The Muslim Brotherhood (18 page)

As such, by the 2000s, the international
tanzeem
appears to have been reduced to a body that promoted organisational co-ordination without obligation. That is not to say that Cairo did try to convince other Ikhwani branches of what to do or how to act in certain situations. Jordanian militant and former Ikhwani Bassam al-Amoush, who was a member of the international
tanzeem
, complained in 2007 that whilst it is ‘nothing more than a co-ordinating body between the Ikhwani branches … it suffers from the control of the Egyptian brothers’.
⁷⁷
Similarly, according to one Iraqi brother, although Egypt has not exercised its power to prevent members from taking certain decisions and leaves it to local branches to decide, ‘it sends members to ask what happened and why. If the movement goes astray … the
international Brotherhood decides which faction is the most faithful and says to the one that isn’t “You don’t represent the Ikhwan.”’
⁷⁸

In fact, the Guidance Office has made its disapproval of the actions of some branches overtly clear in recent years. The leadership in Cairo found it extremely difficult to accept that the Syrian Ikhwan had formed an alliance with former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam. As explained in
Chapter Two
, the Syrians joined Khaddam to establish an opposition platform called the National Salvation Front. Akef states: ‘I sent for them and I told them my view but they are free to make their own decision. I don’t intervene as long as their decision is based upon their views and their Shura Council.’
⁷⁹
He also says:

I gave them space to move around because I am not under the same pressure that they are because hundreds of their families are suffering under bad laws … So I gave them space to move around, but I am not with their view in this case … If I were fighting with the Palestinians I would oblige them to follow my decision but because I am not fighting with them I give them the chance to take their own decisions.
⁸⁰

This reference to the Palestinians goes to the core of why the Guidance Office and many other Brotherhood groups were so opposed to the Syrian bid to strengthen the challenge to the al-Assad regime. Following the toppling of Saddam Hussein, the Syrian regime became known as the primary champion of the Palestinian cause within the Arab world. Its intransigence towards Israel and the West combined with its support for Hizbullah and more importantly Hamas brought it praise from groups such as the Brotherhood. Bashar al-Assad’s willingness to host Hamas leader Khalid Meshaal was seen as almost heroic by many Ikhwani. Given the primacy of the Palestinian issue in the Arab world and within the Ikhwan’s own platforms, the Guidance Office believed it should be quietly supporting the Syrian regime
rather than an opposition platform, even if that platform was shared by the Syrian brothers. Although Cairo did not forbid the Syrian Ikhwan from joining Khaddam’s platform, it certainly brought some serious pressure to bear on the movement over the issue.

The Guidance Office in Cairo was also deeply troubled by the Iraqi Islamic Party’s willingness to take part in the political process in Iraq following the 2003 invasion. However, the Iraqis were not afforded the space given to the Syrian Ikhwani to forge their own path, because Iraq was a clear case of a foreign power occupying a Muslim land. The statements and pronouncements made by key Ikhwani leaders in relation to the situation in Iraq are completely at odds with the stance taken by their Iraqi brothers. According to the spokesman for the political arm of the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood, the Iraqi Islamic Party, when the party decided to take part in the Iraqi elections ‘the International
tanzeem
opposed it because they didn’t understand it’.
⁸¹

He also complained that there had been particular problems with some Ikhwani ‘of a more nationalistic outlook’.
⁸²

According to Akef a group of Iraqi Islamists including Tariq al-Hashemi, the head of the political arm of the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood and the Iraqi Islamic Party, Harith al-Dari the head of the Iraqi Scholars Committee and Adnan Dulaimi, the head of the Sunni Al-Tawafaq Front, came to see him in Cairo. During the meeting al-Hashemi explained that his party believed that they should take part in the post-Saddam political process. Akef goes on:

