The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things (138 page)

41
But in common with Nietzsche and Bergson: see
Ch. 15
, n. 85, and
Ch. 16
, §4, respectively.

42
He wants to effect a straightforward reversal of prioritization, in other words. This is not Derridean deconstruction. Derrida is someone who would be as interested in challenging the first component as he would the second.

43
Here the material in §2(d) is again relevant: see n. 40. Cf. also Wood (
2001
), p. 31.

Note: Deleuze goes as far as to say that the givenness of discrete entities and their features involves a kind of
illusion
(though not a kind of error: p. 126).

44
Cf.
A Thousand Plateaus
, p. 4. Cf. also Spinoza’s definition of an ‘individual thing’ in Spinoza (
2002c
), Bk II, Prop. 13, Def.

45
Both Plato and Aristotle also struggled with a range of related problems. Thus Plato was exercised by the question how the relation between a Platonic form and its instances bore on the relation between each such instance and its simulacra (e.g.
Timaeus
, 28bff.) And Aristotle was exercised by the question how being, genera, and species were related (e.g.
Metaphysics
, Bk Β,
Ch. 3
, 998b 20–27). Deleuze discusses each of these ancient concerns in connection with his own concerns about difference at, respectively, pp. 126–128 and pp. 30ff.

46
A comment in Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus
seems pertinent here, namely 2.0233. See also 5.5302, which is in effect a flat denial that qualitative identity entails numerical identity.

47
At one point Deleuze talks of repetition appearing as ‘difference without a concept’ (p. 13). This serves as an expression of his own anti-Leibnizian stance. In the same context he cites Kant’s example of exact mirror images, or what Kant calls ‘incongruous counterparts’, which both he and Kant think show a further way in which numerical difference can consist with qualitative identity (see Kant (
2002a
), §13: but note that Kant uses the example to support his view that space and time are
a priori
intuitions, a view to which Deleuze does not subscribe). Again some comments in Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus
seem pertinent (though they are also highly cryptic): 6.3611–6.36111.

48
See
Ch. 16
, n. 19.

49
For extended discussion, see Russell (
2009
), Pts III and IV.

50
The scholastics, notably Oresme, were much exercised by such differences: see Oresme (
1968
). Kant too paid special attention to them: see Kant (
1998
), A166–176/B207–218 (the section entitled ‘Anticipations of Perception’).

51
Not even speed? Not even speed. Let us not forget how much is presupposed in assigning a measure to time.

52
Cf. DeLanda (
2002
), pp. 69ff.

53
For very helpful discussions, see Williams (
2003
),
Ch. 7
, and Turetzky (
2005
). See also Duffy (
2006
), pp. 240–248, for how this further distances Deleuze from Hegel.

54
See Duffy (
2006
), Chs 4 and 5.

55
Cf. the discussion, at p. 28, of how something can ‘make a difference’ by ‘distinguishing itself’, even though ‘that from which it distinguishes itself does not distinguish itself from it’.

56
See Moore (2001a),
Ch. 4
, §§1 and 2.

57
See again the material cited in the previous note.

58
For Deleuze’s own reflections on the calculus, see pp. 170–182. See also Smith (
2005
), esp. §5, and Duffy (
2006
),
Ch. 2
.

59
See also
Logic of Sense
, p. 344, n. 5.

60
There is a very similar project, to which Deleuze is much indebted, in Simondon (
1964
) (see
Logic of Sense
, 15th Series, n. 3). Note: the fact that the subject too needs to be constituted is what makes the project empiricist (§2(d)). It also means that the field cannot itself have the form of a subject (
Logic of Sense
, pp. 98–99).

61
Cf.
What Is Philosophy?
, pp. 153–154. For helpful discussions of the material so far in this section, see Hardt (
1993
),
Ch. 4
; DeLanda (
2002
), passim, esp. Chs 1 and 3; Williams (
2003
), Chs 6 and 7; and Duffy (
2006
), pp. 227ff.

62
See Williams (
2008
),
Ch. 1
, for a helpful discussion of these ideas.

63
Deleuze himself considers Frege’s notion of sense in
What Is Philosophy?
, pp. 135ff.

64
See also 19th Series and
Difference and Repetition
, pp. 153ff.

65
It is instructive here to look at Wittgenstein (
1961
), 4.023 and 4.06ff.

66
Very pertinent in this context, especially given the broader context, is Wittgenstein (
1975
), §V.

67
There are very helpful and insightful discussions of Deleuze’s views about sense in relation to language in both May (
2005
),
Ch. 3
, esp. §§VIII–XI, and Williams (
2008
),
Ch. 2
, passim. Also helpful is Poxon and Stivale (
2005
).

68
This is a Nietzschean phrase: see e.g. Nietzsche (
1974
), §§270 and 335, and the motto to Nietzsche (
1967b
), p. 215. It derives from Pindar (
1980
), Pythan 2, l. 71.

69
I borrow the terminology of ‘triggering intensities’ from Williams (
2003
), p. 20.

70
Cf.
Logic of Sense
, p. 176.

71
See
Ch. 15
, n. 72.

72
There are two interesting echoes here: of John 3:1–8; and of Wittgenstein (
1961
), the 6.4s, esp. 6.41–6.43. In each case there is room for fascinating debate about how clear or how muffled the echo can be said to be.

