The Bletchley Park Codebreakers (60 page)

Page
102
used on the Russian front: ibid., 2: 294.

Page
103
broke no Vulture keys: ‘Huts 6 and 8: Summary for August and September 1941’, 4 October 1941 (PRO HW 14/20).

Page
104
Vulture and Chaffinch: ‘Graphs Illustrating the Work of Hut 6 from September 1941 to November 1942’ (PRO HW 3/164).

Page
105
broke Chaffinch: ‘Huts 6 and 8: Summary for August and September 1941’.

Page
106
part of October: Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence
, 2: 294.

Page
107
2,800
Heer
signals: ‘”E” situation 20th June 1942’, Table [V.

Page
108
Even
Heer
Mediterranean ciphers: ‘Appreciation of the “E” Situation, June to December 1942’, 15.

Page
109
the Mediterranean
Heer
keys: ibid., 13.

Page
110
only
Heer
cipher to produce cillies: ibid., 5.

Page
111
success rate in 1942: the figures are from ‘Graphs Illustrating the Work of Hut 6’ and ‘”E” situation 20th June 1942’, Table IV.

Page
112
eight or more ciphers: ‘Graphs Illustrating the Work of Hut 6’, note on Graph 6.

Page
113
increased from 32,000; Unidentified traffic: ‘Graphs illustrating the work of Hut 6’.

Page
114
first five
Stecker
pairs; sent by land line: ‘Cryptanalytic Report on the Yellow Machine’, 82.

Page
115
solved the Railway traffic: letter, 17 August 1940, to Col. Hatton-Hall (PRO HW 14/6); ‘GCCS Report for 1940. German section No 4. Intelligence School’ (PRO HW 14/11); Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence
, 2: 668. For the decrypts, see GRD 1–59 (PRO HW 5/745).

Page
116
90 per cent success rate: ‘Graphs illustrating the work of Hut 6’.

Page
117
stopped using discriminants: Ultra/Zip CCR 22, 27 February 1944, ‘German Signals Security Improvements Since the Battle of El Alamein (October/November) 1942’, 2 (NACP RG 38, Radio Intelligence Publications, Box 169, RIP 403).

Page
118
identified many of the
Heer’s
ciphers: Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence
, 3(2):779.

Page
119
UKD would be widely used: S. Milner-Barry, memorandum, 25 July 1944, ‘Operation D’ (PRO HW 14/101).

Page
120
about twenty-five
Luftwaffe
ciphers: Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence
, 3(2): 847.

Page
121
enciphered call signs: Ultra/Zip CCR 38, 22 December 1944, ‘German Signals Security Improvements During 1944’, 2, 6 (RIP 403).

Page
122
retained their fixed frequencies: The History of WO “Y” Group’, 67.

Page
123
Figure 4.3, Enigma breaks (Hut 6) 1942 and 1944: ‘”E” situation 20th June 1942’, Tables I, IV; ‘Appreciation of the “E” Situation, June to December 1942’; IR 4082, Annex E, ‘Figures for November’ (‘Capt. Walter J. Fried Reports’, NACP HCC, Box 880, Nr. 2612).

Page
124
a system under which: ‘History of German Air Section’, Section V of Part I: 11 (PRO HW 3/106); cf. Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence
, 3(2):848 (referring only to ‘improved security precautions’ then, even though the nature of the precautions had been published in 1986).

Page
125
fell from 1,800 to 1,000 daily: ibid.

Page
126
a postwar history concluded:
ULTRA and the History of the United States
Strategic Air Force in Europe vs. the German Air Force
(University Publications of America, Frederick, MD, 1986 – a reprint of SRH 13), p. 179.

Page
127
special ‘traffic watch’: ‘History of German Air Section’, Section V of Part I, 12.

Page
128
thirteen occasions: Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence
, 2: 662.

Derek Taunt has sadly passed away since writing this chapter. He died on 15 July 2004, aged 86. Obituaries:
The Daily Telegraph
, 23 July 2004;
The Times
, 13 August 2004

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/obituaries/article468838.ece

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1467625/Derek-Taunt.html

Page
1
‘an exaggerated view of security …’; ‘… not at first satisfactory’: ‘De Grey’s History of Air Sigint’, 135 (PRO HW 3/95).

