The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things (23 page)

2
In this he, like Descartes, showed the influence of his scholastic heritage: see further below.

3
In calling this something close to a basic datum for Leibniz, I am prescinding from some attempts that he made early in his career to prove it (see Mercer (
2001
), p. 3, and the references given there), attempts which he later abandoned (see Bennett (
2003
), p. 176, and the references given there). For a fascinating discussion of the principle, in relation to Plato as well as to Leibniz, see Wiggins (
1996
).

4
Cf. ‘A Specimen’, p. 75; ‘Monadology’, §§31 and 32; and
Correspondence with Clarke
, ‘Fifth Paper’, ¶10.

5
Cf. ‘Discourse’, §35, and ‘Letter to De Volder’, dated January 1705, in II, 278.

6
Cf. Christia Mercer (
2001
),
Ch. 1
. On p. 471 of ibid., Mercer writes that ‘for Leibniz the road to truth was paved with the books of the great philosophers.’ Cf. in this connection ‘Letter to Remond’, dated 10 January 1714, in III.

7
See Mercer (
2001
),
Ch. 1
, §2.

8
For extensive discussion of Leibniz’ proofs of the existence of God, see Adams (
1994
), Chs 5–8.

9
Cf. Parfit (
2004
).

10
Leibniz’ vision was famously satirized by Voltaire in Voltaire (
1990
).

11
This is something that Nietzsche will later see with especial clarity: see Nietzsche (
1967a
), Essay II, §7, and Essay III, §28; and see
Ch. 15
, §6.

12
It is noteworthy that the only philosophical book that Leibniz published during his lifetime was called
Theodicy
.

13
It is not entirely uncontroversial that they include God: see Russell (
1992a
), p. 187. But Russell himself cites passages from Leibniz which imply that God is a monad. He suggests that these are ‘slips’. I disagree. Cf. ‘Monadology’, §§1 and 47.

14
So to say that monads include you and next-door’s cat is to presuppose that you and next-door’s cat are independent of your bodies.

15
Once Descartes separated the self from its environment in the way in which he did (
Ch. 1
. §6), it was only a question of time before a post-Cartesian philosopher would espouse such idealism: see Heidegger (
2003a
), pp. 32–33. Note: Leibniz’ idealism has much in common with Kant’s (see
Ch. 5
, esp. §4), but, unlike Kant, Leibniz is happy to accept that we can know a good deal about the underlying non-spatio-temporal reality.

16
Note: I shall use the phrase ‘possible monad’ in such a way as to preclude God Himself. A possible monad exists in some
but not all
possible worlds. Note also: although I shall talk of God Himself as existing in all possible worlds, as a way of registering that His existence is necessary, there is at least one respect in which such talk is misleading. Possible worlds themselves depend on God (‘Monadology’, §43; cf. also n. 23 and the material cited therein).

17
For an excellent discussion, with references, see Adams (
1994
), Pt I, esp.
Ch. 2
, §1.

18
For two extremely helpful discussions, see Wiggins (
1988
), esp. §9, and Bennett (
2003
), §139.

19
It is a further question, which I here simply note, what exactly this actualizing consists in: what the difference is between a possible monad that exists and one that is ‘merely’ possible. (For discussion, see Adams (
1994
),
Ch. 6
, esp. §§1 and 2.) That such a question should arise, given that it concerns what is, after all, the greatest difference there could be, is indicative of how high the seas of metaphysics are running here. (This is a deliberate echo of both Wittgenstein (
1967a
), Pt I, §194, and ibid., §304.) P.F. Strawson gives the question a further twist in Strawson (
1959
), where he discusses the views of ‘a possible philosopher at least very similar to Leibniz in certain doctrinal respects’ (p. 117). Strawson asks, in effect, why a possible monad should not be actualized twice.

Note: Deleuze writes that ‘in Leibniz … the world has no existence outside the monads that express it, while yet God brings the world, rather than the monads, into existence’ (Deleuze (1990a), p. 334). I am not altogether convinced by his reasons for drawing this distinction, but in any case I intend what I say in the main text to be neutral with respect to any such issue of ontological priority. (I shall return briefly, and parenthetically, to this issue later in this section.)

20
See ‘Discourse’, §§23–25, for discussion of what this proper use comes to.

21
Cf. II, 251–252.

22
These senses have to be metaphorical because monads are not literally in space. Quite what they amount to is not easy to say. For an excellent discussion, see Brandom (
2002c
). See also Deleuze (
1990b
), 24th Series, esp. pp. 171–172. Note: Deleuze distinguishes Leibniz’ views from a perspectivism that we find in Nietzsche. We shall return to the latter in
Ch. 15
, §3. One important difference worth noting straight away is that on Leibniz’ view there is one point of view, namely God’s, that is privileged (e.g. ‘Discourse’, §14, and ‘Monadology’, §60).

23
Could Leibniz say that God
is
required to ensure that the world is possible on the grounds that the world’s being possible, although it does not depend on His will, does depend on His understanding (cf. ‘Discourse’, §2, the clause immediately after that cited in the main text, and ‘Monadology’, §§43–46)? Perhaps. But this would still not leave room in his system for the view that compossibility entails harmony. This is because he takes the harmony of monads with one another, which on that view would be a consequence of the world’s being possible, to depend on God’s will, not just on His understanding (e.g. ‘New System’, pp. 131–132 and
Correspondence with Clarke
, ‘Second Paper’).

