“Mr. President, I don’t care,” Regan replied. “We’re between the devil and the deep and it’s not going to help things to maintain silence. If these hostages don’t materialize soon, you’re going to have to speak up. You’re going to be ripped apart on the weekend talk shows. The Monday morning papers will pick it up. The American people are going to start demanding to know what’s going on here.”

Reagan still refused. But he said he would reconsider on Monday after he returned from Camp David. He flew to the presidential retreat, where he persisted in blaming the media. “
The Saturday night and Sunday
morning talk shows continued to hammer on the hostage and Iran arms story giving credence to every rumor and supposed leak,” he wrote. “They can do great harm with their irresponsible drum beating.”

Don Regan hoped to enlist Nancy Reagan to help in persuading the president to go public. But she declined. “
He’s not going to talk to the press,” she said. She added, according to Regan’s recounting, “My Friend says it’s, you know, it’s just
wrong
for him to talk right now.”

Regan had bitten his tongue at the influence of Nancy’s astrologer in determining the president’s schedule, but this crossed the line into policy. Over the phone he exploded in frustration. “My God, Nancy,” he said. “He’s going to go down in flames if he doesn’t speak up.”

On Monday, Reagan met with his national security team. “
Subject: the press storm charging that we are negotiating with terrorist kidnappers for the release of hostages using sale of arms as ransom,” he recorded. “Also that we are violating our own law about arms sales to Iran. They”—the press—“quoted as gospel every unnamed source plus such authorities as a Danish sailor who claims to have served on a ship carrying arms from Israel to Iran, etc. etc. etc. I ordered a statement to effect we were
not
dealing in ransom, etc., but that we would not respond to charges or Q’s that could endanger hostage lives or lives of people we were using to make contact with the terrorists.”

Reagan only reluctantly agreed to speak to the leaders of Congress in a private session. He told the lawmakers that the administration had indeed sent arms to Iran but merely in small amounts and not in exchange for hostages. Don Regan watched the visitors as the president spoke. “
Some of those men were skeptical,” he recalled. “You could see it in their faces. But they had no choice but to accept what the president told them. Ronald Reagan had never lied to them (or in my experience, to anyone). And there is no question in my mind that he thought he was telling the truth.”

Reagan sensed the skepticism as well. He wasn’t used to having his integrity impugned. He decided that the only way to resolve the matter was to take his case to the American people. “
This whole irresponsible press bilge about hostages and Iran has gotten totally out of hand,” he wrote to himself. “The media looks like it’s trying to create another Watergate. I laid down the law in the morning meetings—I want to go public and tell the people the truth.”

T
EN DAYS AFTER
the story surfaced, the president addressed the American people from the Oval Office. He dispensed with the typical opening joke, though he allowed himself a jab at the media. “
I know you’ve been reading, seeing, and hearing a lot of stories the past several days attributed to Danish sailors, unnamed observers at Italian ports and Spanish harbors, and especially unnamed government officials of my administration. Well, now you’re going to hear the facts from a White House source, and you know my name.”

His television audience had never seen him more serious. “I wanted this time to talk with you about an extremely sensitive and profoundly important matter of foreign policy,” he said. “For eighteen months now we have had underway a secret diplomatic initiative to Iran. That initiative was undertaken for the simplest and best of reasons: to renew a relationship with the nation of Iran, to bring an honorable end to the bloody six-year war between Iran and Iraq, to eliminate state-sponsored terrorism and subversion, and to effect the safe return of all hostages.” Iran’s cooperation was crucial to achieving these goals.

He went straight to the most damning allegation. “The charge has been made that the United States has shipped weapons to Iran as ransom payment for the release of American hostages in Lebanon, that the United States undercut its allies and secretly violated American policy against trafficking with terrorists.” He let the charge hang in the air for a moment, and then, looking straight in the camera, he said, “Those charges are utterly false. The United States has not made concessions to those who hold our people captive in Lebanon. And we will not. The United States has not swapped boatloads or planeloads of American weapons for the return of American hostages. And we will not.”

