Red Storm Rising (1986) (109 page)

“Can you win?” the General Secretary asked.

“Yes, Comrade Secretary! Given several days to organize my forces, and if I can do some crucial work with the arriving reserve formations, I think it likely that we can sunder the NATO front.”

“Likely? Not certain?” the Defense Minister asked.

“In war there is no certainty,” Alekseyev answered simply.

“We have learned that,” the Foreign Minister answered dryly. “Why have we not won yet?”

“Comrades, we failed initially to achieve strategic and tactical surprise. Surprise is the most important variable factor in war. With it we would probably—almost certainly—have succeeded in two or three weeks.”

“To achieve certain success now, what else will you need?”

“Comrade Defense Minister, I need the support of the people and the Party, and I need a little time.”

“You evade the question!” Marshal Bukharin said.

“We were never allowed to use our chemical weapons in the initial assault. That could have been a decisive advantage—”

“The political cost of those weapons was deemed too great,” the Foreign Minister said defensively.

“Could you make profitable use of them now?” the General Secretary asked.

“I think not. Those weapons should have been used from the first on equipment-storage depots. The depots are now mainly empty, and hitting them would have only a limited effect. Use of chemicals at the front is no longer a viable option. The newly arriving C formations lack the modern equipment necessary to operate efficiently in a chemical environment.”

“Again I ask the question,” the Defense Minister repeated. “What do you need to make victory certain?”

“To achieve a decisive breakthrough, we need to be able to blast a hole in NATO lines at least thirty kilometers wide and twenty kilometers in depth. To do that, I need ten full-strength divisions on line, ready to advance. I need several days to prepare that force.”

“How about tactical nuclear weapons?” Alekseyev’s face did not change.
Are you mad, Comrade General Secretary?

“The risks are high.”
There’s a prize understatement.

“And if we can prevent, politically, NATO retaliation?” Defense asked.

“I do not know how that is possible.”
And neither do you.

“But if we can make it possible?”

“Then it would increase our chances measurably.”
Alekesyev
paused, inwardly chilled at what he saw in those faces.
They want to use nuclear weapons at the front—and when NATO responds in kind and vaporizes my troops, then what? Will it stop with a single exchange or will more and more be used, the explosions advancing west and east? If I tell them they are crazy, they will find a general who will not.
“The problem is one of control, Comrades.”

“Explain.”

If he were to stay alive and prevent this . . . Alekseyev spoke carefully, mixing truth and lies and guesses. Dissimulation did not come easily to the General, but at least this was an issue he had discussed with his peers for over a decade. “Comrade General Secretary, nuclear weapons are, foremost, political weapons for both sides, controlled by political leaders. This limits their battlefield utility. A decision to use an atomic warhead in a tactical environment must be passed on by those leaders. By the time approval is granted, the tactical situation will almost certainly have changed, and the weapon is no longer useful. NATO never has seemed to grasp this. The weapons they have are mainly designed to be used by battlefield commanders, yet I have never thought myself that NATO’s political leadership would lightly give use authority to those battlefield commanders. Because of this, the weapons they would more probably use against us are actually strategic weapons aimed at strategic targets, not the tactical weapons in the field.”

“That is not what they say,” Defense objected.

“You will note that when we made our breakthroughs at Alfeld and Rühle, nuclear weapons were not used on the bridgeheads even though some pre-war NATO writings would seem to suggest they should have been. I conclude that there are more variable factors in the equation than were fully appreciated. We have learned ourselves that the reality of war can be different from the theory of war.”

“So you support our decision to use tactical nuclear weapons?” the Foreign Minister asked.

No! The lie rolled off his lips. “If you are certain that you can prevent retaliation, of course I support it. I caution you, however, that my reading of NATO’s response might be very different from what we might otherwise expect. I would expect retaliation to fall some hours later than we think, and against strategic rather than tactical targets. They are more likely to hit road and rail junctions, airfields, and supply facilities. These do not move. Our tanks do.”
Think on what I just said, Comrades: things will quickly go out of control. Make peace, you fools!

“So you think we could use tactical weapons with impunity if we simultaneously threaten strategic targets of our own?” the General Secretary asked hopefully.

“That is essentially the NATO pre-war doctrine. It overlooks the fact that the use of nuclear weapons over friendly territory is not something undertaken lightly. Comrades, I warn you that the prevention of a NATO response will not be an easy exercise.”

“You worry about the battlefield, Comrade General,” the Defense Minister suggested lightly. “We will worry about the political questions.”

There was only one more thing he could say to discourage them. “Very well. In that case I will need direct control of the weapons.”

“Why?” the General Secretary demanded.

So they won’t be fired, you fucking idiot!
“We have here a question of practicality. Targets will appear and disappear on a minute-to-minute basis. If you want me to blast a hole in NATO lines with atomic arms, I will not have the time to get your approval.”

Alekseyev was horrified to see that even this did not dissuade them.

“How many would you need?” the Defense Minister wanted to know.

“That is a question contingent upon the time and place of the breakthrough operation, and we would use small weapons against discrete point targets—not population centers. I would say a maximum of thirty weapons in the five- to ten-kiloton range. We would launch them with free-flight artillery rockets.”

“How soon will you be ready for your attack?” Marshal Bukharin asked.

“That depends on how quickly I can get veteran troops into the new divisions. If these reservists are to survive on the battlefield, we must get experienced men to firm up their ranks.”

“A good idea, Comrade General,” the Defense Minister approved. “We will not detain you further. In two days, I want to see detailed plans for your breakthrough.”

The five members of the Defense Council watched Alekseyev salute, pivot on his heels, and depart. Kosov looked up at Marshal Bukharin.

“And you wanted to replace this man?”

