Authors: Perry Anderson
Yet it is difficult to avoid the feeling that a more specific factor is also at work. The United States remains the most unchanging of all political orders, its constitution petrified apparently forever in its eighteenth-century form. In the title of a recent study, it is the âFrozen Republic'. Europe, on the other hand, has now been the stage for a continuous political experiment for half a century,
with no precedent and still no clear end in sight. The novelty and restlessness of this process seem to have made it a magnet of attraction for minds formed in a culture at once constitutionally saturated and paralyzed, offering an outlet for intellectual energy frustrated at home. That, at any rate, would be one reading of the situation. To this could be added the intellectual advantages often afforded, historically, by distance. In the nineteenth century, no native mind came near Tocqueville, perhaps even Bryce, as thinkers about America. Why should not America return the compliment to Europe today? That, at any rate, would be one reading of the situation.
But there is, all too plainly, a further and final strand in the tangle of reasons why Americans have captured the narratives of Europe. The drift of the Union has been towards their presuppositions. The result is something like a new ideological affinity between subject and object. Another way of putting this would be to say that Europe has, to a striking extent, become the theoretical proving-ground of contemporary liberalism. Nowhere are the varieties of that liberalism on such vivid display as in the deliberations on the Union. Even within the span of neo-liberal interpretations, the contrasts are notable. Moravcsik offers a technocratic, Gillingham a classical economic, Eichengreen a post-social, Majone a non-majoritarian version. Set apart from these, and differing again, are Siedentop's classical political, Weiler's communitarian, Schmitter's radical-democratic versions. At one extreme, democracy as understood in a traditional liberal conception is all but extinguished; at the other, all but transfigured. Keohane, Hayek, Polanyi, Montesquieu, Tocqueville, Paine are among the variegated inspirations of this array. Do they exhaust the possibilities of describing the Union? Tocqueville's words come back: âOne stops there, and the new word that ought to express the new thing still does not exist'.
1
. See his comments on âthe lessons taught us all by General De Gaulle' in the preface to the second edition of
The Uniting of Europe
, Stanford 1968, p. xiv: âThe original theory, implicitly if not explicitly, assumed the existence of the condition we have come to label “the end of ideology”. Therefore, the conditioning impact of nationalism was defined out of existence but not empirically examined. I do not regret having done this, because an important point was made in the process: the mutability of the concept of “nation” and of the intensity of national feeling was underlined. But the point was made too strongly, because a new kind of national consciousness has since become discernible, particularly in France'.
2
. Hoffmann on Haas:
The European Sisyphus
, 1995, pp. 34, 84â9, dating from 1964 and 1966 respectively. Lindberg:
The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration
, Stanford 1963, and with Stuart Scheingold,
Europe's Would-be Polity
, Englewood Cliffs 1970.
3
. For Milward's
Rescue
, published in 1992, see
Chapter 1
passim
. above. A second edition came out in 2000. His view of neo-functionalism is to be found in
The Frontier of National Sovereignty
, pp. 2â5, and in his subsequent
Politics and Economics in the History of the European Union
, London 2005, pp. 33â5, Schumpeter Lectures given in Graz, which continued to show his unrivalled mastery of the historical record, across the whole range of EU states, with a bravura linkage of Ireland and Denmark.
4
.
After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Economy
, Princeton 1984, p. 7.
5
.
Journal of Common Market Studies
, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 1993, pp. 472â523.
6
. Andrew Moravcsik, âPreferences and Power', pp. 483, 485.
7
. âPreferences and Power', p. 508.
8
. âPreferences and Power' p. 509.
9
. âLiberal Intergovernmentalism and Integration: A Rejoinder',
Journal of Common Market Studies
, Vol. 33, No. 4, December 1995, p. 626.
10
. Review of Milward's
European Rescue of the Nation-State
in
Journal of Modern History
, March 1995, p. 127.
11
. Andrew Moravcsik,
The Choice for Europe
, Ithaca 1998, p. 176.
