The Journals of Ayn Rand (50 page)

This point—
no man exists for the sake of another man—must be established very early in my system. It is one of the main cornerstones—and perhaps even the basic axiom.
[For AR’s final view of this issue, see the introduction to
The Virtue of Selfishness.]

In relation to my earlier notes on individual competition against big near-monopolies: take notice of Mr. Hazen’s complaint about the impossibility of an independent producer competing with big movie companies because “the big companies won’t loan their stars to independents.”
[Joseph Hazen was president of Hal Wallis Productions.]
Mr. Hazen wants to compete with ready-made tools to be handed over to him by the competition. He doesn’t want to start at the beginning—he wants to expropriate that which the competition has created (and use it against the competition), he wants to be boosted to an equal level to start competing, he wants to be handed an unearned advantage. Is the way open to him to compete from a clean beginning ? Obviously,
yes,
in this case. He
can
and
should
create his own stars, and all his other tools.

Isn’t the situation the same in every other line of business where men yelp about the impossibility of competing with bigness? Monroe Shakespeare [
a businessman in Kalamazoo, Michigan]
says that he can’t compete with automobile manufacturers and he wants to expropriate the patents that they created—which is exactly like Mr. Hazen’s stars. What’s to prevent Shakespeare from inventing his own patents? What if he can‘t—why should he demand the property or discoveries of others? And if there are no new patents to be invented in connection with the automobile—why should he go into that business and expect an unfair advantage? Even from the angle of “the common good,” why should society help [establish] him in a branch of business which society doesn’t need, since the existing companies cover it perfectly?

If he has, not a basic patent to offer, but an improvement on the existing ones, which he cannot use without the consent of the original patent’s owners—then he has to sell his idea to these owners. They won’t see it? That’s too bad—but that is the basic condition of an exchange society—the voluntary consent of those involved in a transaction.
(Yes,
even if a lot of men are blind, stupid and unable to see their own advantage.
That
is the basic law of an exchange society. It includes the right of fools to make mistakes. Any kind
of sin of omission
has to be permitted—there’s no way out of that.
But no sins of commission.)

But, Shakespeare might say, in such a case the owners of the original patent would dictate terms and take unfair advantage of the new inventor. Not necessarily. Not if he holds out and if what he has is good enough and they want it badly enough. Again—the rule of a free exchange society. (And, as a matter of fact and history, the fools cannot hold a valuable invention down, nor close the road to it by being unable to see it and thus not giving it a chance. They cannot stop the inventor or the invention. It is the history of every great innovation that it [overcame] fools. And it’s the fools who suffered—not the inventor, nor society.
Provided
the social system is
free,
and the inventor has a chance to fight. He
does not
need ready-made encouragements. All he needs is—no barriers. Hands off and out of my way! Don’t help me—but
don’t stop me.)

In answer to the argument that “man doesn’t know what is best for him—in this day of specialization a man cannot know what is best for him as well as a doctor can.” First, the primary choice is still with the man—does he wish to call in a doctor and what doctor? If he doesn’t want any, no moral right can force him, even though he might die. He has the right to choose to die.
Freedom includes the right to make mistakes.
There’s no definition of what’s good for a man—except that which a man chooses as good for himself. He is the final and total judge of that—
provided
his choice does not include the use of
force
upon other men. (Incidentally, doctors can be wrong, and so can engineers, and any specialists. There is no [automatically] defined
good
for everybody. Only the right to choose one’s own good. To suffer through the consequences of one’s own error is a proper part of the existence of a being endowed with free will. But to suffer through the mistake of another which is forced on one for one’s own good is an inexcusable, unnatural evil.)
[For AR’s view of the good as objective, see “What is Capitalism? ” in
Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal.]

But
second,
and most important: if the choice here is between a genius subjected to the will of a moron or a moron deprived of the help of a genius—the first is the evil, the second not. Here is a
good
case of the sins of commission and omission. The first is a positive sin of commission. The second is only a sin of omission—
which is not a sin.
(This distinction must be covered very thoroughly, completely and unanswerably. It is a cardinal point; it is the root and source of altruism.)

