The Blackwell Companion to Sociology (22 page)

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Barbara A. Misztal

the liberal state and was crucial through the first half of the nineteenth century.

Its early versions comes from Hegel's attempt to synthesize two previous visions of civil society, while at the same time avoiding their potentially negative legacies of an undifferentiated homogeneity of common will and the unregulated and

self-destructive play of blind economic forces. In Hegel's ambiguous version of

the notion, civil society, seen as just a moment in the unfolding of the ethical idea, is ``the achievement of the modern world,'' since it is modern's society way of reconciling universality and individual freedom (Hegel, quoted in Stillman,

1980, p. 623). On the other hand, civil society is a realm of particularity,

difference and diversity where people recognize each other and grant each

other respect. Civil society is seen as a separate but not self-sufficient sphere whose contradictions are resolved only with the appearance of the universal

state that pursues the general interest. The purpose of civil society is the liberation of the individual, seen as ``neither a passive nor an abstract universal but the union into distinctive individuality of the particular with the universal'' (Stillman, 1980, p. 633), from domination of nature through socially interactive

creative work within corporations of civil society, viewed as voluntary associa-

tions of those sharing vocation, purpose, or interests.

Hegel's ambivalence toward civil society totally disappears in the Marxist

tradition, which rejects the importance of civil society as the condition of both the actualization of universal rights and the development of the particular and

concrete individual, while accepting Hegel's vision of civil society as a sphere of conflicting egoistic interests competing or struggling with each other. Marx, by declaring that the presence of association-like corporations in Hegelian theory is a residue of the feudal past, renounces the difference between the civil society and the state, and reduces civil society to economic life as the main sphere of

realization of private interest (Keane, 1988). The Marxist tradition's suspicion that civil society is a sphere of private egoistic interests of the capitalist class leads to the assumption that civil society is a temporary and historically specific sphere. This assertion is also present in Gramsci's idea of the accedence of

hegemony in civil society that curtails the power of the state. While rejecting

the economism of the old Marxist school and stressing mutual conditioning of

the economy, polity, and culture, Gramsci, whose work has popularized the civil

society tradition with thinkers on the Left, argues that the conflict between civil society and political society could gradually eliminate the domination of the

capitalist state (Bobbio, 1988; Cohen and Arato, 1992).

This idea of resistance to the state finds its best expression in the Eastern

European language of civil society, which, together with other Hegelian and neo-

Gramascian ideas (such as the analytical separation of the non-state realm into

economy and society), contributes to the revival of the idea of civil society

among the Western Left. Such a conceptualization of the relationships between

civil society and the state, where civil society is seen as a counterbalance to state power, is labeled by Foley and Edwards (1996) as Civil Society II, while Alexander (1998b) reserves this label for the Marxist tradition. This version, as

expressed in Arato's (1981) phrasè`civil society against the state,'' by reinforcing the idea of civil society as the antithesis of the state and linking it to new Civil Society

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social movements, marginalizes political associations and underplays the con-

flictual potential of civil society. The weaknesses of this perspective became

visible with the discovery that Latin American civil society is defined not as

being opposed to a repressive state but as an alternative to political parties, while in the Western Europe civil society is a sphere of social autonomy or voluntary

cultural and social organizations (Foley and Edwards, 1996).

Disillusionment with the vision of civil society as antithesis of the state,

together with growing concern over the quality of interpersonal relationships

and democracy in the West, has helped us to revise our understanding of civil

society as the informal, non-state, non-economic realms of both public and

personal life (Alexander, 1995, p. 34). However, when the project of civil society is reduced to the restoration of social bonds and self-organization outside of the official institutions, the importance of the state and its relations with civil society can easily be overlooked, while the role of the emotional dimension of participation can be overestimated. Without examination of all the main practices of civil society ± that is, its autonomous institutions, the relationships between civil

society and the state, and patterns of civil manners (Shils, 1991) ± we are unable to determine whether civil society is committed to democratic practices and

sentiments.

A lesson from historical traditions and theoretical debates is that we need to

avoid being too ambitious in synthesizing these often contradictory meanings,

being overly normative in describing civil society, or being excessively theoretical in delineating a history of ideas. It is necessary, therefore, to recognize more openly the overgeneralized and normative interpretations of civil society. We

also need to confront the contradictory definitions, which can be explained by

the political inclinations of writers, their particular social philosophies, the socio-political context in which they wrote, and the nature of political conflicts of the day (Alexander, 1998b; Edwards and Foley, 1998). The required operationalization of the term ``civil society'' has recently been made easier due to the development of both theoretical and empirical investigations of the phenomenon.

Attempts at Sociological Realism

Sociological and anthropological examinations of the nature and task of various

civil societies suggest that civil society should be particularized and made concrete (Hann, 1996; Berman, 1997; Bell, 1998). Critical discussions initiated by

Habermas, Keane, and Putnam have also called for a greater sociological realism

in approaching the notion of civil society and especially in studying how and

under what circumstances a society's organized components contribute to polit-

ical strength or political failure. Both empirically and theoretically oriented

studies challenge the assumption about the significance of the decoupling of

civil society from the state and question the assertion about the positive role of all types of associations. They claim that the vitality of civil society depends upon both the plurality of its structures and the preservation of shared norms.

