The Campaigns of Alexander (Classics) (17 page)

Thence he proceeded north and east, keeping the Euphrates and the Armenian mountains on his left, through Mesopotamia; for once across the river he preferred not to follow the direct route to Babylon, as by this other route supplies of all sorts, including fodder for the horses, would be more readily available; other needs for man and beast could be supplied by the country through which they passed, and, furthermore, the heat would be less intense.

During the march some prisoners were taken – men from Darius’ army who had gone off on reconnaissance. They reported that Darius had taken up a position on the Tigris and intended to resist any attempt by Alexander to cross it. The force under his command greatly exceeded in numbers what he had had at the battle of Issus. Alexander’s reply to this news was to push on for the Tigris at all speed. However, upon reaching it he found neither Darius nor the guard he had left there; so he crossed without opposition – except from the current, which was
swift and made the operation a difficult one. Once over the river, he gave his men a rest.

While the troops were resting, there was an almost total eclipse of the moon, and Alexander offered sacrifice to Moon, Sun, and Earth, the three deities supposed to be concerned in this phenomenon. The opinion of Aristander, the seer, was that the moon’s failure was propitious for Alexander and the Macedonians, and that the coming battle would be fought before the month was out; he concluded, moreover, that the sacrifices portended victory.
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Alexander now continued his advance through Aturia, keeping the Tigris on his right and the mountains of Gordyene on his left. Four days after the crossing of the river a report came in from his scouts that enemy cavalry had been sighted in open ground, but their numbers could not be accurately estimated; Alexander accordingly, before advancing further, made the necessary dispositions for an engagement, and immediately afterwards more scouts rode in; these had had a better view of the enemy force, and declared their belief that it was not above 1,000 strong, whereupon Alexander rode for it at the gallop with the Royal squadron, one squadron of Companions, and the Paeonian rangers. The main body of the army was ordered to follow at its own pace. The sight of Alexander’s rapid approach was too much for the Persian cavalry, who incontinently fled, with Alexander in hot pursuit; most of them got away, but a few, whose horses could not stand the pace, were killed, and a few others were taken alive, horses and all. From these prisoners they learned that Darius was not far off, with a powerful force.

Darius’ army had been reinforced by the Sogdians, the Bactrians, and the Indian tribes on the Bactrian border –
all under the command of Bessus, satrap of Bactria; their lead had been followed by certain contingents of the Sacae (a branch of the Asiatic Scythians) who, though they owed no allegiance to Bessus, were in military alliance with Persia. These troops were mounted archers, and were commanded by Mauaces. The Arachotians and the Indian hillmen were commanded by Barsaentes, satrap of Arachotia; the Arians by their satrap, Satibarzanes; the Parthians, Hyrcanians, and Tapurians, all mounted troops, by Phrataphernes; the Medes, to whom were attached the Cadusians, Albanians, and Sacesinians, by Atropates; all contingents from the neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf by Ocondobates, Ariobarzanes, and Orxines; the Uxians and Susiani by Oxathres, son of Abulites; the Babylonians, to whom were attached the Sitacenians and Carians, by Bupares (these Carians had previously been resettled after a mass transference of population); the Armenians by Orontes and Mithraustes; the Cappadocians by Ariaces; the lowland and Mesopotamian Syrians by Mazaeus. Darius’ total force was estimated at 40,000 cavalry, 1,000,000 infantry, 200 scythe-chariots, and a few elephants – the Indian troops from the hither side of the Indus had about fifteen of them.
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This was the army which had taken up a position under Darius at Gaugamela, near the river Bumodus,
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about seventy-five miles from Arbela. The country where it lay was level and open, all places where a broken surface
might obstruct the movement of cavalry having been worked on some time previously by the Persian troops, so that all of it was now good going for both chariots and cavalry. The reason for this precaution was the fact that it had been urged upon Darius that much of his trouble at the battle of Issus had been due to lack of space to manoeuvre in – an explanation which Darius was very ready to accept.

