Tank Tracks to Rangoon (5 page)

In the meantime, a disaster of the first magnitude had overtaken Major-General Smyth’s 17th Indian Division. So fast had been the Japanese advance that it seemed that they would capture the decked railway bridge over the Sittang, which would have left the door to Rangoon wide open. The situation was considered to be so desperate that the bridge was blown whilst two of the division’s three brigades were on the far bank. Many of the men swam across, and others built rafts, but the net result was that the fighting strength of the Division was reduced to only 3,400 men, of whom only 1,500 were armed. However, the Japanese were themselves exhausted by their efforts and before
they moved again, 17th Division had been reorganized and re-equipped at Pegu.

On 25th February B Squadron were relieved at Waw by Major M. F. S. Rudkin’s C Squadron. Finding the field of fire inhibited by buildings in the area of the bridge, Major Rudkin burned the deserted village, placed several drums of petrol on the wooden bridge, and had the uprights wired for demolition. During the hours of darkness, the Squadron leaguered 800 yards to the west, leaving the infantry to watch the canal.

During his second night at Waw, Rudkin was on the bridge with the infantry company commander, the sapper officer, and a covering bren party.

‘About 2300 hours a figure was seen moving at the far end of the bridge. We held our fire as it slowly crossed the bridge. As it came closer it was seen to be a man in Burmese dress. When he was threequarters of the way across the infantry company commander challenged him in Burmese. He replied in English and we told him to approach, covering him with rifles, suspecting a trap. To our surprise, however, he turned out to be a sergeant of KOYLIs who had just come through the Japanese lines disguised as a Burmese. He had been cut off some days previously on the Sittang. He told us that the Japanese were advancing in two forces, one passing two or three miles north of the village, and one to the south, and he considered that if we stayed where we were, we would be completely outflanked. After this we continued our vigil on the bridge with some degree of tenseness.

‘Suddenly, about an hour later, one of the infantry patrols reported to the company commander that there were several hundred Japanese lining the canal a few hundred yards north of us and were too many for the patrol to engage. The patrol were obviously shaken and excited. Within a few seconds there were several rifle shots and it seemed that we were being sniped at on the bridge.

‘I had a quick consultation with the company commander, and in view of the information we had, both from the KOYLI sergeant and the infantry patrol, we assumed that the Japanese were crossing the canal at least north of us. I therefore gave orders for the bridge to be blown. The RE officer fired the charges, while the bren gun was fired at the drums of petrol and the incendiary grenades were thrown. The party then retired at speed in a staff car to where the squadron was harboured.’

Due to a misunderstanding, the infantry withdrew from the position leaving the company commander behind, but returned a few hours later. The tanks, which had stood to at the first shots, felt their absence keenly, since they were at their most vulnerable during the hours of darkness, but for some reason the Japanese did not press their advantage.

The following day, A Squadron, under Major H. H. Bourne, carried out patrols north of Payagyi with another Cameronian company, and had the satisfaction of killing fourteen Burmese dacoits armed with Japanese weapons. For the Cameronians this little success was marred by the discovery of the mutilated bodies of one of their missing patrols.

Meanwhile a new Army Commander, General H. R. L. G. Alexander, had arrived in Burma, and was doing his best to comply with the directive of the Commander-in-Chief, General Wavell, that Rangoon must be held at all costs. One direct result of this was that C Squadron 2 RTR were withdrawn from Waw on 28th February.

The next morning the squadron sent a troop to patrol the village, which was found to be occupied by the enemy. In the exchange of fire the operator of the leading tank was killed, and the troop withdrew. An attack was mounted on the village on 2nd March by B Squadron, with infantry and artillery support, but the Japanese resisted fiercely with 75-mm gun and mortar fire, causing some casualties, and the attack was not pressed home.

