The Condor Years (51 page)

157
  
Tell Popper: New York Times
, September 27, 1974.

158
  
Pragmatic policy:
Kissinger quoted in Lars Schoultz,
Human Rights and U.S. Policy toward Latin America
(Princeton University Press, 1981), 110.

159
  
Saturday briefings:
State Department officers called in for those briefings included Chile desk officer Robert Driscoll. Interviews with Driscoll and Rudy Fimbres, who also worked at ARA.

159
  
Kissinger-Pinochet meeting:
The transcript was first declassified in response to a request from author Lucy Komisar. Memorandum of Conversation, June 8, 1976 (Chile Collection). Also present at the meeting was William D. Rogers, who was then assistant secretary for American Republic Affairs. Pinochet was accompanied by Foreign Minister Patricio Carvajal, ambassador to the U.S., Manuel Trucco, and Ricardo Claro, a prominent Chilean businessman who pops up regularly in the role of mediator between the United States and Chile on thorny issues. He played a similar role in 1978 when the United States was pressuring Chile to turn over DINA agent Michael Townley in connection with the Letelier assassination.

162
  
Kissinger speech: Department of State Bulletin
75 (July 5, 1976), 4.

162
  
Rosy assessment:
CIA Latin Trends, June 28, 1976 (Chile Project).

163
  
Round-ups of Communists:
Amnesty International denounced the arrests of 185 people in Antofagasta on May 17–18. The author wrote in the
Washington Post
, August 7, 1976, “A U.S. Dilemma: Chileans Vanish,” that 130 people had been kidnapped by DINA in April and May—a figure that did not include the Antofagasta arrests.

163
  
Plot to kill Pascal Allende:
Interviews with Rolando Otero, Orlando García, and President Carlos Andrés Pérez.

163
  
Otero and DISIP:
Otero provided a boatload of intelligence to DISIP about Chilean operations, including the claim that DINA intended to set up an operation based in Florida using Cuban exiles to conduct operations against Chilean exiles living in the United States. This U.S. installation may have been the “Condor base” the CIA learned the Condor alliance was trying to establish, according to the Senate Report on Activities of Certain Foreign Intelligence Agencies. Otero returned to Chile, which detected his double dealing, detained, and tortured him. FBI legal attaché Robert Scherrer, in Argentina, learned that Otero was being held in Chile, and in personal negotiations with Contreras, obtained his expulsion from Chile into FBI custody. He was imprisoned in the United States and
in 1978 provided information leading to the arrest of Letelier assassin Michael Townley.

163
  
Cuban-Italian role in Condor:
The evidence is circumstantial and basically contained in the Arancibia documents. Delle Chiaie was in Chile at the time of the foundation of Operation Condor, and was also there for the second meeting in June. The Italians and Cubans worked closely with Michael Townley and with Enrique Arancibia, and conducted missions to Argentina. DINA sent a German-Chilean, Karl Werner (an alias) to Peru to spy on the military buildup there, a mission that is well documented in the Arancibia papers.

164
  
Santiago Condor meeting:
Interview with Luz Arce. Arancibia, in a report June 3, 1976 (IA/111), writes, “I had a meeting with Osvaldo Rawson who informed that the SIE had approved of a direct line of communication with our office, just as he had offered Mamo [Contreras] in the past. They needed to know what type of telex machine the office would be using. Rawson and two service technicians would go to Chile after the 10, when the Conference of Ambassadors of the Organization of American States ends.”

165
  
Hill démarche:
Buenos Aires 3462, May 25, 1976 (Argentina Project). “I wish authorization to say to him [the Argentine foreign minister] the following: Quote, The US very much sympathizes with the moderate policies announced by President Videla and has hoped to be helpful to Argentina in her process of national reconstruction and reconciliation. We fully understand that Argentina is involved in an all-out struggle against subversion. There are, however, some norms which can never be put aside by governments dedicated to a rule of law. Respect for human right[s] is one of them. The continued activities of Triple A-type death squads which have recently murdered Michelini, Gutiérrez Ruiz and dozen[s] of others and have kidnapped a member of the Fulbright commission, Miss Elida Messina, are damaging the GOA’s generally good image abroad. These groups seem to operate with impunity and are generally believed to be connected with the Argentine security forces. Whether they are or not, their continued operation can only be harmful to the GOA itself and cause consternation among Argentina’s friends abroad, end-Quote.” State 129048, same date, conveys State’s authorization for the démarche (Argentina Project).

