Read The New Nobility of the KGB Online
Authors: Andrei Soldatov
Tags: #History, #Europe, #Russia & the Former Soviet Union, #Political Science, #General, #International Relations, #Security (National & International), #Intelligence & Espionage, #World, #Russian & Former Soviet Union, #Social Science, #Social Classes
The New Nobility of the KGB (26 page)
In June 2002 the authors received a letter from an FSB official who asked not to be identified. In the letter, he noted that by law the FSB has the right to operate as an intelligence agency.
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In 1999, he wrote, President Yeltsin signed a confidential decree on intelligence agencies that, among other things, created a directorate to coordinate “operative information” inside the FSB. The new directorate was established inside the Department of Analysis, Forecasting, and Strategic Planning and was headed by Major General Vyacheslav Ushakov, who had once served with Nikolai Patrushev, then director of the FSB, in Karelia.
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In 1999, he wrote, President Yeltsin signed a confidential decree on intelligence agencies that, among other things, created a directorate to coordinate “operative information” inside the FSB. The new directorate was established inside the Department of Analysis, Forecasting, and Strategic Planning and was headed by Major General Vyacheslav Ushakov, who had once served with Nikolai Patrushev, then director of the FSB, in Karelia.
The authors asked Andrei Laryushin, the official spokesman of the FSB, about the Yeltsin decree. While Laryushin couldn’t confirm the existence of the decree, which was classified information, he allowed: “Basically, existence of such a decree is logical. If there were no such decree there would be contradictions between the FSB and SVR [foreign intelligence]. That decree would become necessary as soon as intelligence and counterintelligence were divided into different services. Otherwise there would be contradictions between the SVR and FSB just as the FBI and CIA periodically interfere with each other,” he added.
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It soon became clear that the new directorate’s functions were to go far beyond those of a routine coordination effort.
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It soon became clear that the new directorate’s functions were to go far beyond those of a routine coordination effort.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, it was crucial for the Kremlin that Moscow retain its influence in post-Soviet states. Russia’s security services sought to maintain special relationships with the former Soviet republics, even helping them to fill the vacuum in their security structures. In April 1992 the Russian foreign intelligence agency signed an agreement with its counterpart in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the loose confederation of republics that had been established, agreeing not to spy on each other.
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Because most of the countries, with the exception of Russia, had little in the way of intelligence operations, the agreement was skewed.
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In turn, the Russian foreign intelligence agency assumed the posture of “Big Brother,” making visits to CIS capitals to attend multilateral meetings or bilateral talks—where they were sometimes received by the heads of state of the host countries. But soon it became evident that the strategy for maintaining the political status quo in post-Soviet republics was ineffective. In the decade of the 2000s, one after another, the old regimes that had been established in the early 1990s fell like dominoes in a series of popular uprisings known as the “color revolutions”: the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004), and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005). These regime changes were neither predicted nor prevented by Moscow.
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In turn, the Russian foreign intelligence agency assumed the posture of “Big Brother,” making visits to CIS capitals to attend multilateral meetings or bilateral talks—where they were sometimes received by the heads of state of the host countries. But soon it became evident that the strategy for maintaining the political status quo in post-Soviet republics was ineffective. In the decade of the 2000s, one after another, the old regimes that had been established in the early 1990s fell like dominoes in a series of popular uprisings known as the “color revolutions”: the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004), and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005). These regime changes were neither predicted nor prevented by Moscow.
It became clear that at least some former Soviet republics were about to leave Russia’s sphere of influence and needed to be watched more carefully. In Moscow, the prevailing concern was with Western intelligence in the region because the color revolutions were viewed in the Kremlin as a direct result of operations by the West. Although Russia’s foreign intelligence agency should have had jurisdiction over the former Soviet countries, they had agreed not to spy within the territories. The FSB, however, had never signed any such agreement and felt free from any obligations. The FSB’s new directorate was tasked with dealing with Russia’s nearest neighbors. According to authors’ sources, the structure of the directorate was established along geographical lines and its officers were granted the right to travel abroad. On June 30, 2003, an amendment to the “Law on the Organs of the Federal Security Service” was made, stipulating that the FSB would contain a special body dealing with foreign intelligence.
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In 2004, the directorate was made a full department, called the Department of Operative Information (DOI), and its chief, Vyacheslav Ushakov, was promoted to deputy director of the FSB. In the newly established full department, Ushakov was replaced by Sergei Beseda, an influential general who had previously served in the section supervising the Administration of the President, where he had established excellent connections.
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In 2004, the directorate was made a full department, called the Department of Operative Information (DOI), and its chief, Vyacheslav Ushakov, was promoted to deputy director of the FSB. In the newly established full department, Ushakov was replaced by Sergei Beseda, an influential general who had previously served in the section supervising the Administration of the President, where he had established excellent connections.
