Tank Tracks to Rangoon (9 page)

Many of 7th Armoured Brigade’s troop leaders had experiences similar to Palmer’s, but this particular patrol is interesting on two counts. First, the men in slouch hats who he had first taken for Gurkhas and then Indians, were in fact Thais, Thailand having been forced by Japan to declare war on Britain; and secondly on account of the glass phial which one of the Thais had thrown at his vehicle, a weapon which was used again on 16th April, when his troop was once again on patrol, in company with that of Lt John Parry.

John went down the road to the junction, whilst I was sent to a covering position near that I had occupied the previous evening. After moving down the road to Milestone 10, I then cut across country coming out on the main road at Milestone 288, where we tucked the tanks away in a mangrove plantation. The morning was uneventful apart from an RAF raid on Magwe aerodrome.

Meanwhile, John’s troop had reached the junction and bumped into a Jap road block. His troop sergeant, Sgt Campbell, got too close, and a Jap jumped on the back of the tank and threw a phial into the turret. Apparently this phial contained some form of knockout gas which immediately overcame the crew inside the turret. Campbell, who was unaffected as his head was outside the turret, acted with great presence of mind, and slid into the driving compartment, sitting on the unconscious driver. He managed to manoeuvre the tank out of trouble and then scrambled back into the turret and operated his guns on the enemy position. For this action he was subsequently awarded the MM. I assume that this was the same type of phial which had narrowly missed my tank a week or so earlier.

In his excellent history of the 7th Hussars during World War II,
The Seventh and Three Enemies
, Brigadier Davy suggests that the Japanese were using some form of phosphorous grenade, but the Chemical Defence Establishment at Porton Down does not agree with this.

We are aware that the Japanese had frangible glass grenades, but our records suggest that they were charged with hydrogen cyanide (HCN) only. Examples of this type of grenade were captured in Malaya and Burma during the relevant period. The grenades had a practical range of about ten yards and were evidently intended to
be broken dose to slits and openings in AFVs or pillboxes. Since HCN is highly volatile at the temperatures prevailing in Malaya and Burma it was hoped that enough vapour might be drawn in to cause at least giddiness or loss of co-ordination of the crews.

There was also the possibility of using the glass grenades in the open when they could be thrown into Bren carriers or other open vehicles. More serious casualties might result from splashes of liquid on the skin or eyes, but it is uncertain how much liquid would reach the skin at these temperatures.

The only other incapacitating agent in the Japanese chemical armoury were the tear gas chloroacetophenone (CAP) and the arsenical dyphenylcyanoarsine (DC). There is no record of either of these having been filled into frangible grenades. We think that in this case the vapour was HCN; this fits the facts as we know them. These grenades were formal Japanese equipment produced and filled centrally and issued to the troops in the normal way. They were not a local contrivance.

It appears, therefore, that the two attacks described above could well be the first attempts ever made to knock out a tank by purely chemical means. I can find no trace of these weapons being used again against tanks during the war in Burma.

During the days that followed, 7th Hussars carried out a variety of small operations, including a heavy raid on the village where the Thais had been encountered, harassing what was now in fact the enemy’s rear areas. Substantial casualties were inflicted, and some transport destroyed, including two staff cars, one of which contained the Japanese chief of propaganda for the area. The regiment was then withdrawn by 17th Division, and moved to an area west of Meiktila on 22nd April.

For 2 RTR, their relief by 7th Hussars on 13 th April had brought little respite, and during the afternoon of that day they had even to run the gaundet of the bridge over the Yin Chaung
*
east of Kokkogwa, which was covered by a Japanese 75-mm gun firing over open sights from a concealed position approximately 1,000 yards away. After the enemy had hit the bridge several times, those vehicles not across found their way over by a ford to the north.

On their way north, the regiment picked up the KOYLI and ferried them to Milestone 310 where they were to take up positions between the road and the river, and cover the west flank of the withdrawal. The Second, less B Squadron, then proceeded
by stages to Milestone 336, where they spent two relatively quiet days.

On 14th April B Squadron, who were still detached, inflicted casualties on the enemy while they were trying to recover transport of the KOYLIs which had been ambushed the night before while trying to reach their infantry. The transport had been abandoned in the village of Tokson, and B Squadron sent one troop, 8 Troop, with the KOYLI drivers.

On approaching the village the tanks came under considerable machine gun fire and it was evident that the village was strongly held. As there were no infantry with the tanks it was not possible to put in an attack. The KOYLI drivers were therefore sent back and the village was engaged by the tanks and the gunners. At least fifty of the enemy were killed. This was confirmed by some of the KOYLI who were at the far side of the village unknown to the tanks. They had tried to contact the tanks to plan an attack on the village, but the tanks had retired before contact was made as the liaison officer from the infantry had gone missing on his way.

On 16th April both B and C Squadrons covered the withdrawal of the two infantry brigades, the 1st and 13th, which were under increasing pressure from the enemy, who ambushed another column of lorries and made B Squadron’s tanks a specific target for their mortar teams, causing them to change position constantly.

Several other enemy columns were reported moving northwards and C Squadron was ordered to assist B Squadron. C Squadron moved off and advanced south from the lateral road running east from Magwe to try and cut the road running north east into Magwe. The Squadron advanced on a front of about a thousand yards so as to try and make contact with the enemy columns moving north and to try and link up with B Squadron on their left. The country in this area had some very thick areas which were interspersed with some large open stretches. Visibility was therefore sometimes only a few yards, and sometimes up to five hundred yards.

