The Internment of Japanese Americans in United States History (6 page)

In some camps, evacuees spent many evenings sitting around campfires. Issei might sit around one fire, remembering the way things were and blaming Nisei for their current miseries. Another campfire might find young Nisei radicals ready to go on strike or beat up suspected informers. Other Nisei would gather at another fire, irritated both at the Issei who disdained them and the Americans who imprisoned them.

These groups had resentments that smoldered under the surface. In some camps, the resentments would flame into violence.

Chapter 6

WHAT'S THIS CAMP COMING TO?

Under a calm surface, tensions boiled in the camps. There was resentment against the low pay, the unappetizing food, the crowded bathrooms. Most of all, evacuees resented the lack of freedom. They hated the censorship that authorities forced upon them. White camp employees read evacuees’ incoming and outgoing mail. Camp residents published newspapers, but they were subject to review by the camp directors. The
Manzanar Free Press
was free in name only.

Under these conditions, people became suspicious of each other. Anyone could be an informer, a spy for the administration. Resentments flared against the informers, the camp administration, the United States government that kept them prisoner, and the American people who allowed the government to oust them from their homes. These demonstrations took the form of protests and strikes.

Poston

Hooded assailants cornered Kay Nishimura at Poston on November 14, 1942. They beat the suspected informer almost to death. Authorities suspected that the camp’s judo club was a headquarters for administration haters. Fifty judo club members were rounded up, but they soon were released. The following night, the parents of another suspected informer were beaten. Judo club members George Fujii and Isamu Uchida were rearrested.

WRA director Dillon Myer visited the camp the next day. Camp director Wayne Head, Myer, and other top officials left the camp a few hours later. Soon, a crowd gathered in front of the camp jail. They shouted speeches in favor of the imprisoned “judo boys.” They denounced informers, whom they called
inu
(dogs).

John Evans, the next in command, let the Issei protesters speak; then he addressed the assembled evacuees. Evans asked everyone to remain calm, but his translator did not repeat the director’s remarks. Instead of relaying what Evans had said, he called for release of the prisoners and a strike by camp residents.

At nightfall, soldiers marched to Poston’s gates. Some militants wanted to fight the troops. Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed. Troops and guns withdrew. Both prisoners eventually were released. Dislike, distrust, and turmoil remained, but the bullets stayed outside of the camp.

Manzanar Massacre

Hatred burned almost immediately at the Manzanar camp. Pro-American, pro-administration members of the JACL formed one faction. A group of
Kibei
(American-born people educated in Japan) were on the other side.

Manzanar residents had reason for discontent: White camp employees were stealing their food. Sugar and other supplies were rationed throughout the United States, and many Americans were willing to pay high prices for the scarce black market goods. The employees cheated camp residents out of part of their food supplies, took the surplus into nearby towns, and sold the stolen food at black market prices.

Evacuee Henry Ueno kept track of the sugar thefts. When he found the camp’s sugar supply to be 6,100 pounds short in October 1942, Ueno confronted camp officials. They promised to make up the shortage in November; Ueno, however, noted continuing food thefts. Instead of being grateful for Ueno’s alertness, camp officials considered him a troublemaker.

The food crisis erupted on December 4, 1942. “Food was being taken out of camp not by one carton but by the truckloads,” noted Tom Watanabe. “The white drivers coming in were stealing the food. . . . [Ueno] was keeping a record of it and they snatched him.”
¹

Ueno spent the night in jail in nearby Independence, California. Meanwhile, six masked men beat up a JACL leader believed to be an informer. Several suspects were arrested.

Government agents then returned Ueno to Manzanar and threw him into the camp jail. These arrests drew protests. Hundreds of evacuees gathered outside of the administration building. Military police quickly surrounded them. With rifles and tear gas, the troops were prepared for attack. Then someone threw a light bulb at the military patrol. It shattered, causing a shot-like sound.

The MPs responded by hurling tear gas canisters at the evacuees. “That smoke just covered the whole area,” Ueno recalled. “A sergeant taking charge in front was yelling, ‘Remember Pearl Harbor, hold your line.’ . . . And [at] the same time, before the gas is cleared, they start shooting.”
²

Two lay dead and ten injured after what became known as the Manzanar Massacre ended. Authorities tried to cover up the incident. A board of inquiry from army headquarters in San Francisco tried to persuade witnesses to say that the dead and injured evacuees were threatening or attacking the military police. However, the investigation of the trajectory of the bullets showed that they had been shot in the side or the back. When the hospital’s chief surgeon was asked to falsify the medical records, he refused and was fired the next day.

Pro-American ringleaders were shipped off to one work camp; their foes were shipped to another. Ueno was kept in isolation at the second camp. When FBI agents came to question him, he repeated the accusations of theft by Manzanar employees. “That’s a very serious charge,” he was told. “If your statement’s wrong you could be in serious trouble.”

Ueno answered, “I know, but I’m right.” The FBI investigated and never bothered him again. Ueno figured that they must have discovered the wrongdoing.
³

No-Nos

On January 28, 1943, Secretary of War Henry Stimson declared, “It is the inherent right of every faithful citizen, regardless of ancestry, to bear arms in our nation’s battle.”
⁴
President Roosevelt added, “No loyal citizen of the United States should be denied the democratic right to exercise the responsibilities of his citizenship, regardless of his ancestry.”
⁵

For some Nisei, the announcements were a blessing. They loved the United States and wanted to fight for their country. Others were less enthusiastic. They had volunteered for the armed forces after Pearl Harbor. Then instead of being in combat, they found themselves behind barbed wire.