Page
2
main
Luftwaffe
cipher had just been broken: ‘The History of WO “Y” Group’, 48 (PRO HW 41/119).

Page
3
Milner-Barry on the 6813th Signal Security Detachment: Milner-Barry, letter 10 May 1945, to William Bundy, ‘Technical History of the 6813th Signal Security Detachment’, 13 (NACP HCC Nr. 4685).

Page
4
Welchman on the management of Hut 6: Gordon Welchman,
The Hut
Six Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes
(Allen Lane, London, 1982), pp. 126–7.

Page
5
Milner-Barry on Welchman: ‘In Memoriam W. Gordon Welchman’,
Intelligence and National Security
, 2(1) (1986), 141.

Page
6
‘hankies’: these were charts (sometimes called ‘hanky-pankies’) in which a ‘discriminatrix’ recorded cipher discriminants, plus the name of the ciphers and the radio frequencies used. The name was derived from John Hancock, who designed the chart.

Page
1
rang through to Bletchley Park: letter from Edward Clarke, Nobby’s son, who was on duty when the message came through.

Page
2
He suspected dactyls and a rhyme: Penelope Fitzgerald,
The Knox Brothers
(London, Macmillan, 1977), pp. 145–6.

Page
3
Alice in ID25
: CCAC MSS DENN 3/3.

Page
4
The story of the Polish contribution: see Chapter 4.

Page
5
‘… not mathematical but classical’: Christopher Andrew,
Secret Service:
The Making of the British Intelligence Community
(William Heinemann,
London, 1985), p. 96.

Page
6
‘very strange beasts indeed …’: Michael Smith,
Station X: The Codebreakers
of Bletchley Park
(Channel 4 Books, London, 1998), p. 16.

Page
7
‘Knox grasped everything very quickly: Wladyslaw Kozaczuk,
Enigma
(University Publications of America, Frederick, MD; Arms and Armour Press, London, 1984), pp. 60, 236.

Page
8
He enclosed a set of rods: ibid., p. 60.

Page
9
Welchman, who had given much thought to the necessary organizational methods: see Gordon Welchman,
The Hut Six Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes
(Allen Lane, London, 1982), pp. 74–6.

Page
10
Denniston recalled later: Denniston, letter to Knox, 11 November 1941 (PRO HW 14/22).

Page
11
‘treatise on the Enigma’: ‘Mathematical theory of ENIGMA machine by A. M. Turing’, also known as Turing’s ‘Treatise on the Enigma’ (PRO HW 25/3). Turing’s example of rodding is from the unsteckered Railway Enigma. Its wiring was solved by Hut 8 in 1940, using established methods (see p. 61).

Page
12
‘the work did not really need mathematics’: F. H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp (eds),
Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park
(OUP, Oxford, 1993), p. 113.

Page
13
Cunningham came down: John Winton,
Cunningham
(John Murray, London, 1998), p. 139.

Page
14
ready with a poem: personal possession.

Page
15
Ultra Secret: E W. Winterbotham,
The Ultra Secret
(Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1974), p. 66.

Page
16
accompanying book: Richard Deacon and Nigel West,
Spy!
(BBC, London, 1980), pp. 76–7.

Page
17
The Times
, 18 February 1980.

Page
1
Many of the signals translated: decrypts of the Coral signals are in PRO ADM 223/264–83, as the SJA series, and at NACP as RG 457, SRNA series. Translations of Japanese Naval Attaché messages.

Page
1
Hobart-Hampden success: A. G. Denniston, ‘GC&CS Between the Wars’,
Intelligence and National Security
, 1(1) (1986), 55–6.

Page
2
Difficulties with Japanese interception: Jones to Lambert, 22 August 1924 (PRO HW 3/1), Folio 15; W. F. Clarke, ‘Documents Relating to Naval Section’ (PRO HW 3/1), Folio 1. 4–5; W. R Clarke, ‘History of Naval Section, The Years Between’ (PRO HW 3/16), 5, 20, 21.