I told them literally, ‘Are all of you agreed that resistance is a must?’ They said yes. All of them. So I told them, ‘Okay, you agreed on resistance so let’s look at what methods we can use to achieve it, whether political or resistance.’ They all answered, ‘We agree on resistance and we will resist in the way we see fit.’ I told them, ‘You can agree on resisting through the media, writing, politics, but you mustn’t take
part in ruling because the Iraqi rulers are traitors who were brought in by the occupiers and who are so keen on remaining there.’
⁸³

The Iraqi Islamic Party determined to take part in the political process in spite of the Murshid’s objections. This angered Akef: ‘As for the Iraqi Islamic Party, it doesn’t represent the Muslim Brothers. They say they are Muslim Brothers but they are not. They are not Ikhwan and they don’t represent the Ikhwan in Iraq. I told them that clearly to their faces. What is happening in Iraq is a very dangerous situation. It is run by occupiers.’
⁸⁴
Akef also states that there was still a group of Muslim Brothers operating underground in Iraq who were not taking part in the ruling structures. In a scene reminiscent of the earlier days of the international
tanzeem
, the Guidance Office decided to back a group of Iraqi Ikhwani who were not taking part in the political process whilst marginalising those who disagreed with it. Cairo’s need to voice the sentiment of the street and to be seen to be standing up to the occupying power once again overrode its commitment to the political wishes of individual branches.

That both the Syrians and the Iraqis chose to ignore Cairo’s objections is testimony to the fact that after all these years the international
tanzeem
had been reduced to little more than a talking shop. As Mohamed Habib explained, ‘As the international
tanzeem
, we discuss challenges facing Islam and nationalist causes.’
⁸⁵
However, for all that it might have had limited importance in recent years, contrary to the assertions of some brothers, the international
tanzeem
is most definitely a reality rather than a myth. Yet, the international
tanzeem
appears to have been primarily the romantic and unattainable dream of a group of Ikhwan led by Mustafa Mashour. The project was very much personality driven and it is no coincidence that the decline of the international organisation corresponded to the demise of Mashour. For a movement made up of so many different currents
all facing different challenges the idea of pulling them together into a cohesive ideological and administrative unit was clearly over-ambitious and doomed to failure. The core concept of the international
tanzeem
went against the very characteristic of the Ikhwan that has enabled it to endure for so many years, namely its flexibility.

Whether the Arab Spring will see a renewed push for this international body to be reinvigorated has yet to be seen. The Brotherhood’s emerging on to the political mainstream not only in Egypt, but also in Libya, has certainly opened up new possibilities for greater co-operation on the international level. Indeed, such co-operation is inevitable. Some elements within the Egyptian Brotherhood, however, have already taken to calling for the reactivation of the international
tanzeem
.
⁸⁶
Senior Egyptian Brotherhood member, Sofwat Hijazi, meanwhile, has called for the setting up of an alliance of ‘Ikhwani
wilayas
’ (governates). Hijazi has also spoken of his dream of establishing a new caliphate across the Islamic world.
⁸⁷
Whilst such talk of a new caliphate is clearly exaggerated, and whilst national priorities continue to dominate, not least because of the precariousness of the post-revolutionary climate, particularly in Egypt, there may well be a growing momentum among some parts of the movement to try to extend the Brotherhood’s international reach through the international
tanzeem
once again.

Whilst the main focus of the Ikhwan’s activity has been the Middle East and the Islamic world, Europe has also provided an arena for this transnational movement. The Ikhwan put down roots in the continent in the 1950s and 1960s, through students who had come to Europe to study and figures such as Egyptian Ikhwani Said Ramadan, who sought to spread
dawa
. The Ikhwan’s numbers were bolstered too by those fleeing persecution from their own regimes who sought refuge in various European countries. Through the 1970s and 1980s, when the period of Islamic revivalism swept Islamic communities in Europe, just as it did the Arab world, the Ikhwan was able to capitalise on the renewed religious consciousness combined with increased politicisation. During the 1980s in particular, when the international
tanzeem
was at its peak, Europe became an important financial centre for the Ikhwan as well as a media centre that could assist in instrumentalising the struggle in the Middle East. The Brotherhood built up a network of mosques and Islamic centres, often with money from backers in the Gulf, and was able to spread its
dawa
among Islamic communities. By the end of the 1990s the Ikhwan had in many countries been able to
establish itself as the primary Islamic organisation, quietly dominating religious institutions across the continent. As Dr Kamal Helbawy observed, ‘Wherever Muslim Brothers go they establish institutions. They don’t like to work individually.’
¹