A and C Squadrons had spent the day patrolling, and C Squadron had fought a skilful little battle north of Payagyi. Japanese 75-mm guns had suddenly opened up on the leading troop, damaging two tanks, and causing two of the infantry’s carriers to ditch a few hundred yards from the enemy. A plan to recover the carriers was worked out with the accompanying section of E Troop 414 Battery Royal Artillery (The Essex Yeomanry—7th Armoured Brigade’s integral artillery unit) who fired a concentration for twenty minutes whilst one tank rushed in with the carrier crews, and dragged the carriers clear. The operation was carried out successfully and without loss.

During the night 3rd/4th March the Japanese resumed their offensive. Major Rudkin was woken at 0400 hours and told to take half of C Squadron down the Waw road to a village three miles away which was being threatened by the enemy. The remaining
half squadron would protect the road junction at Payagyi where the Waw road left the main Rangoon–Mandalay road.

After proceeding only one and a half miles Rudkin encountered some Ghurka stragglers who told him that the Japanese had just occupied a village 800 yards further on. Being without infantry he decided not to proceed further until first light, as visibility would be limited to a hundred yards by heavy mist. As the light began to grow, firing broke out three hundred yards in his rear, firing which gradually increased in volume until it became obvious that a major Japanese attack was in progress.

While Rudkin had been waiting for better light, his second-in-command, Captain N. T. Plough, had been told to bring up the remainder of the squadron from Payagyi. Suddenly the tanks were surrounded and overrun with yelling Japanese who advanced right up to the tanks, some carrying explosive and incendiary devices attached to long poles, which they attempted to drop into the turrets; clearly the enemy had been expecting tanks, and prepared accordingly.

For all their efforts, the Japanese had little success, and the Stuarts’ machine guns did considerable execution. In one troop the tank commanders were using their tommy guns from their turrets at very close range, and the result was deadly. Nor were the Japanese particularly lucky in their timing, for 7th Hussars, who were due to relieve 2 RTR on this sector, anyway, were already approaching the battle from the west, and by 0800 had informed Rudkin that they were ready to take over.

Rudkin therefore ordered Plough and his half squadron to withdraw through the Hussars, which was accomplished without difficulty. However, his own position was now most precarious, since he was now effectively cut off, and the mist had now thickened to the extent that visibility was down to fifty yards in places, making control impossible.

I therefore gave orders for each tank to find its own way back to RHQ across country. The going was extremely bad and obstacles were tackled for which the tanks could never have been designed. It was a nightmare journey as one could not pick one’s route owing to the mist, and the odd sniper who infiltrated across the road behind us kept the heads of the tank commanders down. By a miracle every tank arrived back safely although the crews were bruised and shaken.

7th Hussars’ leading squadron, B, commanded by Major G. C. Davies-Gilbert arrived in Payagyi to find the enemy there before
them. One of Davies-Gilberts troop leaders, Lt G. S. B. Palmer, describes the course of the action throughout the day.

By the time we were approaching Payagyi the dawn light was just breaking and there was a thick mist with visibility down to ten yards. I was stopped by 2 RTR patrol and told that the area was full of Japanese snipers. I reported back to the Squadron Leader and was told to take up a position a hundred yards up the Waw road until the visibility cleared. The opportunity was taken to replenish the tanks, but no sooner had the petrol lorry arrived at my troop and while we were in the act of refuelling, than a storm of small arms fire broke out all round the area.
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The situation was most unpleasant, as the visibility was now almost nil. As the leading troop, our position was very sticky and there appeared no way of getting off the road. I saw a little figure creeping up the ditch towards my tank and took a pot at him with my sub-machine gun; he didn’t cause me any further trouble.

Wireless communications were appalling. The No 11 set was very temperamental in the tropical static, and I had little idea what was happening.

The following troop passed up a message that Squadron HQ, behind us at the cross roads, was under attack from enemy ambush which had apparently allowed our troops to pass through before opening fire. This was the first of many ambushes we were to be involved in during the next few months.

However, this attack was quite harmless as they appeared to have no anti-tank weapons. One troop leader (Lt Patteson) and his driver were minor casualties. Slowly the mist lifted and the firing died away, and we could see no sign of the enemy apart from a few bodies.

Basil Young’s troop was ordered through me and told to patrol towards Waw. He had not gone far before he reported numerous Japanese in the area.