Page
3
Problems finding Naval Japanese experts: ‘GCCS Requests Treasury Approval for Four new junior Assistant posts for new Sigint Bureau Proposed for Hong Kong’ (PRO HW 3/55).

Page
4
Nave on recruitment by Royal Navy and Admiralty instructions: Eric Nave, ‘An Australian’s Unique Naval Career’ (unpublished memoir, Australian War Memorial, MSS 1183), pp. 168–79. NB. This appears to be the first record of the use of ‘Y’ for interception.

Page
5
Nave progress and Flintham: Nave, ‘An Australian’s Unique Naval Career’, pp. 168–200; Nave Notes on Procedure Y, 30 March 1926 (Australian National Archives Melbourne, MP 1049, 1997/5/196).

Page
6
Improvement in Japanese codes and ciphers: Michael Smith,
The Emperor’s Codes: Bletchley Park and the Breaking of Japan’s Secret Ciphers
(Dialogue, London, 2010), p. 34.

Page
7
Tiltman on breaking Japanese military attaché system: J. H. Tiltman, ‘Some Reminiscences’ (NACP HCC Nr. 4632), 5.

Page
8
Foss and Strachey break the Japanese naval attachés’ machine cipher: Nave, ‘An Australian’s Unique Naval Career’, pp. 338–45. NB. This was the machine referred to by the US Navy codebreakers as Orange and broken by them in February 1936, apparently as a result of a ‘pinch’ of information, possibly even a machine, from the apartment of the Japanese naval attaché in Washington. See L. F. Safford, ‘History of Japanese Cipher Machines’, 3 February 1944 (NACP HCC Nr. 2344), 1–2.

Page
9
Those working on the Japanese diplomatic material: John Ferris, ‘From Broadway House to Bletchley Park: The Diary of Captain Malcolm D. Kennedy, 1934–46’,
Intelligence and National Security
, 4(3) (1989), 430.

Page
10
Details of the Type A machine: Nave, ‘An Australian’s Unique Naval Career’, pp. 338–45. Kenworthy: Johnson,
Evolution
; H. C. Kenworthy, ‘A Brief History of Events leading to the Growth of the “Y” Service’ (PRO HW 3/81), 9. The Americans broke the Type A machine, which they called Red, in late 1936: see Safford, ‘History of Japanese Cipher Machines’, 1–2; Frank B. Rowlett,
The Story of Magic: Memoirs of an American Cryptologic Pioneer
(Aegean Park Press, Laguna Hills, 1998), pp. 112–32.

Page
11
Setting up of FECB: see R. T. Barrett, ‘HMS Anderson and Special Intelligence in the Far East’ (PRO HW 4/24), 1–3; Paymaster-Captain H. L. Shaw, ‘History of the Far East Combined Bureau’ (PRO HW 4/25), 1–3.

Page
12
Tiltman breaking army codes: Tiltman, ‘Some Reminiscences’, 8–9.

Page
13
Tiltman break into JN-25: Shaw, ‘History of the Far East Combined Bureau’, 14–15, 18; Ralph Erskine and Peter Freeman, ‘Brigadier John Tiltman: One of Britain’s Finest Cryptologists’,
Cryptologia
, 27 (2003), 289.

Page
14
Moves of FECB and Bletchley Park: Barrett, ‘HMS Anderson and Special Intelligence in the Far East’, 4; Shaw, ‘History of the Far East Combined Bureau’, 15–17; Ferris, ‘From Broadway House to Bletchley Park’; Michael Smith,
Station X: The Codebreakers of Bletchley Park
(Channel 4 Books, London, 1998), pp. 1–3.

Page
15
FECB JN-25 capabilities: ‘Collaboration of British and US Radio Intelligence’ (PRO ADM 223), 1; Lt.-Cmdr. Neil Barham, ‘Japanese Cipher Notes’ (PRO ADM 223/496), 3; Shaw, ‘History of the Far East Combined Bureau’, 23–4.

Page
16
Break into Purple: Rowlett,
The Story of Magic
, pp. 151–9.