On receiving this information from the Persian prisoners, Alexander stayed where he was for four days, to rest his men after their march. He fortified his camp with a ditch and palisade, as he proposed to leave the pack-animals there together with all troops unfit for service, while he himself led to battle the remainder burdened with nothing but their weapons. The order to fall in was given, and at night, about the second watch, the advance began – so timed as to engage the enemy at dawn. The report that Alexander was on the move soon reached Darius, and he, too, ordered his men to battle stations. Meanwhile Alexander was drawing nearer, his troops ready to engage – but the opposing armies were still seven miles apart and had not yet seen each other, as each was screened by a ridge of high ground.

Past the crest of the ridge, just as he was beginning the descent, Alexander had his first sight of the enemy, about four miles away. He gave the order to halt, and sent for his officers – his personal staff, generals, squadron commanders, and officers of the allied and mercenary contingents – to consult upon the plan of action. The alternatives were either to advance at once with the main corps of infantry, as the majority urged him to do, or to accept the advice of Parmenio and stay where they were long enough to enable a careful reconnaissance of the ground to be made; for there might well be reasons for caution –
hidden obstructions, concealed trenches or stakes – and, in addition to that, it would be wise to get a more accurate knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions. Parmenio’s proposal appeared the better of the two; so for the moment there was no further forward move, the troops all remaining in the order in which they were to engage.

Alexander meanwhile carried out a wide reconnaissance with his light infantry and the Companion cavalry, minutely examining the whole terrain where the battle would be fought; he then returned and called a second meeting of his officers. There was no need, he said, for any words from him to encourage them to do their duty; there was inspiration enough in the courage they had themselves shown in previous battles, and in the many deeds of heroism they had already performed. All he asked was that every officer of whatever rank, whether he commanded a company, a squadron, a brigade, or an infantry battalion, should urge to their utmost efforts the men entrusted to his command; for they were about to fight, not, as before, for Syria or Phoenicia or Egypt, but this time the issue at stake was the sovereignty of the whole Asian continent. What need, then, was there for many words to rouse his officers to valour, when that valour was already in their own breasts? Let him but remind them each for himself to preserve discipline in the hour of danger – to advance, when called upon to do so, in utter silence; to watch the time for a hearty cheer, and, when the moment came, to roar out their battle-cry and put the fear of God into the enemy’s hearts. All must obey orders promptly and pass them on without hesitation to their men; and, finally, every one of them must remember that upon the conduct of each depended the fate of all: if each man attended to his duty, success was assured; if one man neglected it, the whole army would be in peril.

With some such brief words of exhortation Alexander addressed his officers, and in reply they begged him to have every confidence in them. Orders were then given for the troops to rest and eat.

Some authorities state that Parmenio went to Alexander’s tent and advised a night attack, because the enemy would not be expecting it, and it would naturally cause alarm and confusion. Alexander and Parmenio were not alone in the tent; others were listening, and that, perhaps, was one reason for Alexander’s reply: ‘I will not,’ he said, ‘demean myself by stealing victory like a thief. Alexander must defeat his enemies openly and honestly.’ However, these lofty words probably indicated confidence in danger rather than vanity, and in my own own opinion they were based upon perfectly sound sense: night-fighting is a tricky business; unexpected things happen to both sides – to those who have carefully planned the attack as much as to those who are taken off their guard – and often enough the better men get the worst of it, while victory, contrary to everybody’s expectation, goes to the weaker side.
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More often than not Alexander took risks in his battles; but on this occasion he felt the chances of a night attack to be too unpredictable; moreover, the mere fact that it was delivered stealthily and under cover of darkness would save Darius, were he again defeated, the necessity of admitting inferiority, either in himself or in his men; while if they themselves suffered an unexpected reverse, they would be a defeated army in an unfamiliar
country among enemies thoroughly at home and surrounded by friends – and of those enemies not a few would be the prisoners of war, who might well attack them at night even after an indecisive victory, not to mention a defeat.

These arguments were sound enough, and I therefore commend Alexander’s decision, and approve no less his resounding claim to act openly.

