The Condor Years (47 page)

61
  
Democracy pro and con:
ARA-CIA weekly meeting, November 23, 1973 (Chile Project). Other documents make clear that some funds were allocated to the Christian Democrats, as Shlaudeman recommended. The party passed into opposition to
Pinochet early in 1974, and soon its leaders were being arrested and its offices raided by Pinochet’s security forces.

64
  
Decline in deaths:
Contemporaneous mimeographed reports of the
Vicaría de la Solidaridad
, the successor organization to the Peace Committee, and lists of deaths and disappearances provided by the office of Chile’s
Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación
, as updated in 1996.

64
  
Contreras biographical workup:
Department of Defense Biographic Report, May 15, 1974 (Chile Project). The report says Contreras’s English was fluent enough in 1968 to act as a translator and interpreter. Contreras spent a year in the United States, September 1966 to September 1967, while attending the U.S. Army engineering course, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. There is no record of Contreras ever receiving training at the U.S. Army School of the Americas, a U.S. military school dedicated to training Latin American officers, many of whom subsequently have been accused of human rights abuses.

65
  
Defense attaché reports:
DIA 6 817 0041 74, February 5, 1974 (has reference to KGB); 6 817 0044 74, February 8, 1974 (reference to “Pinochet, God and DINA”); and 6 817 0094 75, April 15, 1974 (interservice rivalries and reference to Gestapo) (Chile Project).

66
  
Intelligence officer’s description:
Interviews in 1979 with Robert Scherrer, FBI legal attaché covering the Southern Cone.

66
  
Brazil relationship:
CIA document dated September 6, 1974 (Chile Project).

67
  
Peru violence:
Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded in an August 2003 report that approximately 69,000 people were killed in political violence after 1980; more than half were victims of the guerrilla group Shining Path (
Sendero Luminoso
), a Maoist group. Peru is the only country in Latin American in which the military killed fewer people than did the guerilla groups they were pursuing.

68
  
Concept of national intelligence:
Interviews with several U.S. military intelligence officers familiar with South American intelligence operations.

69
  
Interview with Contreras for this book:
June 2002.

69
  
DINA training needs:
DIA 6817 0041 74, February 5, 1974 (Chile Project).

70
  
Senate report:
“Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Activities of Certain Foreign Intelligence Agencies in the United States.” January 18, 1979 (draft date). Copy in author’s possession was provided by investigative reporter Dale Van Atta, who wrote a series of reports on it in the Jack Anderson column. See
Washington Post
, August 2, 1979, “Six South American Regimes Run Hit-Man Rings in Foreign Lands.”

70
  
Espinoza corroboration:
Deposition in Chile to Judge Juan Guzmán, ca 2000.

70
  
Former DINA agents:
Both asked to remain anonymous. One was a noncommissioned army officer, the other was a civilian. I was able to confirm their DINA affiliation independently. See also González,
La Conjura
, 431–33, for an account of the creation of DINA.

70
  
Venezuelan intelligence agency:
Interview April 22, 2002, with Orlando García, General Commissioner of DISIP (
Dirección de Servicios de Inteligencia y Prevención).
Garcia said that when Carlos Andrés Pérez became president in 1974, he ordered the CIA official removed. The CIA also provided anti-subversive training in Paraguay, according to a Paraguay Archive document, a letter November 22, 1977, from Police Inspector General Antonio Cardozo to Commissioner Alfonso Lovera Cañete. A “CIA expert” was giving a lecture on “identification of false documentation in use by subversive groups,” the letter says.

71
  
CIA destroyed records:
CIA, “Name Trace Request, Juan Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda, Pedro Espinosa [sic] Bravo, et al,” memorandum May 21, 1991 (Chile Project). Payment to Contreras is Hinchey Report, 17.

71
  
Dealing with disgruntled officers:
CIA memorandum from the office of the Director of Central Intelligence, March 22, 1974, “Aspects of the Situation in Chile.” (Chile Project). The memo includes a paragraph justifying and minimizing the human rights violations of the regime: “The government has been the target of numerous charges related to alleged violations of human rights. Many of the accusations are merely politically inspired falsehoods or gross exaggerations—the junta has not been bloodthirsty. The government has given first priority to repressing perceived security threats, however, and respect for human rights has been a secondary consideration.”

