The departure of Khālid left the remaining Muslim forces along the Iraqi border leaderless. For a while Muthannā seems to have taken over command, but when Umar became caliph he decided to send another army to the Iraqi borderlands to ensure the continued allegiance of the Arab tribes there. It was not a particularly impressive force, numbering at most five thousand and probably many fewer. Recruitment seems to have been difficult and we are told that men disliked going there ‘because of the Persians’ authority, might, power and glory and their victories over other nations’.
19
Many of them were recruited from the
ansār
of Medina, not noted for their military skills, and they were led by a man called Abū Ubayd, from the Thaqīf tribe of Tā’if, the little city in the hills near Mecca. Probably in late 634 Abū Ubayd, who had met up with Muthannā and his men, encountered a Persian force in a conflict that became known as the Battle of the Bridge. The Arabic sources give an unusually consistent account of the battle.
20
The Persian forces were led by Rustam, who had recently been appointed commander-in-chief. They were said to have been well equipped, their cavalry horses wearing chain mail (
tajfīf)
, horsemen bearing heraldic banners (
shu
c
ur)
, and with a number of elephants.
21
With them they brought the great tiger-skin standard of the Persian kings, 40 metres long and 6 metres wide.
22
Between the two armies lay an irrigation canal with an old bridge which the people of nearby Hīra used to cross to reach their fields. Despite advice to the contrary, Abū Ubayd, who is portrayed as obstinate and very much afraid of being thought a coward, was determined to cross to meet the enemy. The elephants seem to have terrified the Muslims’ horses and Persian archers did devastating work among the Muslim ranks. As usual in the wars of the conquests, the Muslims dismounted and began hand-to-hand fighting with swords. Abū Ubayd himself is said to have tried to attack one of the elephants, either by spearing it in the belly or cutting off its trunk, but the elephants responded by trampling him until he was dead. The loss of their commander led to a rout among the Muslims. It was at this moment that one of them decided to cut the bridge to stop the Muslims fleeing and make them stand their ground, or so he said.
23
As a result many more Muslims perished by drowning as they attempted to swim across the canal to safety. Only a small number of survivors remained to be rallied by Muthannā and retreat into the desert.
The Battle of the Bridge was the worst defeat the Muslims suffered in the early wars of the conquests. It might well have signalled the end of their campaigns against Iraq, which would have remained a largely Christian, Aramaic-speaking land under Persian rule. That this did not happen was due to two things - disarray among the Persian ranks and the determination of the new caliph, Umar, that the defeat should be avenged.
In the immediate aftermath of defeat, the surviving Muslim soldiers, led by Muthannā, who seems to have been quite severely wounded at the Battle of the Bridge and died shortly after, were reduced to doing what Arabs had so often done before, raiding along the desert margin when Persian power was too weak to prevent them. Umar’s immediate response was to call on reinforcements. Manpower, however, was beginning to be a problem. The tribes of the Hijaz who had formed the core of early Muslim power were now widely dispersed, mostly in Syria, and the defeat had depleted their ranks still further. But Umar did not want to rely on men from those tribes who had, only a year or two before, challenged the Islamic leadership in the
ridda
. So he turned instead to tribesmen who had been more or less neutral in the war that had just ended. South of the Hijaz, towards the borders of Yemen, lay a mountainous area called the Sarat. It was from the villages and encampments of this area that most of the new recruits came, led by a rather larger-than-life tribal leader called Jarīr b. Abd Allāh al-Bajalī. Jarīr had good Islamic credentials, having converted to Islam a few years before the death of Muhammad and being hence entitled to the coveted status of Companion of the Prophet. On the other hand, he was a tribal leader, proud of his ancient lineage and high social status. He saw no good reason why the coming of Islam should undermine the power and prestige of a man in his position.
From the first, relations between him and Muthannā had been sticky, a rivalry that is reflected in the historical sources as supporters of each of them tried to exaggerate their hero’s achievements.
24
And new dangers were appearing on the horizon, for while the Muslim forces were restricted to desultory raids, the new young Persian king, Yazdgard III, had become strong enough to assert his authority and mobilize his troops to get rid of those irritating Bedouin for good and all.
25
The Armenian Sebeos, the writer closest to the events (Sebeos was writing in the 650s, little more than a decade later), says the Persian army numbered 80,000, and he may have had good inside information since a number of Armenian princes came with contingents of between 1,000 and 3,000 men to join the imperial army.
In response, Umar began to organize another army. To solve the problem of command, he chose a man who was very much part of the early Islamic elite. Sa
c
d b. Abī Waqqās came from the Quraysh of Mecca but he had also joined the Muslim cause early and was one of that small band of veterans who could claim to have fought beside the Prophet in his first victory at the battle of Badr in 624. He has a reputation in the Muslim tradition of being something of a hothead. When Muhammad was being verbally abused by his enemies in Mecca before the
hijra
, Sa
c
d hit one of them with the jawbone of a camel and drew blood. In later life he delighted in his reputation as the first man to fire an arrow in the cause of slam.
26
Neither Muthannā nor the newly arrived Jarīr could challenge his right to lead. The army he brought, however, was not especially impressive. Largely recruited in the Hijaz, Yemen and other parts of south Arabia, it was probably about four thousand strong when it left Medina in the autumn of 637, drawn from as many as ten different tribal groups.
27
Umar also ordered contingents from Syria to join these forces in Iraq, including, apparently, some of those who had previously left Iraq for Syria with Khālid b. al-Walīd. By the time of the confrontation between the Muslims and the main Persian army, Sa
c
d’s forces probably numbered between 6,000 and 12,000,
28
significantly smaller than the Persians: as the most important modern authority on the conquests notes, ‘for all its importance, the Battle of Qādisiyya seems to have been a clash between two rather small armies’.
