Schwerpunkt: From D-Day to the Fall of the Third Reich (14 page)

There are about a dozen Panzer divisions in the northern half of France but realistically, less than six are even in the general vicinity of Normandy. Decisions had to be made immediately as to where to place our troops, both to defend our territory and to launch the counterattacks necessary to push these enemy invaders back into the sea. Our chain of command, however, does not easily facilitate this.

Field Marshals generally have the right to order Panzer divisions to critical areas but not always. Der Führer has ultimate control over all Panzer divisions of course, but he retains sole personal control over various elite SS Panzer divisions both here and in Russia. No individual Field Commander has the authority to move these Panzer divisions without Hitler’s prior approval since, in an overabundance of caution and being the military genius that our Führer is, he has to make sure that no commanding officer orders Panzer movements beyond his capabilities. Since Hitler himself is the only military commander capable of ensuring the war is won, he alone can move and divert various Panzer divisions to where they are most needed. Certain Field Marshals are competent to move one or two or, as in Field Marshal Rommel’s case, even three divisions but any orders to move the rest have to be cleared through der Führer who, even though he commands from afar, is still in the best position to know how to deploy troops and tanks. I’m sure the whole hierarchy sounds more convoluted than it actually is since it was put in place by Hitler and Hitler is a genius.

So, of the Panzer divisions even remotely around Normandy, Hitler alone controls the movements of three of them. He and no-one else can direct the movement of the 1st SS (“Leibstandarte Adolph Hitler”) Panzer Division; the 12
^th
SS (“Hitler Jugend”) Panzer Division and the Panzer Lehr Division. Of those, the Hitler Jugend and Panzer Lehr are relatively close to where the enemy troops are assaulting the beaches and they could be of some real immediate help in repelling the invasion, whether diversionary or not. Both General von Schweppenburg and General von Rundstedt have shared power over der Führer’s three Panzer divisions but the former has only administrative power and the latter only has operational power and then, only provided he obtains Hitler’s prior approval first. So neither division has been released from its position. The 21,000 soldiers in the Hitler Jugend Division along with near equal forces from Hitler’s Panzer Lehr Division are doing nothing right now to repel this invasion, whether diversionary or not. We all waited for der Führer’s orders since without a doubt, putting the power and might of these Panzer divisions against the invaders would cause the crushing destruction not only of the enemy soldiers themselves, but of their ships and boats and all the other equipment we’ve been hearing the enemy is bringing ashore. And while we wait for these orders, more of everything is coming into France.

Field Marshal Rommel was given command and sole control of the 2
^nd
Panzer Division; the 21
^st
Panzer Division; and the 116
^th
Panzer Division. The 116
^th
is across the country, east of the Seine River. The 2
^nd
is even further away from the landing sites in Amiens, beyond the Somme, defending an area around Calais where, up until several hours ago, virtually everyone thought the real Schwerpunkt would take place. Elements of the 21
^st
Panzer Division, however, are in perfect position to counter-attack the invaders but General Rommel is not here to assess the situation and to issue the orders that only he can give.

General Rommel previously commanded the 21
^st
Panzer Division (“Afrika Corps”) and therefore knows their strength and tenacity. This division got its name from the fierce battles they fought against the English General Montgomery. Now of course, after the surrender in Tunis last year, there aren’t many veterans from Afrika in the division and there aren’t nearly as many troops in the division as there were back then but they are still first rate tankers and they are still commanded by General Rommel. But since no one except General Rommel can order the tanks of the Afrika Corps to be moved, his field commanders sit where they are just like the Field Commanders of the Panzer divisions under der Führer’s control sit where they are and wait with their units for orders to defend against the invasion. And because none of the field commanders who had been ordered to halt the enemy on the beaches have any power to move any of the Panzer divisions, the situation is getting more and more dire by the hour.