73
Helpful reading on Deleuze’s ethics include: Hardt (
1993
),
Ch. 4
; Buchanan (
2000
),
Ch. 3
; and Williams (
2008
),
Ch. 4
.

74
See pp. 55–56 for a fuller account of this. At p. 262 he says that difference ‘can become thinkable only when tamed – in other words, when subject to the … iron collars of representation.’

75
For a sketch of an argument to this effect, see A.W. Moore (
1996
), pp. 157–158. See also
Difference and Repetition
, p. 121.

76
Descartes himself understood distinctness in such a way that it entailed clarity (
Ch. 1
, n. 13). In Descartes’ terms, then, Deleuze is challenging the very legitimacy of the notion of distinctness. – Question: even if what Deleuze says is by and large true of perception, is it true of the sort of perception for which Descartes reserved the label ‘intuition’ (
Ch. 1
, §4)? – Well, perhaps it is: consider, for example, the great pains taken in Whitehead and Russell (
1927
) to make our perception that 1 + 1 = 2 more distinct, nicely encapsulated in the comment at *54.43. Nevertheless, the application of Deleuze’s critique to Cartesian intuition, or to anything like Cartesian intuition, requires the support of further argument.

77
Cf. Descartes’ account of error (
Ch. 1
, §4).

78
Cf. p. xvi (where Deleuze refers to the ‘traditional’ image of thought, but it is the same thing). There is a fuller list, highlighting connections with the paradigms of common sense and good sense, on p. 167. See also pp. 262–272.

For discussion of these assumptions, and of the dogmatic image of thought more generally, see Williams (
2003
), pp. 120ff., and May (
2005
),
Ch. 3
, passim.

79
Ch. III
– which, on p. xvii of his preface to the English edition of the book, he describes as ‘the most necessary and the most concrete’ of all the chapters.

80
Cf. Deleuze’s comments on the calculus on p. 177.

81
Cf. pp. 161–162 and 197–198.

82
This is a comparison to which Deleuze himself is alive. He frequently relates problems to the Kantian ideas of reason in terms of which regulative principles are framed (e.g. pp. 168ff.).

See further, for the rest of the material in this paragraph, pp. 158ff. and 176–182; and
Logic of Sense
, pp. 121–123. See also Williams (
2008
), pp. 106–115.

83
For a classic discussion of a similar but far more interesting example, see Lakatos (
1976
). See further
Difference and Repetition
, pp. 158–164.

84
For a fuller account of problems, see
Difference and Repetition
,
Ch. IV
, passim. See also DeLanda (
2002
),
Ch. 4
, passim; Williams (
2003
), pp. 124–137, and (
2008
), pp. 7–13.

Note: Deleuze further and very interestingly relates his account of problems to a non-propositional account of learning, which he sees as a kind of assimilation of the problematical. See e.g. pp. 165 and 192, and for discussion, see Williams (
2003
), pp. 135–137, and May (
2005
),
Ch. 3
, §XII.

85
In ‘Philosophy’, p. 149, Deleuze is unafraid to put a physiological gloss on such an act of creation. He talks about the ‘twisting, folding, [and] fissuring’ of the brain’s matter and refers to ‘new connections, new pathways, new synapses.’

86
Cf.
Ch. 19
, §3(g). On the non-propositionality in Deleuze’s notion, see
What Is Philosophy?
, pp. 137–138.

87
This is not to suggest that what follows is not likewise true on the analytic notion.

88
See further
What Is Philosophy?
,
Ch. 1
and Pt Two, passim. For discussion of how concepts can be symptomatic of something deeper, see
Nietzsche
, pp. 72–73.

89
Here as hereafter I am prescinding from the fact that the passage that follows is co-authored by Guattari.

90
See below, §7(c), for a qualification even concerning ‘human’.

91
Cf. ‘Letter to Bensmaïa’, pp. 164–165, where there is also talk of new ways of feeling and new ways of perceiving. Cf. also
What Is Philosophy?
, p. 11, where, among other things, we find the following wonderful observation: ‘The more philosophy comes up against shameless and inane rivals and encounters them at its very core, the more it feels driven to the task of creating concepts that are aerolites rather than commercial products. It gets the giggles, which wipe away its tears.’

General references for Deleuze’s account of philosophy are ‘Philosophy’, passim, and
What Is Philosophy?
, passim. (Each of these, preeminently the latter, includes discussion of how philosophy both differs from and relates to both science and art. All three of philosophy, science, and art confront the infinitude of virtual chaos: philosophy wants to preserve it, but by establishing connections within it; science is prepared to relinquish it, in order to define various finite features of the actual; and art wants to restore it, through the creation of finite sensory aggregates (see esp.
What Is Philosophy?
, pp. 197–199, and cf. ‘Mediators’, p. 123).) For discussion, see Rajchman (
2000
), pp. 42–45; DeLanda (
2002
), pp. 215–223; and Duffy (
2006
), pp. 257ff.