The New Nobility of the KGB (24 page)
Read The New Nobility of the KGB Online
Authors: Andrei Soldatov
Tags: #History, #Europe, #Russia & the Former Soviet Union, #Political Science, #General, #International Relations, #Security (National & International), #Intelligence & Espionage, #World, #Russian & Former Soviet Union, #Social Science, #Social Classes
Yandarbiyev left Chechnya in 1999 for the United Arab Emirates, having been appointed by Maskhadov as a representative of Chechnya in Muslim countries. (In his new role, he opened a Chechen embassy in Kabul and a consulate in Kandahar.) In the early 2000s Yandarbiyev came to Qatar as a personal guest of the emir, despite having been on the Interpol wanted list since 2001.
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In May 2003 Russia formally requested Yandarbiyev’s extradition from Qatar, and in June the U.N. Security Council’s counterterrorist committee added him to its “sanctions list.”
2
The week after the attack on Yandarbiyev, on the night of February 18, Qatari authorities arrested three Russians in a rented villa near the Russian embassy. The arrests became known because of a statement by Igor Ivanov, the Russian minister of foreign affairs. Ivanov admitted that all three were agents of the Russian secret services:
1
In May 2003 Russia formally requested Yandarbiyev’s extradition from Qatar, and in June the U.N. Security Council’s counterterrorist committee added him to its “sanctions list.”
2
The week after the attack on Yandarbiyev, on the night of February 18, Qatari authorities arrested three Russians in a rented villa near the Russian embassy. The arrests became known because of a statement by Igor Ivanov, the Russian minister of foreign affairs. Ivanov admitted that all three were agents of the Russian secret services:
“The Russian citizens, one of which has a diplomatic passport, are employees of the Russian secret services. Within the limits of the status attached to the embassy, they were in Qatar on legal grounds, and they fulfilled the tasks without any violation of local legislation, tasks of an information-analytical character, connected to counteraction of international terrorism.
3
Although he claimed Russia “has no involvement in this incident,” Ivanov pointed out that Russian authorities had “repeatedly, including at the highest level, addressed Qatar with urgent requirements to extradite Yandarbiyev, who was personally responsible for the deaths of hundreds of citizens of Russia, including victims in the Dubrovka theater in Moscow, as a result of acts of terrorism which were supervised directly from Qatar.” The Russian authorities accused Yandarbiyev of helping to mastermind the hostage taking, based on two phone calls between Movsar Barayev, a leader of hostage-takers, and Yandarbiyev during the crisis that were intercepted by the secret services.
The Qatari authorities riposted by releasing a statement containing the names of the Russians: Alexander Fetisov, the first secretary of the Russian embassy in Qatar, who was released to the Russian embassy due to his diplomatic status but was not allowed to leave the country; Anatoly Yablochkov (sometimes pronounced as Belashkov); and Vasily Pugachev (or Bogachyov). Yablochkov and Pugachev were charged by Qatar with the assassination of Yandarbiyev, the attempted assassination of his son, Daud, and with smuggling weapons into Qatar. Both agents gave detailed confessions that were included in the Qatari prosecution case during the trial. Russia said their confessions were extracted by torture.
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The way the operation was carried out can be gleaned from information published by Chechens, who described it as the result of the Qatari interrogation of the suspects.
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There are still unanswered questions and gaps, but the trial was closed to the public at Russia’s request, and further details could not be obtained.
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There are still unanswered questions and gaps, but the trial was closed to the public at Russia’s request, and further details could not be obtained.
At 7:30 A.M. on January 22, 2004, Yablochkov and Pugachev landed at Doha airport. The authors’ sources provided information that both officers were agents of Russian military intelligence. The Russian newspaper
Kommersant
later reported that it had learned from sources in the Qatari prosecutors office that the order to kill Yandarbiyev had been issued directly by Sergei Ivanov, the Russian defense minister.
6
Kommersant
later reported that it had learned from sources in the Qatari prosecutors office that the order to kill Yandarbiyev had been issued directly by Sergei Ivanov, the Russian defense minister.