12
.
The Choice for Europe
, p. 131.
13
.
The Choice for Europe
, p. 491.
14
.
The Choice for Europe
, pp. 90, 175, 205, 268, 403, 405, 477, 488, 496.
15
. See, in particular, Jeffrey Vanke, âReconstructing De Gaulle', and Marc Trachtenberg, âDe Gaulle, Moravcsik, and Europe', in
Journal of Cold War Studies
, Vol. 2, No. 3, Fall 2000, pp. 87â100 and 101â16.
16
.
The Choice for Europe
, p. 470.
17
. Andrew Moravcsik, âNegotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community',
International Organization
, Vol. 45, No. 1, Winter 1991, p. 52.
18
. Craig Parsons,
A Certain Idea of Europe
, Ithaca 2003, p. 235.
19
.
A Certain Idea of Europe
, pp. 27, 235.
20
.
European Integration 1950â2003: Superstate or New Market Economy?
, Cambridge 2003, p. xvi.
21
. Gillingham takes the term from John Ruggie, âInternational regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the post-war economic order', in Stephen Krasner (ed.),
International Regimes
, Ithaca 1983, pp. 195â231. The most notable contribution to this canonical collection of early US regime theory is the blistering attack on the whole notion of international regimes by the late Susan Strange which, in effect, concludes the volume: âCave, Hic Dragones', pp. 337â54. Strange not only pointed out the vacuity of the idea that American hegemony was over, but also noted the extent to which the future of Europe wasâalreadyâbeing more debated by US scholars than by their counterparts in Europe.
22
. Douglas Forsyth and Ton Notermans, âMacreconomic Policy Regimes and Financial Regulation in Europe, 1931â1994', in Forsyth and Notermans (eds),
Regime Changes
, Providence 1997, pp. 17â68. Here âregimes' signifies macro-policy packages of monetary and financial regulation, held to set parameters for labour-market, industrial and social policies.
23
. Gillingham,
European Integration
, p. 231.
24
.
European Integration
, p. 152.
25
.
European Integration
, p. 230.
26
.
European Integration
, p. 412.
27
.
European Integration
, pp. 150, 498.
28
.
European Integration
, p. 498.
29
. The same is true of Forsyth and Notermans' account of the regime changes of the thirties and seventies, as they admit: âA more significant limitation of our argument is that it does not explain fully the timing and causes of the deflationary and inflationary nominal price movements that triggered the policy changes we explore. We do not claim to have developed a comprehensive explanation for why the containment of inflation through microeconomic instruments failed during the 1970s and 1980s. Nor have we explained why the pre-1914 gold standard did not produce deflationary pressures as severe as those that developed beginning in the late 1920's . . . We have proposed neither a comprehensive explanation for the Great Depression, nor for the long postwar economic expansion, nor for the downturn since 1973':
Regime Changes
, p. 68.
30
. Barry Eichengreen,
The European Economy Since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond
, Princeton 2006, p. 333.
31
.
The European Economy Since 1945
, pp. 415â16.
32
.
Euroclash: The EU, European Identity and the Future of Europe
, New York 2008.
33
. Respectively,
European Modernity and Beyond
:
The Trajectory of European Societies 1945â2000
, London 1995, and
Sozialgeschichte Europas: 1945 bis zur Gegenwart
, Munich 2007.
34
. Fligstein,
Euroclash
, p. 54.
35
.
Euroclash
, pp. vii, 6, 15â18, 139, 251, 253.
36
.
Euroclash
, p. 178.
37
.
Euroclash
, pp. vii, 10, 33, 34, 69, 123, 187, 191, 192, 244, 251.
38
. Compare
Euroclash
pp. 4, 138, 14, 250. Oscillation between these emphases recurs throughout the book. For example, âone must be circumspect about how far the process of creating a European society has gone. A very small number of people in Europe are interacting with people from other European countries on a daily basis'âfollowed a hundred pages later by âthe likelihood of social interaction between people who live in different countries in Europe has expanded dramatically over the past twenty-five years': pp. 29, 165.
