The Israel-Arab Reader (69 page)

One of certain indisputable things, brothers, is that the correct description for a certain situation is not necessarily the correct solution to that situation, but an inevitable introduction leading to the correct solution. Therefore, in all cases, a solution does not merely consist of defining which issues are rejected, both concerning our behavior or the behavior and thinking of others who harm our pan-Arab security and national and pan-Arab interests. Another thing over which there is no room for dispute is that the policy of the age is not set by concerned foreign parties on any basis other than policies and strategies whose expected final result is to serve the interest of their countries.

Zionism realized these facts and concentrated its international effort here and there in accordance with an accurate perception and longer-lasting knowledge than that of the Arabs. The Zionists were progressive initiators in fields where they would disrupt the calculations and influences of the Arabs. In accordance with this basis, and not only on the basis of developing public opinion, Zionism directed its special concentration on the United States of America to involve it in its strategy, after realizing that the future of its goals and joint action with the Europeans would come up against special obstacles. The United States accepted the concept of joining interests and action with Zionism out of its concept of its own interests, after the United States had taken over the role of the European colonialists following World War II.

Despite all the harm the United States inflicted upon the Arabs due to its alliance with Zionism, there remained the fear of communism, the Soviet Union, and the Arab friends and allies of the Soviet Union in the region, in addition to other factors. This continued to prevent the Arabs from taking influential stands towards U.S. policy, with minor exceptions. Their stands became restricted to a mere ineffective rejection or an ineffective silence and acceptance. The United States began not to take Arab stances seriously. The United States may have the famous red lines beyond which it does not tread concerning the interests of other nations that deal peacefully with it, but its policy so far has no red lines warning the concerned sides in the United States not to tread beyond them where Arab interests are concerned.

Realizing Arab solidarity on the basis of pan-Arab interests, correctly defining Arab interests, clearly and accurately defining everything that threatens their security and stability, and proceeding from this basis of capability, frankness, and solidarity with the United States, or other countries in general, prevents these countries from exceeding the proper bounds with the Arab nation and thus becoming a threat.

This might be a realistic basis for the establishment of Arab relations with the United States and other states, based on the principles I have mentioned. These are mutual respect, noninterference in internal affairs, and respect for the requirements of pan-Arab security and common interests on a legitimate and agreed-upon basis.

Brothers, Zionism and its entity, Israel, have been used to embark upon areas and affairs to which the Arabs do not pay attention. The Arabs have also been used on occasion to rise all together to counter the Zionists' political, informational, or any other offensive for which Zionism has prepared all requirements through effective work over a long period of time. The Arabs would launch a counteroffensive without being fully prepared and soon their rising would dwindle and vanish. Therefore, the Arab reaction is often verbal or ineffective even if part of it takes the form of real action. In politics as well as in war, responsibility and experience have taught us that the counteroffensive should not necessarily be on the same axis that is always chosen by the enemy, especially when the encounter lasts a long time and when it is possible to choose one or more axis or one or more places other than those from which the enemy began its offensive and for which it prepared the requirements of confrontation and took into consideration Arab reaction. In such a case it might be enough to preoccupy the enemy on the axis selected for its offensive against us, and then we would attack it from another axis if the desired results were possible on the other axis. Accordingly, the direct offensive on the harmful plans and means used by the U.S. and Zionism against the Arabs in a certain field might not be always the right solution if we use all of our potential at one time in a manner that takes us away from other fields.

The big does not become big nor does the great earn such a description unless he is in the arena of comparison or fighting with someone else on a different level. The big powers became big only when small and medium-sized countries were found on this earth around these big powers. The big powers do not become big unless they are influential in small and medium-sized countries. Accordingly, among the means to weaken hostile policies and the harmful influence of those who harm us is to weaken the one who harms us inside or outside his national soil. Accordingly, and because interest is the basis of the Soviet Union's new policy, as well as the policy of the East European states, as it has always been the basis of the policy of other states, we are dutybound to ask and answer accurately how we can approach these states in order to weaken our enemies' influence on them or how we can benefit from our common financial, economic, political, informational, and other powers to achieve better results.

