Suleiman The Magnificent 1520 1566 (25 page)

Though no law forbade the Turks from having as many concubines as they pleased in addition to their lawful wives, It is unlikely that the average man availed himself of

65 lorga, n, 429; Bassano, fols, 48 verso-49 recto,

^lorga, II, 429; Busbecq, I, 107, in. 67 lorga, II, 432.

^Busbecq, however (I, 224-227), takes pains to emphasize the fact that the Turks behave kindly to any kind of animal, 69 lorga, 11,432-433.

the implied permission to do so. In the first place it was too expensive; moreover there were many cases in which the husband gave his personal promise to remain faithful to his wedded spouse, as for instance if she brought a larger dowry than usual, or if her father was of high rank, The husband, however, could obtain a lawful divorce by a mere statement of his intention; in case the wife desired it, the problem became somewhat more difficult. Adultery was punished publicly and with relentless severity. The guilty woman was led through the streets on an ass for which she^ herself was obliged to pay; similarly the man was obliged to reward the public executioner for every one of the hundred strokes of the flogging he received, to kiss his hand and to thank him for it. 70 "The endurance of the Turks in undergoing punishment," says Busbecq, "is truly marvellous. They often receive more than a hundred blows on their soles, ankles, and buttocks, so that sometimes several sticks of dogwood are broken on them, and the executioner has to say repeatedly, c Give me the other stick.'" 71

Trading, as between Turk and Turk, was notable for its honesty; the precepts of the Koran and the laws of the Sultan prescribed it. Many a merchant had the receipts which had been given him by his co-religionists buried with him in his grave, and every Moslem was in honor bound to state exactly what he had paid for the goods which he offered for sale. 72 In their transactions with Christians the Turks were unquestionably less scrupulous, but their dealings with one another were of exemplary rectitude.

On the other hand, the custom of giving presents or fees was universal; and at the upper rungs of the ladder, it

™ Menavino, pp. 35-37; Busbecq, I, 228-230; lorga, II, 434; Spandugino, Petit traicte de Forigine des Turcqz, ecL Charles Schefer, pp, 255-256.

71 Busbecq, I, 294.

72 lorga, 11,434-435.

developed into a system of officially recognized bribery. The traveller who, on his arrival, was presented with a nosegay by a boy or girl in the street, was expected to toss out two or three coins in return/ 3 The Sultan, who, theoretically at least, was accessible to the humblest of his subjects, was always offered some kind of a gift, usually set before him on the end of a pole as he passed on horseback through the streets, by those who hoped to induce him to help them. 74 The bakshish which the Janissaries received at the accession of a new Sultan is but another phase of the same story. Every representative of foreign powers and of the Greek Orthodox church, and all those recently appointed to high station in the Ottoman government, were expected to dole out presents to their friends and to those who had used their influence in their favor. The amounts of the gifts that they gave naturally varied in accordance with the importance of the places that they had attained, but at the top there can be no doubt that they were very large. 75 The passing to and fro of vast sums among the magnates worked havoc in the Turkish government under Suleiman's weaker successors, as did also the contrast between their vast wealth, and the poverty of the mass of the nation. All the property of the wealthier of the kullar who were executed or died childless, as well as that of certain other magnates, went by law, as we have already pointed out, to the Sultan at their deaths. If they had children, and the latter were usually permitted, in Suleiman's time, to have nine-tenths, it was by imperial grace and favor and not of right; and the day was not far off when that grace and favor were to be no longer extended to them. 76 And what was the result? The rich, realizing that they had less and less chance of being able to pass anything on to their

73 Bosbecq, I, 87.

74 lorga, II, 434.

75 lorga, H, 438-439. 76 Lybyer, pp. 55-56, 178.

sons and daughters, used ail their money to enhance the splendor and magnificence of their own establishments.

They spent everything they had; and the outward evidences of the chasm that divided their luxurious existence from that of the simple life of the common Turk grew rapidly more and more obvious. 77 —These facts are worthy of serious consideration by those who believe that a principal cure for the evils from which America is suffering today is to be found in "the confiscation of all property once a generation."

