The Battle of Poitiers 1356 (2 page)

It was from his principality of Aquitaine that the prince launched the English response. It was to be his last campaign and he secured his final victory at the battle of Nájera. He restored the English-allied Pedro I to the throne of Castile, a throne from which he had recently been deposed by mercenaries in the pay of Charles V and led by Bertrand du Guesclin, soon to be Constable of France. The battle of Nájera in 1367 was a close-run affair partly as a consequence of du Guesclin’s influence. He demanded better armour for the Trastamaran forces and attempted to counter the English combination of archers and infantry by making his knights fight on foot.

Victory for the prince and Pedro, however, was short-lived, for the latter in a very literal sense – he was murdered by his half-brother, Enrique of Trastamara, at Montiel in 1369. A different fate awaited Edward when he returned to Aquitaine bankrupt and broken with the illness which would eventually claim his life. Pedro’s promises of repayment for the campaign proved hollow and when the prince demanded taxation from the principality of Aquitaine certain nobles appealed to the king of France and the parlement of Paris complaining of the financial impositions and the ‘tyranny’ of his government. Charles demanded the prince answer the charges; Edward refused. Rebellion followed, and soon open war. Within two years at most the French had recaptured all the territory ceded in 1360.

Edward returned home after the siege of Limoges (1370), the last military action in which he participated. His health was such that he directed the assault on the city from a litter. His last years were ones of uneven decline, and his personal tragedy was underlined by the death of his eldest son, Edward of Angoulême. Until his death he took a greater interest in domestic politics and tried to secure the throne for his second son, Richard. His reputation grew as his health failed alongside the English war effort, and national mourning accompanied his death.

CHAPTER ONE:

The
Grande Chevauchée
of 1355

In 1346, before the Crécy campaign, an appeal for military assistance had led to an English expedition in France. So it was once again in 1355. In January certain members of the Gascon nobility including Jean de Grailly, the captal de Buch (so-called because of the hereditary title he bore, to the captalate of Buch), and the lords of Lesparre and Mussidan, were present in England at the birth of Edward III’s son, Thomas of Woodstock. They took the opportunity to express their deep concern at the hostile activities of the count of Armagnac. As one of the most important members of the nobility of southern France, Jean d’Armagnac had been appointed the French king’s lieutenant in Languedoc in November 1352. He had not proved an amicable neighbour – only two months later he laid siege to the Gascon town of Saint-Antonin. Military pressure continued and considerable inroads were made into the duchy so that by the end of May 1354 Armagnac was encamped on the banks of the River Lot only twenty-seven leagues from Bordeaux.

This assault was set against a general backdrop of growing hostility. Formal activity in the Hundred Years War had been limited after the fall of Calais to the English in 1347, partly because of the disruption caused by the Black Death (1347–50). Attempts at diplomacy including the abortive treaty of Guînes had failed and subsequent negotiations at Avignon had broken down. Accordingly, the Gascon request for a response to Armagnac’s attacks merely hastened the resumption of the Anglo-French war.

Recruitment

The Black Prince’s expedition in 1355 marked his first independent command, and the size and quality of the army he led was indicative of his importance and authority as a military commander and his status as heir-apparent. The expeditionary force composed members of his household, his retainers, annuitants and the retinues of those magnates who followed him.

The English military machine had undergone something of a transformation, perhaps even a revolution, since it had been taught a bitter lesson in many battles with the Scots, the most painful of which had been delivered at Bannockburn. By 1355, English armies were becoming increasingly ‘professional’. They were no longer recruited through traditional ‘feudal’ means. Rather, recruiting captains were employed by means of indentures – contracts specifying the number and types of troops to be supplied for a particular campaign or particular period of service. Specific conditions of service concerning payment, booty and dates, and points of embarkation were agreed. Such agreements, which might be taken out for an individual or a whole army, were indicative of the increasingly sophisticated military approach the English had adopted.

However, if the means of bringing an army into the field was innovative, the broad strategy that the army would implement was not. Raiding had been and continued to be one of the most common forms of warfare waged throughout the medieval period. But, the degree of organisation and devastation that the Anglo-Gascon army brought to this military tradition was something new. The English
chevauchée
strategy aimed to dislocate the foundations of economic, social and political life in France. In the event that this drew out the enemy to the battlefield an effective strategic and tactical plan had been established. In order to implement this, the right kind of troops, properly equipped and supplied were necessary. Such a strategy was not cheap, however, and its cost led to the development of near-permanent taxation in England.

On 10 July 1355, the prince signed an indenture with his father which outlined the composition of the expeditionary force and the responsibilities of those involved. The prince was to lead a force of 433 men-at-arms (although this may have been exceeded), 400 mounted archers and 300 foot archers totalling 1,133 soldiers. This was to be supplemented by troops under the command of the earls of Warwick, Suffolk, Oxford, and Salisbury, Sir John Lisle and Sir Reginald Cobham. Taking into account the advance payments made to the captains around the same time, it is probable that the prince set sail with a total force of around 2,700.