It has been proven that Arabs are capable of being influential when they make a decision and set their minds to it for actual application purposes. We have much evidence of how effective they can be; for example, the joint Iraqi-Saudi resolution of 6 August, 1980, and the warning the two countries issued together that embassies must not be moved to Jerusalem, one of whose direct results in less than a month—the duration of the warning—was not only that the concerned countries did not transfer their embassies to Jerusalem, but also that embassies that had already long been transferred to the city returned to Tel Aviv.

The reason the United States stays in the Gulf is that the Gulf has become the most important spot in the region and perhaps the whole world due to developments in international policy, the oil market, and increasing demands from the United States, Europe, Japan, Eastern Europe, and perhaps the Soviet Union, for this product. The country that will have the greatest influence in the region through the Arab Gulf and its oil will maintain its superiority as a superpower without an equal to compete with it. This means that if the Gulf people, along with all Arabs, are not careful, the Arab Gulf region will be governed by the U.S. will. If the Arabs are not alerted and the weakness persists, the situation could develop to the extent desired by the United States; that is, it would fix the amount of oil and gas produced in each country and sold to this or that country in the world. Prices would also be fixed in line with a special perspective benefitting U.S. interests and ignoring the interests of others.

If this possibility is there and it is convincing, those who are convinced by it must conclude that peace in the Middle East is remote from the U.S. point of view because U.S. strategy, according to this analysis, needs an aggressive Israel, not a peaceful one. Peace between Iraq and Iran could be far off as long as Iran does not react favorably from an aware and responsible position and with the peace initiatives proposed by Iraq. The region could witness inter-Arab wars or controlled wars between the Arabs and some of their neighbors, if tangible results are not achieved on the basis of the principles of noninterference in others' internal affairs and nonuse of military force in inter-Arab relations.

Agreement should be reached over clear and widespread pan-Arab co-operation programs among Arab countries in the economic, political, and educational fields, as well as other fields. Love and peace of mind will take the place of suspicion, doubt, mistrust, and giving in to information and speculation propagated by rumormongers such as prejudiced Westerners and some rootless Arabs.

Brothers, the weakness of a big body lies in its bulkiness. All strong men have their Achilles' heel. Therefore, irrespective of our known stand on terror and terrorists, we saw that the United States as a superpower departed Lebanon immediately when some Marines were killed, the very men who are considered to be the most prominent symbol of its arrogance. The whole U.S. Administration would have been called into question had the forces that conquered Panama continued to be engaged by the Panamanian Armed Forces. The United States has been defeated in some combat arenas for all the forces it possesses, and it has displayed signs of fatigue, frustration, and hesitation when committing aggression on other peoples' rights and acting from motives of arrogance and hegemony. This is a natural outcome for those who commit aggression on other peoples' rights. Israel, once dubbed the invincible country, has been defeated by some of the Arabs. The resistance put up by Palestinian and Lebanese militia against Israeli invasion forces in 1982 and before that the heroic Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal in 1973 have had a more telling psychological and actual impact than all Arab threats. Further, the threat to use Arab oil in 1973 during the October war proved more effective than all political attempts to protest or to beg at the gates of American decisionmaking centers. The stones in occupied Palestine now turn into a virtual and potentially fatal bullet if additional requirements are made available. It is the best proof of what is possible and indeed gives us cause to hold our heads high.

Just as Israel controls interests to put pressure on the U.S. Administration, hundreds of billions invested by the Arabs in the United States and the West may be similarly deployed. Indeed, for instance, some of these investments may be diverted to the USSR and East European countries. It may prove even more profitable than investment in the West, which has grown saturated with its national resources. Such a course of action may yield inestimable benefits for the Arabs and their national causes.

Our purported weakness does not lie in our ideological and hereditary characteristics. Contemporary experience has shown our nation to be distinguished and excellent, just as our nation's history over the centuries has shown this to be the case. Our purported weakness lies in a lack of mutual trust among ourselves, our failure to concentrate on the components of our strength, and our failure to focus on our weaknesses with a view to righting them. Let our motto be: All of us are strong as long as we are united, and all of us are weak as long as we are divided. Then we will see how all of us will reach safe shores, God willing, so we can take off together on the road of stability and prosperity, heartening our people and ourselves. We will also see how Satan will grow weaker wherever he may be and the evil will depart our homeland and our nation. We are proceeding with resolve and firmness. God willing, to reach this goal through brotherly cooperation that would serve as a model for common Arab action and developed brotherly cooperation. Let us go forward.

