The Blackwell Companion to Sociology (20 page)

``first-order'' loyalties.

From this perspective, ``whiteness'' might be considered to be an earlier form

of first-order tribal loyalty. Unlike contemporary post-national forms, it took

root under the conditions of colonialism and in the context of nation-state

formation. One implication of Appadurai's argument is that racism, which is

fueled by ``hot'' whiteness, will subside only with the emergence of ``cool''

identities associated with dehyphenization, globalizing diasporic experiences,

the discovery and affirmation of ``roots,'' and the deepening of multiculturalism.

More precisely, as white Americans come to discard their own socially con-

structed hyphens and accept distinctions as part of a broader, complex social

fabric, black±white differences, as well those involving Native-Americans, La-

tinos, and Asians, will become mere components of a taken-for-granted cultural

diversity.

Shifts in identities and culture do not, however, quickly solve the glaring

gaps in educational attainment and economic resources between whites

and blacks. Charles Tilly's (1998) analysis is clear about that. He contends

that explicit categorical boundaries have been drawn and reified in

America, especially in terms of race, but also in terms of other binary dis-

tinctions, such as gender and language. It is at these boundaries that deep

inequalities develop by means of exploitation and the hoarding of opportun-

ities. The boundaries that establish inequalities help dominant groups to

solve organizational problems, such as loyalty, solidarity, control, and succes-

sion. In other words, whites do what they do because it is a winning game for

them.

There are consequences of racism and racist practices. Namely, there are

resulting differences in performance (educational achievements) and in outcomes

(occupations and earnings), which thereby reinforce the categories, and come to

justify what whites do. Tilly is not optimistic (see Darity and Myers, chapter 13

in this volume). On the other hand, along the lines of Appadurai's argument,

contemporary identities are constructed not only in terms of first-order identities, such as race, gender, ethnicity, and religion, but also in terms of multi-

stranded cosmopolitan and global connections that groups and individuals

acquire. First-order identities becomè`cool,'' we might assume, as these con-

nections, and codependencies, take hold.

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Judith R. Blau

De-hierarchizatio

De-hierar

n,

chization, Diversity and the Public Sphere

Contemporary theory about the public sphere (civil society) places great empha-

sis on the extent to which society is dynamically constructed around diversity,

and through pluralistic and democratic participation (see Misztal, chapter six in this volume). It is assumed, moreover, that personal autonomy ± that is, having

choices ± is compatible with a high degree of flexible interdependence. That is

the case because autonomy is the consequence of membership in diverse multi-

stranded networks patterned around socially meaningful identities and as

``plural selves'' (Coser, 1991; Blau, 1993). People also vest their identities in realms of meaning that accompany participation in community affairs, religion,

and social and political movements.

This conception of how the self relates to society is different from earlier ones in which individuals were considered to be integrated into society through

groups and status orders (Tocqueville), through larger differentiated social

structures (Durkheim), functionally, through shared values and institutions

(Weber, Parsons), for good or bad, in social classes (Marx), or in terms of their particular roles or statuses (Merton). Put simply, these groups, structures, institutions, societal values, and status configurations are not as stable as they once were, and individuals are liberated from the constraints that were understood to protect them from risks. To capture the dynamic character of social life, a

general non-deterministic conceptual framework is needed that focuses on

agency and choice, as well as interdependence and socially emergent and con-

structed meanings (see Wagner, chapter three in this volume).

It is consistent with our understanding of agency that individuals are no longer incorporated into modernity's hierarchies ± namely, high church, high culture,

high politics, bureaucratic organization, and status orders. Agency is as mean-

ingful for groups as it is for individuals, which helps us to understand that locales uniquely micro-manage global influences and appropriate elements from global

culture for their own particular uses. The contrasts between rural and urban

places and between social classes are quickly eroding, as are those between the

developed core and the dependent periphery, as earlier described by Wallerstein

(1979). It is a flatter, but more variegated and complex, world than the modern

one that was organized in terms of privilege, hierarchy, and status. Extraordin-

ary differences in wealth and power, however, cut across this variegation and

complexity.

Fortunately, there is new thinking within the social sciences and in philosophy

about economic and social justice. It is initially useful to reconsider how fairness and justice have been colloquially understood. The term that immediately comes

to mind is ``tolerance.'' It conveys the meaning of charitable forgiveness and the entitled right to be tolerant. However, as taken-for-granted, traditional privileges are challenged, the term ``tolerance'' loses its moral bite (but see Walzer, 1997).

Consider the alternative coinages. A factory owner must appeal to residents to

be tolerant of the factory's depletion of community resources. As a homeowner, I inadvertently increase the local taxes that are passed on to poorer residents who Bringing in Codependence

69

live in rented apartments ± for which I ask their tolerance. We might say that

blacks are overly tolerant of whites who hoard superior schools. Evidently, the

classic conception of tolerance, with its presumption of asymmetry and privilege, should be replaced with another conception that recognizes equality among

people and pluralistically constituted selves.