One of the officers under General Rommel is General Feuchtinger. He commands the 21
^st
Panzer Division and he’s been telephoning our headquarters to ask if he can launch a counterattack from his position around Caen. He said he could see what was happening and he could get his defensive units into offensive position in no time. But because General Rommel was not there, Dr. Speidel told him to continue waiting. As General Feuchtinger waited, his anti-aircraft defenses came under attack from enemy planes and they were all but destroyed. Could this possibly have happened just because there was no one with proper authority to give him the order to smash the enemy he was sitting there watching? Finally General Rommel began phoning orders to his 21
^st
Panzer commanders and General Feuchtinger was now ordered to launch a counterattack. This came hours after the initial landings and by now, the enemy was strongly holding their positions. He was ordered to attack north and west of Ouistreham, a city near one of the landing beaches with a huge gap separating it from the next landing beach to the east. He moved his units and, as he was commencing to begin the attacks, he later reported that under heavy fighting and heavier air attacks, his tanks were simply unable to breach the gap. His counterattack was not successful and we received reports that the enemy took many prisoners from the Afrika Corps Panzer Division. May I please be allowed to repeat what I said about a series of fatal errors?

I do not personally care for many of the generals I come across working for General Rommel. Most of them are ass lickers who would do or say anything to keep their positions and their posts. I know der Führer has seen through a great many of them and has fired some and has relieved many of their commands. One general in particular that I do not care for is Old Field Marshal von Rundstedt. Obviously though, he didn’t get to be old or a Field Marshal just by passively attending to his command duties. When General Rommel implored General von Rundstedt several months ago to move the reserve units closer to the Normandy coastline in order to exploit the enemy before they had time to reinforce and strengthen their forces, General von Rundstedt refused. He said he might agree if he knew positively which beaches were going to be the site of the enemy’s invasion and in fact did agree to move some troops and armored units around Calais.

Now, on the day the enemy is landing, whether as a diversionary feint or not, immediate mobilization of the tank units under Hitler’s control is required. As General Rommel raced back to our headquarters, General von Rundstedt was still refusing to seek der Führer’s permission to allow any of the six Panzer divisions to be moved from their reserve positions. He kept them positioned where they were until he could find out exactly where they should be moved to do the most damage to the enemy invaders once those invaders moved to their inland objectives. As the hours went by and more and more enemy troops were landing, General Rommel, who we were in contact with sporadically by telephone, became more and more infuriated.

Finally! I see now that General von Rundstedt is not a hopeless case after all and that he must have some sense and backbone. He just now has come to recognize that General Rommel was right about having to fight the invaders on the beaches before they could gain a foothold inland. After seeing thousands of enemy soldiers streaming off the beaches and after several hours of hearing what the enemy troops were doing and where they were going, General von Rundstedt began scrambling to get more defenders moved to positions where at last they could be of some desperately needed help. General von Rundstedt finally did what he generally had a right, as a Field Marshal, to do and he ordered the reserve Panzer Units to the beaches. But he ordered the Hitler Jugend and the Panzer Lehr Divisions to be brought forward! I couldn’t believe he did this though, because he clearly did not have that right with respect to these particular two divisions. These Panzer units are under der Führer’s personal control but General von Rundstedt is here and der Führer is not. He has seen for himself that only armored divisions are going to destroy the invaders and I’m sure he’s worried about whether it took him too long to reach this conclusion. So he ordered der Führer’s armored divisions towards Normandy and probably felt certain he was doing exactly what der Führer would have wanted done. The fact that just up until now it was only General Rommel who saw and recognized that it was critical to bring up these two Panzer divisions was incomprehensible. I saw a copy of the official message General von Rundstedt sent to General Jodl’s headquarters advising him of this order to bring the Hitler Jugend Panzer Division up from past Lisieux, about 140 kilometers from the beaches, and Panzer Lehr up from around Chartres which is about 180 kilometers away.