During the night Darius’ army kept the same dispositions as on the previous day, the reason for maintaining battle stations being their fear of a night attack, added to the fact that their position had no regular defence works. One thing, at this critical moment, told against the Persians, more than anything else: their protracted stand under arms, and the consequent fear, natural enough when lives are at stake, but on this occasion rendered less bearable by the fact that it did not come, as it were, in a flash from the moment’s crisis, but had been brooded on hour after hour until their spirit was sapped.

We are informed by Aristobulus that Darius’ written orders for the disposition of his troops came into Greek hands after the battle; we know, consequently, what his order of battle was.
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On his left was the Bactrian cavalry supported by the Daae and Arachotians; in touch with them were mixed Persian cavalry and infantry, followed by Susian, and then by Cadusian contingents. These units composed the left wing of the army as far as the centre. On the right were the contingents from Lowland Syria and Mesopotamia, and the Medes; then, in touch with these, were the Parthians and the Sacae; then the Tapurian and Hyrcanian contingents; lastly, next to the centre, the Albanians and Sacesinians. In the centre, with Darius himself
and his kinsmen, were the royal Persian bodyguard with the golden apples on their spear-butts, the Indians, the so-called ‘stateless’ Carians,
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and the Mardian archers. Uxians, Babylonians, troops from the Persian Gulf, and Sitacenians were drawn up in depth behind them. In advance of the left wing, facing Alexander’s right, were the Scythian cavalry, about 1,000 Bactrians and 100 scythechariots – the elephants and fifty war-chariots were posted in close support of the Royal Squadron of the King’s cavalry. In advance of the Persian right were fifty scythechariots and the Armenian and Cappadocian cavalry; the Greek mercenaries – the only troops likely to be a match for the Macedonian infantry – were drawn up facing them in two sections, one on each side of Darius and his Persian guard.

On the right wing of Alexander’s army was the Companion cavalry, led by the Royal Squadron under the command of Cleitus, son of Dropidas; in touch with them, and working towards the centre, were the squadrons under the following officers and in the following order: Glaucias, Ariston, Sopolis son of Hermodorus, Heracleides son of Antiochus, Demetrius son of Althaemenes, and Meleager; finally there was the squadron commanded by Hegelochus son of Hippostratus. Parmenio’s son Philotas was general officer in command of the Companions. Of the infantry, the shock troops of the Guards were posted in closest touch with the cavalry, and were supported on their own left by the other Guards units under the command of Nicanor, son of Parmenio; next to them was the battalion of Coenus son of Polemocrates, followed (working towards the left) by the units commanded respectively by Perdiccas son of Orontes, Meleager son of Neoptolemus, Polysperchon son of
Simmias, and Amyntas son of Andromenes – the last being commanded by Simmias, as Amyntas had been sent to Macedonia to recruit.

The left of the Macedonian infantry line consisted of the battalion of Craterus son of Alexander – who commanded all the infantry in that sector; in touch with him were the allied cavalry units under Erigyius son of Larichus, supported by the Thessalian cavalry commanded by Philippus son of Menelaus. The Thessalian cavalry extended to the left wing of the army, the whole of which was under the general command of Parmenio son of Philotas. Close about this officer were grouped the mounted troops of Pharsalus, the finest and most numerous unit of the Thessalian cavalry.

Such was the disposition of Alexander’s front line, in addition to which he posted reserve formations in order to have a solid core of infantry to meet a possible attack from the rear; the officers of the reserve had orders, in the event of an encircling movement by the enemy, to face about and so meet the threatened attack. One half of the Agrianes, commanded by Attalus and in touch with the Royal Squadron on the right wing, were, together with the Macedonian archers under Brison, thrown forward at an oblique angle, in case it should suddenly prove necessary to extend or close up the front line of infantry, and in support of the archers was the so-called ‘Old Guard’ of mercenaries under Cleander. In advance of the Agrianes and archers were the advanced scouts and the Paeonians, commanded by Aretes and Ariston; the mercenary cavalry commanded by Menidas were posted right in the van. The position in advance of the Royal Squadron and other units of the Companions was occupied by the other half of the Agriane contingent and of the archers, supported by Balacrus’ spearmen who stood facing the Persian
scythe-chariots. Menidas had orders to wheel and attack the enemy in the flank, should they attempt an outflanking movement.