166
  
Intelligence briefing:
Briefing Memorandum, to the Secretary, from INR-Harold H. Saunders, “Murders in Argentina—No Intergovernmental Conspiracy,” June 4, 1976 (Argentina Project). Kissinger instruction to ambassadors: State 137156, Immediate Action, Possible International Implications of Violent Deaths of Political Figures Abroad,” June 4, 1976 (Argentina Project).

166
  
Response to query on conspiracy:
Santiago 5434, June 7, 1976, and Buenos Aires 3766, June 7, 1976 (Chile Project and Dinges FOIA Release). State 141275, June 10, 1976, is a report summarizing responses from the various embassies and is addressed to the U.S. delegation, including Secretary Kissinger, gathered in Santiago for the OAS meeting (Argentina Project).

167
  
CIA intelligence on Condor meeting:
CIA, National Intelligence Daily, June 23, 1976 (Chile Project). This report links the new organization to the murders of Michelini and Torres. CIA, Weekly Summary, July 2, 1976 (Chile Project), is the first mention of Condor in the U.S. documents. INR report no. 526, July 19, 1976, quoted without redaction in State 178852, July 20, 1976 (Dinges FOIA Release). A copy of this document released in the Argentine collection in August 2002, after the Bush administration announced a more restrictive FOIA policy, eighteen months after I received it, blacks out all references to the Santiago Condor meeting and joint operations in Paris. The unredacted version also contains a reference to a joint Brazilian-Argentine operation: “A reliable Brazilian source has described a Brazil-Argentina agreement under which the two countries hunt and eliminate terrorists attempting to flee Argentina for Brazil.”

168
  
Shlaudeman role in Chile:
While Kissinger was in Chile in June, Shlaudeman was called before a Senate confirmation hearing and grilled about his knowledge of the U.S. government’s role in the coup plots. In secret testimony, Shlaudeman admitted he had made misleading statements to cover up U.S. participation in the coup plots. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ca June 1976, undated, unpublished transcript, “Statement of the Honorable Harry W. Shlaudeman, Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.”

168
  
Trends report:
State 171456, July 10, 1976, “Trends in the Southern Cone,” addressed to all embassies in Latin America “for ambassador from Shlaudeman” (Dinges FOIA Release).

169
  
Argentine cable:
Buenos Aires 4844, July 23, 1976, “South America Southern Cone Security Practices” (Chile Project).

169
  
Uruguayan embassy cable:
Montevideo 2702, July 20, 1976 (Dinges FOIA Release).

170
  
CIA-State meeting:
ARA-CIA Weekly Meeting—30 July 1976, “Operation Condor” (Chile Project).

171
  
Other reports summarizing Condor intelligence:
There are four reports in all with Condor assassination information between the July 30 briefing and the Letelier assassination. CIA, Latin American Trends Staff Notes, August 11, 1976, “Southern Cone Counterterrorism Plans”, CIA, August 12, 1976, “Decision by Condor Countries to Suspend Operations in Europe,” INR Afternoon Summary, August 13, 1976, “Latin America: Suspension of ‘Condor’ Plans,” and September 21, 1976, “Latin American Political and Economic Cooperation in Southern Cone” (Chile Project).

174
  
August 3 meeting:
The meeting is mentioned in the declassified memorandum of August 30, 1976, “ARA/CIA Weekly Meeting, 27 August 1976 (Chile Project). Habib, whose name is blacked out but was provided by an informed source, “is very concerned about making representations concerning Operation Condor (notes for meeting of August 3),” the memorandum says.