6
Two hours later a Jeep Cherokee and Nissan Primera, both bearing diplomatic plates, crossed the border into Qatar from the UAE. The cars held a batch of explosives. Yablochkov and Pugachev stayed in a villa rented by the Russian embassy, where they were met by the first secretary of the embassy, Fetisov.
Preparation for the operation had taken three weeks. On February 13, three Russians in a Mitsubishi Pajero with diplomatic plates arrived in the parking lot of the Sheraton hotel in Doha. Yablochkov traded the Pajero for a rented van and headed to the mosque, where he was to wait for Yandarbiyev. When the Toyota Land Cruiser, with Yandarbiyev inside, pulled up in front of the mosque, Yablochkov returned to the Sheraton for Fetisov. Back at the mosque, Yablochkov planted the bomb beneath Yandarbiyev’s vehicle. After the explosion the agents returned to the Sheraton parking lot, where Pugachev was waiting for them. They changed cars once again before retuning to their villa.
Because of their obvious Slavic appearance Yablochkov and Fetisov were noticed and later identified by the security guard of the mosque’s parking lot. Crucial evidence was found in their rented villa, including details of explosives and photographs of Yandarbiyev taken during surveillance.
At the time of the attack, Qatar lacked a professional counter-intelligence service. The emir turned for help to U.S. intelligence, which may have helped to track the cellular phones used by the Russian agents. U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Steven Pifer confirmed in an interview with the Moscow-based newspaper
Vremya Novostei
that the United States did provide Qatar with “very insignificant technical assistance” in tracking down the alleged assassins.
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Asked by the Associated Press to comment on this statement, an official of the U.S. embassy in Moscow replied that Washington had sent a team of explosives experts to Qatar at the emir’s request, adding that the U.S. experts “played no role in the arrest or investigation of any suspects.”
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Vremya Novostei
that the United States did provide Qatar with “very insignificant technical assistance” in tracking down the alleged assassins.
7
Asked by the Associated Press to comment on this statement, an official of the U.S. embassy in Moscow replied that Washington had sent a team of explosives experts to Qatar at the emir’s request, adding that the U.S. experts “played no role in the arrest or investigation of any suspects.”
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The Kremlin made strenuous efforts—from visits by high-ranking personnel and presidential calls to pressure on the media—to get the detainees back to Russia. At a diplomatic level, Putin repeatedly sent Igor Ivanov, the secretary of Russia’s Security Council and a former minister of foreign affairs, to Qatar for negotiations. In Qatar the captured agents were provided with attorneys from the famous Russian law office of Yegorov, Puginsky, Afanasiev, and Partners. This was a clear sign of direct support from Putin, because the head of the firm, Nikolai Yegorov, had studied at university with Putin and maintained close ties with him. Leonid Parfenov, a host on NTV television in Moscow, obtained an interview with Yandarbiyev’s widow after the bombing. It went on the air in May as part of the Sunday program
Namedni
, one of NTV’s most highly rated and well-respected programs. The program aired in eastern Russia, but as the hours passed, NTV management pulled the interview before it was seen in western and central Russia including Moscow. In a letter to Parfenov, NTV’s management said the FSB had ordered that the interview be dropped, arguing that it could negatively impact the ongoing trial in Qatar. Parfenov protested and sent the letter to the newspaper
Kommersant
. Two days later Parfenov was fired and the program was shut down.
9
According to NTV’s Web site, Parfenov had breached his contract with the network by “not supporting the company’s leadership.”
10
Namedni
, one of NTV’s most highly rated and well-respected programs. The program aired in eastern Russia, but as the hours passed, NTV management pulled the interview before it was seen in western and central Russia including Moscow. In a letter to Parfenov, NTV’s management said the FSB had ordered that the interview be dropped, arguing that it could negatively impact the ongoing trial in Qatar. Parfenov protested and sent the letter to the newspaper
Kommersant
. Two days later Parfenov was fired and the program was shut down.
9
According to NTV’s Web site, Parfenov had breached his contract with the network by “not supporting the company’s leadership.”
