Suleiman The Magnificent 1520 1566 (27 page)

23 R. B. Al, m, 318-319; Ham Halifa, p. 53.

Clearly the quondam pirate had become an officially accredited Admiral—if not more, and certainly the Turks were nothing daunted by the fact that the Emperor had taken Tunis.

The next phase of the story was to see the main scene of the naval conflict transferred for a few years to the eastern basin of the Mediterranean, but there was a lull in the fighting during the whole of the year 1536. For this the renewal of the war between Charles V and Francis I was primarily responsible; and the fact that Barbarossa was absent in Constantinople convinced the Emperor that his North African possessions were for the time being safe. 20 On the other hand, rumors had already reached Western Europe of the great raid that Suleiman was meditating on Southern Italy as soon as Barbarossa had completed the construction of his new fleet, and the prospect was the more serious because the Sultan's alliance with Francis I was now in full running order, and the allies were timing their movements to coincide. 20 Strangely enough, it was at this critical juncture that the Emperor received a secret message from Barbarossa, to the effect that Khaireddin, if reestablished in Tunis, would be willing to change sides. He was apparently deeply jealous of the famous Lutfi Pasha, the seraskier of Rumelia, whose authority and influence were so great as to threaten his own. It is probable also that he was angered by the execution of Ibrahim, who had loyally supported him in 1533-34. Doubts as to whether or not Barbarossa's proposals had been made with treacherous intent, in order to lull Charles into a false sense of security, and still more the length of time that necessarily elapsed before the principals could

25 R.B.M.,IH t 320-321.

26 Ludwig von Pastor, The History of the Popes from the Close of the Middle Ages, tr. F. L Antrobus et al^ 34 vols. (London, 1891-1941), XI, ^6l ff.

get into touch, rendered their negotiations abortive for the time being; they were however to be resumed in the near future. Khaireddin for the moment was not wholly loyal to his master, and the Emperor had not enough of the enthusiasm of the true crusader to neglect any opportunity to gain his ends without a fight. 2T

The Turkish raid on Apulia began in earnest in July, 1537. A landing was effected at Otranto, and numerous captives were carried off; Andrea Doria was too weak to offer any effective resistance. But the Turks failed to follow up the advantage they had won. Francis I had apparently promised them to appear in Italy and support them, but when the moment came, he failed to keep his word. A truce at Bomy (July) had already put a stop to his hostilities with the Emperor in the North, and a corresponding one for the South, though not signed till November at Monzon, was already inevitable. It was the same old story; unless he was in desperate straits the French king invariably disavowed his Turkish ally. The result was that in August Suleiman ordered Barbarossa to desist from his attack on Italy and join him in an attempt to capture from the Venetians the island and fortress of Corfu. The Sultan himself had led a powerful army overland, and was now encamped at Avlona. 28 That he should have suddenly decided to attack the one Christian power with which, up to that time, he had maintained amicable relations need not cause us too much surprise. The Venetians had been displeased by the trade privileges granted to France in the "capitulations" of the previous year, and they showed it. They were "famous," wrote the Turkish historian Hajji Halifa, "for . . . their deceit and perfidy in all their transactions," and "are in reality the most inveterate of all the enemies of the faith." * They had also

27 R. B. M., HI, 331-332. » Hajji Halifa, p. 56.

^R.B.M^HI, 322.

recently been guilty of various acts of overt hostility in the waters about Corfu. Of these the latest and most flagrant was an attack on a Turkish vessel bearing messages and the governor of Gallipoli, and the murder of all on board, "except a youth who threw himself into the sea, and floated on a plank till he was taken up by one of the ships of the fleet, which conveyed him to Lutfi Pasha. The latter laid the matter before the Sultan, who . . . commanded that Corfu should be besieged." so But the place proved unexpectedly strong, and repelled all assaults; on September 15 the Turks withdrew, defeated. 31 Burning for revenge, they transferred their efforts to the waters of the Aegean, and raided most of the Venetian islands there. The republic was ready at last, after long wavering, to unite with the forces of Christendom against the Turk. 32