Whilst the Ikhwan had its differences with those of a more militant bent who were also active in the continent, the distinction between moderates and radicals was not so clear-cut at this time. The nature of the community was such that these groups orbited around each other, disagreeing bitterly with each other’s methods but ultimately feeling that they were part of the same Muslim minority. The events of 9/11 would change this situation: the Ikhwan suddenly found itself forced to take a very public stance on a range of issues from violence to terrorism to radicalisation.

The Brotherhood has responded to these new challenges with characteristic pragmatism, seeking to posit itself as the main interlocutor between Muslim communities and governments in a bid to extend its political and educational influence. This in turn has given them a greater control over their own communities. In this way, they have almost become pillars of the establishment, part of the status quo; something that has brought them the ridicule of more hardline elements, who accuse them of selling out. Their willingness to work with the establishment is partly a continuation of the Ikhwan’s tradition of working within existing political frameworks, but it is also symptomatic of the limited appeal that they have among Muslim communities, leaving them desperately seeking a way to increase their own political leverage. Moreover, the Ikhwan has generally been considered as an elitist group within the Islamic milieu.

Analysing the evolution of the Ikwhan in Europe is particularly challenging because in many cases its members are reticent about their links to the Brotherhood. Their desire to avoid such linkages is understandable in that many Ikhwani brought the mentality of their own countries to Europe, fearing that their own security
services would target them even whilst they were there or, worse, that their families back home would be harassed as a result of any open connections to the Ikwhan. Such concerns are not as far-fetched as they may appear. In 1981 Syrian Ikhwani Issam al-Attar was targeted by the Syrian security services in Germany in an attack that left his wife dead. The Libyan regime was also known for getting rid of troublesome opponents during the 1980s. However, the fear of being openly associated with the Ikhwan extends further. Many Ikhwani are wary of being associated with an organisation that has such a negative reputation in some Western circles and that – despite its pacific stance – has been involved in violence on occasion. Such concerns became all the more pressing after 9/11, when the Brotherhood feared that it might be proscribed as a terrorist organisation.

Another reason that some Ikhwani in Europe have sought to conceal their links to the Brotherhood is their desire to reach beyond their natural constituencies to attract a wider support base. They have played on the idea that the Brotherhood is a school of thought rather than a movement. In some senses this is true; the reformist conservative Islam that they are promoting is the ideology followed by many communities across the Islamic world. As such they have tried to present their organisations as following the same broad philosophy as the Ikhwan but with no institutional linkage to the movement. However, the vast majority of those running these Islamic organisations in Europe are fully fledged members of the Brotherhood, in many cases tightly enmeshed into the Ikhwan’s international networks through family, marriage or personal ties.

The bid to distance themselves from the Ikhwan is further driven by the fact that such linkages are a potential source of problems and embarrassment. Living as part of a minority community in Europe means that these Islamist leaders need to be able to dissociate themselves from some of the proclamations of key Ikhwani leaders over issues such as suicide bombing, the war in Iraq and Palestine, as
well as over women’s rights and the treatment of religious minorities. Ironically, this sometimes puts the leaders at odds with their own constituencies; such proclamations may represent popular opinion, yet these organisations cannot afford to be seen to be supporting such ideas within the confines of their host countries. In addition, there has been a need since 9/11 to distance from Saudi Arabia and the financial flows from the Gulf that had so assisted them in the past.