Page
17
American gift of a Purple machine: ‘History of the Signal Security Agency’, Vol. Two, ‘The General Cryptanalytical Problems’ (NACP, RC 457 SRH 361), 13.

Page
18
Details of co-operation: ‘Report of Technical Mission to England’, A. Sinkov and Leo Rosen, 11 April 1941, ‘Army and Navy Comint Regs & Papers’ (NACP HCC Nr. 4632).

Page
19
Barham on introduction of JN-25B: Barham, ‘Japanese Cipher Notes’, 3.

Page
20
Early co-operation between FECB and Corregidor: ‘Collaboration of British and US Radio Intelligence’ (PRO ADM 223/496), 1; Shaw, ‘History of the Far East Combined Bureau’, 31–3; Nave, ‘An Australian’s Unique Naval Career’, pp. 398–9.

Page
21
Exchanges with US Army and Dutch: ‘History of the Far East Combined Bureau’, 31–3.

Page
22
Nave return and exchange deal: Nave, ‘An Australian’s Unique Naval Career’, pp. 405–11, 429–32; Nave to Shaw, 28 August 1941 (PRO ADM 223/496); Central Bureau Technical Records. Part A – Organisation (in author’s possession), 1; Smith,
The Emperor’s Codes
, p. 80.

Page
23
–
24
Oshima messages and GC&CS difficulty in making Whitehall believe that Germany was about to attack Russia: Carl Boyd,
Hitler’s Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and Magic Intelligence
(University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 1993), pp. 18–21; F. H. Hinsley,
British Intelligence in the Second World Wa
r (revised abridged edition) (HMSO, London, 1994), pp. 106–9; Smith,
Station X
, p. 73.

Page
25
Oshima messages revealing German attempts to draw Japan into war with Russia and Japanese intention to attack Indochina: diary of Captain Malcolm D. Kennedy (Kennedy Papers, University of Sheffield Library), 13–22 July 1941.

Page
26
FECB tracking of Japanese Fleet: ‘Pearl Harbour and the Loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse’ (PRO ADM 223/494), 2–8.

Page
27
‘intelligence covering a wide field’: Barham, ‘Japanese Cipher Notes’, 3.

Page
28
warnings to the Japanese embassy in London to await the Winds messages: PRO HW 1/240 and HW 1/303.

Page
29
Additive and call sign changes: Smith,
The Emperor’s Codes
, pp. 98–9.

Page
30
Winds message received: Shaw, ‘History of the Far East Combined Bureau’, 28.

Page
31
–
32
British surprise: Nave, ‘An Australian’s Unique Naval Career’, pp. 420–2; diary of Captain Malcolm D. Kennedy, 7 December 1941.

Page
33
FECB move to Colombo and capture of Hong Kong: Shaw, ‘History of the Far East Combined Bureau’, 30, 35–6; Peter Elphick,
Far Eastern File: The Intelligence War in the Far East 1930–1945
(Coronet, London, 1997), pp. 96–7.

Page
34
MacInnes on disruption caused by move from Singapore: John MacInnes, ‘History of Anderson’, chap. IX, Production (PRO HW 4/25), 119–21.

Page
35
Nave on Fabian security issues: Nave, ‘An Australian’s Unique Naval Career’, pp. 409–11, 429–32, 449–51; Sharon A. Maneki,
The Quiet Heroes of the Southwest Pacific Theater
(NSA, Fort Meade), pp. 63–6, 88–91.

Page
36
MacInnes on advantages from Japanese failure to replace JN-25B book: MacInnes, ‘History of Anderson’, chap. IX, Production, 138–9.

Page
37
Codebreakers predict attack on Colombo: Hugh Denham, ‘Bedford-Bletchley-Kilindini-Colombo’, in F. H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp (eds),
Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park
(OUP, Oxford, 1993), pp. 274–5; MacInnes, ‘History of Anderson’, chap. IX, Production, 131.

Page
38
MacInnes on further disruption caused by move to Kilindini: ibid., 119.

