The Journals of Ayn Rand (52 page)

A possibly helpful point toward a clear definition of what constitutes one’s own judgment and what is merely taken on second-hand authority: an independent rational judgment is one which we know how to apply to the concrete. Every statement or judgment is an abstraction; when we repeat an abstract statement with no clear idea of its concrete application, we are [being] intellectually second-handed; we destroy our connection with reality and our sole means of handling it—the very fact of our consciousness.

It is useless to accept generalities second-hand, i.e., on the authority of others, because generalities are of no value except when and as applied to the concrete, and each man must do that for himself, applying principles to the concrete events of his life. He cannot do it with a principle he has not understood.

Man has a right (and a moral duty) to state the terms of his existence (again, since his nature is in his own keeping). At a certain point, he must tell his brothers:
“This
is the kind of existence
I
do not accept.” At that point, he [may] face a firing squad rather than submit to others.
Think this point over carefully:
it leads to an extremely important fact—that morality is
not
social, but in certain respects
anti-social.
Morality is unsocial in essence: it applies to and proceeds from
man,
not society. But when it involves man’s relation to other men, it becomes anti-social; it is man’s protection
against
society. (“Rights were not given to man by society nor
for
society, but
against
society. They are man’s protection against all other men.”) And, incidentally, only when each man is thus protected can one have a
good
society. Let society always remain what it is—a consequence, not a determinant, an effect, not a cause,
the secondary, not the primary.

 

 

Nail down—thoroughly, completely, once and for all—the fool idea that good is merely a matter of good will or good intentions. Here’s another abstraction without relation to the concrete—a “floating abstraction.” [
AR’s first written use of this expression.
] Before you can have “good will,” i.e., before you can want to do good, you must know what is the
good.
In effect, fools say that all the problems, personal and political, can be solved by finding “men of good will.” But the “good” is never defined. And actually, most of the evil in this world is done by and through “good” intentions. The cause of evil is
stupidity,
not malice. “Good” is an intellectual concept.

Regarding the golden rule: “Do unto others as you’d want them to do unto you.” This is used in support of altruism. In that way, it would imply that you must give out to charity because you want to be an object of charity yourself. Or—you must sacrifice yourself to others because you want them to sacrifice themselves to you. Actually, the golden rule can work
only
in application to
my
morality: you do not sacrifice yourself to others and you do not wish them to sacrifice themselves to you. You may want to be helped in an emergency or a catastrophe—but
only
in such cases. You consider such cases a calamity—not your normal and proper state of existence. You
do not wish
to live as an object of charity—and you do not hand charity out to others.

1. The nature, necessity, and axiom of morality. (Morality
must
be practical.)

2. Define the morality of egoism.

3. Define the morality of altruism.

4. Virtues—under both moralities.

5. Human relations (personal, economic, political)—under both moralities.

6. Conclusion—the spiritual wreckage and corruption caused by altruism. The spiritual status of an egoist.

The reference of political forms and ideas to morality—and to both systems of morals.

Blast—
once and for all—the horrible notion that love is in the nature of a handout, that it’s alms, charity, something undeserved but handed down out of generosity or pity. This idea leads to the impossible precept of loving everybody. If love is undeserved, one can love everybody; then, the less the object deserves it, the nobler is the love, since it makes the one who loves more generous. Therefore, the noblest emotion would be, not to love a Roark, but to love the lowest, vilest, most contemptible moron one could find. This has been actually preached. Yet, in common sense, people do not love that way.

Love is exception-making and
it must be deserved.
This means [it must be] an exchange—the one who loves gets a personal, selfish happiness out of the virtues or qualities he admires in the object of his love, and love is his payment for them.

It is the idea of love as alms that leads to the idea of parents’ love for their children as a generous sacrifice. But if the parents get no happiness out of their love for their children—their sacrifice is of no use and they’re vicious parents (other things being normal). If they do get personal happiness and their love is authentic, they’d better stop prattling about self-sacrifice.

When society makes claims on the individual—the individual also starts making claims on society (such as “my right to a beautiful street”). Then no untangling [of “rights”] and no justice is possible. The ultimate recourse is brute force. Without individual rights, no peace among men is possible. By herding men into “unity,” one creates total disunity and chaos. Instead of peace, one gets war of all against all, and general hatred.

 

 

The contradiction in the collectivists’ view of mankind: They hate mankind and believe that men cannot rule themselves for their own good, [because of] malice or stupidity or both. Yet they advocate giving total power to this vicious, incompetent majority. This is where the idea of a Nazi elite comes in—fuhrers ruling others for the others’ own good.

Every collectivist hates mankind because he hates himself.

The collectivists have such a tender concern for the dregs of humanity. What is their attitude toward humanity’s heroes?

 

 

For morality as non-social: it is most important (and hardest) to be honest with oneself. The person who lies to himself is much more revolting and corrupt than one who lies to others.

Why is the word “virtue” used as a synonym for “strength” or “effi cacy” ? There is here the same connection as between “right” used for “true to facts” and for “morally correct.” Obviously, the conceptions of morals and virtues were [meant] to be
practical
—not the complete opposite of practice. Altruism made them this last.

There is also the question: practical for whom? If ethics had always been considered as a social matter and based on collectivism—obviously the “good” and the “virtues” were set to profit collectivism, to work for the collective (for society). But collectivism doesn’t work. Therefore, the ethics of collectivism didn’t and couldn’t work. Men
had
to live as individuals—at least partially—in order to survive at all. Thus ethics and “ideals” became the impractical, the impossible. Thus all beauty, dignity, and inspiration were taken out of men’s actual lives. Men functioned on the conviction that their actual existence and their deepest reality were vicious, depraved, contrary to all ideals. And every attempt to reach the ideal resulted in suffering, horror, and evil.

No, ethics are
not
set arbitrarily, with some utilitarian purpose in view (as the dialectic materialists may claim at this point); that is, ethics are
not relative,
set “pragmatically.” No, we cannot have: “bourgeois ethics,” “capitalist ethics,” “collectivist ethics”—for the sake of a class, a state or any other “sake.” Ethics
are
absolute and objective. They must be based—not on an arbitrarily chosen purpose—but on the very nature of man. And the nature of man is individualistic. And the only ethics that will work are the ethics of individualism.