10
On February 26, 2004, two Qatari citizens were detained at Moscow’s Sheremetievo airport. FSB officials claimed they were suspected of having ties with the Chechen rebels, although both the detainees, Ibat Akhmedov and Naser Ibragim Midahi, were members of Qatar’s national Olympic team. They had traveled from Belarus to Serbia through Moscow, and were sent to Lefortovo prison. The detention of two of its national athletes was a clear attempt on Russia’s part to make a bargain with the Qataris.
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On March 23, Putin personally called the Emir of Qatar. After the call, Fetisov was allowed to come back to Moscow and the two Qatari citizens in Moscow were released.
12
In April the trial in Qatar began, but at Russia’s request it was held behind closed doors.
13
In the months that followed, the Russian secret agents were tried and convicted of murder. Both men were sentenced to life in prison—not to death, as had been requested by prosecutor.
14
In the summer Qatari authorities promised to hand the officers over to Russia, ostensibly to serve out their sentences in a Russian jail. For that to happen, Qatar approved a new version of its Criminal Code that allowed the convicts to be transferred to their homeland.
15
Not long afterward, Russia and Qatar signed a prisoner exchange agreement.
12
In April the trial in Qatar began, but at Russia’s request it was held behind closed doors.
13
In the months that followed, the Russian secret agents were tried and convicted of murder. Both men were sentenced to life in prison—not to death, as had been requested by prosecutor.
14
In the summer Qatari authorities promised to hand the officers over to Russia, ostensibly to serve out their sentences in a Russian jail. For that to happen, Qatar approved a new version of its Criminal Code that allowed the convicts to be transferred to their homeland.
15
Not long afterward, Russia and Qatar signed a prisoner exchange agreement.
On the night of December 23, a Russian government plane, one that usually carried high-ranking officials but this time with both prisoners onboard, landed at Moscow’s Vnukovo airport. Vnukovo was chosen because it is a VIP airport, used by Putin for traveling all over the world. There the two prisoners were met by Russian officials, and although no press was allowed to attend the meeting, it became known that the proverbial red carpet was rolled out for them. The secret agents had come home to a hero’s welcome.
16
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The same day the official news agency of Qatar declared:
The State of Qatar has granted the Russian government’s request to hand over two citizens of Russia to serve the remaining term of their sentences, determined at trial in Qatar, in a Russian prison. Consent has been given according to an agreement concluded by the two states on the basis of rules and laws appropriate to the specific case.
17
In Moscow, members of Parliament and government officials were busy arguing what kind of awards should be granted to national heroes, and nobody even pretended to comply with the conditions imposed by Qatari authorities.
18
“In Russia’s eyes they are innocent. There is no need for any further court procedure,” said Dmitri Peskov, a deputy press secretary to Putin, in January 2005.
19
In February 2005 the head of Russia’s Federal Penal Service, Yuri Kalinin, claimed he had no information on the whereabouts of the agents convicted in Qatar. “As for our citizens who were delivered from Qatar, they are not being held in our institutions,” Kalinin said in comments carried by the Ren-TV television channel.“I have no further information. Maybe they are receiving medical treatment somewhere. Maybe some procedural issues are being resolved. You see, a sentence passed by a Qatar court does not serve as grounds for holding somebody in prison in Russia.”
20
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“In Russia’s eyes they are innocent. There is no need for any further court procedure,” said Dmitri Peskov, a deputy press secretary to Putin, in January 2005.
19
In February 2005 the head of Russia’s Federal Penal Service, Yuri Kalinin, claimed he had no information on the whereabouts of the agents convicted in Qatar. “As for our citizens who were delivered from Qatar, they are not being held in our institutions,” Kalinin said in comments carried by the Ren-TV television channel.“I have no further information. Maybe they are receiving medical treatment somewhere. Maybe some procedural issues are being resolved. You see, a sentence passed by a Qatar court does not serve as grounds for holding somebody in prison in Russia.”
20
The Qatari operation was intended to be a showcase for the Russian secret services. The consequent arrest of three Russian suspects, their eventual conviction by a Qatari court, and their triumphal return to Moscow helped to create a new strategy—one that would launch operations beyond the borders of the country. Russian officials said they were impressed by the Israeli example of hunting down terrorists abroad. After Yandarbiyev’s assassination, one FSB colonel in the elite group Vympel asked Soldatov: “Take a look at the Mossad. Why cannot we do the same with our terrorists?”
