The Muslim Brotherhood (16 page)

Whilst some elements within the Brotherhood, such as those in the Gulf and in Jordan, were broadly happy with this new system, others were less than enamoured with the new set-up. This included Sudanese Brotherhood leader, Hassan al-Turabi, who resented Mashour’s mission to bring everything under his control. Turabi, himself an ambitious internationalist, who had become somewhat of an Islamic personality in his own right, refused to be put under such a tight yoke and refused to give his
baya
(allegiance) to Mashour. Unable to accept such disobedience, the Guidance Office in Cairo took to wooing those Sudanese Ikhwan who were uncomfortable with Turabi’s stance. This included Sheikh Sadeq Abdelmajid, who had been educated in Egypt and whose ‘heart was with the Egyptians’.
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According to Sudanese brother, Dr Alamin Osman, Mustafa Mashour ‘fought harshly against Dr Hassan al-Turabi and encouraged Sheikh Sadeq to break away’.
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Consequently in 1985 a number of Sudanese brothers led by Sadeq split from Turabi and joined the Ikhwan’s international structure, thereby splitting the movement inside Sudan.

Turabi’s refusal to submit to Cairo’s authority came as a major blow to the Egyptians and shook their confidence at a time when they believed that the world was their oyster. As part of the Nizam al-Khass, they prized obedience as a core principle of the Brotherhood and they clearly could not countenance any challenge to their belief that as Egyptians, they were the natural leaders of the entire Ikhwan movement. Yet the inflexibility of this group at this time highlights one of the Ikhwan’s more systemic problems. Their rigidity and unwillingness to accept anyone with a different political or intellectual approach has meant that they have never allowed any space for personalities to develop inside the movement. This has resulted in figures such as Hassan al-Turabi, Yusuf al-Qaradawi and the Tunisian scholar Rashid al-Ghannouchi moving out of the Brotherhood and its tight hierarchy in order to progress their thinking. Indeed, Cairo’s insistence on running the show and keeping the role of Murshid an exclusively Egyptian post has lost the Ikhwan some key thinkers who might have moved the movement forward in a more creative way.

The Turabi crisis aside, the Ikhwan continued to develop its international structures and to expand its reach. As Hossam Tamam has correctly observed, ‘The 1980s were the golden age for the Ikhwan. They established themselves everywhere.’
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Indeed, the brothers made the most of the Islamic revivalism that flourished at this time to build up their networks of mosques and activities in Europe, which became a key propaganda centre. They also made use of their global networks to support their activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The international
tanzeem
used its close relationship with Saudi Arabia to facilitate money flows and propaganda efforts aimed at bolstering the mujahideen in the Afghan struggle.

It was also in the 1980s that the Ikhwan made use of important personalities like Egyptian businessman Youssef Nada to extend their international reach. Nada, who was dubbed the King of Cement, having made his fortune in the Egyptian cement business and supplied cement to Saudi Arabia during the boom building time of the early 1970s, had fled Egypt in 1960 and eventually settled in Campione, an Italian municipality in Switzerland. Although a member of the Brotherhood, Nada was an important figure in his own right and his immense wealth, important connections and shrewd intellect made him a valued resource that the Ikhwan was keen to make use of. As a result Nada who held no official position with the Guidance Office or other organisational structures became a sort of roving ambassador for the Ikhwan and was responsible for managing the movement’s important international relationships.
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He guided the Ikhwan’s relationship with the new regime in Tehran following the Iranian revolution of 1979 and arranged for a number of Ikhwani delegations to go to Iran to pay their respects to the new leadership. Nada used his finances to fund some of these visits, allegedly paying $30,000 in one instance to charter a special aeroplane to take one Ikhwani delegation from Islamabad to Iran.
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He also mediated on behalf of the Ikhwan in relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and between the Algerian Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) leaders in prison and the Algerian government during the 1990s. He was clearly a linchpin in the Brotherhood’s international structures.