It is difficult to trace the operations of this department, but its key officials traveled to the newly independent former Soviet republics during political turning points. In 2002 the authors published in the weekly
Versiya
the first of a series of stories concerning the department’s activity. (The series was continued in 2004 in
Moskovskie Novosti
and finally in
Novaya Gazeta
in 2006.) By then journalists from the CIS countries had sent the authors information about the activity of the FSB leadership in their respective countries.
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Versiya
the first of a series of stories concerning the department’s activity. (The series was continued in 2004 in
Moskovskie Novosti
and finally in
Novaya Gazeta
in 2006.) By then journalists from the CIS countries had sent the authors information about the activity of the FSB leadership in their respective countries.
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According to these outside reports, the FSB’s trail was found in Belarus and Moldova. In Belarus the FSB was accused of attempting to influence the political situation on the eve of presidential elections in 2003.
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In Moldova, Ushakov was said to have recruited a prominent local politician for his department.
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In Moldova, Ushakov was said to have recruited a prominent local politician for his department.
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It was also known that the leadership of the department took part in talks with presidential candidates during the 2004 presidential elections in Abkhazia, another breakaway region from Georgia supported by Moscow. FSB generals had gone to Abkhazia to support the pro-Moscow candidate, who lost.
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The visit seriously undermined the intelligence positions of the FSB in Georgia, and the department failed to predict the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia some four years later.
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The visit seriously undermined the intelligence positions of the FSB in Georgia, and the department failed to predict the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia some four years later.
Meanwhile, the FSB was also active in the politics of countries beyond Russia’s borders, although it is not clear how effectively. On May 12, 2005, FSB director Patrushev claimed before the State Duma to have helped unmask a plot against the political regime in Belarus. According to Patrushev, international nongovernmental organizations had met in the Slovak capital Bratislava in late 2004 during Ukraine’s Orange Revolution “to plan the downfall of the regime of Belarus president Alexander Lukashenko.”
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Surprisingly, the Belarus KGB didn’t express outrage at such open intervention by the FSB into its internal affairs. The following day, the Belarus KGB confirmed the FSB’s statement. A few days later the heads of the security services of the CIS countries gathered in Astana, Kazakhstan. The main subject of discussion became clear at the end of the meeting when Patrushev again remonstrated about the dangers of the “color revolutions.” This time, he was supported by the chiefs of the Belarus State Security Committee and Kazakhstan’s National Security Committee. Both Belarus and Kazakhstan have sharply restricted political opposition and free speech.
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Surprisingly, the Belarus KGB didn’t express outrage at such open intervention by the FSB into its internal affairs. The following day, the Belarus KGB confirmed the FSB’s statement. A few days later the heads of the security services of the CIS countries gathered in Astana, Kazakhstan. The main subject of discussion became clear at the end of the meeting when Patrushev again remonstrated about the dangers of the “color revolutions.” This time, he was supported by the chiefs of the Belarus State Security Committee and Kazakhstan’s National Security Committee. Both Belarus and Kazakhstan have sharply restricted political opposition and free speech.
In the decade of Putin’s rule, the FSB’s overseas ambitions intensified. In spring 2009 one colonel in the department told Soldatov that it had expanded its activity to Afghanistan and Pakistan, a statement that was confirmed by a second source. In May 2009, FSB department chief Sergei Beseda was promoted to chief of the Operative Information and International Relations Service of the FSB. His former post was filled by Oleg Khramov, who was known as a Middle East expert.
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At the same time, the
Gorizont
Company, specializing in manufacturing insignia and medals, produced at the FSB’s request a special medal for the department. It turned out to depict a globe, the same symbol of world-spanning reach used in the insignia of the Russian foreign intelligence agency.
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Gorizont
Company, specializing in manufacturing insignia and medals, produced at the FSB’s request a special medal for the department. It turned out to depict a globe, the same symbol of world-spanning reach used in the insignia of the Russian foreign intelligence agency.
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AFTER THE FALL of the Soviet Union, Russia hoped to preserve a sphere of influence in the former Soviet republics. All but the Baltics had joined the CIS. But not all of its members were equally happy at finding themselves once again beneath the gaze of Big Brother in Moscow.
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Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan were allies who allowed Russian military bases to be stationed on their soil. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine drifted in NATO’s direction, in part because Russia had supported separatist movements within the countries’ breakaway regions: Nagorny Karabakh from Azerbaijan, Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, Transnistria from Moldova, and Crimea from Ukraine. At the same time, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, long suspicious of ethnic Russians who had migrated during Soviet times, began to purge Russians from the ranks of their security services.