Brother leaders of the ACC countries; brother members of the audience. These are ideas and concepts that we are proposing for brotherly dialogue in the context of an exchange of views and experience among us on all issues of concern to our Arab countries and nation. We ask success from God toward the good. The peace and blessings of God be upon you, brothers.

Do not forget that I was continually warning about the constant possibility of an escalation in this region. Most specifically, last April I pointed out two possible explosive points: On the one hand this involved increased U.S.-Israeli threats to Iraq and the Palestinians in southern Lebanon, and on the other the mass settlement of Jews into our occupied Palestine—a problem that I was constantly pointing out and to which I was trying to attract the world's attention because it involved a move with unpredictable consequences. I also said that the Arab summit in Baghdad in March this year should be a summit to straighten things out. Anyway, I will give you the letter the Americans sent us at that time through the Arab League. This is the dangerous letter that no one has wanted to talk about. I will give you a copy: go ahead and publish it if you wish. In this letter they openly announce that they will increase their presence in the Gulf and warned the Arabs that they will not tolerate any resistance to their presence. When I spoke about this on 17 May, two lines concerning the U.S. intentions were already apparent among the Arabs. One line approved of their presence and the other did not.

Another issue was the question of Israel and its expansion. The letter itself was a classic ultimatum. They issued a metal coin—here, I will give you one—with a sketch on it of the map of Israel as they see it. This Israel contains half of Iraq, half of Syria, the whole of Lebanon, Jordan, the whole of Palestine, a part of Saudi Arabia, and a good part of Sinai. They have not forsaken this dream. When I left Beirut in 1982, I said that the storm that had overtaken that city would not stop. The storm at that point had one center, one “eye” as we would say: Palestine. Today that storm has two eyes—one in the Gulf and the other in Palestine. . . .

A few days ago, when I was with Saddam Husayn, it seemed to me that the chances of peace were great. What the Americans have prepared through the Security Council, however . . . this is some kind of declaration of war. This is an ultimatum. Really, there is the danger of the Middle East's exploding, not only in the Gulf but on all sides. If Israel is in this war—and it certainly will be—we will fight against it as well as against the Americans. They must know that not one single Arab soldier—neither Egyptian, nor Syrian, nor Saudi—will agree to be in the same trench as Israeli soldiers. This is the reality.

There is no doubt about it. No matter what the outcome of the war, the Arab order as a whole will collapse. . . .

We are the greatest losers even now. Our people in Kuwait were the richest. The total losses of the Palestinian colony in Kuwait amounted to $8.5 billion. Our people had almost $3 billion in the banks there alone. Look what happened. The U.S.-European committee discussed, and to a considerable extent has already paid, compensation to the whole world for the money lost in Kuwait, but the Palestinians did not receive anything. What is this meant to be? A punishment for the Palestinians? Where are the principles here? Are they not ashamed of this? Or do they really only want to ignite a new explosion? Viewed in the long term, perhaps there is cause for optimism. In the shorter term, the situation is exceptionally difficult. It seems that we have definitely come closer to a war which will leave behind nothing but catastrophe. Both Asia and Europe will feel the repercussions. In order for people to come to their senses, it is necessary for a lot of effort to be made throughout the world. But there is no sense. Look at the Security Council—what is its duty? To foment war or to seek peaceful solutions? I cannot accept this. As regards the solution, it is very strange that, for example, it is being demanded of the Palestinians that they talk with the Israelis while they are occupying the Palestinians' country, but at the same time we are not being allowed to ask that Arabs look for a solution among themselves for the new problem in the Gulf. So one can have negotiations among enemies but not among Arabs. What do they want? That I reject one occupation but accept another, or something like this? I cannot accept a foreign presence in this region. I know that they are literally punishing the Palestinians because of this, but I will not sell my opinion for any sum of money. I could easily say that I support the Saudis or the Americans. You know, however, that I have fought for principles, and I will not betray them.