Minor point: if the majority of men cannot know what is good for them, each for himself, how can they know what is good for others by proxy? If they are to be controlled by “specialists,” because they cannot know everything themselves, how and by what standards will they choose the specialists? This is where communism runs into fascism—the rule of a collective by an elite for the sake of the collective.

How many men are incapable of living by independent effort in a system of free enterprise, based on merit? Only a small, subnormal minority are incapable. Thus collectivism is not even the sacrifice of a brilliant minority for the sake of the average majority—but the sacrifice of everybody, of the
majority,
to the worst and lowest minority: the incompetent and subnormal. Collectivism is not even “the greatest good for the greatest number,” silly and vile as such a formula is. Collectivism is the sacrifice of the greatest number for the greatest good of the vilest and smallest number. And besides, it won’t work—even for the benefit of the morons.

 

A possible definition of a
right:
a “right” is that which it is morally permissible to defend by force. Here I have to be
very
careful. This might be totally wrong. If carelessly handled, it could be used as justification for the right of a communist to murder an employer who does not give him a job. Again, “sins of omission” come in. This is only a hint, a possible clue to be thought out very carefully, from every possible angle and in every possible application. It is no good—
unless
a total
proof
of it can be given. As a clue to it: it would have to be clearly stated that only that which does not depend
primarily
upon other men can be considered “a right”—such as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. But again—the definition of the principle and its application in reality has to be given—“the long-range and the immediate.” Such as: “My happiness depends on my work—what about the man who refuses to give me the job I want?” Here again—the definition of basic individualism in an exchange society. (Clue: Nobody is forced to provide you with the means of exercising a right. But nobody must stop you from exercising it.) [See
“Man’s Rights” in
The Virtue of Selfishness for
AR’s final definition.]

Could it be that
virtues
(toward other men,
socially only)
are virtues of
omission,
while sins are only of
commission?
There’s something important here. Of course, the real and primary virtues are individual and positive, virtues of commission, such as: integrity, courage, wisdom, honesty, independence. But in the social realm—in relation to others—the virtues are all of omission, that is,
hands off.
While the sins are of commission—positive violence.

The whole relation of man to society has to be defined, its proper order stated: Man, the entity, first—
then
his relation to society. Society is only the sum of individuals, therefore the order is natural, logical and proper: individual entity, rights, and morality
first,
then the secondary matters pertaining to society, to the established entity’s relation with others. If relations are placed first—
who is it
that’s having relations,
whom
are we talking about?

In any clash between the
individual
and the
social,
the
individual
must win, the individual has the right and the priority. (But be sure that the individual is
strictly
individual and clearly defined as such.)

 

 

The force which a proper government exercises against criminals is
not
in defense of
society,
but of an
individual.
A murderer did not hurt “society”—he killed an individual man. He violated, not a “social” right, but an individual right. Secondarily, the punishment of a murderer benefits society [because] society cannot exist unless individual rights are protected. Here again, the social is secondary, a natural consequence of the individual—and beneficial
only
in that secondary manner.

This point is extremely important. It is the sloppy fallacy that a policeman protects “society”—that he is there to combat crimes against society—that creates the acceptance of the idea that we can exercise force for the
“social”
good. There is no “social good” and it can never be defined. Only in serving
individual good
can we accomplish any
social
good at all. And the clear, objective standards defining the individual good are inalienable individual rights. Force can be exercised only in the protection of these rights.
[Here we see AR’s respect for the rights of every man, genius or not; her individualism has led her away from Nietszche.
]

The policeman is not protecting a community (a collective) against single individual malefactors. He is protecting individuals against the possibility of collective violence. The only protection the individual needs is against the collective, and the only action which a collective can take (as a collective) is violence—physical force. A society based on the prohibition of the exercise of physical force between its members is an anti-collectivist society. (Force is the only specifically “collective” method.)

(Breach of contract comes under the same category. If a man is up against a single man and a contract is broken, the man can deal with the breaker by force. But he cannot [protect himself] if the breaker has a collective of followers under his command. Then the intervention of government—of law to protect contracts—is needed, because this keeps the issue between two men and their rights, allowing no recourse to violence in which the man with the most followers would win. Again, a contract society is an anti-collectivist society.)