39
. Andrew Moravcsik, âThe EU ain't broke',
Prospect
, March 2003, p. 38. Although it is not a major part of his case, Fligistein largely concurs with Moravcsik's arguments for dismissing concern with a democratic deficit, while allowing that he may over-estimate the stability of present arrangements:
Euroclash
, pp. 228ff, 240, 216ff.
40
. âWhat Can We Learn from the Collapse of the European Constitutional Project?',
Politische Vierteljahresschrift
, 47, 2006, Heft 2, p. 227.
41
. âWhat Can We Learn from the Collapse?', p. 221.
42
. âWhat Can We Learn from the Collapse?', p. 221.
43
. âWhat Can We Learn from the Collapse?', p. 238.
44
. âConservative Idealism and International Institutions',
Chicago Journal of International Law
, Fall 2000, p. 310.
45
. âConservative Idealism and International Institutions', p. 310.
46
. Andrew Moravcsik, âIn Defence of the “Democratic Deficit”: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union',
Journal of Common Market Studies
, Vol. 40. No. 4, 2002, p. 618.
47
. John Gillingham,
Design for a New Europe
, Cambridge 2006, p. 153.
48
.
Law, Legislation and Liberty
, Vol. 3, London 1979, p. 40.
49
. âIntroduction', in Giandomenico Majone (ed.),
Deregulation or Re-regulation? Regulatory Reform in Europe and the United States
, London 1990, p. 1.
50
. Majone,
Deregulation or Re-Regulation?
, p. 2; see also
Regulating Europe
, London 1996, p. 10.
51
. Majone, âFrom the Positive to the Regulatory State',
Journal of Public Policy
, Vol. 17, No. 2, MayâAugust 1997, p. 162.
52
. See Majone, âThe Politics of Regulation and European Regulatory Institutions', in Jack Hayward and Anan Menon (eds),
Governing Europe
, Oxford 2003, pp. 300â305. The property rights school, descending from the ideas of Ronald Coase of the University of Chicago, is associated principally with the work of Harold Demsetz and Armen Alchian of UCLA in the seventies.
53
. âThe Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe',
West European Politics
, No. 17, 1994, p. 81.
54
.
Governing Europe
, p. 311.
55
. Renaud Dehousse and Giandomenico Majone, âThe Institutional Dynamics of European Integration: From the Single Act to the Maastricht Treaty', in Stephen Martin (ed.),
The Construction of Europe: Essays in Honour of Emile Noel
, Dordercht 1994, pp. 92â93; Majone,
Regulating Europe
, p. 62.
56
. âThe EU could increase its competences only by developing as an almost pure type of regulatory state': Majone, âFrom the Positive to the Regulatory State', p. 150.
57
. âUnderstanding regulatory growth in the European Community', in David Hine and Hussein Kassim (eds),
Beyond the Market: The EU and National Social Policy
, London 1998, p. 16.
58
. Majone,
Dilemmas of European Integration
:
The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth
, Oxford 2005, p. 46.
59
.
Dilemmas of European Integration
, p. 50.
60
.
Dilemmas of European Integration
, p. 40.
61
. Majone, âFrom the Positive to the Regulatory State', p. 165.
62
. Majone,
Regulating Europe
, p. 299.
63
. âInternational Economic Integration, National Autonomy, Traditional Democracy: An Impossible Trinity?', EUI Working Papers, pp. 23ff.
64
. Majone,
Regulating Europe
, p. 285.
65
.
Regulating Europe
, pp. 295â8.
66
. âIs the European Constitutional Settlement Really Successful and Stable?',
Notre Europe
, October 2006, p. 5âan intervention that is a direct response to Moravcsik.
67
. Majone,
Regulating Europe
, p. 7.
68
.
Regulating Europe
, p. 7.