77 lorga, II, 439—440. It is fair to add that many of them established religious endowments of various kinds, and stipulated that a descendant should be the administrator.

c^ IX -^

War and Victories in the Mediterranean* Khalreddin Barbarossa

w¥ e remember that Suleiman had started out in 1532 on the expedition which received the surrender of Giins, with the avowed object of measuring swords with the Emperor Charles V, and that he openly expressed his disappointment at having been unable to find him. In the following year and afterwards he w^as to renew his efforts to try conclusions with the "king of Spain," but henceforth his attempts were to be made for the most part on the sea. The Sultan himself never accompanied his fleets, but he was ably represented by some of the most daring sailors of the day. Under their leadership, and with the occasional help of the king of France, the Ottoman navy was destined to become, for a time, the dominant power in the Mediterranean.

As the Emperor in the early years of his reign could not venture, unsupported, to risk his fleets in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean, it was obvious that Suleiman must seek him out in the western. Events had been occurring in the Barbary states of North Africa during the reign of his father and grandfather which gave promise of enabling him to do so. The great days of the earlier warlike dynasties there were now over. The Beni Merin of Fez and Morocco, the Beni Zeian of Tlemcen, and the Beni Hafs of Tunis had long since passed their prime, and their control over the various governors and petty chiefs along the coast was

but nominal. But these same chiefs were practiced in the arts of piracy. The region is particularly favorable to it; the shallowness of most of its harbors and the uncertainty of its treacherous winds offer admirable opportunities of escape to marauders familiar with local conditions. Ever since the fall of Granada in 1492, thousands of fugitive Moors had taken refuge there. They burned for revenge against the Spaniards, and eagerly pointed out to their hosts the vulnerability of the Andalusian shores. So persistent was the raiding in the ensuing years that the Spaniards w r ere obliged to take vigorous measures to put a stop to it, and the obvious one w^as to carry the war into North Africa itself. The more ardent souls, such as Queen Isabella and Cardinal Ximenes were constantly harping on the necessity of doing this, and longed to reestablish the authority exercised by Hispania Romana over the province of Mauretania Tingitana. 1 In 1505 the Spaniards had captured i\lers~el-Kebir; in 1509 Oran; in 151 o Bugia, Algiers, Tenes, Dellys, and finally Tripoli fell into their hands.

Meantime the Moors of North Africa had not been idle, and they were destined to find aid and effective leadership in the persons of the two famous Barbarossa 2 brothers, Aruj and Khaireddin. These were sons of a potter of the island of Lesbos, who after stormy careers as pirates in the Levant had transferred their operations to the western basin of the Mediterranean. At Tunis, which the Spaniards had prudently avoided, they were well received by the local Hafside ruler; and thence, after some reverses, Araj succeeded in 1516 in retaking Algiers, although the Pefion, or rocky islet in the mouth of the harbor, continued to defy him. In the next two years he extended his conquests, recapturing Tenes and Dellys, so that his sway

!R. B. M n I, 12.

2 It would appear that Aruj was the only one of the pair to have a red beard, but that it was so vivid and conspicuous that the name was passed on by his Christian foes to his younger brother as well.

covered nearly the whole length of the coast of modern Algeria, but when he attempted to penetrate inland and take Tiemcen, the Spaniards sent a strong force against him, and in 1518 he was defeated and slain. 3 But his brother Khaireddin, who succeeded him, was soon to show the world that besides being the equal of Aruj in energy and daring, he was vastly his superior in statecraft. Recognizing that his present resources were Insufficient to enable him to defend himself against further attacks by the Spaniards without outside help, he skilfully appealed to the power that could best furnish it. Selim the Terrible, on his triumphant return to Constantinople after the conquest of Egypt, gave audience to an embassy from the famous corsair, who forswore his independence, did homage to the mighty Sultan, and besought his aid. 4 Selim was quick to appreciate the value of such an opportunity to extend his authority, even if only nominally, into the western basin of the Mediterranean. He therefore received Khair-eddin's message most graciously and appointed him bey-lerbey of Africa, in token whereof he despatched him the horse, the scimitar, and the banner of two horsetails— the usual Insignia of the office. He also sent him munitions and a force of 2000 soldiers, with permission to levy others who should enjoy the privileges of Janissaries. 4000 volunteers profited by the chance of serving under a leader so likely to offer rich prospects of booty.