The WRA felt Nisei in combat would be good for public relations. Some government officials had their doubts. The War Department chose to have every adult Japanese take a loyalty test to separate patriots from potential troublemakers. A loyalty registration form was created to determine which Japanese Americans wanted to serve in the armed forces, and which wanted to be released for war-related work. WRA director Dillon Myer called the loyalty question “a bad mistake” but went along with the directive.

Issei and adult Nisei soon received loyalty questionnaires. Question 27 asked Nisei men if they would volunteer for combat in the armed forces (Nisei women and Issei were asked to volunteer for nursing or auxiliary units). Question 28 asked if they would swear allegiance to the United States.

WRA officials assumed people would give unquestioning positive responses to questions 27 and 28. They were wrong. Issei balked at answering question 28. They were not eligible for United States citizenship. If they renounced the only country that allowed them to be citizens, they would be stateless people.  

Many Nisei, on the other hand, fumed when they were asked to renounce their allegiance to Japan. They were Americans, not Japanese citizens. Togo Tanaka refused to renounce allegiance to the Japanese emperor. Tanaka explained, “we never owed him allegiance. So how could we renounce it?”
⁶
Question 28 was later changed to “Will you swear to abide by the laws of the United States and take no action which would in any way interfere with the war effort of the United States?”

Questions 27 and 28 had to be answered in the presence of U.S. Army recruiters. The registration form was mandatory except for people seeking repatriation to Japan. Even so, the response disappointed the WRA. Many irate evacuees refused to answer the questionnaire altogether. Some answered No to questions 27 and 28; they became known as No-Nos.

Others found different ways to protest. One man, a Yes-Yes, asked the army representative if he was a citizen. Yes, came the reply. Then the man asked, “May I go to Phoenix?” No, he could not, because the Arizona city was part of the restricted area. Then he tore up the questionnaire. “That’s the way I feel about your attitude toward our citizenship,” he responded.
⁷

It was hoped that thirty-five hundred Nisei registrants would volunteer for the U.S. Army. Instead, only twelve hundred volunteered. WRA officials did not expect opposition to the loyalty oath. In some camps, opposition to the oath became a matter of honor.

Rejecting the Military

Reactions to the registration varied from camp to camp. Topaz evacuees sent a petition to the War Department asking for full restoration of civil rights before they would register. The government responded that registration was a “crucial test” for the evacuees and it was no time “to quibble or bargain.” The committee that drew up the petition urged Topaz residents to register. They did, but 32 percent of the men answered No to question 28.

In Minidoka, Nisei men who answered Yes to questions 27 and 28 were immediately whisked over to “voluntary induction.” Only 7 percent of male Nisei in Minidoka answered No to the controversial questions. About three hundred young men from Minidoka volunteered. The camp, which had only 7 percent of the total evacuee population of the camps, had 25 percent of the volunteers.

Hecklers at Poston bombarded government officials with direct, pointed questions: Why were loyal Japanese Americans not allowed back in California? Why couldn’t Nisei soldiers visit the camp? Why were Nisei draftees kicked out of the military after December 7, 1941? Why were veterans of the last war, who already had proved their loyalty, put into camps?

Jerome evacuees were threatened with imprisonment if they failed to register. Eventually, everyone registered. Many answered No to question 28.

At Manzanar, Issei flocked to sign forms for repatriation to Japan. The rush became so intense that authorities stopped handing out repatriation requests until the registration period ended. Issei, meanwhile, urged their Nisei children to respond No to 27 and 28. After question 28 was revised so that Issei would not have to renounce foreign ties, most changed their answers to Yes.

Tule Lake presented problems to the WRA from the beginning. Tuleans heard of the upcoming registration at the end of January 1943. They heard that registration would not be necessary for people who applied for repatriation to Japan.

Community council members tried to get information from the camp director about the registrations. Instead, the director stalled until the actual registration began.

The evacuees remained uncertain of why they had to register and how the registration would proceed. They were angry about the injustice of imprisoned citizens having to join the military and the possibility of forced resettlement. When the JACL met in early February and favored voluntary enlistment and reinstatement of the draft for Nisei, rumors circulated that the JACL and Tule Lake administrators were responsible for the registration. Army team members and WRA officials met with evacuee groups on February 9. The officials read a prepared War Department statement. Few officials accepted questions from the evacuees. Those that did gave only prepared responses that did not answer the questions.

Few Tuleans registered. Some who did tried to withdraw those registrations. Instead, they wrote petitions complaining about the registration. Officials still refused to answer direct questions about the registrations. Instead, they threatened anti-registration leaders with fines and prison sentences. Later, when those same officials learned from the FBI that there was no law against refusing to participate in the loyalty oaths, they never bothered to relay that information to the evacuees.

At first, registration was done at the individual housing blocks. Administrators feared that block pressure might keep some evacuees from registering, so they changed the registration site to the administration area. The change made no difference. On February 18, the army and internal security officers appeared at the mess hall and read off the names of those who had not registered. They warned of sedition (treason) penalties for those who would not cooperate. The next day, trucks arrived to take registrants to the administration office. No one boarded them. Two days later, military police charged into block 42, picked up the uncooperative Nisei, and trucked them off to nearby county jails.

The arrests frightened some residents. For others, the arrests only strengthened their resistance. Many requested repatriation to Japan. The army countered that it was a “mistaken idea” to assume that such a request exempted anyone from having to register. This ruling contradicted earlier statements that those seeking repatriation would not have to register.

Anti-registrants now had another issue: They would not cooperate until the arrested resisters were returned to camp. Authorities refused to return the arrested men, to promise that there would be no further arrests, and to stop having teachers put pressure on their students to change No answers to Yes.