In the second half of the 1990s, the Kremlin was eager to establish special relations with all the security services in these states. Two major efforts were launched, but both flopped. The first attempt was the creation of a Council of the Leaders of CIS Security Organs and Special Services in March 1997.
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The council was headed by the FSB chief and its executive branch by the chief of the FSB international relations service. But the council’s functions were purely consultative and its activities were limited to Moscow’s traditional area of influence: The most active members were Belarus and Armenia, the closest Moscow allies, while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan refused to join. The second attempt was made in 2000 with the establishment of a CIS Antiterrorist Center, headquartered in Moscow with a Central Asian branch in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
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The council was headed by the FSB chief and its executive branch by the chief of the FSB international relations service. But the council’s functions were purely consultative and its activities were limited to Moscow’s traditional area of influence: The most active members were Belarus and Armenia, the closest Moscow allies, while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan refused to join. The second attempt was made in 2000 with the establishment of a CIS Antiterrorist Center, headquartered in Moscow with a Central Asian branch in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
Though the center was conceived of as a supranational structure, it was effectively under full FSB control: Russia was in command, filled 50 percent of the staff slots, and provided half of the budget, while the other CIS countries shared the rest. The Antiterrorist Center was headed by the first deputy director of the FSB, and the FSB supervised “collective” antiterrorist exercises in Central Asia, which were held every April. In fact, the center was a mechanism for Russia to keep the CIS countries in its sphere of influence.
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But the Antiterrorist Center ultimately failed. Its mandate was to create a database for intelligence sharing among the security services of all the member countries. But the idea of pooling intelligence information was abandoned when members learned that the database would be located in Moscow. Too much distrust existed within the CIS countries to willingly send their data to Russia. Soon, the Antiterrorist Center became just another backwater bureaucratic organization.
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Furthermore, some CIS states simply did not buy the notion that Russia had a sincere desire to help with counterterrorism efforts on their soil. Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan refused to send representatives to the center, and after the Rose Revolution in 2005, Georgia stopped sending representatives as well.
The Antiterrorist Center kept trying to expand its influence in Central Asia, even when doing so meant expressing support for local authoritarian regimes that repressed popular uprisings or dissent. In May 2005, riots in the Uzbek city of Andijan were severely suppressed by Uzbek security forces, leading to hundreds of deaths. An FSB general, Boris Mylnikov, then the chief of the center, publicly announced his support for the Uzbek authorities and proposed that the center help Uzbekistan’s National Security Service.
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But in the end, the center was unable to extend Russia’s influence beyond the states that had already been secured in the early 1990s.
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But in the end, the center was unable to extend Russia’s influence beyond the states that had already been secured in the early 1990s.
Meanwhile, the looming presence of U.S. and coalition forces in Central Asia during their Afghan campaign was seen in Moscow as a continuation of the nineteenth century’s Great Game between the Russian and British empires over the region, but this time between Russia and NATO. That prompted Moscow to change tactics. Since earlier efforts to control security services in the region had proved ineffective, a new alliance was sought. Key to the new effort was Uzbekistan, ruled by Islam Karimov, a strongman since the Soviet days. Uzbekistan was valuable territory to the United States as a base for launching unmanned predatory aircraft into Afghanistan; Russia wanted the republic to retain its traditional role as a territory under Moscow’s sphere of influence.
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In turn, Karimov wanted to suppress his country’s internal Islamist opposition, a group known as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (the IMU). Most of its members had fled to Afghanistan, and some to Russia. The idea was quite simple: If the Americans could hunt for the IMU in Afghanistan, the Russian security services might help to hunt down Karimov’s enemies on Russian soil.
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From the mid-1990s on, Russia had become a safe haven for political opponents of Central Asian regimes. Using old but still valid Soviet passports and taking advantage of porous borders, the flow of people into Russia included refugees, political opponents of the regimes, and Islamic activists from Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. In most cases refugees were secular opposition activists or Islamists from the party Hizb-ut-Tahrir. The party, founded in Jerusalem in 1953 and brought to Uzbekistan in the mid-1990s, opposes violence but advocates the overthrow of secular governments throughout the Muslim world and their replacement by an Islamic state in the form of a re-created caliphate. By the end of the 1990s Hizb-ut-Tahrir had become so popular that was considered a threat to Karimov’s regime in Tashkent. Uzbek security services began arresting its members in 1998. For Russia, Hizb-ut-Tahrir posed no threat: Its activities were generally limited to giving sermons or handing out leaflets.
But Karimov was not willing to tolerate any opposition, fearing that Russia could use dissidents in exile to foster rebellion. Uzbek secret services created a strategy of reaching into Russia to grab people who might pose trouble for Karimov. The Russian security services, including the FSB, either participated in the plan or looked the other way.
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