In this context it is useful to reconsider diversity. There is a noticeable shift in public opinion in the USA to seeing that a monolithic Anglo culture is boring for Anglos and illegitimate from the standpoint of others. It is increasingly recognized that the treatment of indigenous populations was wrong; that it is better to encourage Latino youth to maintain ties with their language and culture than

not; and that the social fabric is far richer with diversity than without. Demo-

cracy can only be maintained when groups are given the rights to insert their

own distinctive perspectives into political processes (Torres, 1998). What lies

behind these possibilities is a developing normative climate whereby groups are

accorded freedom, autonomy, and responsibility for participating in democratic

processes in terms of their own cultural and social identities. This is an ongoing project that rejects static individualism, but rests on common interests in finding universals across myriad of differences (Alexander, 1995).

Relevant to the social science understanding of changing conceptions involv-

ing the self, groups, and civil society is Sen's analysis, which I have already

briefly discussed. To extend this a bit, his views suggest that cooperation can be institutionalized along new lines and with new understandings. First, people

come to accept the idea of reflecting on their own agency and well-being as

they are codependent on the agency and well-being of others. Second, people

come to consider the consequences of their behaviors and decisions in intergen-

erational terms, which is to say, over the long run. Benchmarks for justice

considerations include how outcomes and resources are distributed over groups

and populations, and over time. Skewed outcomes that systematically favor one

group over another are to be suspected from this perspective. Examples include:

racial imbalances in prison populations; gender differences in wages; and educa-

tional, health, and other disparities between whites and non-whites. These

examples highlight why codependence considerations are useful.

These conceptions originate in philosophy. Alasdair MacIntyre (1984) refutes

the idea of a unitary self and contends that the individual is inseparable from his or her situation in relations with others, through engagement and empathy.

Along similar lines, Emmanuel Levinas rejects ontological autonomy and inde-

pendence in favor of irreducible social relations and discourse. What follows

from this is an ethics, indeed, the social necessity, of responsibility. Simply put, wèàre responsible beyond our intentions'' (Levinas, 1998, p. 3). He contends

that a contemporary ethical framework must be based on difference, not onto-

logy; on responsibility, not tolerance; on interdependence, not independence. He writes: `ìt is impossible to free myself saying, Ìt's not my concern.' There is no choice, for it is always and inescapably my concern ` (Levinas, 1998, p. 237; see also Campbell, 1999). In my own words, social scientists, by investigating how

people's utilities are vested in cooperation rather than in individual self-interest, will contribute to our understanding about how codependencies form and how

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Judith R. Blau

they can be encouraged. As I have suggested, social and cultural diversities

require these codependencies, and, no doubt, encourage them.

Conclusions

I raised two paradoxes initially. One deals with how social egalitarianism can

emerge in opposition to economic inequalities. This is possible because globali-

zation accompanies the decline in centralized structures and sturdy institutions that earlier had strong holds on behavior. Under these conditions, we can expect that people are more likely to err on the side of generosity and to be cooperative in their dealings with others. Social actors have great choice in contemporary

societies, and choice possibilities are embedded in a tapestry of codependencies.

Individual utility, in contrast, is defined from the perspective of each singular, competing self-maximizing actor. In globalizing markets, economic actors have

few constraints except for their own initial assets, with the result that they amass great wealth. Economic inequalities among and within nations and groups, and

among individuals, place undue strain on our proclivities to cooperate, just as

the logic of utility has marketized the conditions under which we make choices.

Although the global economy introduces great uniformity in production,

labor, consumption, media, and so forth, the trend toward uniformity is accom-

panied by increasing social and cultural diversities, as well as, importantly, an appreciation of their value. Such diversities provide weakly institutionalized

structures around which people organize their codependencies and the respons-

ibilities that accompany them.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For their critical comments on an earlier draft, I would like to thank Vicki L.

Lamb, Ted Mouw, Peter M. Blau, and Keri Iyall Smith.

Part II

Relationships and Meaning

6

Civil Society: a Signifier of Plurality

and Sense of Wholeness

Barbara A. Misztal

Why Has the Concept of Civil Society Captured the

Sociological

Sociological Imagination?

During the past two decades the concept of civil society has been very popular in sociological writings and has become one of the most favored exports from

sociological theory into the language of politics and journalism. Although the

initial concern was with civil society as a purely abstract idea, the recent revival of interest in civil society has led to empirical studies of associational life as a realm of emancipation from state power, as a condition of the stability of

democracy, and as a source of generalized reciprocity. In such sociological

research the term ``civil society'' is interpreted in a variety of different ways and used to identify cases as diverse as the consequences of recent economic

changes in China, the transformation of postcolonial states in Africa, and the

vitality of democratic processes in Western democracies.

This wide dissemination of the idea of civil society has not, however, elimin-

ated ambiguous definitions and conflicting interpretations of the concept. Con-

sequently, the notion of civil society, presented as a panacea for all the problems of modern societies and used to identify a wide range of diverse cases, has been inflated to the point of losing much of its meaning. To continue to use this

concept we need to recognize and confront more openly its ambiguous and

seductive nature, as well as the different contexts to which this term is applied.

By examining factors behind the popularity of (and resulting confusion about)

the use of the concept of civil society, I shall show why the idea has captured the sociological imagination and evaluate the heuristic potential of different

approaches to this issue.

While the origin of the concept of civil society is identified with eighteenth-

century philosophy and the emergence of modern European societies, the rebirth

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Barbara A. Misztal

of the idea of civil society in the twentieth century has been inspired by a wave of democratization in Eastern Europe and Latin America and the emergence of new