During the next ten years hostilities continued intermittently. Charles V was too busy in Europe to send adequate aid to the Spaniards, and Suleiman was too much occupied with the capture of Rhodes and his Danubian campaigns to give vigorous support to Barbarossa, whose services he inherited from his father. Khaireddin, moreover, had to contend not only with the Spaniards but also,

3 R. B. M., HI, 292-293.

4 Ernest Mercier, Histoire de PAfrique Septentrionale, HI, 23-24.

at first, with his Berber neighbors, whose jealousy had been aroused by his recent promotion. In 1520 the ruler of Tunis attacked him and forced him temporarily to abandon Algiers. Nevertheless Barbarossa was able to win the majority of his encounters with his Christian foes. The year after his return from Constantinople he routed a force of 5000 Spanish veterans, sent across from Sicily under Don Hugo de Moncada to dislodge him. 5 In 1522 he captured Velez de la Gomera on the shores of Morocco. In 1523 he reentered Algiers, and in May, 1529, he at last got possession of the Penon, and built the mole which connects it with the mainland today. The Spaniards had held the islet continuously since 1510 and their possession of it had largely neutralized their enemy's possession of the town. 6 Barbarossa's captains also ravaged the Valencian coasts, and in October, 1529, off the island of Formentera, the most daring of them, the famous Caccia Diabolo, disastrously defeated a Spanish fleet which the Emperor had despatched to intercept him. 7 Exploits such as these were not without their effect on Barbarossa's co-religionists in North Africa. The earlier jealousies were forgotten. All the Mohammedan pirates in the Western Mediterranean, most of them European renegades, flocked to serve under his orders, and he kept a strong force of regular troops under arms, balancing the Janissaries with local elements. His private bodyguard was made up of renegade Spaniards. Thousands of Christians groaned in captivity in the bagnios of Algiers, from which they were drawn forth to row the boats which were to bring in new plunder. Meantime he also extended his authority farther and farther into the interior, and organized a loose but effective system of government of the troublesome native tribes and confederations.

5 R. B. M., Ill, 293-294. 7 R. B. M., ffl, 296.

• R.B.M., II, 257; ffl, 294-295.

zio Suleiman the Magnificent

Barbarossa had, in fact, attained such importance by 1529 as demanded vigorous action by his Christian foes, and now at last the Emperor was in a position to take it. The peace of Cambray in August of that year gave him a seven-years' respite in his struggle with Francis I, and fourteen months earlier the great Genoese Admiral Andrea Doria had left the service of the French king and transferred his allegiance to his rival, to whom he remained loyal for the rest of his life. Charles now had a really strong navy, and one of the ablest of living sailors to lead it. 8 The results of these developments made themselves evident in 1530. In July of that year Doria attacked Cherchell, a pirate's nest about fifty miles west of Algiers. Although the expedition was finally repulsed, it was at least good proof that the Christians had assumed the offensive. A year later they captured the town of Honeine (or One) just west of Oran, from which Tlemcen drew its provisions, and installed a Spanish garrison; and in 1532 they beat off a raid of Caccia Diabolo on Sardinia, which Barbarossa had launched in reply. 9 Far more significant than these petty clashes were the operations of Doria further eastward. In 1532 he passed through the Strait of Messina with a fleet of forty-four galleys; and on September 1 2 he captured Coron, on the southwestern tip of Greece. 10 The enterprise, to which reference has already been made, was doubtless chiefly intended to distract the Sultan's attention from the land campaign which faded away after Guns; but it did far more than that. A Spanish garrison was left in Coron, and with Doria' s aid it succeeded in 1533 in beating off a much larger army and fleet which Suleiman had despatched to retake it. The

, M.,m, 297. 9 R.B.A1, III, 297-298.

10 R. B. M M III, 298-299; Hajji Halifa, The History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks, tr. James Mitchell (London, 1831), p. 44.

place _ was voluntarily abandoned, indeed, by the Christians in April, 1534. It was too remote to be of real value, and the Emperor was doubtless glad when the Turks permitted the garrison to evacuate it, and march out with all the honors of war. That, however, was not the essential fact. The thing that mattered was that the Christians had ventured to carry the naval warfare into the east-em basin of the Mediterranean.