C Squadron advanced about two miles but found great difficulty in linking up with B Squadron who were withdrawing on their left. B Squadron were continually reporting enemy moving north and north-east up the road to Magwe. One troop of B Squadron was fired on from a village near the main road, one tank being hit by a 75-mm. The tank was not knocked out and managed to shoot up the crew of the gun and damage it. At the same time the centre troop of C Squadron was fired on from a village a short distance to the west. 2/Lt Timmis’s tank was hit six times at very close range by a 75-mm, and Timmis, with the remainder of his crew, was killed. The driver, Tpr Russel, was seen to get out after the first
shell and try to get a rifle off the side of the tank to engage the enemy before the second shell killed him.

Both B and C Squadrons remained in observation for the remainder of the afternoon engaging small parties of the enemy who were seen moving in the area. At 1700 hrs the regiment received orders to retire to the area north of Yenaungyaung for a few days rest and maintenance, but to leave one squadron to act as rearguard to 1st Burma Division.

Accordingly, having detached A Squadron for this purpose, the regiment moved off at 1830, B Squadron following Brigade HQ, followed in turn by E Troop Essex Yeomanry and C Squadron. The move through the gathering darkness was illuminated by the glow of the burning oil wells and installations at Yenaungyaung, which had been destroyed over the past two days by the Burma Oil Company’s own civilian demolition teams.

4 The battle of Yenaungyaung

Passing through Yenaungyaung itself, the light from the raging fires made it possible to read inside the turrets of the Stuarts.

A little north of the town, Sgt Gibbs of C Squadron reported that his tank was suffering from a petrol stoppage, and Major Rudkin told him to clear this and follow on as soon as he was able. It was now about 2300, and most of the tank crews were riding on the outside of their vehicles, enjoying the cool night air and unwinding after the action during the afternoon. After retiring 25 miles they had reason to feel safe, and the column was now travelling with lights on.

A few miles beyond Yenaungyaung lies the Pin Chaung, almost dry at this time of year, and here came the first hint of trouble when the Military Police controlling the crossing advised the crews to get back inside, since there had been a good deal of sniping in the area.

As the tail of the column was crossing the chaung there was a burst of machine-gun fire from somewhere up ahead, followed by a heavy explosion. The column halted, and all lights were switched off.

Very soon, a B Squadron crew came down the road and reported that their tank had had a track blown off, probably by mortar fire, as they were passing a burning staff car. Brigade HQ and half of B Squadron had passed the same spot without incident.

Infantry patrols from the Burma Frontier Force were sent out to reconnoitre, and it was decided to await their reports before making any plans. The column was now concentrated in the space of a mile, with tanks, guns, infantry and lorries, some parked three or four deep, all mixed up together.

At 0230 Sgt Gibbs reported by radio to Major Rudkin that whilst he had cleared his petrol stoppage, he had bumped a road block not far north of the chaung. Rudkin told him to destroy the tank and make his way back to the regiment, keeping to the west of the road. An hour later the Japanese set fire to the B Squadron tank that had been knocked out earlier in the night.

With the first streaks of daylight, the enemy began to shell the column sporadically, whilst from the south heavy firing could be heard from the Yenaungyaung direction, indicating that 1st Burma Division, and A Squadron, were in their turn cut off. The various interdictions placed by the enemy across the line of retreat thus created a tactical picture something like this, reading from north to south.

7th Armoured Brigade HQ

½ B Squadron 2 RTR

1 Company West Yorkshire Regiment

C Squadron & ½ B Squadron 2 RTR

Burma Frontier Force

Miscellaneous Units

1st Burma Division

A Squadron 2 RTR

The situation, therefore, possessed all the potential of a major disaster, and General Alexander at once arranged with Lt-General Joseph W. Stilwell, the American officer commanding the Chinese forces in Burma, that the newly arrived Chinese 38th Division should move into the Yenaungyaung area at once, coming under the command of Lt-General William Slim’s 1 Burma Corps.

The 38th Division had the reputation of being one of the best in the Chinese Army. In spite of being entirely deficient in artillery, tanks, transport and indeed any heavy equipment, they were considered to be a very brave and valuable fighting force, and what they lacked in skill they made up for in guts. Their officers made a point of being conspicuous in action, with the result that their casualties were high amongst the commissioned ranks. Morale and discipline were excellent, and they regarded evacuation through wounds or sickness to be a form of disgrace.

As the light began to increase, the details of the enemy’s blocking position became clear. About 1,000 yards to the north the road climbed through a steep cutting to the top of a ridge, and along this the Japanese could be seen in strength, especially east of the road. At about 0700 the Frontier Force patrols returned and pointed out further enemy positions they had encountered during the night. A plan was then made with Brigade HQ to exert pressure simultaneously on the enemy from north and south.

At 0800 the Essex Yeomanry’s 25-pounders began to plaster the ridge from the north, whilst C Squadron, which had shaken out off the road, added their fire to that of the Frontier Force from the south. A 3.7-inch AA gun, which had been protecting the Pin Chaung crossing, opened up from just behind Major Rudkin’s tank, which was ‘most disconcerting when it fired, as the end of the muzzle was within ten feet of the turret of the tank.’ After the gun had fired half a dozen rounds, Rudkin was not sorry to pass on Brigadier Anstice’s request that the gunners should desist at once, since their powerful weapon, engaging at what amounted to something less than point-blank, was bouncing its flat trajectory shells off the ridge and into Brigade HQ beyond.