71
  
Coordinated action:
CIA June 23, 1976 (Chile Project); interview with embassy security officer with liaison to police and military.

72
  
Prats’s book:
Carlos Prats González,
Memorias: testimonio de un soldado
(Pehuen, Santiago, 1985). Other details from 1979 interview with Prats’s daughter, Maria Angelica Prats.

73
  
Townley CIA overtures:
The CIA had an officer meet with Townley, conducted a name check on him, and approved him on December 23, 1970, for “operational support.” CIA memorandum, January 4, 1971 (Chile Project). For a detailed account of Townley’s contacts with the CIA, see
Assassination on Embassy Row
, 100–104. At one point, the CIA attempted to contact Townley, but was unsuccessful.

74
  
First plot to kill Prats:
The evidence includes dozens of depositions whose transcripts are part of the Servini de Cubria investigation. A central document summarizing much of the relevant evidence is the June 26, 2001, indictment, or
Procesamiento
, naming Contreras, Espinoza, General Raúl Iturriaga Neumann, Jorge Iturriaga Neumann (Raúl’s brother, a private businessman), and Brigadier José Octavio Zara Holger, Raúl Iturriaga’s deputy. “Evidence Collected” is enumerated 1 through 82, and “Elements of judgment” 1–33. Evidence concerning the first plot is found in sections 34 (payment of $20,000), 75 (Arancibia’s role and background), 76 (DINA sources give FBI information on Arancibia’s and Townley’s role); and “Elements of proof,” 28.

74
  
Argentine plotters:
SIDE agents became notorious in 1976 for their work as kidnappers
and torturers in the Condor interrogation center known as Automotores Orletti. The group’s leader was Anibal Gordon (see below). A typewritten intelligence report entered into evidence says an Argentine, Luis Alfredo “Freddy” Zarattini, was the go-between for Townley, Arancibia, and the terrorists they hired in Argentina. “Freddy was the one who put Arancibia in touch with Anibal Gordon through one of the members of the group . . . This group would have been the one that kept the money the Chileans paid to carry out the Prats assassination, but they didn’t do it and kept the money, which explains Townley’s anger.” Document in author’s possession.

74
  
Stasi intelligence on Prats:
Markus Wolf, with Anne McElvoy,
Man Without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism’s Greatest Spymaster
, (New York: Times Books, 1997), 309–14. Wolf wrote that the system used hiding places constructed “in much the same way that escapees from the GDR were secreted in cars to get past the [Berlin] Wall.”

78
  
Prats passports:
Prats and his wife already had official diplomatic passports, but as a matter of military honor Prats refused to use them improperly on purely personal travel. See Servini,
Procesamiento
, op. cit., Evidence no. 68, testimony of Renato Osório. Another consular official, Eugenio Mujica (Evidence no. 48), testified that he traveled to Chile in a personal attempt to get the passports. He testified he was told just three days before the murders that there was an order, from Undersecretary Claudio Collados Nuñez, saying “those passports are not going to be issued.” In March 2003, the Prats murder investigation was finally opened in Chile, and the message from Collados to the Consulate was discovered in ministry files.

78
  
Osorio death:
Robert Service memorandum, “Letelier Case—The Death of Guillermo Osorio,” March 17, 1978 (Chile Project).

78
  
Investigator’s conclusion about Townley:
Interview with an Argentine official directly involved in the Servini de Cubria investigation.

78
  
Argentine approval:
Testimony of Vincenzo Vinciguerra to Judge Salvi, March 1993, 12.

79
  
Eight Chileans:
Arancibia Collection, December 6, 1974, IB/392. Documents confiscated from Arancibia Clavel will be identified by date and document number assigned by the Federal Court of Buenos Aires. Documents are arranged in folders (
carpetas
), IA, IB, II, III, IV and V, each containing approximately 300 pages of documents in reverse chronological order.