Yet some things needed to be explained. “During the course of our secret discussions, I authorized the transfer of small amounts of defensive weapons and spare parts for defensive systems to Iran,” Reagan said. “My purpose was to convince Tehran that our negotiators were acting with my authority, to send a signal that the United States was prepared to replace the animosity between us with a new relationship.” But the shipments were no more than a gesture. “These modest deliveries, taken together, could easily fit into a single cargo plane. They could not, taken together, affect the outcome of the six-year war between Iran and Iraq nor could they affect in any way the military balance between the two countries.”

As for the hostages: “At the same time we undertook this initiative,
we made clear that Iran must oppose all forms of international terrorism as a condition of progress in our relationship. The most significant step which Iran could take, we indicated, would be to use its influence in Lebanon to secure the release of all hostages held there.”

The initiative had borne fruit. “Some progress has already been made,” Reagan said. “Since U.S. government contact began with Iran, there’s been no evidence of Iranian government complicity in acts of terrorism against the United States. Hostages have come home, and we welcome the efforts that the government of Iran has taken in the past and is currently undertaking.”

Reagan emphasized Iran’s strategic significance. “It lies between the
Soviet Union and access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean,” he said. “Iran’s geography gives it a critical position from which adversaries could interfere with
oil flows from the Arab States that border the Persian Gulf. Apart from geography, Iran’s oil deposits are important to the long-term health of the world economy.” For these reasons, the United States had to establish a dialogue with Iran. He likened Iran to
China in the early 1970s, and his secret policy to that of
Richard Nixon. “In 1971 then-President Nixon sent his national security adviser on a secret mission to China. In that case, as today, there was a basic requirement for discretion and for a sensitivity to the situation in the nation we were attempting to engage.”

Reagan offered greater detail about his Iranian initiative. “Our discussions continued into the spring of this year,” he said. “Based upon the progress we felt we had made, we sought to raise the diplomatic level of contacts. A meeting was arranged in Tehran. I then asked my former national security adviser, Robert McFarlane, to undertake a secret mission and gave him explicit instructions. I asked him to go to Iran to open a dialogue, making stark and clear our basic objectives and disagreements. The four days of talks were conducted in a civil fashion, and American personnel were not mistreated.” The dialogue had continued since then, and progress continued to be made. The release of
David Jacobsen was the latest sign.

Reagan reiterated that Jacobsen’s release had nothing to do with the arms shipments. “We did not—repeat—did not trade weapons or anything else for hostages, nor will we.” The Iran initiative did not signal an easing of American policy toward terrorism. “Those who think that we have gone soft on terrorism should take up the question with Colonel Qaddafi. We have not, nor will we, capitulate to terrorists.” And the ini
tiative violated no laws. “The actions I authorized were, and continue to be, in full compliance with federal law.”

Reagan appealed to Americans’ good sense. “As president, I’ve always operated on the belief that, given the facts, the American people will make the right decision. I believe that to be true now. I cannot guarantee the outcome. But as in the past, I ask for your support because I believe you share the hope for peace in the Middle East, for freedom for all hostages, and for a world free of terrorism.”

G
EORGE
S
HULTZ WATCHED
Reagan’s address with mounting dismay. “
The president’s speech convinced me that Ronald Reagan still truly did not believe that what had happened had, in fact, happened,” Shultz recalled. The secretary of state had gradually realized that his and Caspar Weinberger’s strong opposition had not spiked the Iran initiative.
John Poindexter had kept the details from him, but Shultz divined enough to conclude that it was a disastrously conceived arms-for-hostages deal.

Yet Poindexter had managed to persuade the president otherwise, Shultz observed. “What had been going on here was a staff con job on the president, playing on his very human desire to get the hostages released. They told the president what they wanted him to know and what they saw he wanted to hear, and they dressed it up in ‘geostrategic’ costume.” The con job worked all too well. “So what Reagan said to the American public was true to him, although it was not the reality.”

Shultz was hardly alone in finding Reagan’s explanation incredible. A
Los Angeles Times
poll revealed that a scant 14 percent of respondents thought the president was telling the truth about the Iran initiative. By a margin of three to one they rejected his claim that the administration did not negotiate with terrorists. Only one in five respondents believed Reagan’s claim that his administration had not violated federal laws in sending weapons to Iran.