However, Nada is perhaps most famous for setting up the Al-Taqwa bank in 1988 along with Syrian Ikhwani Ghaleb Himmat and Ahmed Idris Nasreddin. After the 9/11 attacks, the US treasury accused the bank of financing terrorism and funding al-Qa‘ida and in 2001 the US pressurised the Bahamas to revoke the bank’s licence. Nada himself was also put under investigation by Swiss prosecutors, who raided his villa and that of Himmat in 2001. Although the case was eventually dropped through lack of evidence, the controversy did
little to assist the Ikhwan in its bid to be the moderate face of political Islam. Al-Taqwa is often referred to as the ‘Ikhwan’s bank’. Furthermore, many of the bank’s shareholders were members of the Ikhwan and other figures with close links to the Ikhwan also held shares. Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, for example, is reported to have held 5,285 shares in the bank as at April 2000.
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But to present Al-Taqwa as a financial arm of the Ikhwan is to misrepresent it somewhat: as Nada himself explained, ‘The Ikhwani do not have money in the bank as a group, but as individuals.’
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However, whilst Al-Taqwa was not a Brotherhood institution as such, it was a useful conduit for financial flows that enhanced the Ikhwan’s international position at the time.

Just as Nada brought the Ikhwan unwanted controversy so too did a document that was found in the house of his colleague Ghaleb Himmat during a police raid on his villa. Dubbed ‘The Project’, some commentators have portrayed this document as evidence of the Brotherhood’s sinister project to take over the Western world.
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The document dated 1 December 1982 laid out the Ikhwan’s goals in its bid to create an international Islamic strategy. These goals were divided into twelve key points, and include the following pledges:

To know the terrain and adopt a scientific methodology for its planning and execution.

To reconcile international engagement with flexibility at a local level.

To work loyally with Islamic groups and institutions in multiple areas to agree on common ground.

To accept the principle of temporary co-operation between Islamic movements and nationalist movements in the broad sphere and on common ground such as the struggle against
colonialism, preaching and the Jewish state, without however having to form alliances.

To construct a permanent force of the Islamic
dawa
and support movements engaged in jihad across the Muslim world

To use diverse and varied surveillance systems, in several places, to gather information and adopt a single effective warning system serving the worldwide Islamic movement.
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In spite of the allegations, this document is a fairly mundane wish list and would appear to be largely an expression of intent that reflects the ambition and optimism of the time. The document was produced at the beginnings of the international
tanzeem
and seems to be a broad set of objectives that were typical of the ideas that were doing the rounds then. Helbawy noted that there was much consultation and many such documents being produced in the early 1980s. Nada also asserts that he has no idea what the document is.
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Therefore, whilst much has been made of this text, it would simply seem to reflect the dream of internationalisation that was taking place within the movement at the time.

By the end of the 1980s, however, this dream was looking increasingly distant as a far more serious crisis was to unfold. It would kill the dream of the international
tanzeem
and flag up serious doubts about how far ‘international brotherhood’ could really extend. This crisis was Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, which plunged the Ikhwan into complete disarray and that challenged its administrative and ideological unity. Whilst some branches were more sympathetic to the Kuwaiti
predicament, others felt that their loyalties lay with Saddam. According to Bassam al-Amoush, a former Jordanian brother, ‘The Ikhwan’s stance during the second Gulf crisis was terrifying. There was a big division in the movement and no clear Ikhwani vision as to which stance to take.’
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Just when the Ikhwan needed to take a clear stance and to direct the movement’s response, the international
tanzeem
proved unable to step up to the mark.

On the day that Saddam’s tanks rolled into Kuwait the Guidance Office in Cairo issued a statement signed by Murshid Mohamed Hamid Abu Naser. Although the statement expressed the Brotherhood’s surprise and disappointment at the Iraqi regime’s actions, it came across as a rather lukewarm and unconvincing denouncement of the invasion that simply called upon Iraqi leaders to ‘reconsider what they had done’ and expressed the Ikhwan’s hope that these leaders would ‘go back on their steps’.
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Whilst the statement asserted that the Islamic world and the
umma
had condemned Iraq’s actions, there was no explicit condemnation of Iraq by the Muslim Brotherhood itself. As the former General Guide of the Syrian brotherhood Ali Saddredine al-Bayanouni admitted in retrospect, ‘The first statement we issued, we condemned the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq. We condemned the occupation in a way that might be considered to have been mild.’
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The statement was so tepid that just nine days later the Guidance Office issued another in which it tried to clarify its stance. This was slightly more forceful in its criticism of the invasion although still not particularly strong and simply stated that the Brotherhood ‘opposes any military intervention by an Arab or Muslim state against another Arab or Muslim state.’
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But by this point the international situation had changed. The first US forces had arrived in Saudi Arabia in preparation for action against the Iraqi regime. Furthermore, the Arab League had also voted to send Egyptian, Syrian and Moroccan forces to join the Western troops in their bid to force Saddam Hussein out
of Kuwait. The Brotherhood therefore came forward in this second statement to express their total rejection of the presence of American forces in the region, declaring:

The Muslim Brotherhood condemns and fiercely opposes the American military intervention in the Gulf crisis whatever justification the US is using for their presence … Their presence is rejected on every level and by every means because it will result in a return to the era of the protectorate and to occupation of the region.
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The statement was also unequivocal in its objection to Arab troops working alongside those from Western countries.

The contrast between the Ikhwan’s lukewarm criticism of Iraq and its outright condemnation of the US in this statement is striking. It was as if America’s entering the conflict had provided the Ikhwan with a much-needed get-out clause. It gave the brothers a rallying point that they could focus on, as it was far easier to retreat into the safety and comfort of anti-Westernism than it was to take sides between Iraq and Kuwait. Opposing the ‘Western enemy’ not only had a broad populist appeal; it was also something that the various national branches of the Brotherhood could be guaranteed to agree on. As Tunisian leader Sheikh Rashid al-Ghannouchi summarised, ‘We are not worshiping personalities, but anyone who confronts the enemies of Islam is my friend and anyone who puts himself in the service of the enemies of Islam is my enemy.’
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However, some branches were so forthright in their condemnation of foreign intervention that to some Kuwaiti eyes they appeared to be supporting Saddam Hussein. As Dr Kamal Helbawy tactfully explained:

The official stance was that we were against the invasion of Kuwait and we were against seeking assistance from the
Americans. But individually yes maybe some people were … the Palestinians and the Jordanians were closer to Saddam Hussein and some other countries and personalities were with the Kuwaitis, you could say. But I am sure everyone was against the presence of the American troops in the area … Some of the Syrians who had lived with Saddam Hussein maybe supported him beyond the reasonable limit. But it was a time full of crisis and that is why the Ikhwan advised Saddam to pull out.
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Whilst figures such as Mustafa Mashour had close ties with the Kuwaitis, who had been willing to provide the movement with much needed financial assistance, others had a much stronger personal loyalty to Saddam Hussein. Some of the Syrian Ikhwani had particularly close ties with the former Iraqi leader, who had offered them support when they were being persecuted by the Ba’athists in their country. Dr Hassan al-Huwaidi, Ali Saddredine al-Bayanouni and Adnan Saad Eddine all spent time in Baghdad under Saddam’s protection even though he had persecuted Iraqi Ikhwani; as Adnan Saad Eddine explained, ‘I knew Saddam very closely and knew all the [Iraqi] leaders.’
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Those who felt most honour-bound to stand with Saddam, however, were the Jordanians, who were particularly vocal in their objections to the presence of American troops in the region. According to Kuwaiti brother Mubarak al-Dwaila, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan were the most aggressive and differed a lot from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt whose stance was good.’
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These loyalties derived largely from the fact that Saddam Hussein was widely considered at that time to be the champion of the Palestinian cause; given the large numbers of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, including within the Jordanian Ikhwan, the brothers there felt duty-bound to defend Saddam. They issued a number of statements following the invasion such as that of 5 August, which made no criticism of the Iraqi invasion but
declared: ‘We condemn the stance of the American crusaders that are leading the forces of arrogance. America is the state that is leading all the forces that are hostile to Islam and Muslims.’
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Jordanian brothers also voiced their anger in other arenas and some joined pro-Saddam demonstrations in the streets. One Ikhwani Deputy to the Jordanian parliament, Yousef al-Athaum, declared, ‘Iraqi feet on Kuwaiti territory are better than American feet.’
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Feelings were running so high in Jordan that the Jordanian Ikhwan was eventually forced to issue a statement reminding the Jordanian population that whatever the politics involved, the Kuwaitis should be treated with respect, not least because the ‘Muslim Kuwaiti people gave a lot to our
umma
and were the most interested in the Palestinian cause. They gave a lot of their money to help their brothers everywhere.’
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