There are no extant muster rolls for the 1355 expedition, but some reconstruction of the army can be made through shipping records which indicate that Warwick, Suffolk, Oxford, Salisbury, Lisle and Cobham probably brought 500 men-at-arms and 800 archers. In addition to those recruited by the prince, this gives a total of 933 men-at-arms and 1,800 archers to which were added about several thousand Gascon troops.
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The first indications that there would be a campaign, at least in recruiting terms, pre-dated the formal signing of the indenture and began in the prince’s earldom of Chester. In May and June 1355, 500 archers were to be ‘chosen, tested and arrayed’ along with 100 from Flintshire. They were contracted to arrive at Plymouth, the point of embarkation, ‘by three weeks before Midsummer’ and it appears that all but forty of these did so. Cheshire archers, probably due to national leanings rather than an indication of military skill, received a higher rate of pay than the Welsh soldiers who were employed as both archers and light infantry, armed with lances and pikes.
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In contrast to the Crécy-Calais campaign there was only a small Welsh contingent in the prince’s army in 1355. These were attached to the prince’s own household retinue. Gronou ap Griffith commanded 60 men from north Wales, and David ap Blethin Vaghan, 30 men from Flintshire. Three notable Welsh knights also brought their retinues: John Griffith, Rhys ap Griffith, who may have been the leader of a force from south Wales, and Hywel ap Griffith, known to posterity as Sir Hywel of the Axe. This was the first campaign in the Hundred Years War in which the Welsh were recorded as using horses.
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Wages of war and ‘regard’ (an advance payment) were received by the following:

As well as a considerable administrative and logistical exercise, this was a major financial undertaking. The advance cost of the expedition including war wages and payment of ‘regard’ totalled some £19,500, and shipping contributed a further £3,300. In the year from September 1355, over £55,000 was spent on the prince’s military operation in Gascony.
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Although sent to Gascony to lead a military expedition the prince also had governmental, political and diplomatic responsibilities. Appointed his father’s lieutenant in the duchy, he was provided with financial resources ‘for the conciliation of the people of the country’ and authority to make ordinances and act ‘as he shall think best for the honour and profit of the king in all matters ... in the duchy of Gascony’. Furthermore, in the event of the prince being besieged or beset by overwhelming forces, reinforcements were to be sent by the king in person and/or the duke of Lancaster, and earls of Arundel, Northampton, March and Stafford. It was to be a national expedition, resourced by the crown and supported by the most powerful magnates of the realm, but the inherent dangers were also recognised and the potential threat of the loss or capture of the heir-apparent was given due consideration.

Nonetheless, the force that left England in 1355 was small compared with those recruited in 1346 although it was complemented on arrival by Gascon forces and further increased prior to the 1356 expedition when Sir Richard Stafford, one of the prince’s key retainers, was commissioned to reinforce and re-supply the army.

Evidence for the Gascon participants in 1355 and 1356 is also not as comprehensive as one would wish. Despite the abundance of records in Gascony for the period 1354–61, those detailing the 1355 campaign are not complete.
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It is clear, nonetheless, that several members of the local nobility led military companies and some had seen action in English service in the past. Despite the chequered nature of Gascon relations with the English crown over many years, the political and military integrity of the duchy depended, to a greater or lesser degree, on the support of the local aristocracy. In this context, even without any other motivation, the reason is clear for the success of the Gascon appeal to Edward III. The Captal de Buch, an established supporter of the English cause, was among those who asked for help in January 1355. To further strengthen his loyalty, Edward III granted him various rights and perquisites, mainly in the towns of Bénauges and Ilaz. In addition, members of the Albret family, Amauri de Biron, sire de Montferrand, Auger de Montaut, sire de Mussidan, Guillaume de Pommiers, Guillaume Sans, sire de Lesparre, and Guillaume Amanier, sire de Roson all led troops in the campaigns of 1355–6.

The Commanders

The chief commanders and officers of the 1355 expedition were closely associated with the prince’s household and personal retinue. Among the magnates, Robert Ufford, earl of Suffolk, the titular head of the prince’s council, had been associated with him since 1338, and William Montague, earl of Salisbury, had been knighted with the prince when they had landed at La Hogues on the Crécy campaign in 1346. In addition to Warwick, Lisle and Cobham, the leaders included James Audley, Richard Stafford, John Chandos, John Wingfield, Baldwin Botetourt, Bartholomew Burghersh, Nigel Loryng, Stephen Cosington, Roger Cotesford, Alan Cheyne and William Trussel. These were men of considerable military experience in the wars with France and Scotland, and several had fought in Gascony and understood its political character. Among these, Loryng, Audley and Stafford had served with Henry of Grosmont, then earl of Derby, in 1345.

The military talent at the prince’s disposal can be seen in the fact that the army contained seven current knights of the Garter and two future members – Ufford and Cobham. Among the commanders at least a dozen had fought at Crécy. These bonds would be strengthened by a year’s campaigning, and its growing collective experience made the prince’s retinue an extremely effective military force.
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In addition to the purely military arm of the prince’s entourage, much of his domestic household also rode with him, and their peacetime function was amended to incorporate campaigning duties both for the prince himself and the army at large. The prince’s household staff included Nicholas Bonde (squire), Henry Aldrington (master-tailor), William Bakton (yeoman of the buttery), Richard Doxeye (baker), Robert Egremont (pavillioner), Geoffrey Hamelyn (keeper of the prince’s armour), John Henxteworth (controller of the household), William Lenche (porter), and Henry Berkhamsted (porter, later constable of Berkhamsted castle). These men organised and administered the campaign and the prince valued their service highly: officers of the household received gifts worth a total of £275 10s. for their efforts in outfitting the expedition to Gascony.
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The roles these men played in the daily organisation of the army and in its command structure can be reconstructed partially from evidence contained in a number of campaign letters. These were part of an ongoing propaganda campaign that appears to have been relatively successful in ensuring public support and, more importantly, public money for the war with France. These communications, sent back by Edward and others, indicate Audley, Chandos, Botetourt and at times Burghersh ‘were the prince’s handy men for field work, that Stafford was assigned to special tasks (as he had been before the campaign), that Wingfield remained as ‘head of the office’ and that these men who had of course known one another before going out to France, formed a group bound by friendly relations to one another and by common loyalty to their chief: they were part of the ‘permanent staff’.’
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