24
Cf. Wiggins (
1988
), pp. 278–279.

25
For discussion of these and further complications, see Russell (
1992a
), §69; D’Agostino (
1981
); Savile (
2000
), pp. 15–16; Bennett (
2003
), §139; and McDonough (
2010
). And for some further striking suggestions about what compossibility consists in, see Deleuze (
1993
), 59ff.; Deleuze (
1994
), pp. 263–264; and Deleuze (
1990b
), pp. 171–172. (But see also
Ch. 21
, n. 27, for some concerns about Deleuze’s handling of this notion.)

26
That the possible monads that are actualized should at least form a
set
, where this is understood in such a way that those that are not actualized form the complement of the set, in other words that each possible monad should be either actualized or not but that none should be both, is determined by the principle of contradiction. (I am prescinding from nominalistic concerns about the existence of sets, and also from anachronistic concerns about whether there are too many monads to form a set: see Moore (
2001a
),
Ch. 8
, §§3–5.) That they should form
this
set is determined by the principle of sufficient reason. Again, that they should form a set depends on God’s understanding; that they should form
this
set, on God’s will (‘Monadology’, §46).

27
Cf. ibid., §§4 and 5. In §5 he expresses it as follows: ‘everything possible
has an urge to
existence’ (emphasis added). This might put us in mind of Spinoza’s notion of conatus (see
Ch. 2
, §3). But see Deleuze (
1990a
), pp. 230ff., for why the two should not be assimilated: Spinoza’s notion has no application to what is ‘merely’ possible, a category that Spinoza does not so much as recognize. Indeed, if Leibniz’ formulae were understood in too Spinozist a way, for instance in such a way as to entail that each possible thing would exist unless it were prevented from doing so, then we might begin to wonder what need there was for any creative act on God’s part (as opposed to acts of prevention): cf. Lovejoy (
1964
), pp. 177ff., and Neiman (
2002
), p. 27. See Bennett (
2003
), p. 181, where he addresses this concern and scotches any such interpretation. See also Blumenfeld (
1981
) for a very interesting discussion. (I should concede, as both Jonathan Bennett and David Blumenfeld do, that Leibniz sometimes states his view in a way that precisely encourages such an interpretation: see e.g. II, 194, and ‘The Ultimate Origination’, pp. 137–138. But see also ‘A Specimen’, pp. 75–76, n. 1, for a more careful statement.)

28
Not even this is uncontroversial. David Blumenfeld, in Blumenfeld (
1995
), adduces an impressive variety of textual support for a reading whereby there is just one kind of desideratum. If there is, then some of what I shall say later in this chapter needs to be recast, but I do not think its gist is affected.

29
See further
Ch. 11
, esp.§1. See also
Ch. 4
, §3, for the Humean inspiration behind this conviction. See Kripke (
1981
), pp. 54–55, for some well-known contemporary (non-Leibnizian) dissent.

30
There is a nice account, with references, in Adams (
1994
), pp. 109–110.

31
God, by contrast, does have an infinite intellect: He ‘comprehends the infinite at once … and can understand
a priori
the perfect reason for [any] contingency’ (‘Necessary and Contingent’, p. 97). And He can infer from this, together with His own perfection, that the contingency in question holds (cf. ‘On Freedom’, p. 109). But He can also be said to ‘sense’ the contingency, not in the way in which we might sense it, but in as much as ‘it pleases Him’ (
Schriften
, Series VI, Vol. III, p. 56).

32
Leibniz seems to hold that every proposition is of subject-predicate form, though the exegesis is delicate. For discussion, with references, see Ishiguro (
1972
),
Ch. 5
.

33
What counts as absurdity? Running together the ideas in ‘Monadology’, §§33–35, we can say that absurdity consists in denying a ‘primary principle’. And what is a ‘primary principle’? According to ‘Monadology’, §35, it is a proposition whose denial contains an express contradiction. So the upshot of these three sections is that truths of reasoning are those that can be shown, by a finite process of analysis, not to be deniable without violating the principle of contradiction, the second of the two fundamental
a priori
principles of reasoning introduced in §1 (cf. ‘Discourse’, §13). But that seems to exclude the other one, the principle of sufficient reason, which Leibniz elsewhere suggests should be included (e.g. VII, 301). The fact is that Leibniz’ views on these matters are not settled (see n. 3). In what follows I shall make the assumption which seems to me to be in the greatest harmony with the greatest amount of what he says: that the principle of sufficient reason does indeed count as a primary principle, and is therefore itself a truth of reasoning. (One important consequence of this assumption is that, insofar as that principle is needed to prove any given proposition, for instance the proposition that God exists (see e.g. ‘Nature and Grace’, §8), that is no threat to the proposition’s being a truth of reasoning).

34
Cf. Edward Craig (
1987
), p. 61, n. 47, where Craig likewise says that this kind of proposition is an exception for Leibniz, but without any reference.

35
In fact Kant’s views are complicated in a way that makes even this comparison questionable: see below,
Ch. 5
, §3. (This is quite apart from the complication that, for Leibniz, it is a truth of reasoning that God exists, whereas Kant denies that
any
existential truths are analytic.)

36
See ‘Letter to Arnauld’, dated 4–14 July 1686, in ‘Correspondence with Arnauld’. See also Wiggins (
1988
), esp. §§IV and V, and Adams (
1994
),
Ch. 1
, §2.6, and
Ch. 2
, §3, for helpful discussions.