Vympel, which consists only of officers, was created inside the KGB in August 1981 to carry out deep penetration, sabotage, and liquidations in times of war. In the 1980s the Vympel officers, highly skilled and fluent in different languages, were sent undercover to the West.
21
However, in the mid-1990s, Vympel was turned into an antiterrorist unit, and later it focused on hunting down rebels in Chechnya, in the process losing priceless skills—a matter for constant regret for its officers. At the same time the Kremlin appeared to have learned the lessons of its predecessors, namely that killings would be most effective in countries more willing to rewrite their policy in favor of the states resorting to such tactics. From the beginning, Qatar was regarded by the Kremlin as a state that might be convinced, a hunch that proved correct.
21
However, in the mid-1990s, Vympel was turned into an antiterrorist unit, and later it focused on hunting down rebels in Chechnya, in the process losing priceless skills—a matter for constant regret for its officers. At the same time the Kremlin appeared to have learned the lessons of its predecessors, namely that killings would be most effective in countries more willing to rewrite their policy in favor of the states resorting to such tactics. From the beginning, Qatar was regarded by the Kremlin as a state that might be convinced, a hunch that proved correct.
Two years after the Qatari incident, on June 3, 2006, shortly before 3:00 P.M. a Chevrolet Tahoe carrying five Russian diplomats was cut off by a minivan and a sedan 1,200 feet from the Russian embassy in Baghdad. Gunmen attacked the diplomats’ car in the upscale Mansour neighborhood. One of the diplomats, Vitaly Titov, was severely wounded and died later that day. The other four men were kidnapped. On June 19, the Iraqi insurgents demanded Russian troops withdraw from Chechnya and free all Muslim prisoners in Russia within forty-eight hours, or the diplomats would be executed. On June 25, the terrorists released a hostage video showing one man being beheaded and another shot dead, as well as the body of a third. The next day Russia confirmed that the four diplomats were dead.
On June 28, Putin ordered Russia’s secret services to find and kill the insurgents responsible for kidnapping and killing Russian embassy employees in Iraq.
22
Patrushev, then FSB director, stated that the special services would do everything possible to eliminate the terrorists: “We should ensure that any terrorist who has committed a crime will not avoid the responsibility,” he said. Patrushev added: “This is not a casual assignment. It is in the logic of what we do [i.e., how counterterrorism is understood by the Russian secret services].”
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Patrushev, then FSB director, stated that the special services would do everything possible to eliminate the terrorists: “We should ensure that any terrorist who has committed a crime will not avoid the responsibility,” he said. Patrushev added: “This is not a casual assignment. It is in the logic of what we do [i.e., how counterterrorism is understood by the Russian secret services].”
23
Although it was presented in news reports as an emotional reaction to the diplomats’ murders, Russia’s policy of carrying out assassinations abroad had been under preparation for some time. The Russian parliament spent months discussing the new legislative initiative that allows the FSB to kill terrorists on foreign soil.
24
The first draft of the bill, according to Mikhail Grishankov, a deputy chairman of the Security Committee at the State Duma, was presented to the Duma in March of 2006.
25
It took only a week following Putin’s declaration of retribution in Iraq before the State Duma and Federation Council approved foreign assassinations by intelligence agencies. The federal law was approved by the Duma on July 5, and the special decision of the Federation Council (the upper house of the Russian Parliament) was approved on July 7, 2006.
26
According to this package of antiterrorism bills, the president could now order Russian
spetsnaz
or intelligence groups to conduct operations in foreign countries.
24
The first draft of the bill, according to Mikhail Grishankov, a deputy chairman of the Security Committee at the State Duma, was presented to the Duma in March of 2006.
25
It took only a week following Putin’s declaration of retribution in Iraq before the State Duma and Federation Council approved foreign assassinations by intelligence agencies. The federal law was approved by the Duma on July 5, and the special decision of the Federation Council (the upper house of the Russian Parliament) was approved on July 7, 2006.
26
According to this package of antiterrorism bills, the president could now order Russian
spetsnaz
or intelligence groups to conduct operations in foreign countries.
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