80
  
Chief of Clandestine Information:
Arancibia Collection, Luis Gutiérrez, ca November 1974, II/220.

80
  
Anti-Communist information community:
Arancibia Collection, Memorandum no. 2, October 10, 1974, IB/406–407.

80
  
Intelligence on Prats murder:
“Blessings of Pinochet”: DIA 6 804 0461 74, September 30, 1974 (Chile Project). CIA sources on Prats: CIA DO (Directorate of Operations), October 25, 1974 (Chile Project).

80
  
Precursor to Condor:
Hinchey Report, 6.

82
  
Tucumán campaign:
Lewis, 100, 105ff., for control of territory; Maria Seoane,
Todo o Nada: la historia secreta y la historia publica del jefe guerrillero Mario Roberto Santucho
(Buenos Aires: Planeta, 1991), 264, for number of fighters. It is a matter of dispute whether ERP actually controlled territory in Tucumán. See Andersen, op. cit. 129 ff, who says the ERP greatly overestimated their own success, quoting one veteran as saying, “We had already begun talking about liberated zones when we had just begun to fight.”

83
  
MIR fighters in Tucumán:
Pascal interview. The MIR casualties included a Chilean known as Sargento Dago, and a Swede, Svante Grande.

83
  
Liberated zones: El Combatiente
, July 30, 1975, cited in Seoane, 269.

84
  
Tupamaro plans:
Interview with Luis Alemany, Luis Nieto, and Amir Kimal.

84
  
Penetration of Tupamaros:
Excerpts of the transcription were obtained by Alfonso Lessa, a Uruguayan writer. He describes the events in his book,
Los tupamaros y el fracaso de la vía armada en el Uruguay del siglo XX
(Fin de Siglo, Montevideo 2002).

84
  
MIR postponement:
Mattini interview. He said Fidel Castro also had urged MIR to move more quickly to military action. Cf. Mattini, 378.

84
  
Bolivia intelligence exchanges:
La Paz 3657, May 11, 1976 (Dinges FOIA release).

85
  
Paraguay plot:
Interviews with participants Gladys Meilinger de Sannemann and Dimas Piris Da Motta, and Luis Alberto Wagner. CIA report December 4, 1974, Staff Notes, Latin American Trends (Dinges FOIA release).

85
  
Campaign stalled:
Seoane, op. cit., 265. The most carefully documented account of the Tucumán campaign is in Andersen, 128–134, and notes citing internal army documents on guerrilla strength and army operations.

86
  
Revolutionary grant making:
Mattini interviews, and cf. Seoane, 380. Mattini says much of the money was wasted: “The Political Bureau, particularly Santucho, acted with magnanimity that sometimes bordered on naivete and in some cases efforts and resources were expended on people who were not very responsible.” M-19 interest in JCR: Francisco Martorell,
Operación Condor: El vuelo de la muerte
(Santiago: LOM, 1999), 77. Martorell does not give a source for his information, although he names Alvaro Fayad as the M-19 representative.

87
  
JCR Executive Commission:
It was comprised of Enríquez for MIR, Roberto Santucho for ERP, former Bolivian army major Rubén Sánchez for Bolivia, and a shifting cast of the deeply divided Tupamaro leaders, including William Whitelaw.

87
  
Trip objectives:
Mattini e-mail interview.

87
  
Relocation of JCR:
Interviews with Martín Hernández, a former MIR militant, who mentioned Peru, and Kimal Amir, a Tupamaro leader, who said the JCR was considering relocation to Caracas.

89
  
U.S. account of arrest:
Buenos Aires 7936, October 21, 1977. See also Asunción 4318, October 20, 1977, and State 256523, October 26, 1977 (Dinges FOIA releases).

89
  
Carrying cash:
Paraguayan human rights activist Francisco de Vargas helped arrange Santucho’s release in 1979 and accompanied him on his flight to freedom
in Switzerland. Luis Mattini, in an e-mail interview, said the money was probably about $5,000 and was intended to be given to the Peruvian organization they planned to meet.

89
  
Travel documents and Peru mission:
Fuentes arrest record: Document 16:1117–18 (Paraguay Archive).