175
  
Pinochet personally authorized:
Contreras’s statement was in a 300-page statement to the Chilean Supreme Court December 23, 1997, 259–261, after his conviction for
the Letelier murder. Espinoza implicated Pinochet in a notarized declaration known as
Acta de Punta Arenas
, May 2, 1978, signed by Espinoza and notorized. The secret document was obtained by journalist Patricia Verdugo and provided to the author. Espinoza said a superior officer tried to force him, as a coverup, to accept sole responsibility for the “elimination” of Letelier, and that he, Espinoza, wanted to state instead that Contreras gave him the order “on assignment from the President of the Republic” (“por encargo del President de la Republica”). See John Dinges, “Affidavit Links Pinochet to Car Bomb Assassination,”
Miami Herald
, March 24, 2000.

Fernández Larios made statements implicating Pinochet after he arrived in the United States as a cooperating witness in the Letelier case in 1987, including an interview with the author February 9, 1987, that was broadcast on National Public Radio. Townley has made general statements in his many court testimonies to the effect that he understood that the orders originated with Pinochet, although he did not have firsthand knowledge.

176
  
Kissinger and Letelier:
Kissinger interview with Elizabeth Farnsworth of PBS’s
The News Hour with Jim Lehrer
, February 2001.

178
  
Contreras visit to Washington:
Walters confirmed the visit in Congressional testimony in 1981. See “U.S. Economic Sanctions Against Chile,” House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade and on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 10, 1981, 55–56. Information on the purchases are in Saul Landau and John Dinges, “The Chilean Connection,”
The Nation
, November 28, 1981. A dated weapons invoice signed by “Renato Sepulveda,” a Contreras pseudonym, places him in Washington July 8, 1976. Walters did not disclose the meetings in his earlier statements to the FBI as part of the Letelier investigation.

178
  
Townley’s knowledge about Condor:
CIA “Memorandum for the Record,” August 23, 1978, is the CIA’s record of a meeting with Letelier case prosecutor Eugene Propper, who was seeking CIA information on Operation Condor: “Mr. Propper explained that Townley is knowledgeable about Condor and has mentioned it in connection with the issuance of the Paraguayan passports.” The still-classified Senate Report on Activities of Certain Foreign Intelligence Agencies, op. cit., based on CIA documents and testimony, says the DINA officers in Paraguay “might have been operating under the umbrella” of Operation Condor.

179
  
Condor One telegram:
The text is transcribed in English as Exhibit 114, included in evidence sent to Chile in 1979 as part of the Extradition Packet. The FBI obtained a copy of the telegram from Guanes in 1978.

180
  
Landau to Shlaudeman:
Asunción 3233, August 5, 1976. Shlaudeman to Landau, same date: State 194941 (Chile Project). Paraguayan official Conrado Pappalardo also told Landau that the request for the Paraguayan cooperation came in a phone call from General Pinochet to General Stroessner, the Paraguayan president. U.S. investigators later received the Condor One telegram requesting cooperation and
concluded, after interviewing Pappalardo, that no such call was made. See Asunción 3276, August 6, 1976 (Chile Project).

180
  
Three CIA reports:
CIA, Latin American Staff Notes, Southern Cone Counterterrorism Plans, August 11, 1976; CIA, Directorate of Operations, “Decision by Condor Countries to Suspend Operations in Europe,” August 12, 1976; INR Afternoon Summary, “Suspension of Condor Plans” (Top secret/Exdis/Codeword), August 13, 1976 (Chile Project). The reports discuss Brazil’s reluctance to participate in Condor’s European operations, leading to a suspension of the operation until Brazil decided to limit its participation to activities in the Condor countries themselves. This detail is reported in INR Afternoon Summary several weeks later, September 24, 1976, “Operation Condor goes Forward” (Chile Project). ARA head Shlaudeman, however, knew this much earlier. In his August 3 report to Kissinger, he reports Brazil’s decision to limit its participation to cooperation “short of murder operations.” See above pp. 171–72 (Chapter 10).

181
  
Assassination plots:
“Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: Interim Report of the (Senate) Select Committee on Intelligence Activities,” November 1975.

182
  
Phone calls:
Shlaudeman oral history. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, interviewed by William E. Knight, May 24, 1993.

182
  
Condor démarche:
State 209192, “Operation Condor,” August 18, 1976. Two other versions, with identical wording but more extensive redactions, are dated August 23, 1976 (Chile Project).