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Barbara A. Misztal

Ignoring the importance of the state is now perceived as one of the main

failures of the civil society perspective. Not all civil society theorists, to be fair, underestimate the role of the state. For example, Keane argues for `à secure and independent civil society of autonomous public sphere'' which is protected and

legally guaranteed by the state, and also argues that civil society and the statè`must become the condition of each other's democratization'' (1988, p. 15).

Walzer (1992, pp. 103±4) notes that the statè`frames civil society and occupies

space within it,'' and that ``civil society, left to itself, generates radically unequal power relationships, which only state power can challenge.'' Nonetheless, an

easy dichotomy between ``bad'' state and ``good'' civil society has only recently been seriously put to question as a result of more critical debates about social capital (Portes, 1998) and empirical studies of the concrete mechanisms of

ensuring the independence of civil society.

The discovery of what Walzer (1992) calls ``the paradox of civil society

argument'' has helped researchers of postcommunist societies to realize the

importance not only of the distinction between civil society and the state for

the health of democracy but also of a strong democratic state for the stability of democracy and the preservation of freedom. Investigations of the postcommunist societies show that, on the one hand, the transition from communist rule

involves state withdrawal from the public sphere, and, on the other hand, it

demands that the state play an active role in the provision of legislation that

allows social organizations to throw off party±state tutelage (Lowenhardt, 1995; Linz and Stepan, 1996). Considering civil society as ``the arena of the polity

where self organizing groups, movements and individuals, relatively autonom-

ous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and

solidarities and advance their interest,'' Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 6) indicate that the development of postcommunist civil society requires political stability, unambiguous legislation, and a strong and efficient state which is able to

contain conflicts, restrict particularism, and protect the rights for its own organization.

The importance of the state for the well-being of civil society is also the main element of the criticism of Putnam's thesis on the working of Italian democracy.

Putnam (1993) argues that the organization of civil society precedes democrat-

ization, since strong democratic institutions only emerge once strong civic

groups have been formed and have demanded to be represented. Unlike Tocque-

ville, who assumed that the establishment of a democratic polity and political

activity were the primary conditions for a thriving civil society, Putnam argues that the prerequisite of a democratic society is the initial creation of voluntary associations because only their dense networks of interpersonal trust can overcome the free-rider dilemma. However, as his romanticized image of community

precludes him from seeing that certain networks of civic engagement are a source of both trust and distrust, Putnam fails to supply a theory that identifies the

mechanisms of production and maintenance of trust. Thus, while directly linking

the quality of social life with civic engagement and norms of reciprocity, he

argues that social connectedness is at its strongest when rooted in an old tradition. Consequently, Putnam's reformulation of the question of trust assumes that Civil Society

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a society is indifferent to government action, and this leads him to overlook the role of the state (Woolcock, 1998, p. 157).

Many empirical studies question Putnam's deterministic view of democratiza-

tion and suggest that the state can actually promote and strengthen civic organ-

izations (Abers, 1998). Because the state influences the level of funding and

subsidies to voluntary and non-profit groups and because of its involvement in

economic infrastructures, it is also responsible for ``the cross-class and organizational dynamics by which civic associations actually form and persist'' (Skocpol, 1996, p. 22). Therefore, the state's role in securing conditions for the realization of citizens' rights and its intervention within the civic sphere cannot be ignored when one is examining the nature of civil society.

The significance of the state in shaping the nature of civil society can be fully understood by positioning civil society between the economy and polity. However, new approaches, especially ones examining civil society through the prism

of social movements, have eliminated the market from their consideration. For

example, post-Marxist researchers' focus their attention on civil societies as

forms of ``collective actions that are differentiated not only from the state but also from the market economy'' (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p. 5). This departure

from the classical view, where commerce and industry are central, although not

exclusive, components of civil society, effectively eliminates economic power

and economic inequalities as the basis for political change (Meadwell, 1995, p.

190). The consequences of such a removal of interest-representation from the

ambit of civil society are best illustrated by recent studies of the diversity of postcommunist development which point out that the economy needs to be seen

as a part of overall social relations essential for social mobilization and activism (Linz and Stepan, 1996).

The first usage of the idea of civil society connected it with the emergence of

new commercial society and its associations, contracts, and property rights.

Today, the liberal idea that a recognition of property rights is essential for

sustaining individual freedom under a rule of law is increasingly perceived as a necessary but not sufficient condition for a healthy functioning of democracy.

There is a growing understanding that this liberal view needs to be accompanied

by the recognition that many divisions within civil society still ``remain a source of inequality and instability'' (Kumar, 1993, p. 389), and that this limits citizens'

ability to exercise their rights and freedoms. The market economy, while specifying one necessary element, is not a sufficient condition for the existence of a

strong civil society. In order for all individuals to actively participate in the public sphere, a democratic welfare state ought to take it upon itself ``to equalize the worth of liberty to all its citizens'' (Tamir, 1998, p. 223). Only civil society placed within the framework of a democratic welfare state can secure the

conditions for its citizens' participation in public life.

However, the state and the economy not only shape conditions and opportun-

ities for social mobilization activism, they are also essential for understanding the nature of associational life. If people do not have support from the state