General Jodl is der Führer’s Chief of Operations and he protects Herr Hitler from nuisances and interruptions whenever he can. We came to find out that General Jodl countermanded General von Rundstedt’s order to move in the reserve Panzer units and saw to it that these divisions were not going anywhere until der Führer gave his personal order for them to move. General von Rundstedt’s order remained laying on a table, obeyed by no one. General von Rundstedt’s office was told that in order to release the reserves, there had to be explicit orders from Hitler. Hitler, however was sleeping and no one around him was willing to disturb his sleep since he had taken a sleeping drought just before he went to bed that night.

It was reported that at 9:30am on 6.June.44, the Enemy General Eisenhower gave the world the news that the “Allieds” had invaded France. He read his message over the BBC. During the next half hour, Albert Speer kept asking if der Führer had been woken up but of course he had not since he had only gone to bed a few short hours ago. A man of Hitler’s genius needs to recharge and cannot be expected to work nonstop. It is widely reported that when he is awakened, he is generally furious and I can understand why no one wanted to wake him this night. Besides, all of the men around the different command headquarters and field offices knew der Führer was convinced the Schwerpunkt would come around the Pas de Calais so they all knew what his response would be. Probably for this reason alone all were quite content to go along with the order holding the Panzers in reserve so they’d be available when the real invasion came. Those two divisions of Panzer tanks stayed right where they were, far enough from the Normandy coast to be of no help on the day of this invasion, whether diversionary or not.

By the next day, the remnants of what remained of the Afrika Corps were joined by Battle Group Meyer which consisted of General Kurt Meyer’s 25
^th
SS Panzergrenadier Regiment and its infantry regiments. Both units again tried to attack and destroy the enemy around Caen. General Meyer ordered a counter-attack on the advancing troops, trying to drive a wedge between two bridgeheads but the enemy could not be beaten back. We found out that the troops he opposed were Canadian. I truly thought we had wiped them out at Dieppe several years ago. But here they were again and, far from being wiped out, it was reported that they attacked Meyer! They had positioned their Sherman tanks in such a way that they seemed to be waiting for General Meyer’s offensive. I don’t know what happened to the men from the supporting infantry divisions and did not hear how many casualties there were from this fight but General Meyer’s counterattack was stopped cold. I kept hoping I would hear of other counterattacks but almost nothing was received. We later learned that General Feuchtinger led the only counterattack against the enemy the entire first day. Perhaps der Führer is saving counterattacking for when the real invasion comes although that doesn’t make sense to me but then, I am not and have never pretended to be a military genius. What I do know however, is that if the enemy is allowed to join the five distinct beachheads, it will be, as General Rommel predicted, far more difficult to dislodge them especially since they have air cover power and so far, I’ve not seen any appearance from our mighty Luftwaffe.

Looking back on the day, it seemed clear to me that we had been taken by surprise but only because most of our commanding officers were absent. The generals who had been here all spring had just left, some for the training exercises called by General Dollman and others because of personal or other military matters. Had even some of them been present, I’m confident the invasion would have been solidly repulsed. Since that day, I have tried to learn why they were all gone from their positions and why the signs of an impending operation if you will, were not heeded for what they were. I first asked: “What did we know?” What we knew and had pieced together was that there was a “broadcast” of the suspected code words by the BBC on the night of 4.June. We also knew that there were reports of some paratroop landings early in the morning two days later, but who knew if these were real or still more of the dummy drops? Finally, we knew that Herr General Pemsel reported that he saw thousand of enemy troops landing and heard the noises of ship engines off the Normandy coast. But from this it still wasn’t clear to our German command staff at Hitler’s Alpine headquarters that these signified anything other than a possible diversion. We received confirmation that these reports were received by Herr General Jodl’s headquarters but the general’s sleep was not immediately disturbed. And I can only imagine that if the German staff didn’t think these events were important enough to disturb General Jodl’s sleep, they SURE didn’t think them important enough to wake der Führer himself. No, we were told he had just gone to bed and unless there were far more certainty than what these scattered reports showed, no one was willing to face his wrath by waking him up unnecessarily that night.