The changed attitude of the Venetians, and the enthusiasm of Pope Paul III, who longed to revive the crusades, led to the formation, in February, 1538, of a new "Holy League," by the Emperor, the Papacy, and Venice against the enemy of Christendom. 33 The meeting-place for the different contingents was fixed at Corfu. First to arrive were the Venetians, with fifty-five galleys; next, on June 27, came the twenty-seven that were furnished by the Pope; then Andrea Doria appeared with forty-nine more, on September 7, and finally, two weeks later, a large contingent of naos gruesas de combate> despatched by the Emperor from Spain. It is not difficult to guess the reason for Charles's tardiness. If the war was to be fought in the eastern waters of the Mediterranean, he could not possibly derive profit from it, unless—what was virtually unthinkable—the entire Ottoman navy should be wiped out;

30 Hajji Halifa, pp. 56-57. 81 Ursu, pp. 104-105. ^R.B. A/UIII, 322. 33 Pastor, XI, 276-278.

his Interests were still in Western Europe and in North Africa. And so, on the eve of the approaching battle, he made a final effort to detach Barbarossa from the service of the Sultan. On the night of September 20, 1538, at the little town of Parga, opposite Corfu, a representative of the Sultan's Admiral met Andrea Doria and Ferrante Gonzaga, the viceroy of Sicily, who were empowered to treat with him in the name of the Emperor. At first there seemed a real prospect of inducing him to change sides. But Barbarossa refused to budge unless Charles would give him Tunis, where the Emperor was determined to maintain Aluley Hassan, and he totally refused to listen to Charles's demand that he burn such portions of the Turkish fleet as he could not bring over into the imperial service. The conference accordingly broke up, having failed to accomplish its purpose. Enough, however, had occurred to make it certain that the Spanish and Venetian contingents would not cooperate effectively in the fight that was now inevitable. The Venetians were keen to attack. The imperial contingents were chiefly anxious to avoid loss. 34

The Turks had meantime taken up their position just inside the entrance to the Gulf of Prevesa, under the shelter of the guns of the fortress that guards it, close to the site of the battle of Actium. Their fleet was slightly smaller than that of their foes, but it was better manned and more ably led. All the most famous of Barbarossa's corsairs accompanied him, especially the terrible Dragut, who was to follow in his footsteps after his death in 1546. The Christians soon appeared at the mouth of the gulf, but as Barbarossa at first could not be induced to come out and offer battle, a plan was advanced of landing troops, capturing the castle at the harbor's mouth, and blocking up the Turkish fleet within the gulf by sinking a transport at the narrowest part of the entrance. It appears that Doria

* 4 R.B.M.» HI, 322-324.

War in the Mediterranean

22"

had originally approved of the scheme; but when the moment for action came, he entirely refused to play the part assigned to him. His reasons can only be conjectured, though one's suspicions are naturally aroused by his previous negotiations with the enemy. In any case the landing operation was abandoned; the Christians kept out in the open sea, and finally Barbarossa was persuaded by the more pugnacious of his subordinates to issue out from his retreat and go forth to seek the foe.

The engagement which ensued on September 27 is usually known as the battle of Prevesa, and the accounts of it are so contradictory that it is almost impossible to reach the truth. Apparently the Christians were about to retire when Barbarossa came out of the gulf; Doria was leading the retreat, and was only with great difficulty persuaded by his allies to return and fight. Certainly he did nothing to support the Venetians. The two main portions of the Christian fleet got separated, and followed different plans of action. The Turks concentrated their attacks on the greatest of the Venetian galleons, which barely succeeded in defending itself; but most of the rest of the action consisted in long-range and generally ineffective cannonading. Only a few of the larger ships were sunk, and even the Turkish historian only claims the capture of two of the Christian galleys; it would seem that the day really passed off without much serious fighting. But when the battle was terminated by a gale which blew up in the late afternoon, the Christians were in full retreat towards Corfu; the Turks could justly lay claim to the victory, and it was appropriately celebrated as such by the Sultan, when he learned of it while hunting in Rumelia. 55 The Christians tried to neutralize the effect of the reverse they had sustained by attacking the strong fortress of Castelnuovo, at the mouth of the Gulf of Cattaro, and capturing it on