Page
39
Midway: For a fuller description of the role of Sigint in the Battle of Midway, see Smith,
The Emperor’s Codes
, pp. 134–41.

Page
40
Problems caused by lack of co-operation from Fabian unit: Benson,
A History of US Communications Intelligence during World War II
, pp. 87–8; Maneki,
The Quiet Heroes of the Southwest Pacific Theater
, pp. 88–91.

Page
41
Senior officer on US view of co-operation: Elphick,
Far Eastern File
, p. 399.

Page
42
Possibility of British breaking with US: Birch to Hastings, 2 July 1944 (PRO HW 14/142).

Page
43
Breaking of JN-40 and other codes/ciphers by Kilindini: MacInnes, ‘History of Anderson’, chap. IX, Production, 138–9.

Page
44
Tiltman on Japanese military attaché code: Tiltman, ‘Some Reminiscences’, 10–11.

Page
45
Setting up of Japanese military section under direction of Tiltman: Nigel de Grey, ‘History of Air Sigint’, chap. IX, The Japanese War (PRO HW 3/102), 517–20; ‘History of Military Intelligence Section at Bletchley Park’ (PRO HW 3/156), 25–6.

Page
46
Tiltman sets up Japanese courses: Tiltman, ‘Some Reminiscences’, 9–10.

Page
47
Locations of various British outposts: Smith,
The Emperor’s Codes
, pp. 231–2.

Page
48
Breaking of Water Transport Code: author’s various correspondence with Joe Richard, January–February 2000; Alan Stripp,
Codebreaker in the Far
East
(Frank Cass, London, 1989), p. 71; Hugh Skillen,
Spies of the Airwaves
(Hugh Skillen, London, 1987), p. 517; Maclnnes, ‘History of Anderson’, chap. IX, Production, 139.

Page
49
Yamamoto shoot-down: John Prados,
Combined Fleet Decoded
(Random House, New York, 1995), pp. 459–63; Maneki,
The Quiet Heroes of the Southwest Pacific Theater
, p. 90.

Page
50
Bletchley success against Army Air code: Edward J. Drea, ‘Were The Japanese Army Codes Secure?’,
Cryptologia,
19 (1995), 122; interview with Maurice Wiles, 22 December 1999; Minutes of Conference on Japanese Military Ciphers held at Bletchley Park, 7 May 1943–17 May 1943 (PRO WO 208/5074).

Page
51
Conference on army codes: De Grey, ‘History of Air Sigint’, chap. IX, ‘The Japanese War’, 517–20; Minutes of Conference on Japanese Military Ciphers held at Bletchley Park, 7 May 1943–17 May 1943.

Page
52
Expansion of Japanese sections: Smith,
The Emperor’s Codes
, pp. 186–7.

Page
53
Move to Colombo and Redman softens attitude to co-operation: R. T. Barrett, ‘HMS Anderson and Special Intelligence in the Far East’ (PRO HW 4/24), 8; Benson,
A History of US Communications Intelligence during World War II
, p. 119.

Page
54
Saunders on FRUMEL: Cdr. Malcolm Saunders, ‘Report on Visit to US and Other Signals Intelligence Centres’, 28 December 1943 (PRO HW 223/496), 3.

Page
55
Hinsley: Birch to Washington, 28/5/44 (PRO HW 14/142); Robert Louis Benson,
A History of US Communications Intelligence during World War II
(NSA, Fort Meade), pp. 120–1.

Page
56
Alexander role in breaking of Coral: Smith,
The Emperor’s Codes
, pp. 218–20.

Page
57
codebooks found at Sio: Central Bureau Technical Records. Part A – Organization, 6; ‘History of Military Intelligence Section at Bletchley Park’ (PRO HW 3/156), 42.

Page
58
Melinsky quotes: Hugh Melinsky,
A Code-breaker’s Tale
(Lark’s Press, Denham, 1998), pp. 19–67.

Page
59
BULBUL break: Leonard ‘Joe’ Hooper to Arlington Hall, 14 September 1944 (PRO HW 14/142).

Page
60
Kerry quote: interview with Sir Michael Kerry, 15 February 2000.