29
The little town of Qādisiya lay among the palm groves on the very edge of the settled lands of Iraq. In later years pilgrims would assemble here before setting out on the long desert road to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and it was a natural point of arrival and assembly for Sa
c
d’s army. It was here that the fate of Iraq was to be decided.
The story of the battle of Qādisiya formed the basis of great legends.
30
The memory of the victory of a small, improvised and ill-equipped Arab army over the might of imperial Persia has provided inspiration for Muslims and Arabs down the centuries. In Saddam Hussein’s Baghdad, the quarter along the Tigris that housed most of the government ministries was called Qādisiya. When in 1986 Saddam issued bonds to raise money for the war against Iran, they were called Qādisiya bonds. Less appropriately, the Iraqi official media often dubbed the 2003 second Gulf War as Saddam’s Qādisiya. In all cases a conscious effort was being made to tap into popular memory of a time when the Arab armies had triumphed over enormous odds.
Despite the enormous importance of the battle and its iconic status, we know remarkably little about the actual course of the conflict, and many of the details are clearly formulaic. Even the year in which it occurred is quite uncertain. Arabic sources are typically contradictory about the dates, suggesting anything from 635 to 638,
31
with most historians settling for 636. On the other hand, recent research in the Armenian sources suggests that the climactic battle may have happened on the Orthodox Christmas Day (6 January) 638.
32
The descriptions of the battle run to some 160 pages in Tabarī’s great
History
, and although full of events and details, give no clear overall picture. The Armenian sources make it clear that the Persians were disastrously defeated, but that the Armenian princes, naturally, fought with great bravery, two of the most important of them being slain, along with many Persian notables.
The Arab accounts begin with the recruitment and dispatch of the army from Medina, careful attention being paid to the names and tribal allegiances of those who participated. After the arrival of the army on the borders of Iraq there are accounts of embassies between the Arabs and the great king Yazdgard III. We are told of debates and councils of war among the Muslims, and the point is made repeatedly that they should not penetrate deeply into the irrigated lands and canals of the Sawād but should fight on the desert margins, so that if things should go wrong they could escape into the wilderness, so stressing the precariousness of the position of the Muslims.
We also hear of debates among the Persians. When the Muslim forces arrived along the edge of the desert and began to raid the settled areas, the local landowners sent messages to the new young king Yazdgard in the capital of Ctesiphon requesting help and protection. The king ordered Rustam to lead an expedition against them. Rustam had been one of Yazdgard’s main supporters in the struggle for the throne. He was an experienced general and now became the effective regent of Iraq.
33
He is sometimes described in the Arabic sources as an Armenian, and the army he commanded certainly contained Armenian contingents led by their princes. Other sources say he came from Hamadhan or Rayy, and it seems as if his power was based in Media, west central Iran, while Yazdgard III had been supported first of all by the notables of Fars, further to the south. Regional rivalries may have undermined the Persian war effort. Rustam’s image in the Arabic sources is of a man of wisdom, experience and a generally pessimistic disposition.
34
In the great Persian epic, the
Shahnāmah
of Firdawsi, composed around the year 1000, he is described as ‘an astute, intelligent man and a fine warrior. He was a very knowledgeable astrologer who paid attention to the advice of priests’. Firdawsi also gives us the text of a long verse letter that Rustam is said to have written to his brother before the battle, foretelling defeat and the end of the Sasanian dynasty.
35
This house will lose all trace of sovereignty
Of royal glory and of victory
The sun looks down from its exalted sphere
And sees the day of our defeat draw near
Ahead of us lies war and endless strife
Such that my failing heart despairs of life.
I see what has to be, and choose the way
Of silence since there is no more to say
But for the Persians I will weep, and for
The House of Sasan ruined by this war
Alas for their great crown and throne, for all
The royal splendour now destined to fall.
He finishes with a lament on his own impending death and an exhortation to loyalty to the doomed Persian monarchy:
My grave is Qādisiya’s battlefield
My crown will be my blood, my shroud my shield.
The heavens will this; may my death not cause
Your heart to grieve too much at heaven’s laws
Watch the king always, and prepare to give
Your life in battle so that he may live.
According to the Arabic sources, he urged the young King Yazdgard not to fight the Arabs unless absolutely necessary. He alone among the Persians recognized the military abilities and ideological commitment of the despised Bedouin and realized that they would be victorious.
The accounts of the embassies to the Persians and the debates that ensued are among the most interesting parts of the conquest narratives, not because they represent an accurate record of what actually took place but because of the insight they give us into the attitudes of early Muslims to the conquest. One of the fullest narratives
36
begins with Sa
c
d telling a group of his advisers that he is sending them on a mission to the Persians. One of them suggested that this was showing too much respect and that only one man should be sent, so the speaker, Rib
c
ī,
c
was dispatched on his own. He was taken under guard by the Persian authorities to meet with Rustam. Before he was brought in to face the general, the Persians agreed that they should try to overawe this Bedouin. They set out to demonstrate the wealth and sophistication of the Persian court. Precious objects (
zibrīj
) were displayed, cushions and carpets laid out. Rustam himself was seated on a golden throne and it was decorated with rugs (
anmt
) and cushions em broidered with gold thread. The contrast between this and the condition of Rib
c
ī, who came in on a shaggy, stumpy horse, is played up in the sources.
37
His sword was finely polished but covered in a scabbard made of shabby cloth. His spear was bound with camel sinews. He had a red shield made of cowhide ‘like a thick round loaf of bread’ and a bow and arrows.