October 27, but they held It for less than ten months before It was retaken by Barbarossa. 36 The episode, moreover, had the effect of increasing the jealousy between the Spaniards and the Venetians, who quarrelled bitterly over the right to garrison It during the short period that It remained In Christian hands. The whole affair was, In fact, a crowning demonstration to the republic that she had made the gravest of errors in breaking relations with the Porte. She at once set to work to re-open them, but did not finally succeed in gaining peace till October, 1540. The terms which the Turks demanded were very harsh: the cession of all the small islands w r hlch Barbarossa had cap-tured from her, as well as the unconquered fortresses of Napoli di Malvasia and Napoli di Romania, and also the payment of a war indemnity of 300,000 ducats, besides "presents" of over one-tenth of that amount to her "friends" among the Turkish officials. 37 But she had to submit; there was no other way out. At Constantinople her Influence was by this time almost completely supplanted by that of France. As for the Turks, besides the glory and booty and fortresses and islands, they had gained one advantage of even more value still, namely, the control of the sea. From the battle of Prevesa in 1538 to that of Lepanto in 1571, they had made themselves the first naval power in the Mediterranean and a match for all the others put together. In view of their past history, and of their lack of Interest In things maritime until after the conquest of Constantinople, this was certainly no mean achievement. 38

The victory of the Turks at Prevesa and the reestablish-ment of good relations with Venice naturally made Sulei-

86 R. B. M., HI, 525-328. 37 Hammer, V, 316-317.

38 R. B. M., in, 328-329. For a foil account of this treaty and the negotiations for it, see T. F. Jones, "The Turco-Venetian Treaty of 1540," in American Historical Association, Annual Report, I (1914), 161-167,

man and Barbarossa anxious to carry* the naval war Into enemy waters, and the next chapter of the story takes us back to the western basin of the Mediterranean. It opens with a series of minor encounters, in which the Christians were on the whole the more successful. In the middle of June, 1540, a prolonged chase of the corsair Dragut was terminated by his capture in the Inlet of La Giralata on the northern shore of Corsica. He was carried off to Genoa, and chained to a rower's bench until four years later he was ransomed by Barbarossa. The Turkish reply to this coup was to launch an expedition against Gibraltar. It was organized at Algiers, at the instigation of Barbarossa, and consisted of sixteen ships, which were chiefly manned by Turks. On September 9 they arrived off the fortress, which was just able to hold out against them; but they gutted the town at the base of the Rock, and carried off seventy-three prisoners to Velez de la Gomera on the Moroccan coast; the Spaniards had to pay 7000 ducats to obtain their release. 39 On the first of the following October there ensued a furious naval battle off the little island of Alboran, 125 miles due east from the strait. After an hour victory declared itself for the Christians, who sank one of the Turkish ships and captured ten more; the enemy, however, made them pay dearly for their success. 40 Despite minor reverses, there could be no question that the Turks had seized the offensive. Never before had the Ottoman power penetrated so far west.

The Emperor all this time had been busy In the Netherlands. 41 Such resistance as the Turks had encountered had been due to the activity of the Spanish naval commanders on the spot, for Charles was anxious If possible to save both himself and them from the necessity of further en-

3 »R.B. M.,III, 330-331. 40 R. B. M., Ill, 331-332. 41 H. Pirenne, Histoire de Belgique, III, 122-126.

counters with the Ottoman fleet. A new war with France was already probable, and with Barbarossa In command of the entire Turkish navy, the Franco-Turkish alliance would be more menacing than ever. Might it not be worth while to revert to the crooked diplomacy of 1537 and 1538, and make one more effort to win Khaireddin to his side? The ransom of the survivors of the garrison of Castelnuovo gave a pretext for renewing negotiations, and this time the Emperor instructed his agents to offer Barbarossa what he had balked at before; he would abandon Muley Hassan and give up Tunis; he might even consent to the dismantling of Tripoli and La Goletta. At first Barbarossa professed himself satisfied, and everything seemed to Indicate that the Emperor's hopes would be realized, when suddenly at a moment's notice the whole affair was dropped. One story is that the French representative at the Porte, the Argus-eyed Ringon, got wind of the negotiations and reported them to the Sultan; but it seems more probable that Khaireddin had been duping the Emperor from the first, that he never had had any intention of deserting his master, and that his sole object in listening to Charles's proposal was to learn his designs and report them to headquarters. 42 Suleiman continued to command the allegiance of his admiral-in-chief, together with such measure of control of his North African possessions as he brought with him. 45