The General Secretary agreed. “That’s the first real fighting soldier I’ve seen in years.”

Alekseyev waved for Major Sergetov to follow him. Only he felt the cold lead weight in his belly. Only he knew how weak his knees were as they trod down the marble steps. Alekseyev didn’t believe in God, but he knew that he had just seen the door to hell cracked open.

“Major,” he said casually as they entered the staff car, “since we’re in Moscow, perhaps you would like to visit your father the Minister before we return to the front?”

“That is very kind of you, Comrade General.”

“You have earned it, Comrade Major. Besides, I want figures on our oil supply.”

The driver would report what he’d heard, of course.

 

“They want me to use nuclear weapons at the front!” Alekseyev whispered as soon as the Minister’s door was closed.

“Yes, I was afraid of that.”

“They must be stopped! There is no predicting what catastrophe this could bring about.”

“The Defense Minister says that a tactical nuclear environment could easily be controlled.”

“He’s talking like one of those NATO idiots! There is no wall between a tactical and a strategic nuclear exchange, just a fuzzy line in the imagination of the amateurs and academics who advise their political leaders. The only thing that would then stand between us and a nuclear holocaust—our survival would be at the mercy of whichever NATO leader is the
least
stable.”

“What did you tell them?” the Minister asked. Had Alekseyev retained his wits enough to say the right thing?

“I must be alive to stop them—I told them it’s a wonderful idea!” The General sat down. “I also told them that I must have tactical control of the weapons. I think they will agree to that. I’ll make sure those weapons are never used. I have just the man on my staff to do that, too.”

“You agree then that the Defense Council must be stopped?”

“Yes.” The General looked down at the floor, then back up. “Otherwise—I don’t know. It is possible that their plan might start something that no one could stop. If we die, we die in a good cause.”

“How do we stop them?”

“When does the Politburo meet?”

“Every day now. We usually meet at nine-thirty.”

“Whom can we trust?”

“Kosov is with us. There will be a few others, Politburo members, but I do not know whom I can approach.”

Wonderful
—
our only certain ally is the KGB!

“I need some time.”

“Perhaps this will help.” Sergetov handed over a file he’d gotten from Kosov. “Here is a list of officers in your command who are suspected of political unreliability.”

Alekseyev scanned the list. He recognized the names of three men who had served with distinction in battalion and regimental commands . . . one good staff officer and one terrible one. Even
when my men fight a war for the Motherland, they are under suspicion!

“I’m supposed to formulate my attack plan before I return to the front. I will be at Army Headquarters.”

“Good luck, Pavel Lconidovich.”

“And to you, Mikhail Eduardovich.” The General watched father and son embrace. He wondered what his own father would think of this.
To whom do I turn for guidance?

“Good afternoon, I am Major General William Emerson. This is Colonel Lowe. He will act as interpreter.”

“General Major Andreyev. I speak English.”

“Do you propose a surrender?” Emerson asked.

“I propose that we negotiate,” Andreyev answered.

“I require that your forces cease hostilities at once and surrender their weapons.”

“And what will become of my troops?”

“They will be interned as prisoners of war. Your wounded will receive proper medical attention and your men will be treated in accordance with the usual international conventions.”

“How do I know you speak truly?”

“You do not.”

Andreyev noted the blunt, honest answer.
But what choice do I have?

“I propose a cease-fire”—he checked his watch—“at fifteen hours.”

“Agreed.”

“How long?” SACEUR asked.

“Three days. We’ll be able to attack with four divisions.”

What’s left of four divisions,
SACEUR thought.
We’ve stopped them, all right, but what do we have to drive them back with?

They did have confidence. NATO had begun the war with an advantage only in its technology, which was even more pronounced now. The Russian stocks of new tanks and guns had been ravaged, and the divisions coming into the line now had twenty-year-old castoffs. They still had numbers, though, and any offensive SACEUR planned would have to be carefully planned and executed. Only in the air did he have an important advantage, and air power had never won a war. The Germans were pushing hard for a counterstrike. Too much of their land, and too many of their citizens, were on the wrong side of the line. Already the
Bundeswehr
was probing aggressively on several fronts, but they’d have to wait. The German Army was not strong enough to push forward alone. They’d taken too many losses in their prime role of stopping the Soviet advance.

The youngsters were too excited to sleep. The older men were too worried to sleep. Conditions didn’t help. The men of the 77th Motor-Rifle Division were crammed into passenger cars, and while all had seats, it was at the cost of rubbing against their comrades even as they breathed. The troop trains moved along at a speed of a hundred kilometers per hour. The tracks were set in the Russian way, with the rail segments ending together instead of offset; so, instead of the clickity-click familiar to Western riders, the men of this C division heard only a series of thuds. It tested nerves already raw.

The interval between the jarring sounds slowed. A few soldiers looked out to see that their train was stopping at Kazan. The officers were surprised. They weren’t supposed to stop until they got to Moscow. The mystery was soon solved. No sooner had the twenty-car train stopped than new men filed into the carriages.

“Attention,” called one loud voice. “Combat soldiers arriving!”

Though they had been issued new uniforms, their boots showed the weeks of abuse. Their swagger marked them as veterans. About twenty got onto each passenger car, and rapidly secured comfortable seating for themselves. Those displaced would have to stand. There were officers, too, and they found their counterparts. The officers of the 77th began to get firsthand information of NATO doctrine and tactics, what worked and what didn’t work, all the lessons paid for in blood by the soldiers who did not join the division at Kazan. The enlisted men got no such lessons. They watched men who were able to sleep even as they rode to the fighting front.

Chicago
was alongside the pier, loading torpedoes and missiles for her next mission. Half her crew was ashore stretching their legs and buying drinks for the crew of
Torbay.