The Squadron was told to deploy off the road and feel out eastwards. No sooner had we done this than a small Japanese spotter plane flew over and circled at about 500 feet. Very soon we came under heavy mortar and artillery fire which was very accurate. As a result of this we withdrew a few hundred yards into more broken country where we could get hull-down and remain in observation.

My troop was on the left, nearest to the Payagyi cross-roads. There was a slight diversion when one of our troop leaders reported on the air that he could see either tanks or elephants, but was not sure which. After about half an hour the rest of the Squadron drew back about half a mile, leaving our troops where they were, but about 1100 I was told to take up a position on the Payagyi cross-roads and keep the village under observation. It was now appallingly hot and since we were still in contact with the enemy and in a very open position, the crews could not dismount and we felt like fried eggs in a pan.

I was called back for an ‘O’ group and we were told that an attack was to be put in on Payagyi supported by a troop of Essex Yeomanry and RAF light bombers. This was supposed to start at 1600, but the whole thing went off at half cock as the alleged RAF squadron consisted of one bomber who dropped his load off target. Later that evening a large formation of enemy bombers flew over us and hammered the Pegu bridges. One could visualize another Sittang shambles.

Toward late evening I reported that no movement had been seen for some time in Payagyi. I was told to go through the village supported by a platoon of Cameronians who would clear the buildings. I moved through fast and took up a position north of the village. The infantry searched Payagyi and forced the Japanese to withdraw, inflicting heavy casualties, including five men killed while sitting at their evening meal.

Meanwhile I observed a mule train moving some 2,000 yards to the north, and gave them a good pasting with mg which appeared to have satisfying results. As dusk fell we withdrew back to the Squadron, setting the village alight as we left. We had our first meal since 3 am that morning and then went back into leaguer with a company of Cameronians. We were satisfied with our first brush with the enemy and felt that we had had the better of them.

The following morning B Squadron returned to a position of observation near Payagyi, and were met with sporadic mortar fire, which ceased when they machine gunned the area of the village. At about 1000 several enemy tanks were spotted moving from the direction of Waw towards Payagyi. They were engaged at once, but were small and presented difficult targets, although one was destroyed and the rest withdrew. Apart from this, the enemy did not trouble B Squadron during the day.

On their right, however, A Squadron under Major C. T. Llewellen Palmer had been having problems with Japanese infantry who had infiltrated into a wood, and these were cleared out during the day with help from the infantry. Two Japanese tanks, evidently Type 95s, wandered into the area, probably from the direction of B Squadron, and were engaged by Captain Marcus Fox.

‘They appeared to be very lonely and untrained, and obviously did not know what to do, remaining stationary in the middle of an open field. They were knocked out immediately before they knew we were there. Their tanks were very much the same as the Honey (Stuart) and obviously copied from an American design; indeed they carried cans of American oil.’

In spite of the severe lesson taught them by General Zhukov at Khalkin-Gol during the 1939 Manchurian Incident, Japanese
tank crews never gave the slightest hint that they were capable of fighting a tank battle, and in fact some of their ideas were downright peculiar. For instance, in several cases, when Japanese tanks had been immobilized or prevented from getting forward by obstacles, the crews had been known to dismount and continue the attack on foot with the infantry—an admirable expression of the offensive spirit, but a prodigal waste of expensively trained specialists. However, the mere presence of tanks in the Payagyi area showed that the Japanese were not taking kindly to the check imposed by 7th Armoured Brigade, and the following day they redoubled their efforts.

Both squadrons spent a quiet night and moved out to their day positions before first light. Once again there was thick mist, and there was light shelling.

Because of the mist, Colonel Fosdick had decided to move his RHQ a mile to the south, and was actually moving when his own tank was hit by anti-tank gun fire which blew off a track. Very shortly afterwards a B Squadron tank was also hit and disabled. Major Davies-Gilbert at once despatched Lt Palmer and his troop to assist RHQ. Arriving in the area, all three of Palmer’s tanks were hit repeatedly, fortunately without major damage.